Created: 7/17/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



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SUBJT-CTi Cctwaurdst Intentions Regaj-ding an Early Attack on Taiwan

estimate Communiat intentions regarding art early attack on Taiwan.

That the Chinese Communists still have the capability of

uccessful amphibious assault on Taiwan despite US opposition.


CJJJSI0H: Given ths above assumption, it is estimated that ths Chinese Communists will probably launch an early attack on Taiwan*

This memorandum has not bean coordinated withintelligence or-Sanisations of the Departmenta of State, Army, Hkvty, ard the Air Force.


1, Prior to the invasion of South Korea, there mm evidence off Chinese Coraaunist preparations for an oarly assault on Taiwan. Since the US docis'-c^ to isolate Taiwan with naval forces, there has been evidence, though not conclusive, that such preparations have continued, and the Chinese have


2. 3 probably didpoct the firm its-UN reaction in Xoraa. but seems to have made military preparations for such an eventuality, "lie *oi*ih Korean array has been able to carry an its of .'ensive successfully dean*the intervention of US-UN forces and the USSR hasit to

, Th?iJrem11" Permitted the Worth Korean forces to becomewith the US and therefore the possibility sust bo recognized pQRnifc tho Chinese Comaunlats to beocia similarly

fc. uccessful Chinese Communist assault on Talwae would bringprompt advantages to the 3oviet cause. It

world Communist powers face of tba announced

ua intention to prevent an invasion of Talwanj

fulfill the long-standing Chinese Communist promise to "liberate" all of Nationalist China;

prcctfte lack of confidence in US cccnitannts, and generally

non-Conuaist countries throughout

the world to resist Soviet

onged military Involvement of ths US

with Communist China, therebyiirther drain on US resources;

rovide the USSR and Communist forcesase for furtter


feof conflict*'TO'ad iriC"aC0 the


(b) an invuaion in tho near future would prooaoly inoiousethe bocpo of U3 mobilization and propurition for eventual global war.

60 It ia still entirely possible that thoiie basic considerations ;nay induceSR to localizo the Korean conflict and refraininilar news elsevhore. Iloaever, the fact tbat it is pressing itg cbjoctive in Korea in defiance of US-UH intervention suggests that tha I'SSIt nay not corwider tbe risk of global war to be on overriding deterrent to faggression* In view of US lack of preparedness and thi existing superiority of Soviet forces in being Excluding the Soviet atoaiche USSR although not planning to initiater, may nowwillingcept the of global war Inpllcit in using Satellite for:es to oypandcontrol over peripheral areas. Moreover* Sovla; planners nay estimatsif the prospectlobal nar seems in incut, they wille able to reduce international tensions beforeritical point is reached,.

Original document.

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