CEVTRAL INTELLIGKNCt aGENCY
SUBJECTi Current Hoasoessment of tho Tlto-Sovlet Break
Despite occasional speculationriraors of dubious originossible rapprochement between iioscow ande, all available evidence Indicates that the cleavage between the USSR and the Tito Government has appreciably widened since tha original break on Uoreover, it la estimated that the extent of the cleavage as well as over-riding reasons of self-interest and pr-stlge In the case of both Tito and the Kremlin rendersaoproche-ment improbable.
The Ideological-political conflict betwoon Un Kremlin and the Tito Govermient has sharpened during the past year .nd remains the prime deterrentoviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The Titoiat alternative to Kremlin-dominated Communlamangerous ideological threat to the Soviet monolithic structure; any concession to thetnesis of equalitynatio-ial Communist parties or states would undermine" the whole edifico of Soviet power. The ruthless eradication of local nationalism is an integral part of the Kremlin's efforts to impose the dogma of Uoscoir's unquestioned primacy and infallibility on its orbit. eversal of this policy towards an unrepentant Tito would, therefore, not only create ideological havoc in world Communism but would have dangerous political Implications for future relations between tho USSR and Its Satellites, although the Kremlin haanot abandonedope of recapturing Yugoslavia as part of the Soviet orbit, it will exert every effort to see that Uils occurs on its own terms and under Comlnfora leadership.
For their part, the Yugoslav leaders appear increasingly convinced that the present Soviet leadership is irrevocably conralttedolicy of militant imperialism. During the past year, Yugoslav anti-Stallnist doctrine hap steadily crystallized, and concrete efforts ore being suae to spread the Yugoslav concept of "national- Comiunism with some decree of success. *ugosluv criticism of the Kremlin's "aggressive and hegemonistic- alas has become more outspoken. Tlw Communist leaders of Yugoslavia probably re-lize that any acceptanceworklnj arrangement- with the present Soviet regime would be atragile opportunistic expedient, entailing ultimate submission to Moscow and their personal liquidation. On thad, by pursuing its
Kote: This manoranduo has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Array, Havy, and the Air rorce.,
NO CHANGE ln Claa3. Q
AHCED TO I TS
preaent course, the Yugoslav Government probably la confident that thePowers will support Yugoslavia In ita ideological struggle with Moscow.
The Kremlin, in dealing with Yugoslav defection, has been careful toebate on the ideological merits of the Yugoslav position as well aa any emphasis of tho Tito hereay as an aspect of the Communist movement. Tho Kremlin has gradually broken the political, economic, -nd military ties which formerly bound Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit. Through its Cominform front, it has waged unremitting political warfare against the Tito Government with the avowed purpose of destroying tho "Fascist Yugoslav clique." Voluminous and unprecedented appeals have been broadcast from Uoscow and its Satellites to tho Yugoslav people lo overthrow their government, Ominous military pressures have been exerted on the Yugoslav periphery, while Jugoslav diplomatic missions within the orbit have been subjected to even more repressive measures than have those of tho Western Powers.
Since9 the economic break between the Soviet orbit and Yugoslavia has boon virtually complete,hift of tho Yugoslav economy toward the Seat with the attendant transitional difficulties. Tnere is at present no evidence of direct economic transactions between the orbit and Yugoslavia, even though they might be of mutual benefit. Some minorexchanges nay have occurred through Jwlss or Austrian interned!arias,tho over-commitment of Yugoslav resources for vital Western la-ports largely precludes the resumption of trade with the omit. Having beers forced at great cost to readjust Its entireesult of the soviet blockade, the Tito Government is not likely at this ooint to sacrifice .Testem trade and support in exchangeenewal of Soviet exploitation.esult of the current drought-induced crop failure, the Yugoslav economy apparentlyritical setback, which tho Kremlin will seek to exploit by all available means. If tha crop failure proves as serious as is now indicated, the Yugoslav Government will be forced to turn increasingly to the West for emergency economic aid.
The Korean aggression has apparently caused the Tito Government to revise its previous estimate that the USSR would not seek Its elimination through overt military action. In view of the Soviet build-up of the dat-llito amies and the accumulation of military supplies In the Balkan area over recent months, regarding an attack as imminent,
Lir? be tnr*'t of Soviet/Satellite aggression. Thornment, therefore, is proceeding with several long-ran^ precautionary measures designed to maintain tho combat-readiness of ita forces.
It la reportedly attempting to reduce its dependence on current stocks of obsolescent ollitary equipment (largely supplied byR et the end of the war) by costly purchasea of modern materiel from "neutral" sources and by expanding its own munitions industry. Moreover, the strong Jugoslav UK delegation has apparently been instructed to empliaeiae whenever possible the dangers to world peace resulting froa any Soviet-inspired aggression.
The Tito Government is apparently convinced that it should, for Ideological and political reasons, limit itself to denouncing all aggression, butadhere to an independent position between theStart powerlthough the Tito Government has avoided openly identifying itself withest, it appa-.ro hopefulithin tho UN framework the US will suoport Jugoslavia's Independence, 'eanwhile, Tucoslavia's attitude toward the US *nd its relations with the non-Cosnunlat world have registered aoae Improvement and this trend will probably continuehe potion of XugosluV survivalcritical -nd Eastern support becomes more tangible.Original document.