COMMUNIST CHINA'S ROLE
As lt becomes more apparent that the fighting in Korea will be prolonged, the military capabilities of the Chineseas well as Soviet intentions regarding the use of these capabilities, provide the principal key to the outcome of the fighting in Korea and to whether the fighting will spread to other areas of the Far East. Before the US action ln Korea, the Chinese Communists were believed capable of launching, individually or simultaneously, successful military action against Korea, Hong Kong and Macao,hinese Communist invasion of Taiwan, though costly, was also considered within Communist capabilities. Events since then, however, have affected Chinese Communist capabilities for action in the three key areas of Korea, Taiwan,.and Indochina, and have raised new, political and strategic problems regarding the use of Chinese Communist military forces
Aid to Korea The USSR will be confrontedifficultif .forced to decide whether toorth Korean
defeat or to use Chinese Communist troops to win or prolong the struggle indefinitely.orth Korean defeat would have obvious dihr commit :iu-:it of Chinese Communist forces wuiiId jini nocessai ly.-pre vent suchefeat under these cl^cumstances^would'be far more disastrous^not only because it wouldreater blow to Soviet prestige throughout the world, but because it would seriously threaten Soviet control over the Chinese Communist regime.ictory ln Korea through the use of Chinese Communist troops would have its disadvantages for the Kremlin. The presence of Chinese Communist troops in Korea vould complicate if not jeopardize Soviet direction of Korean affairs; Chinese Communist prestige, as opposed to that of the USSR, would beand Pelping might be temptedesult of success in Korea
to challenge Soviet leadership in Asia. In addition to these purely internal difficulties, tlie use of Chinese Communist forces in Korea would increase the risk of global war, not only because of possible UN or US reaction but because the USSR itself would be under greater compulsion toictory in Korea, possibly by committing Soviet troops.
Taiwan Invasion The principal problems confronting the Kremlin In deciding whether to permit an invasion of Taiwan are the nature and extent of USand the risk of global war precipitated because of the spread of Communist military aggression. Several factors may leadecision to launch an assault on Taiwan before the typhoon season in late August. Recent evidence Indicates that Chinese Communist forces are poised for the invasion and available land, sea and air forces may now be capable ofuccessful assault.izeable beachhead is established, the resultant panic In Nationalist ranks might well induce desertions and snowballing defections sufficient toirtual collapse of organized Nationalist resistance. The Pelping regime is already publicly committed to the Taiwan operation and the operation would not divert forces which might be needed In Korea. In addition, the USSR may reason that US support of Taiwan would gain less international support than the defense of South Korea and that the invasion should bebefore the US can reinforce Its "neutralization" forces In the Formosa Strait. Despite these favorable considerations the fact remains that an Invasion of Taiwan would be ancostly operation with the resulting political and strategicbalanced by the increased risk oflobal war which It is believed the USSR does not presently desire.
Support for Indochina Indochina offers the Chinesetheir greatest opportunity for expanding Communist Influence in Asia with the minimum military or political risks.ilitary viewpoint, the Indochina conflict hastalemate. Despite considerable successes, the French have been unable fully to capitalize on their superiority in equipment and manpower because of the essentially guerrilla nature of the fighting and the terrain which prevents large-scale operations. Given equipment and supplies similar to that of the French, the forces of Ho Chl-Mlnh could shift the course of the present Inconclusive warfare in their favor. The Chinese Communists have the capabilities to supply the material needed by Ho Chi-Minh and may beto step up such assistance in the immediate future.Original document.