Ue-TOWSDUlt fori TABT, iNlSlUaSHCK,
Assistant caifcp op, mAswemcar
mmctob or baval iim&uaiMZ '.
whbctok op IJfTE^GfcCT, bXADQOA^RS, ITOSB
B PCmCE DIRECTOR op iwmiciesce, ATQBJC SNEBOI GOJ0JJS8XOB
DrjUtCTOE FOB JliTBUJOEaCS, THKp jjitesna.TICfl
of jiosab Coral ttee
1* The sixth neeting of tbe JIOfiAE Conzitteo will bo. cf'
on0 hours in'
The attached report of the Sub^oeaaittee will be discussed at the neeting and, if approved by the Cocnlttee, Bill beto tbery Coa^ittea.
Itiiortea of the fifth JIGSAW Cerasltteeheld on0 are alee attached hereto.
lu It ia reqieeted that the oaraee of those attending beby Ulaphone to the office ef tbesar Caoaittee (Cede lhy,0 hoursay. Since fuU representation is do aired, It ia requested that if neither the recular representative nor hie alternate is able toubetituto be designated.
FOli THE CBUSCTtffi of CENTRAL IKTKLLIGftKCEl
APPHQ.ll) FOR RELEASE DATE:1
priorityecaaeaded below lo tbo result of eereful and detailed consideration by tbe JIGSAW Coradttee. In tbe first stage of Its consideration, the Conrtlttee ezajBlned the vary brood field of international Consnmlao, soeking some netbod for concentrating attention on th* lnportant parts of thet field. eport by JIDSASi's Sub-Cosoittee suggested that tho study of Internatlr.ral Coazx-nlsa could be divided into four zajor fields of Investigation! the prlnoiples of Coaanaiisa, International ccaawnletand activities, national coaumlirt parti as, and Cotmronlsa aa an instrumental"ty of Soviet foreign oolloy. Further eonelderaclon by JIGSAW led to the eonelcnlon that tha moat urgent intelligence recailrononte (of those not being met under existing programs or operations of the Intel!ipenoe egenelea) are tound in tho eeoond, third and fourth of these fields of investigation. The next step vac tbeof those projects within these fields which tha repre-eentatlvse of the Intel! Ire nee cpeoolaa suggested for copsider-atlon by tbe JIGSAW Coeadttee.
Iters than one hundred projects were suggested to JIGSAW, and the priority program nao established on certain standards
and criteria. First, it was decided to restrict the priority prograamall number of projects, each of which was regarded asefinite and urpont need. Soeond, in view of tha nuaorcrns roqulvanonta of this gOTornsent and the iriiinr-aided aspect of inte rational Ccoimnisa itself, an effort was made toerioty of dlfforont types of projsots. The pro^ran, therefore, contains area studios, organisational and type stndlas, biographical studies ana atkom, rPnorever poeeible,eries of studies was proposed to -TIQSA5T, only one of the series eae accepted for tho priority prc*rran. Thus, the Geocers of7 strongly feel that it Is rieeessary toetailed analysis of coaniclst Intentions nnd capa--bllitiea in ths strategic industries of the world. SInee all strategic indtistrios cannot be studied at once. It nas decided to begin this series of studies by an examination of euxrr-nnlrrt activities in the interrjatianal aaritlma liidurjtr-r. In similar fashion, the examination of TODroanist capabilities for cabotage and related activities in key areas is initiatedtudy of connsnnist oanebilitias for suoh dacatje In franee and Italy.
Finallyprte rent ad to take Intotbe .various types of facilities available within the Anerlcaii &rrtam*aan for the execution of its priority progi-cua in the near fat are
and to ass as aanr ol* tbesa as possible. Thus, for exex-ple. It vlll ba noted that ageaeiae ezpeeted to participate la the execution of tha priority prograa sill ba tha Blc-rraphle Division of the State Dapartaont, thaeseareh Staff of the State Dnparicent, the Office of Special ^orationa of the Central Intelligence Agsncy, and other ear-bar agencies of tha JIGSAW Committee.
Inl3 priority prograta, thaonsrittee has not attaraptod to rata tha Individual projects as to Irs^ortanoeth referenea to the order In whloh they should be rjxdartakan by the Jirtelligaoee agencies. Thsosadttas bellavos that each of these projects ls eesentlnl to tbo logical derelcvjaent of an IrteUlgoaoa nrogrea In tha field of Intar-nat local Coxajnixn.
RoccTrfDJed ?HorttT rVyrea
capabllltioa aad Intentions for sabotagefacilities In French and Italian areastbe United States1 effort in tho event of oarester-renciea,
it orranlxatiooal potentials aad oapabilltleainternational aarltlaa Industry.
e. The neohanloa of International Corxxaaisn for coritrol of, eoaamnleatloa with, and flnaaelng of, tha rationallst parties. (An explorative sunroary).
d. Ccex9oxdot operations and organisations cxxmn oolsntlflo werfcars outaids ths Soviet union.
. The iapaet of ths Togoalav and other defectiona oa tha eohsalvaaaas of tha eorld coaaaiclet aovaaagt.
f. Tha pattern of clandestinectivities, of both legal and illegal rcrtias, relating toi
Insurrection and preparation of iaeerrootioni
Comounist penetration of araad and security foreesf
Part lean and resistance operations;
Intre-oarto ocawni eat ions psttods In these fields)
Intra-pirty financing la these flalda.
f. Basle cecounlst strategy insent period, ae revealed la ecoainiat taotlcs ia Southeast
b. aethoda of selection, ehanging oha root or la ties In the leaderahlp of the Cosstuaiat nartles in Southeeat Asia.
1. (Exploratory arusaarr) CoBcmnlat related actlviflee of Soriat eobaasies, and othor orert agenoiea abroad, with particular referenceolitical activities|ebrarslve actlTitiee.
J. CoBparatlve study of Ccorunirt aetbods for ponatratioa of goTamaanta and assonptloa of power, as revealed in ths Sasaian, Chineae, CsocfccaloT-jk and other exporisaees. (Thia la rscccnendod only if It can be undertaken by External fienear oh.)
1, Tha Committeegreed In principle toecording device insteadtenogropher for recording tho tulnutes. Tho Connittea votedon-tlnuanoe of varbatin nixtutes and accepted the Chairman's that for exnerlaental purposerief aooount of the ooeting's highlight* by tha Secretary, accompany the report,
2* The Cholraan announced that the project card file of national Intelligence on Corarunian will he proceeeedhe facilities of the Office of Collection and Dleaeesirt&tion, CIA. Abstracts of ths projects can thna be made readily available to analysts.
3. The Chairman araouncod that, for the, the FE3 has withdrawnCS AT. but expressed bona that tho -Jurceu will reconsider this action.
i. The Coamlttee considered two aubnisnlons of theecoi:-nondatlonePriority Pro-ran" of national lntallif-onee on CotWaaisnuggestionn for projects on "Aspecte of Internationalhereisouspion of additional projects such as the extension of project "a" to Oersany, intorortfl in special projects expressed] by agency representatives for later allocation, oapcbilitlas of External Research for collaboration, andof collection for projects such aa an examination of the CFTO. The Chairraan of the Sub-Coaaitteehe Sub^oradUee's trend of thought in orrivlnf? ot the llat of priorities.
The Committee voted to accept the report of the 3ab-Cora-.ittoo.
The Secretaryssmoronduji free the Sub-Coonlttee to tha Corrralttee oonoerning tha posolbla establlshaDnt of an Intardepertosntel periodical est Inste of international Corounlaa for cone Idorat ion by the -JICSAn members. It will be dicrnistedoter meeting.
It was agreed that tha Chalrran wouldhoSATJ report to the IAC upon oonpietion and acceptance by the Committee, so thatvisions ray be made to execute tho Tograa by providingcesoary nanpownr and to determine alloeitionr to the nenbar ogeneios.
LiaXil iE, Centralt
LSr. Theodore Babbitt, Presiding
of tha Air Force
of the Air Force
C! ilefa of Staff
UffERDSPARKSffPAL "JIGSAW" CO^rTTSB
BABBITT i One very practical detailhould like to take up imnediately is that of the decorations on the table- Thia ia ths intake endire recording levice which had already been mounted here. It iaob to mount it. It need notched on. liise Sudmeier Is here and wo can go on ashave. hould like to put up to the Comnittoe the possibility that we use tho wiro recording device in the future, simplyevice to assist our personnel side of our office. Hiss Sudmeier is going to be absent for pone time in the future and the questioneplace cent would be greatly eased if there would be no objection on the part of the Bashers of this Coooittoo to using tho rire recorder. It works the cane naythe rerorlts ara taken down and tran-scribederbatim report will be circulated.
DEBRIS I ould like to take the opportunity of raising the question of whether re want verbatim reports or edited reports. hink on at least one occasion an edited report night havoseful purpose.
ZSRi At the risk ofplit in ayisagree. It aeooB to do that ths incident that occurred would havo occurred anyway.
IIICIIOLSj hink we in the Amy would prefer to get an edited report. Of course with the concurrence of those attending the conferonce after it hos been edited.
BABBITT: Naturally it would bo ciroulatod for the acceotance of the minutes. By anreport' did youeport taken free thereport?
nORRISi Tha usual secretarial notes.
BABBITT t Would you rathererbatim transcription that ia edited
and boiled deem? hink *Jr. Uorrls ia talking about elnply secretarial notes.
"aCIwlTZi hink tha edited report that baa been reduced ooirieshat in generally store purposeful. It oaves aadlngot of iinnoeeseary oaterlal.
BABBITT: ot to do that!
uld it be possible to oak the Seoretory of the CoaatLtto* to givene page Tnnroxy of the results of tho oseticg* with tho othor available for tha others of us who would like to baro tho verba tin report in our filos?
BAJSIFTt If we aro going toerba tin reporthink that could be dens. at hoar that tha enrxensua is in favor of at laactarbatlm transcription handy for reference purposes, In spits of the incident that baa been alluded to. hink Itretty good idea toerhatic transcription available for raferanos.
Does airyona object violntrUy to tho prresanse of these gadgoto on tbe table?
TTACOTITZ: Hot at ell.
InaatVt Why itould tfcaro be any objeeiion?
H": now soon ooople around town who object for psyawlogioal reasono. Soeaathing akin to 'adke
In ecanoctlon with thishink we night address oursalvea to tbe oat tor of tho utilisation of this mehinery In thsouSd be perfectly willing to have this used in the future.
B/UBITTt ather there is no great objection on air/body's port to tho ueo of the wire record inrj devieO.
It wcnld still be desirable if youriefy la
addition to it.
fUBBITTiwill try to work it out.
correction with It) about settingeadily accessible central file of
the projects which here been requested to be sent In to the Secretary*
That Is the description of the projects. a told that It will be wary
easy,echanism known ashink, to reproduce and file
in JJU machines the obstrncta of the projects uoords. They need
not w> uoords, but the reehinery will tela up to that number. This
could be dor* very easily for future filing rtth the Secretary if the Conn it toe
members world see to it that aocoisnanying the rroject (if it is in existence,
or If it is not) they would file an obrtractull description of the
project, which would then be typed on the Telefax carda, coded and recorded.
The ultimate objective being that if any analyst In any agency thereafter
stcrts to workroject having to do with international Cormwnlsm, he
con op-ly to the CIA Libraryoan of all projects on that particular
chase which ho is about to undertake. now this Telefax operation slightly,
froa the outside,now that it works very well. Knturnlly you will
not net out any more thnn you put In; but if everybody puts in everything
they have, we will eventually be able toutton and get out theae
abstracts of all projects bearing on the subject. Aa the coding mechanism
usually works you got rather mora than you nee/ on tho one thing, but you
cover the whole field adequately. It will also give you the location of
the poper of which you have the abstract, and the various copies. For
Instance, you eight find that there are two coplea, and one in OIR
and one lo CIA. m going to pursue that further, to seo the coding
operation, to see If we can cone up with something which will bo of
or ao ti eel value to the JIGS AH operatic*.
Ihould also mention the absence of the FBI renresentetives
this time, and to tell you that the Direction (CIA)etter from
the Direction of the FBI mentioning some remarks of mine et the last meeting
and stating that in view of those remarks the FBI desired to withdraw from
the JiaSAS Committee, that letter has been answered, withrequest far reconsideration, which le still unanswered*. annot tall you whether the FBI will finally end formally withdraw froa the JTCSAE Cosmdttee or not. ost certainly hope they do not, because they are in possesaion of information ehieh should be of groat value in tho study of international Connunlsn if It oonld be made avnliable to tho other neabere of the Committoe. Ilowever, that matter is not decided yet.
You have before you two reports. One was circulated last weaka list of first priority projects. Tin subject isPriority
Tho othern oh more bulky document, which has just been distributed is on the subject of "Suggestions for Projects on Aspects of International Comrunisa". Thisore lengthy document and for thathink it should not be diecussed i- any detail today.
What we Intend to do (if the Committee approves) with both of these documents, if they are aporoved, is to forward than to the IACeport which la yet to be written requesting full support froa tbe agencies Involved in the production of, in the first piece, the priority projects, and within tbe frarework of the larger list of projects.
The larger list, in spite of its else, is edndttedly far from complete.
You will recall the four fields bf investigation which we have discussedoticed, on pagehat there le only one paragraph on field number I. ofnd field number HI. "Activities of national end Ra-rional Communistas not been ccnplotedj and field number IV. "Communism as cn Instrument of Soviet Foreigns only sketched out. ait that, when completed, will be forwarded to the IAC, notist of orojeots, but ee backgroundmmework against which the most im-
portant and eriority nrogr&ns of this Committee are to be viewed. Be shell hooe to get the opinion of the agencies on tbe validity of the priorities
In the nriority progran, and with that their approval of allocations for the produotioa.
Obviously, thereport for the Priority Progran is before you for discussion and possible ajsmflflept in the wey of additions,or in any other way. Is there any discussion? Br. Nonaer, as cholrmnn of the Sub-Oconittee, would you like to load off?
IJH.tZ2K: There nightumber of things pointed out with reference to tho Priority Program. Ton will noto that the Committee has not rated these projects,umber of reasons. First, because It is feltroup of agenoieo rather thanoncy should address itself to the problem of doing then projocta, and therefore several projects could be done at the same tine. In looking over the projects, you willhink, quite readily that wo havoonee pickedumber of projects which oould be done by different deportments. Thus, for example, project 'h1. resent types, methods of selection, changing chare cterlstics in the leadership of the Ccmrra-niet parties lo Southeastsroject to be done primarily by biographies! intelligence organizations of the government. Projecthe pattern of clandestine Ccmmunisi activities of both legal and illegalsroject to be dene principally by SO. Be hove designated projects one which obviously should be at least partly done by External Researchif not 'holly. Thereumber of othar projects which ore of special interest to member departments of the Comrdttce.
Another pointould like to make in this conriection is that this Priority Program, a? we have it here, should not bo thought of as the only aspect of the program for Immediate work in JIQSAJT's program. That is to soy, this is,ense, tho first bateh of reports that ought to be done in the near fixture; but almost all of them make sense only if connected with another series of reports that should ba done soon afterwards.
Thus, for example, take projectomnuniot organisational potentials
and capabilities in the international maritime industry".) It ie quite dear
that la tarns of tbo situation that exists In tha world today, particularly inWestern World, but to soraa extent In other parte of the worldlet's say In Australia and to some extent the South Pacificn undsrstanfling of the Government of Cocriunist potentials and canobilltloo In the noritloa industry is an inportont requlrorxnt, But that ought not to be thought of as Isolated froa related projects which fit together. There are five or six majorindustrieshink all of us agree ought to bo studied at ona time or another If the rsquiroraorits of the American government are to be reached.
The Fane thing con be saidronbor of othera* Project ,g* (which refers to Conr-unist etratogy as revealed in Cosa-unist tactics in Southoaet Asia) although obviouslv of zroat lrportance at this tire in view of the events in the South Pacific, ir really only tho firstorics that ought to be done vrtth reference to Comnunlst strategy end tactics. roumber of others that will core to mird iariediately as you look et the report.
BABBITT) Ids. hould say that that project,n the international porltiBe Industry, would be connected with any other studies of the WFFB, other industries affected by the VTFTU, or any other Ooncunist dominatedlabor organization.
| By refwenoe to the fuller report, pagehis particular one, as sn example, nay be seen In the context of those others you suggest. It is down hero asomunist potentials arid capabilities In the maritime industry.") Thereumber of others under the same general sub-topic. Rufflberhrounhs tho group. The saw thinff holds for the others. That is the general nrinclple that Ifr. femser ls talking about.
BABBITT: Within that framework, is there any discussion, any additions, or suggested deletions fron tha -Ncionity llat?
NICHOLS! ittle confused ottlculer stage. In the short
list we hove 'Communist capabilities and intentions for sabotage of inportont
facilities1 in just two countriesFrance and Italy. hink it should bo
made apnerent that the Army is interested in these capabilities and intentions
In any specific area In which we might be colled upon to use our military forces.ant reassurance on is that this would not restrict our field of Interest. Sot in the slightest.
NE'iZaii On the contrary. That is just thaas trying; to make. As you are cow saying, this suggestiona1 nskea sens* only if we keep in mind that thet must bo done with others.
KICHOLSi ant that in the record.
i oel strongly about that. This is the top cert of the Icebergthe projects that we feel should be seen now, and should be done immediately. But the iceberg can not bo handled unless we do all of the other projocts that nt in Immediately with this.
KICHOLSi ave no other oeenent.
BABBITT. havo to start somewhere. Is this sslace as any, shall we soy, to start?
HTCHQLSi Prom our standpoint, that is the best plaoe. fle are primarily interested in item 'a* on the short list. Te just do not want to be restrictedater tine byomment made to the effect that 'you should have saidong time ego1.
PENIilt'AKi It seems to me it would be usofularagraph statement of Nasser's and 'rice's statements are outlined aid put In.
34BBITTI It will be taken aare of in far mora than one paragraph, I
hope. If this report ia acceptedriority Program,ald, it will
go forward to the IACather lengthy report aa another attachment. The
JICSAK report, which you requested no to do at the last mooting, and whioh I
hove not done, for reasons quite beyond my control (bacterloloeleel of nature) --
endhink we could very well rorward the whole thing in one batch.
That is, this report as an attachment, andoint of fooua of the background
orogress report of JIGSAW up to now, leading up to this, and requesting the
support of the agenciesriority basis. It will be far more than one
noragraph of additional information. ropose to circulate the draft of that
tilCMOLS: hair ran over tho vbola thing.
It nay be that that la tbe kindob that la worth exploring froa the point of vie* of procedures oe -all as substantive value. Thereumber of different nays of doing It,
BABBITT: Thatanted to bring up. imply suggested the CIA raohlneryhe one withn most faEilicr. normally. If that Ware on Internallyeeting would be called to diaeuae the outline and to allocateesponsibility for various sections of it.
ij3 lzsti1 ngfertlonroject of this type would bo that no have to explore the whole business ratbor thoroughly. For example, titles are not really sufficient in som oases to totually let you know Trhot is behind tha request. are like this lt aaeoo to oe that the firstub-CoaRittee would do would be to find out free tbo Array, (who sup-ested lt In th* first place) whnt thoy had In Bind In detail, and get other infer not ion fron other departments as to That they think ought to be done, and as the nrojeot shapes up you My find that one particular organization is bettor, than another In ottaekine; the kind of problen that you now see.
POCHtMS: Does not this sug-reet that thereontinuing value inhefor that numose aoong othersat least on the exploratory level?
BABBITT: hink there la. ight also add, informally at least, to the Sub-Coerltteo (again froa tho Oiffi point of view) one of the nrojeet neople fron the Publications Division, who ore the ones familiar with the machinery, and working out the terms of reference. That could be done on an antlroly informal be sis.
PKfl:miN: aise this question also, to toko it down to one that hits dlreotly ot oec 'J', where it states "Thla la rocennonded only if it can be
undertaken by external Research". There ore two or three things whloh we would
need if re wore to undertake it. Firat of all, this world mean there had been
some kird of romralgreed upon so that every body here gets hit as
ouch as thoy can In getting any research done out tn the universities, so
thatotover countrios we study bo ell" hero anprcrxlrotely the sore kind
of information about eaoh of those countries, so that at sooe point there can
omparatlve study ned*. Individual analysis on tbe countries, which is
at least partly historical, is notreat deal unless we con see it in
a pattern, so that lt can be nrejected into other countries which have not
as yet bean penetrated or hove not as yob had the Communists aesuno power.
So that tho External Research staff ought to have that kind of information
an outline that we could talk to peopls about. Secondly, and this applied to
another prohlen which Is really quite eeperate and which you may not "iah to
discuss at this point, but for the actual conporative study it would probably
man that somebody ought to be paid to do lt. It Is possible, perhaps, without
poymont to get sooe of the other jobs done. We hove poople doing one, or likely
to start lt, ao wo can ft at soma done 'forut when It oomee time for
the comparative study of tho net hods, lt means that somebody has to get this
notorial that has been Hone by others end then go through end to tbe Job of
analysing the various countries in order to make the cooperative statement.
At thisuggest that wo nay have to to out and hire sooe body to do
hree months Job for the manner, or something of that sort.
But at theon't sos how wo can easily escape having that done.
But otherwise, with those two things Inhink that it would be quit*
possible that thososroh Staff oarreat deal on it. We already
have the Duobeoek study on Czechoslovakia. Weittle volume which w*
have not yothance to get out, partially bo causa we cannot figure out
where you send seven copies of soaethin? that thick, without causing trouble.
Row do you no about having everybody core or lees dissatisfied equally! In
any ease, there is one on Bungary. There are others underway. atter of
fact, thare Is one underway on almost all of tho satellite countries. So I
don't think there will be too ouch problem In placing something, or in picking
up aomething already In progress. The final Job Is going to require bom work, and it cay oven bo that to would havo to ask sons of those aho havo already done the study to edd on in order to west eorja of the requirenants that night eomo up around the table*
HEZESU hink It should be stressed In that connection that th* pay-off on that project, Howard,ract be the comparative study and the pattern that oosrgos.anibrary full of books on each of these revolutions and not actually havo groat benefit to the government, unless tho culdinatlng study, thepe etc, and the pattern, and the lessons to be learned from all of those ore brought together In this final Job, for which you have responsibility. It makcB no sense at all to launch into thia unless wo can assure you that you will get support for that last Job.
PSrmiHAHt The othersertain historical value, but to be useful it needs this final pattern thing.
BiBBnTi as far as the motor of .fundan reasonably sure that between CIA and State we can find them.
OBBi As for be the interests of State aro concerned! State le planning studies that relate to or Includee' andThat is to say, OTP. ie considering such studies and is interested In then. avowith the Biographical Division cf State tho possibility of dhtngThay are very such interested, although ws have no connitrsent as yet. BABBITTi| jd yen* say you were working on
Ho, we are not. fieeport two years ago. We ere not doing anything on the subject. Ifcturally, we would assist and help out atybody who needs our help.
HETZSRi Gtato will be interested Inhink, but that would againumber of agencies working together. Stateery definite interest in
BABBITTi The scope of that is tremendous"The mechaniso of3 -
example,ointaa out, thoro are cortoln overt materials thet aretho jpvernoaut. Iterfectly scandalous situation, Itne. Thoro are materials being Bold in bookotaods around In variousthe world that we cannot gat hold of. and of course, thereroadDaterial that should be gotten that islondaatine nature whichImportant. Sone of us feel that the WTQ le In some rospeotsinportant Communist instrumentality outside of the Soviet unionexists In Western Burono and therefore ne ought to he able to get atso no fashion, and we are not doing that. JICSAE night first noteshow some ways of Patting ot the problem, end becomeenseof nreasirro on our collection agencies for getting that probleman adequate fashion in thehough that perhaps
the firot thing that night be doneub-cocsaitteo of JlGSflfi would be toat materials, and what types of materials, are reaching our gcvernment dealing with the TTPTO, and nofco the gaps In the coverage, and then Inwoting with the collection agency ropresontativoieithertRub-coEcdttee meeting, or In some other waypoint these out end point out the necessity for filling these gaps at the earliest possible lacaent.
BAB33TTI Heed ae not include the ^FPD on tha high priority project list if we ara going to put all of this pressure on it? ather think we should.
iS-ZSRi It is oermaotedery real sense with 'b', aa Kr. Babbitt pointed out.
BABBHTj Toe, but is ia not In evidence on the listing.
POGSOtfYr Should wo bo considering whether we should include the eo-called nray in Eastern Germanyigh priorityrocurement? POSSGHYi rocurement.
BABBITTi Tea, posoibly. The whole problem of the information froa the
Soviet sone of ternary is one that is all too familiar to ell ofb quite
surethe difficulties we have had.
It eeoBS to eo it la like nilitory order of battle.
POSSOilti It le the military, or ousai-edlitary.
ITICliOISf Aro you talking about the overt polloo or tho elandeotlno
POSSCOT: Tho overt organisation.
HIOllOLSi That seems to no toilitary order of battle. He are not getting into the Dot bod of deoloying arcries, and the navy in thio are wa?
BABBITT: "all, ituoai-oilitary force.
Used in direct lmplamentation of Cotxxinist otraiegy.
PGSSCKTi And not used in tho conventional nay of strategy.
DABBITvi In tho broadest sense, there Is practically no problem facing as anywhere today that cannot be related back to international Contmnisa. After all, the whole basis of everything is tho DS-BSSB tension, thewar, or whatever you want to coll it, and ovary thing we do has to ba hooked into that frarjonor'4 ofot inconsiderable part is the International Ccccnnlnt
najzat It eeeno to no our orientation night be along these linos 1 That the men of the Krenlinroup of major instrumentalities. One mlgbt Include tho Soviet armies. Another major instrumentality night bo Soviet eocmoetlohird Bight be the Soviet government and lte instrumntallty In such areas as the satellite states. ourth one night be what we call the world Cocrjunlst novemont, as an instrumentality of the Kreelinnot Including the Er&nlln, but as an InstrunDntelifcy of it. and we prosuitsbly aro addressing ourselves to that instrumentalitythe world Communist movement.
nXCHOLSi The Stet Oernan polio* are different then.
HElZEBi In Italy, that ia one of tbe sub-units of tbe Communist Party,
as re understand it.
MICnOLSl And there is nothing covert about tha Inst Cor nan ar-nr.
POSSOHxi Another thing, on pagePattern of clandestine Communist activities, of legal or illegal parties, relating toi a. insurrection and preparation for insurrection." That would be in Eastern Co many or Eastern Germany?
tlffinOLSt It Is not Incurroction in West Germany. POSSOIItt If it docs not invade West Germany.
IIlCHOLSi If Eastern Germany invades then it is no problem for us, and than you have war and this paper would be out of the window.
hink we are mixing up investigation and research, naturally tha problem of para-ailitary forces in VTestorn Germany is in the subject of investigation, but chether wa Trent to include it in cur research progran la an entirely different proposition.
fiSlIZSRi If you were to Indicate youtudy made of Ceetiuniet capabilities end intentions In western Germany including any clandestine military groups that might be used in Peetern Gormary through the Communist organisation, that would, it Beams to ne,lausible addition! bet if we are dealing with what amounte to the Soviet armed forcee sa such, no matter how lsrportant that ia (and It la vitallyt really does not oeae within our scope of work.
PCGSOfBTi Tho firsthink. Is the correct one.
BlCnOLSi annot visualise.the test German Army infiltrating the Western sone.
BABBITT! That -sould be certainly covered under 'f eonawhat. FOSSONZi Thet la correct, yea*fand maybe'. BABBITTi Pbat about the
liORKISi ould be disinclined to cake theriority job for a
couple of reasons. One, because there hoveunbor of reports written
on the "FTU thai ore available. The other reason is that in studying the
international naritire industry, ittudy of one part of the
TTTB. as in boob of tho other projeote, endan go on from there. believe thata Tory good trial runollection Job for
BABBITT i fou would like to treat the TOTO fron the collection aide at the ore sent tine?
KEUZERi At tho preaent Una. And eee Itob to be done In the near future, beyond 'b'as one of tbe eoverel jobs that should follow 'b1. Coo of the points that cost of the mooters of the Sub^nrjlttee have been stressing Is the desire not to overload thia priority list. If we eon posr Jhly do it to keep it downonimua nusbor.
BABBITTi uite agree with that. hink if it ia shorter and nor* dearly defined therereater chance that we will have success with tho IACsuccess in the atterspt to get manpower behind th* JIOSATI projecte.
Thereumber of "rejects where wo have toonsiderable amount of collection, and if you feel that'U is one of the moat 'burning problems1 ot this tine,ould soy it ought to be in somehow.
TRIER! Re wonder whether that would bo.ense, another project, another toak undertakenT*at the Bene tine working on the priority progran, rather than part of it.
BABBITTi la notontradiction in terms?
HEUZERi Bet neoeasnrUy. Because JICS* is going tohole series of tasks in many fields aa oe work along. Thia la only one of the Jobs w* are going to be doing.
BABBITT ( Tea. hink we would like to aay that any Hot of prior it lea here would limit the derands on all of ue to those particular ones, but of eoura* we cannot.
nETiZEBi n sneaking of the work of JIGSflF. JIOSXH will not alwaystself to the problomo of priority end allocation. There are many other problems involved in the whole area of irrternetionel Coanunlasof collection, and duplication of effort. These other problems have
also to bo considered by JIQBAffort of Its normal work, and In a
this iss olosar to the day when re can attack those problemstha first of those problems outside tho program arse.
Do you think thereossibility of shaping point 'b'n liar fashion as point 'f nnd coking tho maritime project one of the sub-pro jeote of the nfnn
CgiZlTti Thatuge project.
There is no question about it,hink thereontredio-tion iflie TTFTU is so Important and than on tbe other band don't put it on the priority list.
don't feel that way, be cease we ore all keenly aoaro of tbe inforciiLion goto red, and we would occupy the position tliat it in not possible at tho araent torojoot on tbe HPTU, but we hove to wait until we got core information, and tbe problem on tha CPTD le now oolleotlon.
FSnrrvJii It Is true. Is it not, that as for as general Information le concorned, you have to got down to somothinG awfully concrete about the and you first hove this collection probles that you speak of to get out of tbe way.
hrjizer: hould soy that tho oroblon of not having too many Jobs enters here. If we wanted toftu job, we ought to cons id or then, taking on 'b'. As between theand 'b', ot thisould ba strongly In favor of doing tho maritime industry first.
The maritime industry job would be one of the class two Jobs, whllo tbe hftd wouldioneering kind of job likeand 'e'.
Penninan sold, thereot of information on ths
BAD3ITTI uggest we leave the HTU off tho priority list and
that Ur. Lfetsl explore the oolleotlon situation, with the help of any of tha
members,iew to presenting toeport on that apeolfio ooHeetion
situationwhat agencies areosition to oolleet ths type of Information
that we wont.
TT i Better start tho other way drewat of requirements to bo coordinated with the other oeencleaiew to putting proesure on whatever collection agency eo^nod to Indicate being able to get that Informationigh priority basis for JICSAH.
Ianonssistance of lie. weezor, who is oost interested in this subjoot.
BIBB ITT i Ee are ell interostedl In rogard to 'because of the note,
I would lllte to make thi3 statement for tlio roecra, that it is ny undorstandlng that 'J' can bo undertaken by External Research.
PMHlMIWl That is ri^ht. To thia extent we can be euro of It. He can get ?ome studies on individual countries, because we already have sone, and wo can expand those. In some easoe where It Is decided by tho Sub-Coredttoo, or by JlCSfilT, or whoever is responsible for that decision, it might be dosirable to go out and actuallyrojoet with Professor Joe Blow, or something which might involvo soma money, but primarily the need for money probably will be at the oorrerstive level ot tho ord. Tith that in mind, sure, Extornal Penoaroh oan do it.
BABBITTi Those are practical details. But it can ba done by External Roaeareh. There is one other point onm not quite clear. Colonel Nichols, did youurning desire to undertake project
IIICROIS: n afraid not. ill have toew remarks, and repeat
rome ofede ot the last Cocritteo resting. That Is, that at the present
tins, we cannot commit any additional Twcanmel, or any personnel, to the
formation and completionrojoct under our terms of roforonco. Wow, however,
if this proposition ia node to the IAC, and the IAC determinoa that tbe Army
will supervise this norticular project, then the Army will have to make available
tho additional personnel and funds to complete it. At the present time there la
no personnel and no funds to conplete workroject of this nature.
BABBITTi Of course that la why we are going through the machinery of the IACIn order to get support on as sufficiently high level aa possible.
That was my understanding of It, but Ur. floraier one nod thifluggestion that this Coaaltteo allocate tbeee projects near.
HUMERI Boto gather ths information on allocation. In other words, if at our next mooting none of us oone back and say wo can commit our ogoney toarticular project then on allocation would folios' autoaatlcally. In those cases where agencies cannot take upon themselves the task of doing oprtain jobs, and the problem of allocation remains, lt seems to oe that thatroblen largely for JIGSAW rooomnonding to tbo IAC.
KICBOLS i As far os the Army Isn efraid that sill havo to bo the procedure that is used,hink that all of you are aware of the cut we have taken In the budget, as hove oil throe departments in tbe Defense establishment. Cur personnel has been out to tbe bone, and we aro performing, at tbe pro cent time. Just current lntellLTonce. Wo hove no personnel to putong range project such as this. nderstead It whet when you write this report to tho IAC it will explain exactlyn driving at, and you will get thatross?
3AB3ITTI Too willreak ot the draft.
e justave the capabili^ of producing, oven through wo realise the value of lt.
BA3SXTT!a sure, is unfortunately true of all of tbe neabers of this Committee, In various degrees.
KICliOLSi la that true of tho Navy?
ABBOTTi hink oven more so In the ease of Hovy, whloh ls so much
smaller than you are.
BABBITTi Tha Air Poroo ia perhapo ollghtly more fortunate?
POSSOMTi Considerably snailer*
IXHHISi Let's give It to ORB.
BABBITT ian takene of the work,ould not sot aon which we -ould coonlote It.
PCREOrr/i uestion which jutrt came uo. on't think that It la completely necessary toot of nonoy for External Hesenrch In Washington. hink tho noin trouble In Washington to some extent la to set core or loss security clearance.
BABBIT?! n afraidill hove very little Influence on the people who give clearances.
PO.VCIJY: There are nony univeraltles In town who had clearances before. Aa anirected the study on coUeotior of Soviet treatises. Finally we finished one volume, and now the State Department soys they ere going to helpittle.
BABBITTi m notth that.
should come In through the eternal Booearch Staff.
possoari is that qui
BAB3ITTI Ho, itoint setup.
P&nilTAIIi Te Just don't snend money now, because you con get thia very
good cooperation thnt you talk about froa the universities and the university
faculties. There ore occasions however, if you say Profeasor 'I' ia the key
man for this kindtudy where it bocorea necessary to pull hin off of
eitheroMng Joberiodr three months, or to pull hie
offesearch project which he is on, and aftr all you have to have people
who ^ill connlote the nrojoct and the problem is to got them to flnleh doing
it. If you pull t'en off of something like that then you nay need sone
aasistonce. This cost something and soroatlros runs into big money. It Is
done in State and in CIA under the KIS progran, or through our own program.
The assistance ranges, to where you hire four or five graduate
book to Dr.suggestion with reference to the Bart Car nan military forces that would presumably be used subvoroively to create Insurrection. If Southeast Asia was inoortent enough to put In there, certainly Germany ia the other big target In the world In addition to 3outbaact Asia right now. Lot's put it thia wayIt has more people guessing.
BABBITT i hink weroat deal more Information on the activities In Western Germany, which la far from satisfactory, but tbe problem of Southeast Aaia pretty well holla downock ofI won't sayack of 'informationack of work and study having been done on that area, and certainly In that respect Germany la far better covered, has bean far hotter covered.
MCBOLSi On the other hand. If we are going toype tudy, it would seem to me that France oerhops woulduch better example to use, because ell six of these thlnga exist in France, which supposedlyree country, wheroae West Germany is occupied, which would necessarily giveoflnlte setup of oonditione.
t In that sense Germany la not typicalj nor would tbe Communist nattern In Germany be typical.
| -r' la net soype study. KBIZERi He. 'fyc study, 'g' is an area study, and woir at of several.
| Lot me put It this way. In concrete terns. tte will stress clandestine CooEuniaatior. methods or covert military organizations. Be will drew on the information available, whether fron Ban tern Germany or Western Germany, or from Bolivia, and "honever possible will apnend area studies. For Instance, the oocnunication system between Bast and Rest Germany. The clandestine system Is pretty well documented through the work of the Army. ill be able to draw on that information. ertain extent your requlromont will be covored.
GACKTilTZi Hot necessarily. a trying to got this frame of rafaranco of our task straightened out in ay otm mind. an seeot of thea* onsvera certainly wouldong nay toward answering any questions which wa night havo hod. on't think it would bo absolutely essential to plnoe it on tho nriority list.
FOS30ffxt hink It ia more Inportant than nunberave no orgunent cgainst the study,hink It Is sore Inportant to find out what they nay do in the next year or so in Cerneny. hink that study of
the strategy is quite useful.
| course, 'o* is of particular Importance In view of tbe fact that ths whole eochanlsn is controlled by the US'R and we would like to find out how.
PETCIIUAIli to sone extent there le validity to Or. rbssony'a oonsent. That te, It ia true thatow, or eroryone asauneawe aay be wrong, but ore crust assure there Is control, and the fact of the control being known the other questions heroense become subsidiary questions which would be desirable to know if we could findut In terns of what the American policy Is likely toindittle hard to believe that It Is as lr-portent to know of the actual findings, and so on, as It is to know, for oxoaple take either Western Germany or Tronoethe basio strategy in tboeo two areae.
hink thereaa la misunderstand Ing here of what thia list
le supposed to be. This isist of the questions that are most important
for American policy at this moment. This an effort to examine the field of
international Ccmnunism, and in the various corners of that field beginning
exploration end being making vital studios. These projects don't oootnete
ith each other to any great extent. They are supposed to cover different
aroao for different reaeona. hink 'e' Is an obvious one free the point of
view of the work of this Committee. re goiho to examine and study
international Communism we certainly should make sure that more and more le known about hen International Corarrunlsm works. Certainly all of us could think of many Inportant probleme that ought to bo answered now for an Amerioan policy,n not euro thet those probloriD ore necessarily the Job of this particular Committee. Our Job Is Internotional Corra.ro ism, as one of the Instruacntalities of the Kremlin. It does not seem to a* to be profitable to try to mark those various projects in terns of priority of, let us sey, the President. We will get different answers froa different people. He ere not here to give many answers to many inportant cueetione that you may think of. We are only here to work In tho broad areb of Into motional CoBcunlari, and we ore here to suggoot different projects for different aspects of that area which need to bo worked on.
IT T Thisifferent meaning to the word
These ere, in our eyes, sanole priority jobs in order that we may move along in several fields ot the sane time.
FOSSOTflft Do you mean to say that this Is purely academic?
tCIZER: This is an effort to realise international Cocrrunlssj as an instrumentality of tha Kremlin. There ere many facets to it, and we ore trying to touch the essential pro hi erne and certain aspects of it. Theuggeated wo do not attack tho WFTU problem ot the same tine wo ore doing the international maritime problem was noton't think the WPTD was not important, but it seene to me it eas part of that same corner of International Communism, and wo ought to suggest the most lia^ortant ones In that corner now.
POSTjJJTi That ia priority aocording to Importance.
XTTI Yes, but the fact thet la Important and has beenay
'b' rather than the whole of the WFTD, doea not Interfere with any of the
others. It does not block it off in any way.
POSSQHI: nderstand that.
I understood tbe auggeation earlier that the Air Faroe rdght hove faeilltiae which could be used, but these projects didn't represent pleoee of work on which they could be used, end therefor* would be used on eonethlng else. Let 'o get
that sonsthlrt" else.
aU By ell Beans,
POSSCJIli on't knee that that wos quite the meaning. hink cur collection effort Is channeled tc Air problens and it is very difficult to turn It over into that.
TTAOKTlTZi Tha whole thing ia geared up right now. Ko so long ago w* were Bore or loes directed, as Arny was, to get out of the political field In various porta of the world, and to confine our reporting specifically to Air
natters. Thia ocrtlcular typo of re-ear oh is digging down beneath the surface
where you have got to hove people whoyre of training thet et least
nost of our field repreaentetivee don't possess. That does not any that we don't
coos across some infornation that would be beneficial. Thot lanent.
| As to the other thing, the fieldstern CerrenyIf they feel it is necessary, could they state it for us,roject?
POSSOinri Xt is vary alsrle. Inhove it read 'in Southeast Asia and Gerneny". Add "Gornnny".
BABBXTTi s two different etudles.
POGSOHTt The sane technique*.
That would be all right except that that la exclusively sabotage.
TACKniTZt This happens to beheals oe have been trying to examine. In other words, we are not ox- acting then to be so crude as to just go to war, but, how can thoy extend their power further without taking that step. PCOSOOTi ecret war.
I Would not It be better toroject to hit tbo
on that particular project!'
aro thinking about the sane thing that Ur. Ifoaaer oaldi Within the instrumentality of tbo world Coaounlct apparatus, how oould tbe Soviets best utilise tholr resources In order to better their position in Western Cerosmy.
BABBITTi Would you improve on the wording of 'g'? PCSSORTi That otater It.
fir. Chairman, if tho Airools strongly enough, it seens
to no we night well simply rake an additional project, put itbo list, add lt and call it, 'Basic Cocnunist strategy in the pre cent world, ac revealed by Conmunist tactics In Western Germany'.
HICHOLS1 ould like to not concur in that particular suggestion. Western Germany is occupied by tho United States. Weigh Commissioner fron the State Dopertnontj we have th* rest of the area under tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff,onrnnd or-in-chief, and if w* get Involved In that you con see thnt we will get Involvedot of internal talk and dissension within our forces. Tbo responsibility far Western Germany Is tbe responsibility of the High Commissioner end the coorrudor-in-ohiof. All of tho oolleotlon effort boing spent in Western Germany, and which will bo spent In Western Germany, is for the benefit of tbe occupation of Western Germany and not for the bonoflt of us who sit here.
BABBITT 1 isagree with you on that, as for as the Office ofoncerned. on't know about the military. Ur.group ia vary definitely accepting retirements and
froa ufl, and working on thanuJt ls sub-divided Into
PHEilBul! Strntegio and politioal.
I!ICHOLSi nail, then tha project ahculd be assigned to then and not to ne.on't agree with you on that.
PQKZUAH* The que at loo of who wao to do the eTaloations cane up. In an
odd "ay, and It gat put downurry that the evaluation wae not to be dona oircept for aorae strictly internal political stuff; but in bo far as it related to the outside, no,
DABBITTi hink thatroper project for us to undertake.
richolsi ill rot vote,ave not changed ny nind.
emiz2l! It soons to ne that thisonimtion far thin list. That Is ny own feeling. It is worthy of consideration. eol It is en addition that goes beyond soee of our own oonoldor-itions. There are nany important orobleoe that 'to have not put in, o think it can be put in, if the Coenitteo fools that way. Certainly we havo eoetlons at Stct* that work on Gerneny all of the tine. In fact, we have turnedeport en this area very recently.o think it Bight bo worthwhile puttingote whether the full Coenittee wanted It addedist of prloritloa.
BABBIT?! Would you Ilka to discuss it further?
dght say one thing In connection with this prohlan. n aware of statements that hevo been node by rather responsible individuals (probably somo of you havo heard this) that Geraany is eventually going to the East or to the TJeat, but it is going to get together. ave hoard that statement node by psople like Souvirlne in Peris;tontgomery Bade it when he addressed the Krtional War College last year;ew others have node that statenentneople Who have aome reason to Bake It. So It scene to me itather Important point in the future devulopnent of Coanunlst strategy.
BABSITTi Is It furdansntally Communist strategy, or is that Soviet foreign strategy which is susceptible of being implemented by moans other than the Cccmunist Party?
WACI37ITZI on't know. on't see how they could do It except
within the inrrtrumentolity of the Connuniat Party if they ore to gain any suoceee.
that would aeon that cost of tha trtudy would base to ba dedicated to the iitAgpl work of tha Coapimlrt Party in Germany, because; wa are pretty wall infcrraad on what tho KPD, tho overt crsanisotico, la
KSCSt! iragroe vory strongly. If it noons that this ia being done In the SED. It aeons to se that everything le being done with the utilisation of tbo other and tho SEDomplete instrumentality* That lo principally what we are talking abouttbe nee of this kind of noehlnery for doing something In the Oeman problea.
BABBITT: That le not thonderstand tbo submission, whichaaio Communist strategy In the present world, as revealed by Cconunist tactics In Western Carmany'
POSSCBBi sed tbe wordithout breaking it down. on't know tbo answer. That Is one of the problems that ease up and we do want It answered.
bY.BBJTTt Xou did not limit lt to Western Cornsny? Then the proposal has boon made by the Air Foreo to lnolode thlo further item on 'Baaio Conrjunist strategy in the pro sent period, as revealed in Coram ndst tactics In Germany'. Those In favor of tbe Inclusion
norm IS l ok the Air Foreo reprosantotlves if they desire this kindtudy boeauee they bollsve thero Is nothing In nesblngton, that no Job In Washington has ettenptod to cone up with any of the anewersT aliswo that preolsoly this kindob is being done over In the State Deportment. hink therehort Job coning out very soon,praotloally that kindtudy.
WACS'ITZ: That, again. Bey be so. Wo don'tut your nontixming it
POSSOIff: That would only bear out the fact that it ought to be on the
list, that the work has been done, and that everybody ought to he happy.
KBHZEHi It seems toit ndght ba wall worth considering that kind of prooaiduro for every ona of tho so projecte. In eo far aa itIGSAW project all Berbersight to look at tha original plan for it.
BABBITTi That was certainly in nyisualise all of these projects being approved by this Committee.
a State proposition so far?
RHBHKl an say that State has onbarked on itI hope, avereople working on it at this tins.
BABBITTj If that is to ba Included on this list and will eventually coca outIGSAW approved pro foot (not that State has to get approval froa the JIGSAW Committee to putroject)but If It is toIGSAW approvedhink its outline should be aubsdttsd to the Coanittee.
I abould be very glad to aubadt it. ight aay that we are hoping toorltico of 'b1the portion we ore interacted Insoae tdne in the near future,hould be very glad, before completing plane on that, to submit it to the JIGSAW. But there willumber of us interested in 'b'.
BABBITTi hink any submissions should be made through the Sub-Cesnittee. Do you agree with that?
fflUZEBt Fine. The suggestion then would be that tho Sub-Committee wouldowwhat wore intensive examination of ths orojoct end then present its reoonmondations for rovie'.T, If necessary, to tbe full Committee.
BABBITT: Kthinking of the 9ub-CoBolttee's neebaniso for obtaining additional viere of direotly Interested agencies, other than those of tho originator.
MEBBtl In that ease, it eight then bo an order for the Sub-Committee, or the members of the Sub-Committee to receive the plans for tha Tito project that State Is nowbarking on, oeccent on It and not waitull meeting of JIGSAW.
BABBITTi hink so. It would be circulated before the meeting, end discussed boforo the meeting. Doea that seem too ponderous?
HEUZSRi accept In terras of the tine clonent. eeltato to nako any etatocont, out we havenodilTwi that If everything goes right again night bring ua pretty olooe to the end of the oroject before JIGSAW me eta again.
BASBIfTi Obviously the full treotaent oonrot be afforded that project, If that la tho case.
fl The first point you rode could be donawe oould ixonedlately contact the combers of the Sub-Committee and get their reactions to the plana now underway.
QADBITTi ish you would do that. On this paper that was Justn view of the lateness of tbohink it rather icrprootiool to start the discussion on it.
HEIiZlSi onder if perhaps we might either change or add to the wording in paragraph 1. on't think that Er. london meant it in quite the faebion lt might be interpreted. Tbo Sub-Coomlttoo didn't actually coooe conclusion'. The Coffinittee is suggesting for consideration this type of periodical estimate.
BABBITT: There oppears tceed for it.
WEUZERi "ell,bothersittle bit. tfeverthelsss, interpret It as such end we will agree.
BABJITTi Zhe proposal "hers, of tno Suo-Ooaoltteeie for discussionuture metingprobably the next nesting of tho JIGS AST Coorolttoe. If there is nohould like to coll another mooting poeeHly In tooon't think we are limited bynow of to meeting onlyonth,hould like to get going aa soon as possible on the report to tha IAC. We'night, at that tine consider tha ideaIGSAft publication.
ITEUZSti As the Chairman, are you thinking of instructing the Secretory to oond the Priority Program officially to tho various deport no nte and ask then for statements on allocations and proposals and plans so that that eon be entox-
for Committee nenbors by the Secretary, concorning reeosfnonaationo for tbo establishment of interdepartmental periodical estirstee of world Conmunism,
talned, oryou thinking of that being dons throughb*ra of thia CosDtlttasT
BABBITTi hink it ehould go out officially. IIEUZSR: allarc that nay. hink that would ba bast. BABBITTi If thara ia no further boalnaaa to ooaa before tho neeting, wa will adjourn.
(Tha oootlng adjournadOriginal document.