EFFECTS OF A VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM KOREA.

Created: 7/10/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

JJJTELLIGEJICE HEWRANUUH0

SUBJECT! mootsoluntary Withdrawal of UE Forces froa Korea.

Referoncei Consequenceo of the Korean Incident.*

Voluntary withdrawal of US forces froa Korea uouldalan&ty, seriously handicapping efforts to maintain US alliances and build political influence among tho nations on whose strength and energetic cooperation the policy of containment of Sctviet-Coanunist expansion depends. It uould discredit US foreign policy snd undermine confidence in US military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawal would be sore damagingailure to send US troops to Korea in the first place orailure of US forces to hold Korea. Hot only would US coramitmento be shown to bewhen putevere tost, but also considerable doubt would be cast on the ability of the US to back up its comitiac-nta with military force.

US withdrawal froa intervention In Korea on behalf of tho UN, especially olnee US action resulted mainly from US initiative, uouldall nations heretofore hopeful that US leadership within tha framework ofould preserve world peace. oluntary act of thoithdrawal would damage US standing in UN affaire and wouldthe effectiveness of the UNevice for mobilizing Westernto Soviet-CcaaDurdst aggro salon.

The Western European allies and other nations closely aligned with the US uould lose confidence in the cdlitary value of US ccendtmente to assist then against armed aggrosaion. This lack of confidence wouldagainst energetic measures tohe expansion of Soviet-Coranrunism through the NATO and MDAP progrcmo. Although some slight credit

flofce!

atill night accrue to the OS for Initially attempting to honor ita commitment in South Korea, most of the nations allied or aligned with the US are more concerned about US ability to counter thrcsto of Sovietthan about US intentions to do oo.

Pro^ gOTcrnncntfl, particularly in sxeec where thoould initiate lirdtod military aggrosolons without openly using Soviet foreea wouxd auffer sorlouo looooo of prestige. In some cases they night looo political control of tho country or fool coroellocl f> seek on aceoDtaTda-tion with the USSR (for coaotople, Indochina, Iran).

Whether or not US forces withdraw from Korea, tne USSR has tho capability oferies of incidentsdler to tbe Korean affair, each one threatening either to tenkrupt tho US policy of containing Soviet exDenaion or to disperse and overstrain US military forces-ln-rocdineM. Without directly and openly Involving Soviet forces, such incidents could bo creatod In Foraosaj Indochina, Burma, Iran. Tugo-alavie, Greece, and Turkey. The USSR will proceed with limitedsimilar to the Korean incident If it does not estimate the risk of global war to be substantial or is preparedlobal war if it develops. Voluntary US withdrawal from Korea probably would encourage rather then dlscourago Soviet initiation of United -wars in other arc on.

5. Upon withdrawal from Korea or certainly after another Korean-style incident, the US ^eounably would be forced to adopt one of the three following alternatives!

Drastically rovioe the pclicy of general cemtainanent by reducing or limiting US ooraadtaents and byto ecaabat Soviet-Inspired aggression only at selected points where existing rdlitorv strength would be adequate for the task;

3egin partial adlitary and Industrial rnoblliaation in en attempt to enable the US to combat any further Soviet^noplred aggression anywhere in the worldj

total mobilisation to enable the US to threaten

ovlet op SoTiet-oponsored aggression with war agalnat the USSR.

ndorproBGuro of Soviet-sponsored cggresaionG. did not drastically revise tho policy of general contalnnorit but begon mobilisationairly largo scale, it would be politically and

CQNFIDl^riAL

CONFIDENTIAL

voluntary irfthdrax.-ol from Korea.

(a) US moblUzatianoluntary withdrawal of US foMM

OJ,Se<ri0nco ofithdrawal Itself- While thie dlottluaion and deloatisa might not be fatal, it

^and ecenorolc efforto to

strengthenrth Atlantic- connunity.

its forces freer, Korea and then

begin partial oobll laa tion, Soviet leaders uoold bo aore liknlr to

t the OSSP. than if the nobilization2t ?T entioD in Eorea. It is pooelblo that

initiative by attacking the OS.

CONPiDENTIAL

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