Created: 1/11/1950

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Only since the end of World War II has Communism become an Important factor in Burmese politics. hort period after the war Communists dominated the most Influential political organization in Burma, the Antl-Faselst People's Freedom League (AFPFL). They were outmaneuvered,by non-Communist elements, split Into two factions and eliminated from the League and the government It sponsored. the relatively few Communists retain considerable popular support, partly because of the widespread appeal of Marxism lnBurmese polities, ond exert anfar out of proportion to their actual numbers.

Both the Burma Communlit Party (BCP) and the Communist Party (Burma) (CPB) are now In armed rebellion against thefJovemmeot. The Burma Communist Partyy far the larger and morehas shown Increasing conformity to the Moscow line, and has of late givenof being Influenced by (Chinesepolicies. Communist elements have contributed heavily to the prevailing political and economicin Burma- They have exploited the instability to extend their influence and to seek new allies In an attempt toopular front through which to achieve their ultimatecontrol of Burma. The BCP is known to have maintained liaison with thc Communist Party of India, and Is believed to be in sporadicwith the Chuiese Communist Party and Communist elements in Indochina. No direct contact with the Soviets has been proved. The Communist Parly (Burma) (CPB) Is a

distinct but weak organization which harasses both the governmeni and the BCP.

Government measures against thehave not yet been very successful the government possesses superior manpower and material resources, It is not likely to be able to suppress the Communist Insurrections In the near future andguerrilla warfare Ls probable. On the other band, the Communists appearof overthrowing the government without considerable outside assistance. ommunist regime In China coupled with the possible emergence of aregime In Indochina would strongly impel the Burmese to accommodateto Communism ) Effective utilization of Western assistance by the Burmesewhich in turn Is largely contingent upon the settlement of the Karen rebellion, might enable tt to establish Itself as the popularof nationalism and improvedIn Burma and at thc same time Identify the Communists as proponents of violence acting under foreign instruction. and use of such assistance would present the government with the complex andproblem of convincingly refuting charges of subservience to foreign interests. UlQ speed at which adverse events are taking place ir. China leaves little time in Burma to promote developments favorable to the West.

Allhough they are largely indued andfrom effects of the situation in Burma on neighboring areas where the US has moreand significant interests, the implicationsommunist-dominated or inclined Burma arc significant lo US security.

otvailable lo CIA as



Cofnmuniim in Burma: Present Statu* ond Future Prospect*.

elatively small minorityby factionalism and apparently losing some support, Burmese Communists remain an Important force in Burmese politics and arciolent effort to overthrow the existing government and establish their own administration. While both Communistare effectively advancing the short term Soviet objective of creating chaotic conditions, the BCP ls considerably stronger and more advanced In Ideological sophistication. The BCP has demonstrated Its willingness tothc international Communist policy and to execute Instructions from foreign sources. It probably will continue to do both, at least as long as foreign control Is relatively well concealed, local control left largely In thc hands of Indigenous Communists, and theof Communist policy remaincompatible with those of extreme Despite lis organizationaland the possibility of increasingfactionalism, the BCP ls still capable of prolonged violence and of implementing Its more Immediate objectives of promotingin Burma, disrupting its economy, and in general undermining the authority of theregime. Although constituting athreat to Burmese stability, it isthat the BCP will overthrow theIn the Immediate future through its own unaided efforts. The probability of the emergenceommunist dominated regime will steadily Increase, however, as Communist control of China is consolidated. Tins will became still more likely if. in the meantime, the Burmese Government fails to eliminate some of its glaring weaknesses, fails to come to terms with a* many as possible of thcother insurgent groups, particularly thc Karens and fails to improve thc conditions of lhe Burmese people The Clones*will beosition to place strong and

varied pressures upon the Burmese people and their government. Their very presence on the undefended borders of northern Burma, with Its Implied threat of overwhelming force, alone is likely to cause many Burmese totheir attitude toward the People'sof Chinahe Chinesecould extend materiel and advisory and technical assistance to their Burmese counterparts which. In time, might enable the latter to replace the existing regime. InUie Chinese Communists will. In all probability, attempt to Influence thc Burmese Government by exploiting the pro-PRCof the Chinese community In Burma and of various non-insurrectionary elements In Burmese politics, including an important faction of tbe Burma Socialist Party, theparty In thc Burmese Parliament. the possible emergence of Communist regimes in Indochina or other southeast Asian countries would provide even greater Impetusurmese accommodation lo Communism.

Although there are Indications that the Chinese Communists are directly Interested in the activities of the Burmese Cornrnunists and occasionally in contact with them.Communist agents have apparentlythc greater part of their energies to winning the support ofin Burma In this respect they haveconsiderable success as most of thecommunity is suspected of being at least opportunistically or passively sympathetic to the Chinese Communist movement While Chinesegitators and organizers are known to be active in Burma, many of theirlh covert and overt, areout by the China Democratic Leaguehich tt reputed io maintain amicable relations with an influential section of the important Burma Socialist Party.

From the evidence at hand, il is believed that Chinese Communist policy toward

Burma is only In thc earliest stages ofIt appears that Chinese Communists are attempting to take advantage of thetendencies of various Burmese political factions and to curry favor wherever possible In the hope of the emergence, perhaps under Chinese Influence,opular frontovernment favorably disposeda Communist China. An Immediate objective would seem to be consolidation of the Chinese population In Burma under firm Communist directioniew to its use latereans of achieving CommunistIn Burma. Another objective seems to be the creation of sympathy for thcmovement by attempting to allayanimosity toward Chinese and fear of Chinese domination. The third and finalnaturally, is Communist control of Burma. Such objectives may explain the Chinese Communists' nvoldance ofdirectly Involved In Burmese affairs and their concentration upon the residentAt the same time, the Chineseare free to deal with the Burmese Communists, while the "separate andCDL can approach other politicalIncluding those supporting thcwithout alienating potentialon either side.

Although the Burmese Government has taken little action against the Chineseunlsta in Burma except toewsuspected of contacting Burmeseil is attempting to suppressCommunists by legal and mililnry force as well as byocial and political program designed to undermine the appeal of Communism. However, the lack of uniformity and the irresponsibility that mark governmental counteractions largely negate the effectiveness ofolicy. Inthe government has beeneemingly endless series ofmany of which are not of its own making. Militarily, the government's armed forces are superior to those of the Communists In terms of manpower and materiel, but they have been severely handicapped by lack of experience.

large-scale desertions, the necessity of having lo Import practically all military supplies,funds, political Interferences, difficult tci rain, and the absence of an efficientand communications system. Perhaps thc most serious weakness derives from tht necessity to disperse government forces over widespread areas In order toariety of insurgents In'addition to the Communists. Despite these serious difficulties, thehas tended to Ignore the advice of the British Military Mission In Burma. Theappears capable of containing the situation as long as the various rebel groups remain divided and mutually antagonistic. Nevertheless, widespread disorders, due in large measure to Communist activity,rastic reduction of government revenues while at thc same time forcingIncreased non-productive militaryand precluding effective administration.

Shortly after becoming Independent, the government enthusiasticallyar-reaching program designed to provide the Burmese with political freedom and economic security without bloodshed. Whilerogram has probably cushioned the Impact of Communist propaganda, shortages ofqualified personnel, and muchhave prevented its successfulthus providing thc Communists with propaganda anununition from another direction.

Recently, the Burmese Government appears to have become mcreasingly aware of its inability to promote peace and prosperity through its own efforts. Its policies have shifted noticeably from the extreme lefia more moderate position It hasonsequent tendency to seek the support of the US and UK, and of nearby Commonwealth countries India and the UK have provided Burma with some military supplies, but the Burmeseroject for joint financial assistance by the UK. India. Pakistan, and Ceylon on the ground that the conditions were too restrictive. The government has also sponsored legislation designed U> attract, rather than discourage, foreign capital for


the development of mineral resources, and has shown Interest In Point Four of President Truman's Inaugural address. The Primehas recommended negotiation ofbeneficial treaties with nations having "commonnd the Foreignhas Indicated Burma's willingness toon-Communist Pacific bloc, provided China and Korea were not Included. Socialistto these changes In policy has been one of reluctant acquiescence, and since theare the government's chiefthey coulderious political crisis at any time. Withdrawal of theircould mean the government'sa split In the Socialist Party, or both. Although such developments are entirelyit seems likely that the partiesrealize the disastrous consequences that would probably result, and will attempt to avoid them at least temporarily. the government, despite the fact that many of Its supporters are extreme leftists, seems to have recognized thatar-reaching socialist program would be Impracticable, if not disastrous. The new trend In Burmese policies, therefore, Indicates that Burmese leaders are at lastthat Communismeal threat to their security and are turning to the West as the only source which can provide theassistance for economic rehabilitation and restoration of Internal stability which are prerequisite to the security of BurmeseIndependence.

Although Communism In Burma will not be suppressed in the predictable future, theIf It Is to restore political stability, must intensify considerably its efforts toitself in the minds of thc Burmese as the true advocate of nationalism and of better conditions in Burma while identifying thc Communists as thc proponents of violence, acting under foreign instructions Insame kind of negotiated settlement will have to be reached with other insurgents and greater confidence and assistance obtained from the various hill people who heretofore have generally been suspicious of tlie Burmese Government in Rangoon. These efforts must

be undertaken by the Burmese themselves, and tbe prospects for their fulfillment are not especially bright. In any event, theis Increasingly dependent upon Western support and assistance, and Its willingness and ability to resist Communism may well be proportionate to the encouragement received from this source. Efforts to obtain such aid without exposing Itself to charges ofto foreign Interests willelicate procedure.

mplications to US Security of aBurma.

The implicationsommunlst-doml-naled or Inclined Burma are significant to US security. However, such implications are. generally speaking. Indirect and are bestIn terms of their effect upon areas where the US has more direct and significant Interests.

A Communist government in Burma would obviously curtail severely'Western bifluencc In still another Far Eastern area. Aside trom the further loss of Western prestige.sway over Burma would further endanger India and Pakistan. Moral and materielcould then be more easily extended to the Communist movements in those countries, especially in Assam and West Bengal where the Communist Party of India (CPI) has been particularly active, and to East Pakistan where the Communists, under the direction of the CPI, appear to be making theirbid for promoting subversion In the Dominion of Pakistan. FurUterrnorc,evelopment, particularly if coupled with the emergencero-Soviet Government inwouldirect threat to the present regimes in Thailand and Malaya Communist activities in Burma have been an important contributing factor inBurmese rice exports from attaining more than approximately one-third their prewar levels and in paralyzutg other export Decreased Burmese rice exports are

mportant being petroleum, limber, lead, tin and lungttcn. sllltoiijh the proilurttoit of these commodities ixnrs^priAotM in teims of world production.

tegic interests arc clearly apparent. Control of Burma could provide the Communists, ln their struggle for all Asia, with an Important economic weapon ln the form of the pressures they could exert In other areas throughof Burmese rice surpluses.




The Genesis of Communism in Burma.

ew Burmans, mostly university students, were liisplred by Communistand participated ln sporadicactivities during the mid-thirties, there was no formally organized Communist Partyhe developmentohesive Communist movement beganhen Communist-inclined Burmese beganpopular opposition to the Japanese and advocated unqualified support of the Allies. Because they were instrumental hi organizing and directing tlic Burmese resistance to the Japanese, the Communists emerged from the war well-organized and with their prestige and popularity greatly enhanced.

Inhe Communists wereresponsible for the amalgamation of various elements of the Resistance into thc Antl-Fasclst People's Freedom Leaguehc dominant political force In Burmese politics at thc war's end.held key positions In the AFPFL. and the Burma Communist Party (BCP)the League's largest and best-organized component. Although the BCP dominated the AFPFL untilt never achieved complete control. The Communists at that tunetrenuous effort lo gain control of thc AFPFL by conducting an Intenseto strengthen the party and lo broaden its popular base. Gradually, however, Its drive for power encountered anti-Communist sentiment within the AFPFL. and agroup, wllh considerable adroitness, split the BCP and forced the withdrawal fiom the League of both factions.

The two Communist groups thereuponthe first effectively organized opposition to the AFPFL. The Communist Parly inurroa)opularly called Red Flags, was. iitganized in0 and commenced

a campaign of violence almost from that date. Although the Burma Communist Party (BCP) (commonly referred to as the White Flags) also Instigated unrest after withdrawing from the AFPFL lnt temporarily avoided overt violence. Rather. Itapprochement with the AFPFL and might have succeeded had It not insisted uponacceptance of Its terms.

Incting on orders believed to have been transmitted by the SovietIn New Delhi through theParty of India, the BCP radically altered Its policies and embarkedrogram of extreme agitation directed against the AFPFL and the government It sponsored. Thepress Immediatelyampaign of abuse and vilification; BCP leaders openly advocated overthrowing theeries of strikes developed, and there werethat thc BCP planned to establish its own administration over the areas ofBurma which it dominated. Onhe government finally tookby forcibly breaking the strikes andas many Communists as possible. All important BCP leaders escaped, however,ull-fledged Communist-led Insurrection soon commenced under their direction.

The growth of the Burmese Communist movement.hort period, from one ofto one capable of seriouslythe constituted national authority, may be attributedumber of causes. The general disorganization of Burmese society, economic hardship, foreign rule, and thcof Hurt nans to participate in theof their country led lo theof Intense nationalism, as well as strong antipathy towards capitalism. Theinitiative In organizing the resistance permitted them to capitalize upon theof Communist leaders after lhc war and


identify Communism with nationalism During the early postwar period superior or-ganlxatlonell-defined party program, with easy promises and simple explanations

of Burmese grievances, gave thcignificant initial advantage over othergroups. Since their break with thehe Communists have capitalized upon endemic lawlessness and theBurman distrust of governmentalby exploiting the numerousand shortcomings of thc AFPFL and the Burmese Government. In some caw, they have profited by certain of theanti-Communist measures which have Injured the Innocent as well as the guilty. Finally, the outbreak of the PeoplesOrganization (PVO) and Karenhave provided the Communists with new opportunities to extend their influence by seeking new allies to augment their ownfor thc overthrow of thc existing regime.

2. The Surma Communijt Party (YVhito. Organization.

Thc organization of the BCP appears to parallel that of other Communist parties throughout the world. Supreme authority, both political and military, is vestedhree-man Politburo theoretically elected and responsibleentral Committee, which, in turn. Is accountable to periodic PartyNo Party Congress has been held sinceelow thc national level, thc Communists established Upper and Lower Burma commands over Districtsupervised by District Secretaries-General and Central Committees. There is evidence that the Communist organization is further subdivided into township and village groups and that separate units, perhaps on the district level of importance, areIn Rangoon, and possibly Mandalay.

BCP organizational problems havebeen complicated by the necessity of operating underground Effectiveness of

he PVO and

theeeCurrent Situation

In Burma "

BCP command functions varies from area to area and from group to group, and is often not too satisfactory. It probably also Isby personal rivalries and thetendencies of local leaders. Nevertheless, the BCP continues to function withefficiency and continues capable ofpressure on tlie government and of expanding Its activities whenever anIs presented.

b. Leadership.

Thc BCP's leader Is Its Secretary General, Thakin Than Tun. Than Tun emerged as an important Communist and Ins, rose to pronibience in thc resistance movement, and was Secretary-General of the AFPFLthree months before thc CommunistsOf all the Burmese Communists. Than Tun probably best understands Communis' ideology ond Its applicability toarticularly dynamic leader. Than Tun has demonstrated his ability to hew to the orthodox party line and hascapacity for organization andIf recent publications In the Soviet press are any indication, his leadership has the sanction of tlie Kremlin, and his party is recognized as the "official" Cornmunist Party In Burma.

With few exceptions, other BCPare young men whose individualcannot be accurately assessed. Few of these Iiavc moreuperficial undcr-standing of Communism, especially of its Inherent danger to Burmese sovereignty. There ore Indications that although BCP unity, discipline, and morale appear lo remain adequate, they have declined somewhat inmonths largelyesult of personal rivalries which tend to develop factionalism in the party, and the Inconveniences of having to operate underground. Nevertheless, these difficulties have not reached disruptiveand there are no indications that the Comuiunlsts. by and large. Intend tofrom their present course.

c. Strength and Distribution.

JudgUig from the limited Informationactual membership of the BCP probably does notew thousand. Tlie BCP's


however, ts substantially greater than Its numerical strength would Indicate. Itonsiderable popular(perhaps several hundred thousand)arge part of Burma, especially ln those rural areas of central and southern Burma where Iterclsod more or less de facto control since the end of the war.

Before going underground, the BCPwith considerable success, to gain the support of peasants, laborers, and youth through Its front organizations, the All-Burma Peasants Union, the Ail-Burma Trade Union Congress, and the People's Democratic Youth League (also known as thc Red Guards, which apparently formed the nucleus of the BCP's military forces). It Is from thesethat the Communists probably draw the bulk of their present support, and one of them, the All-Burma Trade UnionIs still functioning openly Inareas. In addition, thehave promoted some unrest andIn tbe military and police forces, have exploited the pro-Co nun unlst sympathies of the PVO, and have Infiltrated and influenced several Important non-Communist political and cultural organizations.

Avowed Communist publications have been suspended, but the BCP still producesand pamphlets which are circulatedeven ln Rangoon. In addition, some left-wing newspapersumber of ultra-leftist authors continue to publish party-linealthough they refrain from severelythe government Communistmay also be obtainedeople'sHouse In Rangoon which is known to have been established and partially financed by the Communist Party of India.

The BCP has made strenuous efforts tonew front organizations in many parts of Burma, the most successful thus far being the formationoalition, known as thc People's Democratic Fronthichan undetermined number ol PVO'h and army mutineers who had been conducting their own more or less independent rebellions. This organization is potentially an extremely ser.ojs threat to the restoration of stability

in Burmaon-Communist regime While the BCP controls only relatively small and scattered areas throughout southernthe PDF dominates considerable territory along the Irrawaddy River valley andairly large and well-armed military force at Its disposal. The PDF, however, appears to sufferaulty command structure, there Is evidence of friction among Its components, and Its lasting qualities remain to be Nevertheless, the PDF ls thefront" type of organization without which It is highly unlikely that the BCP could achieve domination of Burma. d. Unitary Activities.

BCP military activities are conductedby small guerrilla bonds In widelyareas. These bands ore well supplied with Japanese, British, and US small arms Wlille the Communists have capturedpoorly defended towns and villages, they have been unable toiven position against determined government attack and have avoided engaging In pitched battles wherever possible. Although numerically and materially weaker than the government forces, thc Communists enjoy suchas favorable terrain,apacity lo lose their Identity among local populations. Furthermore, they are opposed by limited and Inexperiencedforces which must cope with other insurgents and are Incapable of givingand continuing protection except In selected centers of population. Consequently, the BCP has not been suppressed, nor Is it likely to be in the predictable future.

The ultimate objective of thc BCP'scampaign is to wrest political power from any existingegime. Until thc BCP canorce capable ofa successful frontal assault upon thchowever, it must continue to confine itself to guerrilla tactics as the bestf undermining tlic government's authority and aggravating national Instability.

Military relations between the BCP and other insurgent groups arc obscure, hugely because of the difficulty often encountered in identifying the participants in any given en-


There arc strong indications tltat on several occasions, because of the general Burman antipathy towards the Karens, the BCP has cooperated with government and PVO forces against the Karens. In other cases, the Communists are reported to have avoided fighting the Karens, or even to have entered into tactical cooperation In localagainst thc government Despite government allegations, there Is very little evidence of premeditated or widespreadbetween the BCP and the Karens. In fact, the Karens have been most emphatic in their condemnation of Communism. There have been clashes bclween BCP and CPB. and it is believed that the mutual animosity of the two Communist groups is bitter and deep-seated. Despite the formation of the PDF and Communist efforts to avoid antagonizing the PVO, there have also been conflictsthe two and there are Indications oi friction within the framework of the PDF over the matters of spheres of influence and local leadership.

e. Plans and Policies.

BCP policies, originally based almoston nationalism and virtually identical to those of the AFPFL. have latterly tended to conform Increasingly to the Moscow line. Nevertheless, thc primary source of friction between thc BCP and the Socialist-dominated AFPFL may be traced to AFPFL efforts tonational independence andocialist program without resorting torather than lo any profound ideological differences. For example, the Anglo-Burmese Treaty, wliich includes Important concessions to the UK in return for independence, hasthe cliicf target of BCP propagandaupon the Burmese Government. For obligating Burma to honor foreign debts, to pay compensation for nationalized foreign property, and toritish Militarytlie BCP accuses thc AFPFL's "right wing" of aoceptbig sham independence. Steadily deteriorating conditions in Burma have forced the government to seek relief by modifying ils extreme socialist policies and seeking closer relations with thc West, thus

providing thc BCP with new propaganda

The most recent expression of BCP policies appears in the9 manifestothe formation of the PDF, which, although signed by representatives of allelements, undoubtedly was written by the Communists. It presents apolitico economic program whichconforms to the hitemational "party hue" and in many respects Is strikinglyto the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, particularly those propounded during the earlier days of the Chinese revolution. According to the manifesto, the first objective is development of the PDF Into an effective political and military organization.

Tlie pricuuy goals ol the PDF arc the overthrow of the present government and the establishmenteople's DemocraticSlate basedew "People's Democratic" constitution. Under thc new admin 1st ration, peasants and workers are promised extensive privileges; freedom of speech, assembly, writing, and religion arelong as they are not used as politicala "broad"of nationalization and mdustrialization is envisaged without the aid ofexpansionists."

Thc new government intends to repudiate all foreign debts, abrogate the Anglo-Burmese Treaty and any others "signed against theof thendontinuous struggle against Anglo-AmericanIt will not accept assistance that would affect adversely Burma's political, economic or military interests (according to its ownof Burma's interests) but would be willing to establish friendly relations with any countryreciprocal and equal" basis. It will negotiate freely with other "People's Democratic" slates in the interest of "world peace."

Of interest also Is the BCP'S attitude towards tho more conservative and backward etlmic minorities, particularly the Karens. The PDF manifesto states that, although the feudal systems of the hill people mustpeople's" administration, these



are entitled to equal rights with all other peoples In Burma, including those of autonomy and secession. The KarenIs attributed to Imperialist machinations, and the PDF is charged wtth "smashing" the Karen re belli on while the Karen "masses" are called upon to repudiate their leaders and Join the Burman "masses" In order to shape their own destiny along "democratic"

While BCP Intentions are clear, theof their ambitions has not progressedthe earliest stages. The conference at which the PDF was founded was markedonsiderable disagreement. The PVOIs reported to haveeeting of Its own tonified policy andfurther fragmentation. Furthermore, there are indications of growing suspicion of the Communists within the PDF as well as thc development of personal Jealousies,the BCP has succeeded, temporarily at least. Inopular front dominated by Than Tun and now may make effortsto Incorporate those revolutionaries still operating independently.esult,internal dissensions appear to have prevented the BCP from fully exploltbig Its gains. Communist capabilities In Burma were appreciably enhanced.

oreign Contacts.

The BCP Is known to have maintainedextensive liaison with the Communist Party of India and Ls suspected uf having sporadic contact with thc Chinese Communist Party and Communist elements in Indochina No direct contact with Soviet agents or the USSIt has been proved, and, if such con tacts exist, they are Indirect.

Tlie extent of foreign control over the BCP is still an unresolved question. Stronginfluence (Chinese and Soviet) IsIn Its propaganda which reflects growing compliance with Soviet policy. Although Than Tun has denied the charge of foreign dictation, hc has publicly slated that (a) thc Communist uprising In Burma is allied with similar movements elsewhere in the world

which recognize thc leadership of Sovietand (b) that there were many Indians and Chinese in the BCP, some of whom had been "elected" leaders hy the masses. The BCP therefore has demonstrated its amenability to foreignt least on policy and lt would doubtless accept material assistance with alacrity. However, lt is entirelythat direct foreign intervention such as usurping authority In the Implementation of Soviet or Chinese Communist policy, orwould alienate large numbers of local adherents to the Communist movement In Burma.

3. Comrnuniif Parry (Burma) (Red Flag).

The CPB appears to have degeneratedairly strong organization into numerous uncoordinated anarchist and bandit gangs operating without principles or clcarcut(Tills loss of cohesiveness may be due largely to the long incarceration of its leader. Thakin See, but may be rectified somewhat now that he Is reported to be once again atn terms of members,support, and insurrectionary potential the CPB Us considerably weaker than the BCP. Although the CPB has been responsible for same disturbances In centralouthern Burma, It has been most active hi Arakan. which forms the western coastal area ofHowever, even In Arakan, It lshow much of the unrest is attributable to the CPB. and how much to ArukanoseThe CPB's policies, if any actually exist, are at best vague generalizations along the lines of theoretical Marxism. Militarily, the CPB violently opposes thc government, thc PVO, and the BCP. thc latter beingopportunistic and compromising.the CPB advocates cooperating with the Karens, it appears to have had little if any success So far as Is known thc CPU docs not maintain any foreign contacts All things considered, thc CPBangcr-ous organization, capable of prolonging the general unrest in Burma, but not of unseating the government through its own unaided efforts.

Original document.

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