SOVIET RETURN TO THE UN
By returning to the UN, the USSR is seeking tomaximum diplomatic and propaganda maneuverability and perhaps to lay the groundworkegotiated settlement in Korea if the turn of events there convinces the Kremlin of the need forettlement. The Soviet Union may also hope to gain support in Asia by attacking the highly vulnerable US position on Taiwan.
The Soviet boycott was proving more and moreto the USSR. Purely aside from failing toits avowedthe Chinese Communistboycott denied the USSR the use of the UN eitheredium through which it could obstruct world action in support of South Korea orounding board for SovietMoreover, the Kremlin probably reasoned that bythe UN It was contributing both to the potentialities of the UN to marshal non-Communist world opinion and to the growing determination of the Western world to mobilize against Soviet aggression. -
The vitriolic and ^obstructionist attitude of the USSR in the first three days following its return to the SC does notater Soviet effortcto'negotiate a: settlement In Korea. By initially concentrating on the Chinese representation issue and procedural maneuvers, the USSR Is attempting to confuse the questions of Korea and China as well as to save face bythat it has not abandoned the issue which precipitated the boycott and is therefore not returning to the UN out of weakness.the USSR Is under no immediate compulsion toettlement of the Korean issue while UN forces are still suffering reverses in Korea. For the present, therefore, the Kremlin can be
expected to make every effort to prevent the UN from focussing its attention exclusively on North Korean aggression. In such an effort, the USSR will concentrate its attacks where itthe US to be mostthe question of Chinese representation in the UN and the US stand regarding Formosa.
In the longer run, however, the USSR probably believes that it must offer somenegotiated settlement in Korea if it is to counter the effect, the JKorean war has had inWestern military preparations and to protect its position in North Korea. While North Korean successes continue, any Soviet peace offer would.probably.not go beyond proposals for the withdrawal of UN military, forces and the holding of all-Korean elections possibly with:some nominal international supervision. The USSR^wquldlexploit some such formula to portray the Soviet Uniondisinterested party concerned only with the restorationntenance of peace. It would also be designed to capitalize: omNorth Korean victories byegotiated;-settte mention .favorable terms before an eventual UN counter-offensive'^hjht. carry acrossh Parallel and culminate.in^the. unification of Korea under UNEven ife^^ns^acceptable to the USSR is not feasible, theee^to-achleve more limited objectives by attempting to shiit'.the.'biame for continuedto the US and to block any UN-approved move to crossh Parallel.
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