THE USSR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (ORE 24-49)

Created: 1/5/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ii o

THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

THE USSR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

his copy ol this publication Is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

Assistant to thc Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State

of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of tbe Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-

mission

Director for Intelligence, Jointor thc Joint Staff

Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for anyor Agency

his copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Centra) Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA

DISTRIBUTION: Office of the President National Security Council National Security Resources Board Department ol State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department or the Navy Department of the Air Force

Joint Chiefs ol Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board

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THE USSR PETROIJCUM INDUSTRY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1. BRIEF

Page

Statement or

Summary and

Oil

Field

d Refined

g Synthetic Fuel

h. Requirements and

L Distribution of Military POL Requirements Assuming War9

J. Military Supply

k. Conclusions: Requirements and

oviet Capabilities To Exploit Middle East

m. Relative Position of thc Soviet Oil

SECTION 2. STUDY

Cbtjde Oil

Oil Field

Petroleum Refining

Refining

Production Potential of Light

Fuel

and

and Consumption of Refined0

C- Requirements and Consumption of Refinedeace

d. Requirements and Consumption of Refinedar

APPENDIXES

Consumption and Requirements of Principal Soviet Consumers

Soviet Capabilities To Transport Military POL Requirements in the Event of

Amount of POL In

Capabilities To Exploit Middle East

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Page

Relative Position of Uie USSR Petroleum

Crude Oil

TABLES AND CHARTS

I. Refinery Capacity by Economic

Refined9

HI. Distribution of Products with Maximum Feasible Production of

TV. Straight Run Gasoline in Crude

Aviation Gasoline Production,

(b) Productionctane Aviation Gasoline,

Percentage Allocation

VII. Re-distributed0

VIII. Requirements of Refined0

IX. Requirements of Refined

X. Miliiary POL

9 Peace; Total

XIJ. Percentage Distribution of Refined Products on Total Crude Requirements3

Million Metric

XDJ. Tabulation of Refined Products Availability9 War

XIV. Requirements of Refined

ar: Total

Summation of the Petroleum Situation of theeace and War

A

Agriculture

I. USSR Traclor Park9

II. Horsepower of9 Traclor

Transportation Rail

I. Percentile Relationship of Railroad Fuel

Transportation Motor

I. Postwar Production of Motor

USSR Motor Vehicle Inventory and Civilian Motor Transport POL Requirements

I. USSR Mid-Year Inventory of Serviceable Motor

II. USSR Mid-Year Inventory of Civilian Motor

III. POL Requirements for Civilian Motor

Inland Waterways

I. Serviceability Mid-Year Inventory of Oil-Burning River vessels

II. Horsepower Hours of

Requirements of the River

Appendix B

ChartShowing Estimated Annual POL Requirements of EachConsumer, the Amount Stockpiled and the Amount that Mustpage 45

ChartShowing Estimated Annual POL Requirements of Eachthe Source of Supply by Economic Regions and thepage 45

MapPOL Requirements in Event of9 . Following page 45

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THE USSR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

SECTION I. BRIEF

Stolement of Project.

The object of the present study ls tothe petroleum Industry of the USSR The following broad subjects arerude Oilefiningequirements and Consumption,trategic and Military Considerations.

2. Summary and Conclusion*.

progress of Soviet crude69 has beenofficial yearly rates of percentagethe previous year. In order toabsolute figure to which thesecould be applied, use was madeSoviet publication which stated thatPlan, the average annual increase inwillillion5 production4 millionthe official percentage Increases arcto5 base from year to year,production9ons.

Important aspect of petroleumis the supply of oilhis is planned toonsiderablethe variety of itemshortage in fabricated steel andand control instruments willexpansion of oil equipmenttrade agreements withSweden indicate that they arc concen-

trating particularly on oil field pipe andUS shipments of approximately sixty-four million dollars worth of petroleumto the USSRas a

decisive factor in keeping the Soviet petroleum industry in operation. US shipmentsf about forty-four million dollars worth of equipment further aided theof the Soviet oil Industry. However, the Western export restrictions instituted in the latter half8 would tend to limitand delay expansion of refineryparticularly for the production of high-octane gasoline.

c. Soviet refining capacity now exceeds crude oil output by an estimated minimum ofercent (withercent excess based on all available reports of plantist showing the location of Soviet refineries and thermal cracking plants, together with their respective capacities. Is given In theA list of refineries of which there Is some evidence bul not fully confirmed is also shown. The condensed table below shows plantby economic region and total crude throughput capacity (principal list) and cracking capacity for each, with the total for the USSR

The principal equipment shortage forrefining is in specialized types for the production of high-octane gasoline, such as catalytic cracking plants, alkylation andunits

1M- intelligence organlzaUons or thc Departmeri* nr

Force have concurred in Ihls report It' y'm*nformation available to CIA as of 25

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ECONOMIC REGION: USSR

(All capacity quotedTY)

Plant

Crude

Capacity

Industrial

Siberia

Siberia

East

Based on indigenous crude oil production8 million metric tonsherefined products, with the exception of

high-octane combat aviation gasoline, will practically meet requirements. Thesummary illustrates this:

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Lubricating Oil Residual Fuel Oil

The shortages are based on Indigenousand can be made up by imports and synthetic productionurplus forconsumptionelatively small deficit for war.

e. Because adequate specialized equipment, such as catalytic cracking plants, alkylation and polymerization units, is decidedly lacking, production of high-octane combat aviation gasoline, which is so necessary in an air age. lags far behind requirements From theinformation. It appears that the USSR can produceercent of its high octane combat aviation gasoline for fullrequirements. In operations where higher-octane gasoline ls not

Shortage Peace War

J*

octane gasoline is uvallable. However, ample jet fuel production facilities arc available along with sufficient crude oil supplies to satisfyfor air force operations, providing sufficient and satisfactory Jet-propelledare available. Requirements for high-octane aviation gasoline will be reduced to the extent that jet-englned planes replace piston-englned planes.

The estimated Soviet aviation fuelfor the first year of operations In war isillion metric tons of high octane combat aviation gasoline, of which onlyillion metric tons can be produced. An additional0 metric tonsctane gasoline, which

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been employed as aviation fuel ln the USSR can be made available. This latter grade, however, ls not suitable for combat purposes but was generally employed forand low-flying ground support and attack.

In the US, blending agents other than those referred to above, such as benzene, toluene, and cumene, which were found so necessary to the US high octane production during World War n. are In short supply ln the USSR even for the chemical and explosive industries, and cannot be counted on to augment the supply of high-octane gasoline.

Tetracthyl lead, perhaps the mostcomponent of high-octane gasoline which improves Its anti-knock value. Is made at the Oka and Kalinin plants in Dzerzhlnsk, and the Olglnsky plant ln Moscow. No other producing areas for this highly criticalare known. Tetracthyl leadital material for the production of combatgasoline because of the small amounts required to produce large increases in the octane rating of the fuel and the efficiency and maneuverability of the plane.

With regard to the whole problem ofaviation gasoline supply, it is mostthat additional detailed information be obtained in the future about theof tetracthyl lead and the construction and oj>eratlons of specialized equipment for thc production of catalytic cracking base stock, and high octane components such as polymer and alkylate, as well as aromatic hydrocarbons such as benzene and toluene.

f. Ample Jet fuel production facilities arc available together with sufficient crude oilto satisfy requirements for air force operations, providing there are sufficient and satisfactory Jet-propelled aircraft. Theof jet fuel is limited primarily byof the crude oil. Jet fuel consists generally of naphtha, kerosene, and light gas oil,ixture of any of them. On thethat the naphtha is included ln the motor gasoline, and that the jet fuelthe total kerosene and light gas oil in the crude, approximatelyercent of the crude, or aboutillion metric tons per year, may be obtained8 million metric

tons of crude oil. If heavy naphtha lswith this, comprising aboutercent of the gasoline, anercent based on the crude may be obtained,otal ofercent. Thus, with the sacrifice of otheraximum productionillion metric tons of Jet fuel ls possible and this should be ample for their needs. Widely scattered storage facilities point to serious attention by the Sovietin this direction. Based on presenthowever, high-octane combat aviation gasoline is In short supply and the amount of Jet fuel required is relatively small,that the program for Jet plane production has only been partly developed.

g. Existing centers of synthetic fuelnamely, prewar experimental plants in the Kuzbas and near Lake Baikal, have been expanded by the additions of dismantledplants and the construction of new ones. The center of activity is apparently localized to areas which are distant from petroleum-producing areas but which have suitable coal deposits for use as raw material. In addition, there are other plants outside the USSR, the products of which would be available to them, namely, at Most in Czechoslovakia and In the Soviet Zone of Oermany. Also, it is rumored that both Albania and Yugoslavia have plans for developmentynthetic oil industry. The maximum production Inf thc six plants in thc Sovzone of Germany wasillion metric tons, which was reduced by bomb damage and dismantling. Taking Into account the present Estonian production of oil from shale and the capacity of thefuel plants in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the USSR can produce1 million tons of synthetic liquid fuels with which to supplement Its currentof POL. The total capacity of the USSR and the satellites is more than double this figure.

It Is doubted whether synthetic fuel can be used as combat aviation gasoline because of the large amounts of blending agents and tetracthyl lead necessary to Improve itto suit combat standards. Also,large quantities of lead in synthetic gasoline would Increase engine maintenance

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Since the Soviets have very limited refining facilities for the production ofbase stock and alkylates, aof these components for blending combat aviation gasoline has probably resulted. This shortage of blending agents for aviationmay be the reason for the Soviet Interest in synthetic fuels when no better product Is available.

ft. The Soviets will be0 with regard to petroleumwith the exception of high-octane combat aviation gasoline. However, this has been made possible only by strict control over the supply of petroleum and refined products and adherence to an allocation system which has allowed lor careful scheduling of available supply of refined products to meet the essential needs of principal consumers. If Judged by Western standards, present Soviet production of refined products is insufficient to meet the increasing requirements of their expanding economy, but severe restrictions on civilian and industrial economyough balance between supply and minimum requirements.

The requirements of refined products for the principal consumerseace and war, are shown below. The data for theconsumers for peacetime use were obtained by integration of thc calculateddata of each. These data,percentage-wise, check closely the relative distribution or allocation systemby the British independently.were made by experts in the various fields of Interest as to the quantity ofproducts needed to operate thc economy at the current level of industrial activity. Use was made of such critical indices as the growth of the tractor park, ton-kilometers of freight hauled, activity in the machine tool Industry,s an Indication of the genera) industrial growth within the Soviet Union. It Is noted that thc principal difference between thcn which the British allocation system was based, and the consumption pattern9 is the emphasis on gasoline and diesel fuel rather than on kerosene, whichatural development in the shift from aeconomyasoline and diesel economy. Allocations for Soviet industrial economy

under possible wartime conditions wereIn the same manner. However, In the latter case the maximum extent to which supply might be curtailed without unduly Impairing thc effectiveness of the Industrial economy to support the military machine In war was balanced against the militaryas determinedpecial study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Requirements of Refined Products by Principal Consumers

(Millions of Metric Tons)

9 War

Agriculture

Rail

Motor

Use

Distribution of Military POLAssuming War

The Soviet transportation system will have thc capability of distributing thc totalPOL requirements amounting toillion metric tons, estimated as needed for one year of military operations:ercent or aboutillion metric tons will beduring the year,illion metric tons will be stockpiled for theand the Black Sea Naval Forces' needs, somewhatillion metric tons, will not require transportation.

If the entire military requirement is moved over the railroads, the total Soviet raildistribution capability would be severely strained as thereequirement of0 tank cars outotalnd therefore, few lank cars would be available for the movement of civilian and Industrial needs during the war. However. It is not likely that lank cars will be used exclusively for the movement of the military supplies,onsiderable amount could be packaged in drums, barrels, or cans, and shipped to ties-

* Ha* been revised1 million metric tvns-

TO

in general-purpose freight cars. Moreover, the internal ground and airof motor and aviation gasoline can bo moved by tank or general-purpose motor truck when consuming centers are In closeto the refineries and the burden on the railroads may be further eased to some extent by the use of water transportation.

i. During World War n. the USSR had no system of supply administration ln the field. Generally speaking, existing railway facilities were the deleirnlnlng factor rather thanor strategic conditions. Materiel was sent to army depots located at various sta-

tions in the rear of the army zono anywhereiles from the front line Inwhile the system was of an elementary character. It proved to be workable andIls essentials would probably be duplicateduture war, modified, however, by greater allotments of motor vehicles to Individual units,

Jr. The foregoing conclusions are generally summarized In thc following tables showing the requirements, available indigenous supply, deficits. Imports, and synthetic production for both peace and

PEACE

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Luboil Fuel Oil

Totals

l Ijj

Available

Supply

Production

2

4.7

.2

.3

.1

9.7

.4

.6

.2

AR

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Luboil Fuel Oil

Totals

6

Available Indigenous

Maximum Imports

Deficit

Synthetic Production

Ji

?

5

(Surplus) .1

7

of combat aviation gasoline, of which thereefinite shortage, it will be noted from the above thai the requirements for other products for both peace and war may be substantially met. This may bebecause of adequacy and flexibility of the thermal cracking plants in the production of light products such as gasoline andfor some uses. The Indigenous refined products must, however, be supplemented by imports and synthetics. The over-all con-

clusion is thai all requirements can be met for peace or war with respect to all refined petroleum products with thc exception ofaviation gasoline.

1 One of the Important phases of the present project is the determination of theof Middle East oil and the Sovietto exploit the same. The mostaspect of Middle East oil to the USSR is the extremely large potential supply of crude oil with an average annual production exceed-

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that of the USSR and with availability of refining capacity of approximatelyercent of the USSR. Over and above these factors is the presence of the Abadan refinery of the Middle East, with an annual capacityillion metric tons ofproducts and currently producingone million metric tonsctanc aviation gasoline. Aside from tbe large supply of POL products. Including jet fuel and residual fuel oils, the acquisition of the Middle East would make It possible for the USSR almost to meet Its requirementsurrent production basis of combat aviation gasoline for the first year of war.ignificant limitation to any Soviet designs In the Middle East ls thc inadequacy offacilities so that the question ofand refining capacity becomes, Insecondary. It is estimated that the USSR could transport only one million metric tons per year from the Middle East. If land transportation facilities were continuously and exclusively employed In hauling oil, thecapacity of rat) and highway deliveries from Iran lo Iraq to Soviet border points and/ or Caspian Sea portsetric tons per year, but the former figure is considered the probable practical limit of transportation capacity because of the poor condition of the railroads Even assuming the maximumcarrying capacity of railroads andthe existing transportation facilities from the Middle East to the USSR would be sufficient to moveercent of the present Persian Gulf refinery output. Also, thecould be relatively easily knocked out of commission by air bombardment because

of the many tunnels in the rail net. Anytoipeline in order to speed up thc flow of Middle East petroleum would be an extremely formidable engineering problem because of the mountainous and difficult

esult of the limited supply of combat aviation gasoline in the Soviet Union, It would appear that the Soviets would attempt either to dismantle and transport the basic units for the production of combat aviation gasoline (namely, catalytic cracking, alkylation and polymerizationr in theto transport by air such critical products as aviation gasoline.

In time of war this would beifficult task as to make it wholly Impractical.

m. The relative positions of the petroleum industry in the United States and the Soviet Union can be judged largely by production. Of the total petroleum produced in the world, aboulercent is produced or can bewithin the confines of the United States. On the other hand, Sovietercent of the world's total. In terms of actual output, the petroleumot the United Stales8 isillion metric tons per year, whereas theUnion has only recently managed0 level ofillion metric tons per year. While the over-all refining plant of the United States ls well balanced withto all products, the USSR is deficient in equipment to make combat aviation gasoline. If the past performance of the Soviet oilis usedasis for comparison, the Soviets cannot be expected to make anyimprovements in the near future.

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SECTION II. STUDY

Soviet Crude Oil Production,

Estimates for the base5 showed some divergence and alter carefullt was concluded that the most reliable method for estimating the current production of crude oil In the USSR was the use of certain releases In the Soviet press, Thc primary factors usedhe petroleum goal under the current Five-Year Plan;nnouncements of progress in the attainment of annual production quotas. The followingescription of the method that was used In estimating crude oil production5

In the postwar period, beginning with thehc progress of crude oilhas been reported In terms of percentage Increases over the previous year, Thus far. the official yearly rate of increase which has prevailed5 has been as follows:

production6'

production7'

o. Oil production8'

d. BAIBAKOV. Minister of the Soviet oilslated that the goal of the oil industry9 was to increase oil8 production.*

In order to establish an absolute figure to which the above percentage Increases could be applied, use was made of Informationin liakmskiy Rabotchiy,his publication stated that during the fourth Five-Year Plan, the average annual Increase in oil production willillion tons, or

1 IZVPSmVA.anusryIZVBST1YA, IB January.anuaryPHAVDA.arch

a total ofillion tons for the five years. Since0 goal4 million tons' this implies that5 output4 nuUlon metric tons. If the official percentageare applied to this base figurehe oil production for each succeeding year is as follows:

of

Tons

These estimates are further confirmed,and Independently, by referenceecent Sovietublished by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. thisgave the development andof the petroleum Industry in the USSR which was characterised In the following manner:

OIL INCREASESHICHERCENT

Percentagepercent

112

133

151

If the5 is4 million metric tons derived by the first method, then crude oil production by the above percentage Increases Is as follows:

'Rinnan text of the fourth Flve-YrarRAVDA.arch 1MB.

K Information Bulletin, Volume IX. No. la,ugust.

7

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Over (Millions of

Tons)

7

Although the fourth Five-Year Planan output4 million metric tons of crude oil by the endoviethave announced that the goal is now to be reached during the current twelve months. This revision was probably made because of thc accelerated tempo of rehabilitation and development6nd in view of much greater need arising for thespeed-up of economic expansion in the USSR

Recent criticisms of the oil industry byleaders with regard to greater exertions, however, has led some observers of the Soviet oil Industry to believe that the revised plan cannot be accomplished and to doubt seriously whether the Soviet oil industry has everits prewar level of output.

Also, it has been assumed by observers of the Soviet economy that the currentoutput figures do notate of progress wholly in line with requirements of the supposed revised plan.

2. Oil Field Equipment.'

Since the planned expansion of theIndustry depends on the availability of oil field equipment, thc USSR has placed heavy emphasis on the rapid development of theoil field equipment industry In order to lessen Soviet dependence on foreign sources of supply.oviet oil fieldproduction is planned toimes the outputonsiderablein the variety of items manufactured. An indication of Soviet requirements may be found in the SIO million worth of equipment shipped to the USSR from the US; about half of which was drilling equipment, and the re-

1ore detailed treatment of thc subject sec OIR Report No.4

mainder cementing and prospectingA shortage in fabricated steel and measuring and control instruments willhinder thc expansion of ol) equipment production.

The Soviets have Improved their postwar supply ot oil field equipment by dismantling oil field facilities In the satellites. Thenow encountered In thc Rumanian oil Industry are attributable to the removal of large and diversified types of oil equipment from Rumanian oil fields. In Austria It has been reported that the Soviets0 percent of the oil well drilling and field maintenance equipment

Recent Soviet trade arrangements with Czechoslovakia and Sweden indicate that the Soviets arc concentrating particularly onpipe and tubing for their oil fields. Czechoslovakia ls expected to0 tons of oil well tubingweden is scheduled torills by the endr an average ofrills per annumtx-ycarecentIndicates that the Czechs have concluded another trade agreement lo deliver more oil field equipment. This Czech-Soviethowever, may have merely clarified the amount that was to have been delivered under thc previous arrangement.

While the Soviet Union Ls expected toimporting badly needed oil fieldit will probablyesture ofoil field equipment to Poland. In view of the shortage of equipment in the Soviet Union, il is doubtful If these shipmentsthat the Soviets can adequately assist the satellites in overcoming the critical shortage of their petroleum equipment.

US shipments ofillion worth of petroleum equipment to the USSRecisive factor in keeping thc soviet petroleum industry inUS shipmentsfillion worth of equipment aided theoil Industryoint where the present production has reached1 level. Aof such oil equipment shipments to the USSR would old the Soviets in production and increase the rate of expansion.

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present Western embargo on oil field and refinery equipment shipments would not drastically hamper present Soviet oilRather, this action on the part of the West shouldnstrumental in limiting Soviet oil field exploration andelay expansion of refinery facilitiesfor the production otlso delay any Soviet schemes of stockpiling strategic quantities of high-octane gasoline and lubricants.

3. PeUoloum Refining Industry. a. Petroleum Refining Equipment. Soviet refining capacity now exceeds crude oil output by an estimated minimumwithercent excess based on allreports of plants shown in Table I. However, the shortage of high-grade refined products, particularly high-octaneindicates that lack of specializedsuch as catalytic cracking plants, alky-lation and polymerization units, continues to be the outstanding deficiency In the Soviet petroleum industry. From availablelt appears that the USSR can produceercent of its high-octane combat aviation gasoline requirements for minimum air force operations. In operations where higher-octane gasoline is notctane gasoline is available. This deficiency in refinery equipment, which retarded thedevelopment of the petroleum Industry, was aggravated during the war by destruction of plants producing refinery equipment and by conversion of oil equipment plants toproduction.

Recent US restrictions on export ofequipment and products to the USSR have been effective In bringing about this shortage. Another adverse factor is thelimitation in operational efficiency and maintenance causedhortage of skilled workers and proper repair facilities.

Construction of sufficient catalytic cracking capacity is In the early stages. This process was Introduced only after the end of the war with the shipment of Houdry units under Lend-lease Four such units were ordered but orders for two plants were cancelled al the end of the war although the USSR did receive

some equipment for these cancelled units. The general lack of technical skill In thepetroleum industry will obviate fullof the two completed units, as well asof the unfinished units. ThisIs evidenced by the Soviet overtures for technical assistance from US companies that took part in Installing the plants.shipments of this type of equipment from thc US has not only had the effect of restricting Soviet production of high-octane gasoline, but will probably accentuate the present shortage for several years.

CONOMIC REGIONS:il capacityTY )

Plant

Crude

868

Industrial

Siberia

Siberia

East

Refitted Products.

ntroduction to Table II.

In estimating the yield of refined products, the chemical and physical characteristics of the crude oil, relative to the quality andof each of the required products were taken into acrount. The capabilities of thc over-all refining plant, as well as of liscomponents, such as genera) refining and cracking capacities, were also considered These factors, together with the crude oilshow the amount of each refined productredetermined quality which will be available- The actual weights of each product were simply determined byroportionate amount of each based on thehaving the above factors in mind.

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volumes of each product weredetermined from the weights on the basis of known specific gravities, and theof each calculated.

Table II shows the available refinedboth by weight and volume, based on the estimated indigenous crude oil production8 million metric tons.

TABLE IT

AVAILABLE REFINED9

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Lubricating Oil Residual Fuel5

28(

3.3

ioo.o

3.0

iooTo

Total Refined Products Refining Loss

and Fuel Other Products

iscussion of Table IL

As explained above, the weights, volumes, and percentages of each productroportionate basis oftaking into consideration theof the crude oil as well as thequality of thc refined products and the capacity and capability of thc over-all refining plant to produce thc same.

For example, thc yield of gasoline, which is the most important product, was determined6 percent by weight0 percent by volume of the crude oil. Since this is well within the potential production based on the above considerations, the actual breakdown to produce It would be as follows: thc average yield of gasoline from thc available cracking stocks, based on the total cracking capacity, taking into account all factors including time cycle efficiency, Isercent. The maximum statistical average) for the United

States which Includes unused capacity5 percent; the used capacity isercent. Calculation from these factors as applied to the USSRieldercent of cracked gasoline based on the charging capacity of the over-allplant ofillion metric tons. The actual weight of cracked gasoline Isillion metric6 percent of the available crude oil. The availability (based on proportional requirement)illion metric tons; therefore, the straight runrequirementillion metric0 percent of the crude oil available, thusotal6 percent by weight of gasoline which is the figure cited above. It ls to be particularly noted that the yield of cracked gasoline is well within thc potential as will be shown later, and the percentage of straight-run gasoline similarly is much lower than that present in thc crude. It must be borne in mind, however, that while morecan be produced, the yield is definitely limited in order toalancedof gasoline and the other requiredas to quantity and quality.

The availability of the other products, namely, kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils, and residual fuel oil from thc refiningwas also distributed proportionately on the requirement and the amount of crude oil available, having in mind the possible yields of these products from crude oil as determined by the amount available and itsThis applies especially to the production of kerosene and lubricating oils. The limiting factor in the yield of diesel oil is the minimum quality which is acceptable on the one hand and the necessary quality of the residual fuel oil on the other, as these are tied together in the refining process. Refining loss, fuel, and other products, such as wax, asphalt, coke,re based on general practice, taking Into account lhe yields of the other products.

c. Maximum Production Potential of Light Fractions.

ntroduction to Table III.

in view of the importance of light fractions, particularly gasoline, it has been considered necessary to determine the maximumpotential of lightasoline

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and kerosene secondarily. This Is necessarily founded on the current crude oil production8 million metric tons, and the over-all cracking and refining plant capacity.

In determining the potential yield ofcareful consideration was given to the characteristics ond tho quality or the average crude as determined from the weightedof the individual crudes from which the quantity of straight run gasolinero-sene can be directly ascertained. Theof the charging stocks to the cracking plant, and the yields of gasoline obtainable therefrom in plant practice corrected to the time cycle efficiency of the cracking plants, which Includes shut-down periods, clean-outs, repairs,ere taken into account The yields of gasoline from cracking were alsoagainst the minimum acceptableof the diesel oil and residual fuel oil, all of which are intimately related.

TABLE in

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Lubricating Oil Residual Fuel Oil Refinery Loss and Other Products

Totals

DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTS WTTHFEASIBLE PRODUCTION OF

GASOLINE

By

By

Volume

0

3.6

Discussion o! Table III. Since the potential yield of gasoline must be directly derived from and Is dependent upon chemical and engineering factors, as well as general refinery practice, It is consideredto show the methods by which thehave been obtained. The premise ofyield is based on maximum gasoline production. This In turn depends on thc gasoline content of the crude as well as the

cracking plant capacity, and the yields ofobtainable therefrom. Taking Intoall operating factors, tho yields of light products win be governed by the gasoline and kerosene content of the crude oil as well as the gasoline from cracking. The yield of the latter will depend on requirements and the amount and minimum quality of othersuch as diesel oil and residual fuel oil.reater cracking capacityetric tons it would, of course, be possible to produce even more gasoline from the other products, such as kerosene and diesel oil, and even from thc residual fuel oil,ithcracking capacity all of the crude oil would be converted Into gasoline, gas, and coke. Also somewhat more kerosene and less gasoline could be produced If desired as kerosene and the heavy fractions of straight run gasoline are Interchangeable within limits. However, this treatment would result either In eliminating thcheavier than gasoline, or In destroying the quality and the usability of products other than gasoline. This approachwould be highly uneconomical andOther than for converting the remaining kerosene and diesel oil Into(ifdditional crackingcould be profitably employed only ifcrude supplies were available. The above remarks with regard to gasolinedo not apply to combat aviationbecause highly specialized equipment Is required for Its manufacture.

stimation of Maximum Cracked

With regard to the determination of thc potential yield of light products comprising cracked and straight run gasoline, thedata methods were employed, all based on commercial practice. The gasoline yield frcm ten heavy cracking stocks Is estimatedercent and that from light crackingAn estimate of the relative amounts of heavy and light stocks Isercent andercent respectively. The percentage ol cracked gasoline derived from heavy stocks based on total cracking stocks ls thusercent and that derived from light stocks,

12

based on total cracking stocks, Isercent,otal percentage yield of gasoline from cracking based on both heavy and light cracking stocks2 percent.

The over-all time cycle cracking efficiency for US practice lsercent maximumfor shutdown time, clean-outs,and equipmentercent maximum time-cycle cracking efficiency for USSR practice, thc over-all average yield of gasoline from thc average cracking stock, corrected for time cyclels thusercent by volume.

The percentage yield of cracked gasoline by weight was determined by taking intothe relative gravities of gasoline and the charging stock, thus converting volume percentage ofo weight percentagehe latter figure multiplied byillion metric tons cracking capacity gives directly the weight In million metric tons of cracked gasoline,hich taken against the weight of the crude8 milliontons)5 percent of cracked gasoline0 percent by volume.

stimation of Potential Straight Run Gasoline in Crude Oil.

The average percentage of straight run gasoline was determined from analysesamples of crude oil atdepths taken from the principal fields of thc USSR Thc weighted averageof gasoline was calculated from these analyses with the following results:

TABLE IV

STRAIOHT RUN QASOL1NE IN CRUDE OIL

22%

Caucasus Volga-Ural

Remaining Areas 7

7

A volume ofercent was therefore adopted and this was converted to weight, taking Into consideration the relativeof the gasoline and crude oil which5 straight run gasoline by weight. Therefore, the total gasoline by weight5 percent cracked gasoline5 percent straight run gasoline, orercent. This convertedolume basis,ade up ofercent straight run gasoline andercent cracked gasoline.

The percentage of potential kerosene by volume may be determined like the straight runrom the analysis of the crude oil.

The percentage of lubricating oil shown is based on the requirement; It has beendetermined that this was well within the amount present, as determined byof the crude oil. The percentage of diesel oil and residual fuel oil was found bythe other liquid products produced from total refined products. The quantities obtained are based on the maximum of each of these products which can be produced from the remaining crude oil of minimumquality. Thus, the potentialof gasoline which can be made, especially that obtained by cracking, must be balanced not only against the crude oil or more directly thc cracking stocks available, but also the permissible qualities of the diesel oil and/or the residual fuel oil.

d. Aviation Fuels.

(I) Aviation Gasoline.

Because adequate equipment, such ascracking plants, alkylation andunits, is decidedly lacking,of this critical commodity, which is so necessary in an air age, lags far behind requirements. From available information. It appears that the USSR can produceercent of its high-octane combatgasoline requirements for minimum air force operations. However, ample jet fuel production facilities are available along with sufficient crude oil supplies to satisfyfor air force operations, providing there are available sufficient and satisfactory jet-propelled aircraft.

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for high-octane gasoline will be reduced to the extent that jet-engtned planes replace piston-engined planes.ndicates the present aviation gasolinewithin the USSR. In the event of war during the calendarhe estimated Soviet aviation fuel requirements for Lhe first year of operationsetric tons of high-octane combat aviation gasoline,etric tons of jet fuel.

In the United States, aviation gasolinerefersctane either foror commercial transport uses, but in the USSR gasolinectane was widelyas aviation fuel The production of this latter grade will, therefore, be included, although It ls recognized that forctane should be

In the United States, aviation gasoline Is made generally byatalytic-cracked base material with high octanesuch us polymer and alkylate, and with ethyl fluid. During thc war. aromatic hydrocarbons such as benzene, toluene, xylene, and cumene, made largely by catalyticof petroleum hydrocarbons, were also employed as blending agents. With regard to quality, even the gasoline employed forplanes is superiorctane rating and generally betteror combat purposes.f- octane rating was

. TABLE AVIATION GASOLINE

In the USSR, however, where the specialized equipment for+ octane combat aviation gasoline, such as catalytic cracking, polymerization, olkylation,s scarce, tbe situation Is quite different Substantialof relatively low-grade aviationctane rating useful forand ground support only, are employed, although their use would not be considered In the United States. To make the latter grade, straight run gasoline with octane ratingas been distilled from special crudes, such as Groznyaku, and May-kop oilfields. These are compoundedelatively small scale with higher octanesuch as pyrobenzene, alkylated aro-matics, and some polymer ands well asuch larger scale with selected fractions of thermally cracked gasoline and tetracthyl lead to producectane product. For thesmall quantity+ octane gasoline produced, the methods and componentsto above for the US are employedimited manner.

High-octane blending agents, such astoluene, and cumene. which were found so necessary lo thc US high-octane production during World War II, are In short supply in the USSR even for the chemical and explosives industries and cannot be counted on tothe supply ot high-octane gasoltnr

V

PRODUCTION, USSR'

Regions Southeast Transcaucasus Volga

Central Industrial Urals

Western Siberia Far East

of Metric Tons per Year)

Cracking6

High-Octane+Grozny)

Saratov)

,) (Quriev)

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V (b)

PRODUCTIONCTANE AVIATION GASOLINE, USSR (Thousands ol Metric Tons per Year)

Regions Southeast Tram caucus us Volga

Central Industrial Urals

Western Siberia Far East

% Distribution of USSR Cracking)8B

ioo

fJ6

thermal cracking and selective fracUonatlon of both cracked and selected strafcht-run disrates, pyrobeazo! and probably polymer gasoline andF con-

fn .h.L0MtanC gaf0"ne.ls notto air-combat operations. It might be employed In the absence of better quality fuel, tor transport and low flying ground support and attack.

Tetraethyl Lead.

Tetracthyl lead, perhaps the mostcomponent ol high-octane gasoline to Improve Its anti-knock rating, ls made at the Oka and KaUnin plants In Diershinsk and the Olglnsky plants in Moscow. No otherareas for this highly critical material are known.

Various other materials, such as monochlor-naphthalene, dibromoethane, and solvents such as benzene and kerosene, as wellye, are used In thc production of ethyl fluid. The amount of tetraethyl lead in thc latter should not be less thanercent and varies generally betweenercent andercent. When two cubic centimeters of ethyl fluid are added to one kilogram of Baku gasoline with an octane number of.he resulting product should have an octaneof not lesshe specific gravity of the ethyl fluid varies from5C).

Two typical US leaded fuels arc shownas examples:

etraethyl3%

Ethyl

Ethyl

Dye and other

etraethyl

Kerosene, dye, and otherlast mixture is classedimilar mixture ls.

Tetraethyl leadital material for the production of combat aviation gasoline. This is because of the relatively small amounttoery large Increase In thc octane rating (the amount employed Is3c's perartsolume) of the fuel; and correspondingly, the efficiency andof the plane.

An important report on the production of the sodium-lead amal gum employed in the manufacture of lead tetraethyl was submitted byated

This report shows the method of production of the amalgam or alloy in sufficient detail to permit calculation of the dally output which was determinediters.

Thc fused sail Installation is located at Ig-umnovo (Gorki Oblast) which isuburb of Dzcrzhinsk. The plant name is Zavodslroy. The process is electrolytic, com-

CKET

ells withdditional cells which It is stated was to have been ready torInhe sodium-leadIs converted to lead tetracthyl at the Zavod Yava plant (sometimes spelled Jarva) located near the village of Rolon.

The details of Lhe report, Includingof Lhe plant, output, temperatures, and other operating conditions as well as theobservations of others make itto be reliable.

From thc data shown Including the derived productioniters of sodium-lead alloy per day the yield of lead tetracthyl and ethyl fluid may be calculated;iters of the alloy is found to be equivalentolumeiters lead tetracthyl per day. This can be made upitersc's of ethyl fluid. At thc rutec per gal. of combat aviation gasoline this Is sufficient for thc treatmentallons, which isercent of the estimated dally production. At the ratec of ethyl fluid per gallon,ercent of the production can be treated. With the operation of thc additionalells, and assuming sufficient capacity for theof the sodium-lead alloy to lead fcetra-ethyl at the Oka and Kalinin plants at Dzer-zhinsk, practically the entire present estimated production of combat aviation gasoline may be treated. This raises the question of the source of supply of sodium-lead alloy at the Olginsky plant in Moscow and whetherlead tetracthyl over tlic estimatedis produced; also whether it is used in aviation gasoline of lower grade or ln motor gasoline.

The reported Soviet practice of employing large quantities of lead In aviation gasoline will lead to an increase of engine maintenance problems. Calculallons of the amount of tetracthyl lead per gallon of fuel, based on the Soviet ethyl fluid composition, gives antetracthyl lead contentc per gallon of fuel. The acceptable USlead contentc per gallon. Service tests conducted In tho United States have shown that the use of such quantities of lead will decrease spark plug life, Increase crank-case oil sludging, and Increase maintenance problems.

With regard to the whole problem of combat aviation gasoline supply. It Is most important that detailed information be obtained about thc production of tetraethyl lead and theand operation of specializedfor tbe production of catalytic-cracked base stock and high-octane components such as polymer and alkylate.

et Fuel.

Ample Jet fuel production facilities arealong with sufficient crude oil supplies to satisfy requirements for air force operations, providing there are sufficient and satisfactory Jet-propelled aircraft. The availability of Jet fuel is limited primarily by composition of tbe crude oil. It consists generally of naphtha, kerosene, and light gas oil,ixture of any of them. On the assumption that naphtha Is included in the motor gasoline and that jet fuel comprises the total kerosene and light gas oil In theaximum ofercent of the crude, or aboutillion metric tons per year, may be obtained8 million metric tons of crude oil.

If heavy naphtha Is Included with this,aboutercent of the gasoline, anercent based on the crude may be obtained,otal ofercent. Thus, with the sacrifice of otheraximum production of approximatelyillion metric tons of Jet fuel is possible and this should be ample for their needs. Widely scattered storage facilities point to seriousby thc Soviet planners in thisBased on present planning, however, high-octane combat aviation is in short supply and the amount ol Jet fuel required issmall, Indicating that the program for Jet plane production has only been partly

e. Synthetic Fuel Industry.

SSR.

The Soviet Union is apparently furtheron synthetic fuel development than had been previously realized. According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the production of liquid fuel from coal and shale will0fons will come fromons will be produced fromI Is estimated that there arc ln the Soviet Unionynthetic oil plants either

or In the process of erection,otential annual capacity ofhis potential includesGerman plants whichotal capacityons pert Is possible that when the Fourth Five-Year Plan was drawn up, the wholesale dismantling of synthetic oil plants in Germany had not then been contemplated, and in consequence the synthetic fuel plan may be revised in andirection.

A high level source (who participatedcientist In the Soviet synthetic fuel program) states that4 the development was given the status of an independent All-UnionEquipment and technical data captured from the German synthetic fuel industry are being fully utilized and leading Germanarc being exploited by the SovietHowever, these acquisitions have by no means met all the requirements of the Soviet synthetic fuel development. Theprogram is undoubtedly still handicappedack of modern scientific equipment,facilities, and skilled technicians.

Both thc hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch processes of synthetic fuelare being developed equally. The main effort has been devoted to developing these two processesiew to supplementing thc short supply of aviation gasoline and lub-oils ln the USSR In addition to otherproducts. The hydrogenation process willctane gasoline, which can be increased to high-octane gasoline byof iso-octanes and tetraethyl lead; Flscher-Tropsch is designed toctane gasoline, and the octane ratings can be greatly increased by use of improvedWhile the hydrogenation process at present produces better gasoline. Including aviation gasoline, the Fischer-Tropsch process is receiving attention because of its ability to produce diesel and lubricating oils.

'Law ol thc FourUi Five-Year Plan. 'Soviet News,une

citation in J.c#nescnskiy, Rcpoit on Fourth Five-Year Plan. tur;i

8bid.

Since thc Soviets have very limited refinery facilities for the production of catalytic-cracked base stock andhortage of these components for blending agents has resulted. This shortage of blending agents for aviation gasoline may also be the reason for the Soviet Interest ln synthetic fuels when no better product is available.

Existing centers of synthetic fuel product, mainly prewar experimental plants ln the Kuzbas and near Lake Baikal, have beenby the addition of dismantled German plants and the construction of new ones. The center of activity Is apparently localized to areas which are distant from petroleumareas but which have suitable coaleasily available for use as raw materials. Therefore, the stimulus for the synthetic fuel plant development around the Kuzbas and Transbaikal Is to make these regionsin fuels and lessen the load on the limited transportation facilities.

Another supplementary source of petroleum available to the Soviet Union Is the shale oil produced In Estonia and ln the Leningrad Oblast of the USSR. According to the Soviet Estonian Prime Minister, A. Veimer. theof shale is to riseillion tons yearly0 and the production of oil from shale toillionhe Leningrad Oblast is to0illion tons per annum of shale.*

While nothing Is known of the shale oil refineries ln the Leningrad Oblasts, the present output of the shale oil refineries in Estonia ls approximatelyillion tons or crude oil.'

Taking into account thc present Estonian production of oil from shale and the capacity of the synthetic fuel plants in the Soviet

'La* oT the Fourth Plve-Ycar Plan Also. A. Vetmer. On Slotm'i New PlxH-Ytar Plan for theend Deeelopnent ol the Natlemal Ecort-onv..clted in ONI Rpt., IS. "Newsletter Irom Behind the IronotnpUcd by the BalticSos.

-FOB Nohe Lai* Ol Ihe Floe-Year Plan for the Meitoraliou ana Drvtlopmenl ol theEconomy ol Ihe USSR.8 Feb. 49

19T Apr.F-*I.

top Secret

It is estimated that the USSRillion tons of synthetic liquid fuels with which to supplement Itsavailability ofatellites.

There arc only two areas of Eastern Europe outside the USSR where synthetic petroleum products are manufactured. The synthetic gasoline plant at Most in Czechoslovakia was originally designed by the Germans during Worldo produce one million tons ofear by means of hydrogenation of local coal. Estimates of present output rangeercent of capacity. The most recent Information places ttercent.

In the Soviet Zone of Germany there are six Important and several smaller synthetic plants.he six plants had ancapacityetric tons.fter bomb damage and dismantling, thc total capacityetric tons. It is estimated that only SO percent of thisis being utilised at this time.

Of the five synthetic plants in Poland (four in the Polish-administered tone of Germany) none is in operation at present. All were damaged during World War II and what was left was for the most part dismantledefforts arc being made by the Polishto rebuild the hydrogenation plant at Dwary near Oswlencine. It is believed this refinery will not begin operatingn addition, it has been rumored that both Albania and Yugoslavia have plansynthetic oil industry.

4. Requirements ond Consumption. a. Methods.

Thc Soviets will be relatively self-sufficient9 and their position is expected toprogressively as crude oil productionand the refining plants arc modernized. Thus far. strict control over the supply of petroleum and refined products has prevented shortages which would effectively impair the Soviet plans for economic development The Soviet Union is continuing to adhere to ansystem which has allowed for careful scheduling of available supply of refinedto meet the essential needs of principal consumers within the Soviet economy.

It should be emphasized that the Soviet Union lsosition to reduce forcibly Its civilian petroleum consumptionanner inconceivable for application In the United Stales. If Judged by Western standards,Soviet production of refined products Is Insufficient to meet the Increasingof Its expanding economy; but severe restrictions on civilian and industrialallow the Soviet Union to balance approximately its supply and muilmalIn this sense, the minimumhave been met which are notthe amounts which the Sovietwould desire.

Such rationing measuresualas prescribed by economic and military considerations. From an economic point of view, strict allocations are designed to meet only the essential industrial needs and to eliminate gradually marginal consumers. From the military viewpoint, control ofenables the Soviets to have additional supplies of refined products for theirneeds as well as to stockpile greater

The various Indices of industrialderived in this report are based mainly on the prewar relationship between domestic consumption and the extent to which the principal consumers of petroleum products have been rehabilitated and expanded. The indices established0ogether with the postwar conditions of the principal consumers, were projectedsof the probable consumption pattern for that year.

The conclusions in this section of the report arc intended to serve primarily as indices of the trend of Soviet postwar petroleumThe methods and assumptions used were largely reflected by thc following fundamental factors:

prewar trends In petroleum production and consumption of refined products;

expected growth of the principal

postwar expansion of the petroleum

continued imports from satellites; and

continued control over allocations.

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a careful review of all petroleum studies by the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, JIC,JCS, JIBSPB, SDS, SED.ere analyzed. Pertinent material from these reports was extracted and taken into account In forming thc basis of the Soviet consumption pattern for the0

In an effort toasic structure which would show the distribution ofproducts among the principal consumers of the Soviet economyarticularwas given to thc British system ofallocation. Here, the totalproducts available to the Soviets0 were categorically allocated according to the main POL (petrol, oil, andproducts In general) consumers. Below Is thc percentage allocation system asfrom thc British report,S:

TABLE VI

0

Agriculture

Vehicles

eating

& Stocks

omputations were checked with all previous estimates and reports which would bear on the validity of the percentageemployed by the British. Therefore, this breakup was included in0 petroleum consumption table since it was found that, by and large, the percentage allocations could he corroborated by most sources on Soviet POL consumption requirements.

In order to have the principal consumers conform to specific areas of Interest, the table was rearranged and somewhat modified. Use was made of certain factors found In several of the State Department and SDS documents which avoid the cumbersome breakdown ofusers of automotive vehicles within each main consumernstead of showing the use of such vehicles in Industry.

a section has been set up to Include the entire automotive park In the USSR under Transport Motor. Also, military stocks were excluded from the consumption and requirements for Military. Thus, the following re-distributed allocations have been used in this report:

TABLE VTJ

0

Transportation

Transportation

Home

100

It should be noted that according to the original British table, the total consumption of commercial vehicles and industries1 percent, whereas thc total revised percentages are assignedercent to the two classes. The over-ail percentages were also somewhat revised ln view of more recent Information.

b. Requirements and Consumption

he USSR0 million metric tons of crude oil. Of this3 million metric tons ot refined products were5 million tons going for refinery loss and other products. This Indigenous production was distributed according to the above percentage allocations and translated Into the amounts of POL that would beto each maingricultureillion metric tons ofillion metric tons, etc. (Table vm).

Until the outbreak of the war. production surplus over consumption and exports lends credence lo probable stockpiling In the USSR. An EUCOM report. Gen.tates that thc total stockpiles seem to haveillion tons before the war. of which the Soviet armed forces alone are said to haveillion tons. Nevertheless, theof Soviet prewar stockpiling cannot be definitely established and for purposes of this report arc not included In0 total. Also.

TOP^ECRET

can be assumed that POL were mainlyfor consumption by the Soviet armed

forces.

c. Requirements arid Consumptioneace.

Thc estimates ot petroleum consumption by the various classes of consumers in9 was developed by considering the status ol petroleum industry, the distribution ofproducts, the effect of the war, and the relative position of thc Soviet economy

gories and the percentage which this bears to the total of refined products; as well as total requirements by the principal consumers.

Estimates were made and checked by specialists In thc various fields of Interest as to the quantity of petroleum products needed to operate the economy at the current level of industrial activity. Use was made of such critical indices as the growth of the tractor park, ton-kilometers of freight hauled, activity In the machine tool Industry,s an indlca-

4.1

Agriculture

3

6.1

Transportation Rail

Transportation Motor

Industry

Shipping

Home Use

Military

Total

6.4

10

illion metric tons otetric tons for power stations.

As such, careful analysis was made as to the minimum quantity of petroleum products that would be required to allow for the recovery of various segments of the Soviet economy.

Tables IX and X. which are based on the foregoing considerations, show thc estimated requirements of refined products in millions of metric tons for mentioned period. They Include the Individual products, namely,kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils, and residual fuel oil, for each of the principalIncluding Agriculture.Rail. Transportation Motor, industry, Shipping and Home Use, as well as for Military. Also shown are thc totals of each product In millions of metric tons for all industrial cate-

5c!

2.5

1.0

1

9.0

100

.1

2.3

Hon of the general industrial growth within the Soviet Union. These estimates werewith military requirements, production and Imports, and arc shown ln the tables Percentage allocations were calculated on the basis of tonnage estimates.

The appendices show In great detail the methods and calculations employed lnthe POL requirements for the variousof the industrial economy, and the following arerief outline of these methods:

griculture.

In estimating the requirements fora totalractors In full-time use9 is indicated. Despite the fact that

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IX

REQUIREMENTS OP REFINED PRODUCTS (Millions of Metric Tons)

4.0

1

-1

.3

1

5.9

2.1

LB

Agriculture Transportation Rail Transportation Motor Industry* Shipping' Home Use Military

Total

7.5

' Includes diesel oil.

illion metric lona consumed by power stations. 'Soviet merchant fleet and inland waterways fleet;

oil:

2.7

.4

B L

,

if

Is

03

66

100

X

MILITARY POLEACE (Metric Tons)

Army MVD PVD

Air Forces Navy

l!

the number of tractors9 is less thanhe total horsepower will be greater to the extent that the POL requirements of all kinds will increaseillion metric tons0illion metric tons

ranjporfafion ML

Although several methods were available for estimating thc requirements for railroads.

Is

4

i552

it was concluded that the actualQ showing the relative percentages of various fuels employed In terms of thermal units were sufficiently accurate for the present purpose. This resultedotalillion metric tons for the railroads for that year. From all availablethe Increased traffic is being largely

top^Tecret

by Increased production of coal-burning units although theremall but steadily growing use of diesel-electrlc units whichto be replacing the old oil-burning steam locomotives. Therefore, there appears to be no appreciable change Ln the oil fuelfor the9 although lubricants and grease will increase.

Motor.

With regard to the POL requirements for thc civilian motor industry, inventories of the serviceable trucks, motor vehicles,ere made and the POL utilization estimatedstimated postwar production0rucks) werewith prewarrewar or lend-leaseilitary inventories of trucks were madePOL requirements were then estimated, based on an average utilization0 miles per vehicle per year for trucks,0 miles per vehicle per year for passenger carseighted average fuel consumptioniles per gallon for gasolineiles per gallon for diesel trucks,iles per gallon for light passenger cars, and ten miles perfor heavy passenger cars. Consumption of lubricating oil and grease was computed on the basisercent of thc gasoline and diesel oil requirements by weight.

Shipping.

The current status of the sea-goingfleet under Soviet registry comprisesesselsross tons and over. Of thisre oil-burning vessels,ofiesei-powered shipsteamships powered by fuel oil.

In the Caspian Sea thereessels of moreross tons,f them tankers,reighters. Of the tankersre diesei-powered andse fuel oil. Of thc freighters,rc diesei-powered andse fuel oil.

In estimating fuel consumption actual records were employed, or where notconsumption rales were based ontonnages. Consumption rates were computed on basis of actual number of ships In each gross tonnage class taking intodays at sea and in port.

nland Waterways.

In order to estimate POL requirements for inland waterways, consideration is given to horsepower inventory of the river fleet, fuel consumption of the Inventory by types, annual number of hours of operation of alloil-burning vessels, and fuelof horsepower hours of operation.

It is estimated that the horsepowerof thc river fleet willt the endt the endonsideration was taken of the allocation of horsepower inventories to coal- and to oil-burning vessels. One British report states thatercent ot the vessels consume oil, and reliable data are available on the steam and diesel ratio. Based on the assumptionays of operation annually for the average river vessel, and on the utilization time2 percent, the average number of hours of operationor eachriver boat is derived, and from this the total horsepower hours of operation may be

On the basis of known factors regarding metric tons of diesel and fuel oil, and the horsepower hours, thc total requirements of the river fleet9 have been estimated atetric tons. As for the other requirements, references and detailed data are shown in the Appendix.

ndustrial Requirements.

Requirements for the manufacturing and mining Industries, which have been combined under thc general heading of "Industrialare largely estimated on the basis ofonsumption trend, as well as on the estimated trend of industrial consumption of petroleum products byAlso, it has been noted that while the requirements for industry have increased in tonnage during this period. It has consistently accounted for approximatelyercent of the total annual consumption by all of thc major consumer categories considered herein.

It is believed logical to assume that industry generally will keep step in petroleumwith agriculture, transportation, and the other categories in the civilian industrialin the same manner zS has been the case by actual records.

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Use.

In estimating postwar consumption offor fuel oil for home use, lt was assumed that domestic burning of light oil was used primarily by the urban population forpurposes and that kerosene is used chiefly by the rural population for lighting andpurposes The increased rate of use of domestic burner oil over kerosene, as well as Increased rural electrification, and use of natural gas for cooking, points towardurbanization in the USSR. This,with increased demands for kerosene as jet fuel, oromponent thereof, wouldecreasing use of kerosene Thetempo of "cold war" conditions would also be felt in restrictions of consumption of petroleum products for home use; and on this basis, it has been assumed that9 would be no greater than that allocated

Requirements.

Military requirements for refined petroleum products for the9 have been prepared by the Department of the Nary. ONI. the War Department General Staff. ID. and by the Air Force and Air Intelligence. These data arein the report and are shown In detail as part of the Appendix.

All the estimates based upon the aboveshown In detail In thc Appendix were combined with military requirements, production and imports, and arc shown in Tables VI to VIII Inclusivehowing estimates0 is included for comparison. Percentage allocations are calculated on the basis of tonnage estimates. In general, the consumption pattern9 so derived does not differ much from the basehe principal dllTerence reflects recent Sovieton gas and Diesel fuel. Kerosenethe bulk of Soviet production before thc war. This would indicatehange in the pattern of petroleum consumption in the USSR is somewhat similar to changes which occurred in the US some years ago. namely, shiftingerosene economyasoline and Diesel oil economy.

d. Requirements and Consumption of Re-finedar.

Soviet economic activity in the event of war will be significantly greater than under peace conditions, especially In the output ofsuch as tanks, ammunition, guns, and planes, and in the basic Industries of steel, petroleum, coal, and non-ferrous metals. To increase further their economic strength the Soviets will undoubtedly curtail the civilian economy to make possible the maximumof economic potential for war.there probably will not bo any drastic change In the present consumption pattern of petroleum products, except Home Use, sinceolicy would seriously deteriorate the Soviet position In food and manpower,and transportation, and thereby adversely affect Soviet economic and war potential.

It is not expected that there will be any serious curtailment In agricultural activity, andut-back in its present estimated allocation, The Industrial war output would be affected at least to the extent thatnourishment would prevent as large an increase in production as might have beenif there were ample food for all. It Is possible, however, for the agriculturalof petroleum products9 to drop to0 level without seriouslythe food supply of the USSR.

Transportation, in the past, the weakest link in the Soviet economy, will have to cope with additional pressure In supplying the front with men and materials, of serving thewar economy and. of less importance,educed economy.

If the USSR has full use of itsuture war, it ls believed that there will be no substantial reduction of POL. There may be some curtailment in the use offor civilian purposes, but the Soviets will wish to utilize any such capacity for thewar effort. Unless war production is reduced by enemy action or the "scorched-earth" policy is once again applied by the Soviets, thc consumption of POL will not be reduced by any significant amount. Military requirements will, of course, be met at all costs. It has been estimated that during World War II, the consumption of refined products by the Soviet Union was less4 than. However, it must be remembered that

^dcT*ET

hift of emphasis from aof peacetime conditions over to definite wartime footing. It is believed, however, that allocation of petroleum products to industry could be dropped back to0 levelendangering the economy of the Soviet Union.

In the event of war, home use wouldthe first and most drastic cut-back In the allocation of petroloum products, quite likely to the extent of some SO percent. Such acut would still leave the home usegroupupply double to that available to the Soviets during World War n.

The military consumer group wouldreceive the highest priority Inits POL requirements In the event of war. To meet the increased requirements ofproducts for military consumption,to the non-military segment of the Soviet economy wouldut-back of thc amount ordinarily available underconditions- Such an attempt was made In this study in estimating how much POL could be taken from thc non-militaryand given to the military without effectively Impairing the Soviet Industrial economy.

Tables XII, XIII. and XV show the data relative to requirements and availability of TABLE XI

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Lubricating Oil Residual Fuel Oil

' References:

Available Indigenous

PEACE (Millions of Metric Tons)

Requirements

3

Synthetic Production

21

1.0

Surplus

1 2

2

2.0

s^r:

SECRET

POL on the assumption of warmetric tons while In the case of war

XVI indicates the comparison betweendeficit ls one million metric tons. This

and war requirements and availability lnthat the requirements of crude oil may

In the former case thereurplus ofsubstantially met ln any event.

TABLE XII PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS ON TOTAL CRUDE REQUIREMENTS3 MILLION METRIC TONS 1

Requirements (Millions

of Metric Tons) Percentage

Distribution on

Total Crude

Requirements

fi

$ O

B O

w

oa

on

Fuel Oil

and

Other

Products

WarUme requirements or refined productsMT. In order lo indicate the total amount of crude oil required to produce theMT of refined products.Loss and Olherwere taken to beercent.8 MMT represented 8fi percent of the total crude requirements3 MMT. In turn, the total crude requirement was divided Into the refined producta requirement to establish the percentage distribution.

TABLE XIII

TABULATION OF REFINED PRODUCTS AVAILABILITY9 WAR CONDITIONS (Millions of Metric Tons)

B

1

w

;s

to

>4

Fuel

3

0

0 El

Availability'

Imports'

. .

Available for War

Requirements

or Surplus

Deficit of Refined Products forillion metric tons.

1 The percentage distribution of the preceding table was used. These percentages werefl million metric tons of crude oil available to thc SovietsIA estimates

'Products distribution accordlne to German practice and data.

Ti

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TABLE XIV

REQUIREMENTS OF REFINEDAR (Millions of Metric Tons)

Agriculture Transportation Rail

Transportation

Motor Industry Shipping Home Use Military

%of TOTAL

of O

1.0

3.4

2.4

JZ

1.1

X2

89

TABLE9 WAR

(Millions o/ Metric Tons)

2J

7 .4

3.0

ioT6"

31

5.9

3.0

100

o>.2

If*

t7

Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Oil Lubricating

Oil Residual

Fuel Oil

E

|

? ir c

XVI

SUMMATION OF THE PETROLEUM SITUATION OF THEEACE AND WAR (Millions of Metric Tons)

Q

surplus) .1

.3

2

Peace War

a

1.3

5.6

II

deficit)

JbECRET

APPENDIXES

A. PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRINCIPAL SOVIET

Ii TRANSPORTATION

Distribution of Military POL Consumption Assuming War9

Military Supply Administration

CAPABILITIES TO EXPLOIT MIDDLE EAST OIL

RELATIVE POSITION OF THE USSR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

CRUDE OIL REFINERIES

last of Crude Oil Refineries in the USSR (confirmed)

Secondary Refinery List (not fully confirmed)

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APPENDIX A

PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRINCIPAL

SOVIET CONSUMERS

Agriculture.

a. USSR Tractor Park.

Tractor numbers In the USSR0t Is estimatedractors were built' giving theractors at the time the Nazis invaded the USSR.

It has been reportedractors were lost to thcin the hands of the Soviets. It lsthatercent of the remainderfrom use9 because ofwearing out and cannabalLzation for spare parts. This wouldotal0 tractors out of the prewar park operating

It Is estimated that the USSR seized as war booty, requisitioned, or received as0 tractors by the end

In0 tractors were received under Lcnd-Leasc and UNRRA.'

Domestic production of tractors5otalIn that000'rojected total0' However, not all of9 produced tractors will be used In Held opera-

SotsialUttcheskot Schkoeo.

*OIR ReportMS.ied "Draft Power In Sovietepartment of State.

'Voennaya Ekonomtkaeriod Olechest-vennol Vovnl. by N. Vor.ncscnsky.

'See Twenty-Pint Report to Congress on Lend-Operations, for the Period Endednd also United Statei Exports of Domestic and Foreign Mtrchandtte. Report No.l. Oroup6ureau of the Census. Department of Commerce.CIA estimate.

tions during the entire year and will notan annual requirement of petroleum products. It Is estimated that the petroleum used by tractors produced9 will be equivalent to thc total annual consumption0 tractors.otalIn full-time use9 Is Indicated.

of Tractor Park.

The total horsepower ofractors0r an average6 horsepower per tractor. Thc Five Year Plan callsotal tractor productionnits,otal power amounting6 million horsepower.'

Despite tbc fact that the number of tractors9 is less thanhe totalwill be above prewar, ororsepower9 as compared with3 million horsepowerhe USSR tractor industry Is gradually Increasing the average horsepower per tractor so that theroductionwill have an average oforsepower per tractor.

Consumptionractors0

horsepowerillion metric tons of petroleum products,on per

Assuming thatercent of the totalof the postwar produced tractors was in diescl-consuming tractors, then the follow-

OUt Reportntitled "Draft Power In Sonetepartment of State.

'Fuel consumpbon and breakdown7stimated ino 2MC, Domeiflcof Petroleum Products In thet. and cites as references Wataillef. Soviet OS Industry19M. inand in the Fvst Jti Month,O; COr (OSSi Report No. SB, -The FJTeet Ol Territorial low on Russia'* Petroleum2.

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tap breakdown of horsepowery cUeW-comuming and other fuel consuming tractors, Is indicated:

Very little diesel fuel In proportion lo other fuels was consumed by Soviet tractors indays. It Is safe to assume thatetric tons of petroleum consumed perby the Soviet traclor would also apply to theercent of postwar production In non-diesel tractors as well as In tractors left over from prewar, tractors obtained byreparations, and from UNRRA and Lend-lease.

Both American and Soviet experience has shown that the diesel fuel requirements per horsepower hour on full or near full load ls about five-sixths that of kerosene (thetractor fuel in prewarhis would Indicate that theetric tons of petroleum should be reduced one-sixth orercent In order to arriveeight of diesel fuel required per horsepower of diesel tractors. Thisetric tons of diesel fuel per horsepower.

The following petroleum consumption9 is thus indicated:

Horsepower of Diesel Consuming Tractors (HP)

Diesel Consumption per(metric tons)

Total Diesel Fuel Requiredtons)

Horsepower of TractorsOlher Fuels (IIP)

Consumption of Olher Petroleum per Horsepower (metric tons)

Total non-Diesel Petroleum(metric tons)

1 Seelpakhelskom Khoayaisloey S. P. Matskevich In SotsialUtlchcskoe Sel-skoe Ktuxyaislvo.

Total Horsepower of all Tractors

Total Petroleum. All Kinds.(metricfollowing breakdown of9 is estimated:

Prewar1 Millionsetric

Diesel

Lubricating

SSR TRACTOR PARK9 (in units of tractors)

Tractors from prewar production Tractors obtained by requisitions.

reparations, etc. Tractors obtained from UNRRA and

I^nd-Lease Tractors produced in5 to

nclusive Total tractors produced9 Full-use equivalent of tractorsin specified year

TABLE II HORSEPOWER OF9 TRACTOR PARK

to -5

o -

S EC

20

Tractors from

prewar

' Tur] consumption and breakdown7 andstimated In BAAt. Domett*ol Petroleum Products in (he, and tiles as references: WaulUel, Soviet Oil Industrynd lit thc fust Sis Months0 CO! <OSS> Report No. Sa. "Theof Territorial Louei on Russia's PeUoleum0.

' See text fnt cxplanaUon of figure*

Table I

'CIA estimate.

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30

Tractorsby requisitions, reparations, etc.

30

Tractorsfrom UNRRA and Lend-Lease

31

Tractorsin, Inclusive

31

Full-useofproduced In specified year

0

2. Transportation Rail.

No current Soviet data ore available on the Soviet railroad requirements for POL.these data can only be obtained by means of estimates. There arc several methods that might be used in arriving at estimates InPOL requirements.

The first way that is suggested isirm figure of POL consumptionrewar year and then increasing this figure9 by the estimated increase In ton-kilometers ol freight in that year over thc base year. This method is not considered desirable for aoflose relationshipton miles and POL consumption cannot beS transportationhe method presupposes Ihat as lori-kilometers and utilization of equipmentthe use of oil-burning locomotives will be increased proportionately;sare added lo inventory, the samebetween coal and oil-burningwill be maintained. The method has merit only in an estimate of the consumption of lubricating oil and grease which represents

' Average horsepower tit all tractors.

mall percentage of thc totalof POL.

A second method that might be used isexperienced POL utilisation factors such as tons of POL per ton-kilometer and passenger kilometer of traffic. Suchfactors are not available for the USSR, and although they are available for the United States, the US factors cannot be applied to the USSR, because knowledge of theof oil-burning equipmentheof ton-kilometers and passenger kilometers produced by Diesel and oil-burningas compared with coal-burningIs not available for the Soviet Union.

The third method, while admittedly one of expediency, appears to be the only one that can be used on the basis of informationavailable on Soviet railroads. This method is based on evidence that the use of oil for motive power fuel has not and Is not being emphasized on the Soviet railroads.oviet source stated that upf the total fuel consumed on thcwas hard mineralhe author goes on to warn that, in the future, theof mazut fuel will be cut sharply and more and more will the use of coalThis ls. it is stated, in full compliance with the instructions ot the party and of the administration on the conversion lo local types oforeover,t was announced that the use of local fuels and productseature of Soviet railroad operations.'

Depending upon lhe availability of localthe railroads of the Soviet Union can bum coal. oil. and wood. The areas in which it is expected that most oil fuel is consumed are the Caucasus and Central Asia Both coal and oil are used for fuel in theomc-tkves operated on the Caucasus railroads. Coal is principally used in the north and fuel oil in the Transcaucasus. Diesels have also been reported in thc Caucasus, and are used

'Material Supply, A. V. Nnumov. Volume,.

at

' Stakhanovltr Methods lor tht fconomUtnff ol. Munun and I. P. Feldman, Moscow, IMS, pane 3

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of the difficulties of the water supply and the poor quality of Immediately available coal. Possibly from Prokhladnaya south and east ln the Turkmen. Uzbek, Kazakh, Tad-thik| and Kirgiz republics south ofh parallel arc the other areas In whichrail traction Is employed.

In conformity with the Soviet practice of holdinginimum the quantity ofconsumed on the railroads, it seems that the modem type of locomotive, notably the JS passenger locomotive and the FD freight locomotive have not been designed as oilbut possibly tho Consolidation lend-lease freight locomotive,,0 freight, the new Pobeda, and0 locomotive bum oil when used in the area indicated above.'

Information on the total number ofof track on which oil-burningare used Is conflicting. However,ilometers may have beento oil tractionhis wouldercent ofilometers of through route in operation in that year. About 6ofilometers of railroad lines planned0 may be used by oU-buming locomotives. Nevertheless, the number ofof track respectively devoted to Diesel and to fuel oil traction Is not known, and the amount of traffic planned or carried over otl-biiralng routes ls not available.

Under the circumstances the most desirable method of determining the quantity of oil burned by the railroads consists of relating the percentile consumption of petroleum products to the percentile consumption of coal and wood. Thc following table shows therelationship in the consumption of the various types of fuel:1

ection VII.ndableable VIl-S. Handbook on USSR Railways Volume III.nd fff

'Embassy Moscow cable.andbook on USSRn3igure ofercent forercent lor Ml. and 1lor wood consumption "before Ihe war" Is used This is relatedut may refer to some other prewar year or even partear.ercent coal" Is an ambiguous term since the type of coal la not known. Separating out the lignite

TABLE I

PERCENTILE RELATIONSHIP OF RAILROAD FUEL CONSUMPTION Tear

3 0 3

5

44

8

Fuel Coal Lignite Oil Wood

The percentages aboveercent for each year described and refer to the totalfuel consumption on the railroads.5 percent of the total coal consumed by all forms of transportation was used by thehe total consumed bywasillion8 million metric tons of coal were consumed by railroadsnd this amounted9 percent of the total amount of fuel consumed by the railroads. Of this8 million metric tons of6 million metric tons are hard coal typesillion metric tons are lignite. Converting the lignite Into hard coal, the total hard coal would amount toillion metricinceercent of the total fuel consumed amounted toillion metric tons of hard coal, we4 million metric tons as the0 percent)0 In terms of hardercent of this amounts2 million metric tons of oil expressed in hard coal units.onversion factor from hard coal tootal oil consumption on the railroads1 million metric tons ls obtained.

nd so far as can be observedhe increased traffic production is largely being effected by the Increased production of coal-burning locomotives although theremall but growing production of dlescl-clcctric units. The dlesel-electric locomotives are bc-

' Ugol

' SID. USSR, Volume II.

'This, most significantly, Is the outputarrived at by3 of Mayor the total coal consumption used on thc railroads

and employing an average of0 BTU lor coal0 BTU forationaa been usedonversion factor lor oil Irom hard coal.

top^techet

used, however, In those areas thatuse oU-burning steam locomotives, and It appears reasonable to assume that the lessefficient oU-burning units will be retired as diesel-electrlc locomotives become available.

The over-all fuel requirements for thetherefore, will be affected only by the small quantity of petroleum products needed foroviet source states thatilograms of grease are allowed per runilometers, and thatonth amakes no less thanrips.'the kind of grease used is not made clear, nor is It made clear whetherncludes lubricants for the cars as well as thc locomotives. Atrips per month, which appear low, the annual consumption of lubricants would amount8 metric tons per locomotive. Multiplied by the estimated serviceable locomotive inventory for thcetric tons of lubricants are

3. Transport a'ion Molor.

In order to determine the POL requirements for thc civilian motor transport Industry for any given year, it is necessary toid-year serviceable inventory of civilian motor vehicles, and apply to that inventory the estimated utilization of each vehicle and

tbe POL requirement for the estimated

Aerviceable inventory of ail trucks' was derived by combining0rucks,

"The Agitator's Notebook m.

'Thii figure is partially substantiated by USTaking th* average consumption per tor. and passenger kilometer of grease lubricating oil. and lieroseoe by thc US railroads during theQ-4S. and applying it to Russian traffic statistic* toretric tons of these products wiU be required to carry the planned traffic. Although lhe railroad system ol the USSR and or the US operate under vastly different conditions. In the matter of lubricants per ton-kilometer and perkilometer, they arc roughly comparable

'A reliable estimate ol the number ol passenRer buses is not available. The Soviets plan torucks0 andbuses The laUerercent o' the former, and this appears loeasonable relationship (or lhe Inventory,

see Table I) with anprewar or lend-lease vehicles1

The military Inventories of trucks9 has been estimated by the IntelligenceDepartment of the Army. Thesedo not distinguish between serviceable and unserviceable military vehicles, consistof gasoline trucks and do not Include any passenger or staff cars. However, from these estimates lt Is possible to arrive9 Inventoryilitary gasoline trucks.

The9 inventory of alltrucks, mentioned above, has beento an inventory of all trucks on the basis thatercent of the total inventory represents serviceablelicrefore thenventory of all trucks amountedehicles. The military Inventory foras subtracted from the totalatn order to arrive at anof the number of trucks in the civilianhis amountedcivilian trucks In

Serviceable passenger car inventories were built up on substantially thc same basis as trucks except that no passenger cars werefor military use for the reason given. Ten thousand prewar and lend-lease motor cars plus postwar production were estimated to be the serviceable inventory by

Having obtained thc average serviceablefor thcOL requirements

'Serviceable prewar or lend-lease vehicles Inrc estimated as0ons orues per gaUon ot0 trucks,iles per gallon ofieseliles per gallon o(0 passenger cars.iles per gallon of fuel. (Based on data taken. Shin kin. The AutomobileThat's Behind the Ironi derived from S. A. Akolzln. "Specifications of the Motor-Vehicles of the

' The Soviet track Inventory was estimated atpercent serviceable at the end7 "Soviet Icoll-ii'i: Slock and Motor Vehicle8 There is no evidence that this percentage ol serviceable trucks has

'No dlsUnctlon has been made in the types of trucks held by tbe military and Utoae In use by Uie civilian economy, except that no Diesel trucks have been allocated lo the military.

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TABLE I

POSTWAR PRODUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES'

Pas-

Pas-

Pas-

The figure0 miles per truck was denved as follows:

19SO plan callsreight turnover4 billion ton-kilometers orillionper day.

to cany this freight willercent of totalediumtotal civilian truck. Inventoryof total vehicle Inventory,2 heavy trucksercentcivilian truck inventory).

c Assuming lhal the light trucks carry anpayloadon, the mediumons, and the heavyotalons may be carried at one tune To produce Hi million ton-kUomeura per day. each truck mustsoo.ooo dividedilometers per day. In terms of miles this amounts9 per day,9 per year.

d. Assuming loaded haulage inf total travel, the figure9 miles Is Increased6 lotal miles per truck per year and rounded off0 miles, e. Thu figure Is supported by data In "Legky* Metally"hkh states that motor vehicles operate on anilometers per dayorking daysear. Seventy-one kilometers represent the average dauy loaded movement 'Ho baau for ihls estimate It Is purely afigure.

fuel consumptioniles per gallon for gas-olbieiles per gallon for diesel trucks,iles per gallon for light passenger cars, andiles per gallon foronsumption of lubricating oil and grease was computed on lhc basis of 5of the gasoline and diesel oil requirement byee Table IU. Appendix B. p.or POL requirements for the

' Based on data contained In S. A. AkolMn. "Speci-flcaUon ot the Motor Vehicles ofJournal of the Auto-Tractor Industryo. IS) and D. B. ShlmKln. "The AutomobUe Industry That's Behind lhe Iron Curtain."of Diesel trucks assumed to be sameon YAZ truck

"These figure* are calculated on the basisercent of gasoline and Diesel oil requirements by weight. This peiecniage was selected as reasonable in Uie light of United States experience For the three6 Uniied Slatestruck and bus operators filing slaUstlcs wlUi the Interstate commerce Commission8 miles per gallon ot fueliles per gallon of lubricaUng oil In other words.allons of fuel were used for3 gallons of oil,stw of TO ton terms ot metric tons, with one gallon of gasolineounds and one gallon of lubricaung oUounds, the ratioo I. The amount of oU used,representsercent of the total weight ol the gasoline Making allowance for grease con-sumpUon and lhe possible less efficient use ofand grease in thche hit of 5as the basis of calculationeasonable estimate

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USSR MOTOR VEHICLE INVENTORY AND CIVILIAN MOTOR TRANSPORT POL REQUIREMENTS

X

USSRENTORY OPMOTOR VEHICLES

9

2 Ions and under

2 V.ons

Trucks

Serviceable Trucks

Passenger Cars

Passenger Cars

Passenger Cars

i

Serviceable Vehicles

with trucks. Estimated

represent

ercent ol tola).

EC

MID-YEAR INVENTORY

CIVIL-

MOTOR VEHICLES

9

Trucks

Military Trucks

Civilian Trucks

Serviceable Trucks

Trucks

Trucks

Passenger Cars:

Included with trucks. Estimated to representercent of total.

4. Industrial Requirements.

Combining the Manufacturing and Mining Industry, Industrial consumption ofproducts9 is largely estimated on the basis ofrend of petroleum consumption by industry, on the one hand.

TABLE IU POL REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN

9

MOTOR VEHICLES

Gasoline Passenger Cars Light' Heavy'

Total Trucks': Total Diesel Oil Trucks': Total

Lubricating Oil and Grease' Total Total POL

'Computed on basis of average utilisation0 miles per vehicle per annum atiles per

gallon.

'Computed on basts of average utlUzaUon0 miles per vehicle per annum atiles per gallon.

on basis of average ullllzaUon0 miles per vehicle per annum at weighted averageiles per gallon.

'Computed on basis ot average utilization0 miles per vehicle per annumiles per gallon

'Computed on basisercent of gasoline and diesel oil requirements by weight.

and the estimated trend of industrialin the postwar period.

7onsumption ofproducts by industry increased6 million metric tons8 million metric tons' While industrial consumption of petroleum products increased in tonnage

' CO/ loss/ Report *SS, "The Effect of Territorial Losses on Russia's Petroleum0his report used the following Soviet publication for Its estimate: Planovoyco.

'Swootnote i. RAA.

34

duringeriod. Industryaccounted (orf the total annual petroleumwhen made relative to the other major categories of consumers.

0 goals for plant equipment call for an increase of aboutercent over0 levels. Since present productivity has not yet reached0 rates In many industries, it Is highly unlikely that the Plan will come near attainment, surely not

Assessment of the postwar activity level in Industry is exceedingly difficult, with only meager and intangible evidence available. Rather than apply an arbitrary increase in the rate of activity In Industry to petroleum consumption, it Is estimated that petroleum consumption will be approximately the same asillion metric tons.

Consumption ofillion tons of oil by Power Stations was Incorporatedwith Manufacturing andn subsequent years. Itthat the relative Importance of coal and the generation of electricity Increased, while that of fuel oil decreased. As such, the total consumption of petroleum products by the Mining and Manufacturing Industry together with Electric Power Industry ls estimated toillion metric tonsnce again. It was found that industry accounted forercent of the total estimatedconsumption by the Soviet economy. 5. Shipping.

a. Merchant Shipping.

The current status of the sea-goingfleet under Soviet registry comprisesesselsross tons and over. Of thisre oil-burning vessels, namely.iesei-powered shipsteamships powered by fuel oU.

In the Caspian Sea thereessels of moreross tons,freighters. Of the tankers,rc diesel-powered andse fuel oil. Of the freighters.re dicscl-powered andse fuel oil.

In calculating the estimated consumption and requirement of petroleum products by

The Consumption or Oil in thc

CRET

shipping, use was made of records of daily consumption of fuel oil and diesel oil by tankers and freighters, as recorded forSoviet ships. Where no record was available of the consumption record of aship, it wasonsumption rate equal to thathip of equal tonnage. Consumption was computed on the basis of the actual number of ships in each grossclass, multiplied by the average dally consumption rate of that tonnage class, since consumption rates vary as the tonnage ln-

Days ot sea and in port were based onactual performance records kept by War Shipping Adrrunistratlon for US freighters, and by the Armed Services Petroleum Board for USNT tankers. An arbitrary reduction ofercent ln days at sea for freighters, and ofercent for tankers was applied toships to allow for less efficient operation, especially on loading and discharging, and for poor condition, lack of repair facilities,s compared with US operations.

Days at sea and In port were assumed to be:

ays atays In port.

ays atays ln port

The assumption of CIAhip in port consumesercent of the amount of fuel consumed at sea was used.

It has been estimated that Soviet shipping requirements9 are as follows:

POLTons

Freighters (deep

Freighters

Tankers (deep

Tankers

Total fuelOil

Freighters (deep

Freighters

Tankers (deep

Tankers

Total diesel

Total deep water

Total Caspian

Total

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CRET

^E

Inland Waterways POL Requirements.

In order to estimate total POLlor the Inland waterways, It isto obtain Information on the horsepower Inventory of tbe river fleet, the corn positron of this Inventory by types of fuel consumed, the annual number of hours of operation of all self-propelled oil burning vessels, and the fuel consumption per horsepower hour of operation.

Mid-year inventories of serviceable vessels have been used In these computations,id-year inventory represents the average number of vessels available throughout the year. It has been estimated that theInventory of thc river fleet willt the end9t the end' Mid-year inventories for these years may be derived by subtracting one-half of the total yearly increment from the end of year Inventory for each year, thus9

No reliable data are available on which can be based allocation of thc total horsepower inventory to coal and oil-burningritish report" states thatercent of the vessels consume oil and quotes an American report' to the effect that theo 1.erviceability ofercent of

1 total Inventory of self-propelled river vessels wu estimatednitsorsepower. (Strategic Intelligence Digest, USSR. Volume III. Transportation,n official Soviet source has claimedessels of all types were destroyed during the war. (River Transport.) In order lo determine the number of self-propelled river vessel* at the end of the war. the prewar proportion of self-propelled vessels to total vessels was applied to Uie totaldestroyed during the war and this number was subtracted from tho prewar Inventory. Based on the prewar average horsepower per vessel, it appears thatelf-propelled vesselsots]orsepower. The current Five Year plan calls for an Increase of self-propelled river vesselsorsepower On the assumption that there will be an (neiement0 hone-power annually, thc total horsepower Inventory ul the end ofillnd at the end

1ID, Op. ell.

the inventory appearshe total serviceable inventory Is therefore estimated as follows:

TABLE I

SERVICEABILITY MID-YEAR INVENTORY OF OIL-BURNTNO RIVER VESSELS

Diesel

Oil-steam

ercent of entire fleet)

It is believedaximumays of operation annually is typical for theriveroviet source states that river boats arc In2 percent of theccordingly, the average number of hours ofer self-propelled river boat per year Is derived.

Thc horsepower hours of operation by types of oil-burning vessels are therefore as follows;

TABLE n

Diesel oil Fuel oil

HORSEPOWER HOURS OF OPERATION

Based on data computedetric tons of diesel oil areper horsepower by diesel river vesselsetric tons of fuel oil areper horsepower hour by river vessels burning fuel oil No firm basis exists for the computation of the consumption ofoil and grease. Although this isignificant figure in the total Soviet POLfor completeness some allowance

'The British Re|>ort3 esllmates aofercent, but UUs does notorsepower of thr totalorsepower will have been constructedthe preceding five years.

aronskiy. Eeoaoatic Gtographt of the USSR. 8th ed.ritish Reportstimates that the river fleet works an average of IS hoursonths In the year, bui this esUmaie Is no* supported In any way.

'An Inquiry Into tht economic* of Railroad Trtntforlatton..

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probably be made for it.ercent of the total fuel and diesel oilhas been allocated for lubricating oil and grease for the vessels consuming fuel and diesel oil. The same amount ofoil and grease consumed per horsepower hour by fuel and diesel oil vessels has beento the horsepower hours produced byburning coal and wood. Accordingly, the lubricating oil and grease consumption of the entire river fleet has been obtained.

The following table presents fuel, diesel and lubricating oil and grease requirements of the river fleet for the

TABLE III

THE RIVER

8

POL REQUIREMENTS OF FLEET (Metric tons)

Diesel oil Fuel oil

Lubes and grease Total

6. Pipelines.

The POL requirements for pipelineIs based on the assumption that SOof the pipelines are operated by diesel power atercentercent of the time.

To determine thc diesel fuel requirement the2 tons per horsepower hour' was applied toercent of the horsepower hour requirements.

used principally by the urban population for heating purposes and that kerosene was used chiefly by the rural population for lighting and cooking purposes

Home Use consumption of light fuel oilmore rapidly than consumption of kerosene In the postwar period, reflectingof the trend toward greaterIn the Soviet Union. Also, moreuse of kerosene is likely to be offset by increased rural electrification and natural gas will probably be more widely used ln the cities than before the war. Nevertheless, rural electrification and natural gas Is expected to eliminate the consideration of kerosene. In view of the Soviet policy to maintain ahigh state of military preparedness, it is believed that the Soviet Government will expend further effort in restricting civilian home consumption of kerosene and fuel oil. Therefore, consumption9 will beno greater than the total allocatedillion metriclightly greater availability of kerosene and fuel oil to Home Use has been shown toto some degree the trend toward greater urbanisation in the USSR.

8. Military Requirements of Refined Products.

Soviet military requirements of refined products for the period being considered have been prepared by the Department of the Navy. ONI. and the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

REQUIREMENTS. PIPELINES

Oil Gas

Total

Mileage

Pumping Stations

9

8

5

% Total) Diesel Fuel (Metric Tons)

8

Home Use Requirements.

In estimating the postwar consumption of kerosene and fuel oil by Home Use. it wasthat domestic burning or light oil Is

'

Pi-?wai consumption:

million metric tons (IQJI percent olonsumption)

7 million metric8 percent of lo:al consumption)

Iter. GDI (OSSi Report (SB, The Effect OtLossa on Russia's Petroleum Position.p..

CR ET

APPENDIX B

TRANSPORTATION

Distribution of Military POL Consumption Assuming War

To estimate the capabilities of the USSR transportation system to distribute themilitary POL requirements in thc event of war9 within the country and to thc borders, and to estimate the amount of POL that will be In transit in order to Insure sufficient supplies where and when needed.

The total military POL requirements are those set out specifically in0 metric tons."

The Soviets will have stocked In the jump-off area sufficient POL to last for the duration of the ground and air campaignsthc periods of combat and0 metriche Black Sea Naval Forces' requirement will notetriche distribution of POL will include the ground and airfor thc occupation and for forces within the USSR and the entire naval requirement needingetric Ions).

The total military requirement will be supplied from production within the USSR.

The movement of the military POLwill be given highest priority on the USSR transportation system.

The average loaded petroleum lank car and general purpose freight car on the Soviet railroads will produceon miles per day.

'The ftovtel military POI. requirements have been revised to1 MMT. For the purpoiea ot the present report, however, the original figure ofMT requirement* has been retained which would otherwise require lecakulations throughout theThe slight difference between the two figures docs not in any way alter the conclusions arrived at In the study.

c. Discussion.

Under the assumption that theof the military POL requirement would be given highest priority on the USSRsystem, railroad transportation of POL in lank cars would be used, whenever it Is economical, for all products exceptLubricants would be packaged in drums, barrels, or cans at thc refineries and shipped to consuming areas ln generalfreight cars. IC the entire military POL requirement were shipped on the railroads, this movement would require the use of0 tank cars for aviation gasoline, motor gasoline. Diesel, fuel and jet oils,C3 general purpose cars for lubricants.

Inasmuch as there are currently only0 serviceable tank cars ln the USSR, the movement of the military POLwouldubstantial part of the total serviceable tank car supply, but the Inventory of general purpose freight cars ls so large that thc military requirement for this type of car ls almost insignificant.if the entire military POLIs distributed on the railroads, lhetank car position would be severely strained and leave an inadequate number of tank cars for the distribution of civilian and industrial POL needs in thc event of war. It is not likely, however, that the total miliiary requirement of aviation and motor gasoline. Diesel, Jet and fuel oils would be movedby lank cars or lhat the military POL requirement would be hauled entirely on the railroads

Some of the military POL requirements in addition to lubricants can be packaged in drums, barrels, or cans at the refineries and shipped to consuming areas also in general purpose freight cars. This would be most feasible In connection with short hauls ofgasoline. Moreover, it ts entirely possible

87

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the Internal ground and airof motor and aviation will be moved by tank or general purpose motor trucks when the consuming centers arc in close proximity to refine lies- Water transportation can also be used to fulfill part of the Baltic and Arctic Naval and Merchant Marine requirement, and this type of transportation can also be used for the purpose of reducing thc rail haul by transporting POL from thc Caucasus by way of the Caspian Sea and Volga River or the Black Sea to rail transshipment points nearer thc consuming areas. Pipelines,the one extending from Armavir to Trudovaya. can be used to reduce thefor transportation by railroad tank car

ased on the speed of railroad tank carotaletric tons of POL will hare to be in transit on theat all times during the year in order to insure that supplies will be available when and where needed. Because other forms of surface transportation arc generally slower than railroadonsiderably larger amount of POL would have to be in transit if other forms of transportation, in addition to the railroads, are used in theof POL

icfuston.

The USSR transportation system could distribute the Soviet military POLin the event of war

The amount of POL that would have to be In transit in order to insure that sufficient military supplies are available where and when neededinimumetric tons.

1. Military Supply Administration.

a Supply System and Packaging.

tn the laic war. the Russians followed no set system of supply administration in the field. The distances between railroad and army dumps and thence to divisional dumps were governed less by terrain or strategic conditions lhan by existing railway facilities. Cases occurred where horse-drawn supplyhad lo lift supplies from the railhead and carry themiles to Army dumps, but

the average distance was aboutiles. The tendency was to assemble large numbers of small dumps within Army or Divisional areas rather than build up large central dumps. Almost all dumps were small by western standards. Consequently, In spite of the Improvised nature of the supply system, wastage from all causes, and particularly from enemy action, was probably relatively small. Packaging received through Lend-lease, particularly standard steel barrels, was undoubtedly widely used and re-used. The USSR also received underank carsumber of tank trucks.

The following Is an extract from Strategic Intelligence Digest, USSR, Chapterrmed Forces. ID.nd Indicates the best Information available on the POL supplyemployed by the Soviet Armed Forces:

"During World War II. supply responsibility and the system of supply in the Zone of the Interior were ihehey are today. Supply units and organlmtlons In the combat tone was organized as follows'

"Factories or central storage depots supplying combat echelons shipped equipment and supplies to front (army group) depots, which were normally located In the vicinity of railheads behind the rear boundary of the command. These depots were large semi-permanent Installations contalnUigdays* supply.

"From Iront depots, materiel was sent to army field depots located at various staUons In the rear of the army Mat anywhere fromoiles from the fiont line. The army depots usually maintained stocksnit ofations,efills of fuel and lubricants for Ihe army, although reserves were increased If protracted offensive operations were In prospect

-Rlfte corps during the war had very little supply responsibility. They maintained no supply depots Aside from the supply of corps headquarters and corps troops, supply personnel had only planning and supervisory functions.

-Ammunition, fuel. food, and fodder werelo rifle ditUton supply points by army transport columns. Olher supplies were drawn at army depots by division transport columns Nor-mally division transport carried ammunition, fuel, food, and fodder to regimental supply points,horse-drawn columns of rifle regimentsobtained the latter three Items atsupply points.

"Unlike rule corps, wartime tank and mechanized corps maintained supply dumps. These werelocated between crops and brigade or regl-

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rear boundaries and were supplied by Uielr ovn motor vehicles from arm/ field depots.

"Subordinate unite were supplied by motorof the tank or mechanized corps. In adeveloping situation, arm* transportationunit transportation.

'The combat supply system of the Soviets during World War TJ was efficient and economical IU essentials would probably be duplicateduture

istant extension of the theater ofhowever, would probably result In Uieof communications xooe between tbe tone of Interior and the combat none. Moreover, now that allotments of motor vehicles to units have been gresUy Increased, the system of higher unit distribution of supplies and equipment may be amended to allow for units below army transporting forward their own supply requirement*"

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO TRANSPORT MILITARY POL REQUIREMENTS IN THE EVENT OF WAR

Total Transportation Requirement.

Thc total POL requirement assumed to be stockpiled and requiring transportationby categories of products is tabulated below:

total number ol generalcars needed for the transportationton miles of lubricants.

of POL supplies forforces and the Navy will require

OF PRODUCT (Thousands of Metric Tons)

Stockpiled

Requiring Transportation Black Sea Naval Requirements

Not considered as requiring transportation for purposes of this study along coast and only ship-shore transporUUon wul be needed.

Railroad Transportation.

a. If thc railroads were used exclusively for the transportation of the total military POL requirement, this movement would amountotal0 ton miles or sixof thc total Soviet railroad traffiche Soviets would use tank cars to theextent possible for all products exceptThe total number of serviceable tank cars needed to carry0 ton miles representing all products exceptis as follows:

ank cars orercent of the total. By services, these are divided as follows:

Percent

ofTotal

Ground

Air

d. The transportation problem ts clearly high-lighted by the following table wluch shows Uial of thc total0 tank cars needed to supply the occupation forces and theotal3 tank carsill be needed to supply the forces In the Far East.

Product

Gasoline Diesel Av. Gas Fuel Ol! Jet

Tota!

Number of

Cars

Total

OF

Western Europe

Middle East

Far East

Black Sea

Baltic

Arctic

Pacific

SERV1CK

Ground Air Cars

0

TOP RET

Zone of the Interior ground and air forces willank cars for the transportation of POL orercent of the total number. Here again the substantial demands on transportation for supplying the Far East are brought clearly to light,ank cars orercent of the total needed to supply Zone of thc Interior forces will have to be engaged in transportation to the Far Eastern region.

ethod Used in Estimating Railroad Transportation Requirements.

Annex "A" to this appendix sets out ln detail the POL requirements by types ofof each user, the economic region orfrom which the POL will have to be transported, the total number of ton miles and cars required for each movement, and the total transport burden measured in ton miles and cars. Annex "B"ap whichgraphically thc POL requirements by campaigns and economic regions.

The ground force occupation needs were computed on thc basis of the number of refills estimated in, Air forceneeds and ground and air force needs within the Zone of Interior, wereby the Joint Intelligence Group. The breakdown of Naval requirements by areas was prepared by the Ad Hoc PetroleumCommittee.

The location of refinery production by economic regions was furnished by the CIA.

In computing thc transport burden, thc needs of each user for POL were filled from avuilable production closest to thc user. Railroad mileages for each shipment were taken from lhe Soviet Railroad Timetable,in cases where the locations ofor consumption were not definitelyIn such cases an average railroad mileage figure was used.

n order to determine the total number of tank cars the total annual transportation requirement measured in ton miles wasby one-half the loaded ton miles that can be produced annually by each serviceable tank car. II is believed that theank car carrying petroleumIn the USSR is approximatelyons and that the average car miles per car day will be

iles. The product of tons and car mileson miles per loaded tank car per day. Inasmuch as the empty tank car movement will approximately equal the loaded movement, the average effective ton miles produced per tank caron miles. The annual effective ton milesper tank car willimes thedaily movementon milesper tank car yearly. The annual ton-mile requirement for the distribution of POL amounting0 ton miles was then to obtain the total tank car requirement0 cars. Thc same process wasto obtain the requirementfreight cars needed to transport lubricants.

3. Alternative Means of Traniport for POL

assumption in this paper ls thaihave highest transport priority.assumption, therefore. It appears thatrequirement would move by railroadall products would move by tank carlubricants In all instances unlesswere not economical.alternative means of transport arefor some movements and It appearsother instances packaging of productsto lubricants, particularly motormight be found to be morethe exclusive use of tank cars

of the individual movementsin Annex "A" reveals that thealternative means of transport might

an be supplied from Region IV via the Volga River as far as Moscow and thence by rail or via the Volga to Leningrad and thence by tanker to German ports on the Baltic. Packaging facilities might beeither at the refineries or at the Volga transshipment point In either case thewouldank cars.

an be supplied via Black Sea tankers and the Danube or by packaging either at the refineries or after traversing the Black Sea ank car*.

It is not likely that the advantages of speedy bulk shipments in tank cars will be de

' Hnd C. However, the pipeline

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Armavir to Trudovaya may be used lor the finished products to reduce the rail haul from Region IV.

The Scandinavian Campaign could be supplied from Region TV via the Volga and thence to Norway, Sweden, and Denmark by tanker. ank cars.

The Italian, Greek, Middle Eastern, and Turkish Campaignshort haul ofiles from Regions IVo the border points or ports. Some smalllend themselves to packaging for railand motor transport could move the Possibleank cars.

The air force tank car requirement for Western Europe could be reduced in thc same manner described forndf the ground force. ank cars.

The air force requirement for theEast and Turkish Campaigns amount to onlyank cars daily. In an emergency thc air force in this area could supply itself.

ovement of the Baltic and Arcticrequirements amountank cars.

While there Is no possibility of packaging this requirement, it is possibleonsiderable amount of it could move by water transport.

he Zone of Interior ground and air forcesank cars for POL supply. However, where POL supplies are available close by and particularly within the regions it should be possible to reduce the dependence on rail transport through the use of organic transport of the military units. The use of such transport and other motor transport when available should serve to reduce theon tank cars by athird.

c. Therefore, whereas lt might be possible to reduce somewhat the over-all dependence on rail and tank car transportation for the shipment of POL supplies, there are certain POL shipments that would have to depend on rail tank car movement. These would be the shipment to the Fararge amount of the shipments to thc Baltic and Arctic fleets, and certain high priority shipments for the ground and air force campaigns In Western Europe.

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MOUNT OF POL IN TRANSIT

Total Amount of POL in Transit by Railroad.

Metric0

Thc total amount of POL In transit at all times during thc year in order to insure that supplies are available where and when needed will amountetric tons. Aof the amount In transit by products is as follows:

Product

Aviation Gasoline Motor Gasoline Jet Fuel Diesel Fuel Fuel Oil Lubricants

2. Method Used in Estimating Amount in Transit.

The total number of annual ton miles was divided by the total annual number ot tons requiring railroad transportation and anlength of hauliles was obtained. The average number of days per shipment was then secured by dividing the average length of haular miles per car day which resulted in an average length of shipment8 days By8 days by the average dally shipment5otalons in transit Is indicated. This process was repeated for each of the products.

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APPENDIX C

SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO EXPLOIT MIDDLE EAST OIL'

most Important aspect of the Middle East oil to the Soviet Union ts the largeof crude oil supplyroduction ofillion metricnd the availabilityapacity totallingillion metricncluded in the refiningis the potential of the Haifa refinery which is not being operated at present. The only refinery in the Middle East currently producing high-octane aviation gasoline Is at Abadan, the largest refinery in the world. This refinery has an annual capacity ofillion metric tons of petroleum products. The rapacity7 production of thisof Items of particular Interest to thc USSR, are shown below:

(Millions of Metric

Capacity

Blending not known

ctane avgas prod.)

Soviet additions to thc Soviet Air Force of increasing numbers of bombers and jet planes have Increased the requiremmts for highgasoline and jet fuel. Owing to thc lack of highly specialized equipment needed in the production of high octane gasoline, thc USSR will undoubtedly be confrontedarrow bottleneck, particularlyesult of this shortage. Therefore, the acquisitionctane aviation fuel, or theblending agents with which aviation fuel could be produced from USSR indigenous crude oil, would be of prime importance to the Soviets since It would satisfactorilyetailed treatment of this subject sec J..

ment Soviet indigenous production and allow for the fulfillment of their wartime military requirements of combat aviation gasoline. Also, there is thc possibility lhal the Soviets could transport to the USSR certain alkyla-tion and catalytic cracking equipment at Aba-cian, with the object of improving theirproductionctane gasoline and blending agents.

Another Interest that would motivateacquisition of the Middle East area Is that control of thc Middle East would facilitate the freedom of movement of any forces that the Soviets might wish to employ in this area. This would give the Soviets an important base of operations and the availability of Middle East petroleum products would amply support their military operations in the area. It Is recognized that under Soviet management the Middle East refineries and other facilities would not be run at their present efficiency. However, it is estimated that Sovietwouldhroughput volume of two-thirds of the current rate. In theof Allied countermeasures. this rate would amply suffice Soviet requirements in the Middle East.

If the Soviets cannot utilize the refining capacity of the Middle East, their primarywould be to deny access of thissource of supply to the US. Soviet control or neutralization of this area would not only seriously curtail the petroleum supply ot the US but would also drain the oil supply of the Western Hemisphere.

A significant limitation to any Soviet designs in the Middle East is the inadequacy offacilities. In considering thefacing the Soviets in trying to overcome the delivery of petroleum products, theof production and refining capacity,Important, becomes secondary. It is estimated that the USSR could import from

47

48

Middle East no more0 metric tons of oil per monthetric tons per year. If land transportation facilities were continuously and exclusively employed In hauling oil. the theoretical capacity of rail and highway delivery from Iran and Iraq to Soviet border points and/or Caspian Sea portsetric tons per year. However, the probable practical limit of transportation capacity that would be attained under Soviet management Is estimatedetric tons per year. Assuming the theoreticalcarrying capacity of thc railroads and highways could be employed and maintained, the existing transportation facilities from the Middle East to the USSR would be sufficient to moveercent of the present Persian Oulf refinery output.

Soviet efforts to gain optimum utilization of transportation facilities would be seriously handicapped The railroads avntlable arcto be in poor condition, difficult to maintain, and could be easily knocked out of commission by air bombardment because of tunnels In the rail net The transportation of petroleum products by highway would present the extremely difficult problems of longmountain terrain, and poor roads. The Soviet Union could possibly attempt loipeline in order to speed the flow of Middle East petroleum products to the USSRthe mountainous and difficult terrain would make ihc engineering problemformidable Experts who have studied the situation have estimated that even Ifipeline could be constructed] under thc best possibleinimum of two years would be required before any benefit could accrue from It

The difficulty of transporting Middle East petroleum products to the USSR can beor could be completely overcome only if the Sovrcts directed an unwarranted amount of equipment, ubor. and planning, to theSince the USSR is currentlyand will continue to make an all-out effort to Inciense Ils indigenous oil production, the USSR could III afford to transfer necessary technical experts to the Middle East There-

fore, the principal Soviet operations in the Middle East would probably be directed to transporting highly critical products such as aviation gasoline and other Ught fractions.

The Soviets could and undoubtedly would transport aviation gasoline or any highlypetroleum products by air. It does notlikely, however, lhal the Soviets would allocate all, orajor portion, of their air transport reserve for the purpose ofMiddle East oil products at the theoretical maximumons per month. It is entirely urilikely thatevel ofwould be maintained The requiredof air transports needed for this operation would seriously affect Sovietcapabilities in other theaters whereair transport might well be moreemployed.

By utilizing all means of transportation, the theoretical capacity ot the Soviets forcrude oil and/or petroleum products from the Middle East In the USSR is estimated to beetric tons per day, depending on thc availability of four-engine transports. The probable practical limit in metric tons is estimated to be as follows:

per day per month

0

By land roules to Soviet bolder points and-'or Caspian Sea ports By Wio regularly

Total

Conclusion.

Even under favorable conditions extendingeriod of one year, the amount ol crude oil that could he transported practically from the Middle faste USSR would bemall fraction of current indigenous ou'.put of the USSR and would scarcely warrant the effort. On the other hand, the acquisition of Middlectane aviation fuel or filkylation polymerization and catalyticequipment would be of prime importance to thc Soviets sinre It would contributeto their war potential.

TOP TR T

APPENDIX D

THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE USSR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

petroleum output of the United Statesillion metric tons per year, whereas the Soviet Union has only recently managed to regain0 level ofillion metric tons per year.

The relative positions of the petroleumin the United Stales and the Soviet Union can be judged largely by production. For example, ofarrels per day of liquid petroleum Including light hydrocarbons currently produced In the world, exclusive of Russia andarrels orre produced or can be produced within the confines of thc United States. Further, ofarrels of oil produced outside the United States, aboutercent isby companies of US ownership orand most of the remainder produced in the world has become possible only by the use of US developed techniques andOn the other hand, the Sovietconstitutesercent of the world's total.

The over-all refining plant of the United States is well balanced with respect to all products, whereas the USSR is deficient in equipment to make combat aviation gasoline.

Among the reasons for these divergenciesontrast In technical and industrial development in each country at the close of World Warifferent effects of thc recent war upon each country;he greatin thc levels of education and other basic factors relating to industrial

Further evidence of the unequal progress between the United States and the USSR is that US oil interests have developed theoil industryoint whereIn Venezuela is twice that of the Soviet Union. This achievement by US interests is exemplified by the fact that oil output in the Soviet Union and Venezuela was almost on the same level before World War II.

Much of the field and refinery equipment of the Soviet Union is out of date and, judged by modern standards. Inefficient in operation. Also, the devastation of World War II hasboth the necessary expansion of theand the maintenance andof existing facilities and equipment. The Soviets are presently endeavoring to correct the deficiency in materials and equipment by expanding their manufacture at home.the supplies are slow in coming forward and are poor in quality and design.

The Soviets have also Instituted expanding programs of exploration and drilling to make good the exhaustion of old fields and further Increase crude oil outputoint where production will reachillion tonsven under the assumption that thc world production of petroleum will remain at thc present leveloviet crude oilwill constitute5 percent of thc world total. If the past performance of the Soviet oil industry is usedasis for comparison, the Soviets cannot be expected to make any spectacular improvements In thc near future.

49

CRET

(Capacities quoted in

metric tons per

REGION:

Ca-

Location

"Shaumann"

Jarve

Northwest

REGION:

Karpati"

'

South

Questionable.

REGION:

SOUTHEAST

REGION:

Waterfront Group 0

Akmedy

refinery,

"Asneft"

Transcaucasus

Plant Location ECONOMIC REGION

Astrakhan

#3

Volga

CENTRAL

500

475

ECONOMIC REGION: URALS

Peregonny"

#2

Urals

REGION: WESTERN

52

Location

#4

Dag

Western Siberia

REGION:

Cheremkhovo

Kemerovo

Total Eastern Siberia

ECONOMIC REGION:

Plant Location Aleksandrovski Khabarovsk

"Ordzhonikldze' Komsomolsk Nikolayevsk

Total Far East

Total

EASTERN SIBERIA0 56

SOVIET FAR EAST Total

Crude Crack-Throughput ing Ca-Capacity

2

2. Secondary Refinery List.

(Not Fully Confirmed) ECONOMIC REGION: SOUTH

Plant

tons yearly throughput ..

tons yearly throughput Formerly known as

"Hubicka Ramnerya..

(or cracking plant is distillate (rem Tuapse and Orozny. World

Oil Atlas gives cracking capacityons yearly. Cracking plant reported moved to Syzran but may have been rebuilt and is carried as such.AW to ONI,

plant reported put into operation6 "Krasnaya Zvesxda".

ept. 46

tons yearlyons cracking capacily. SDS

CIA FDB.f Poltava. Reconstruction began in Mar.

by0 cmrom pumping stutlonm SE

of plant. Five mill ion-liter capacity storage facilities. . Rpt

.

ECONOMIC REGION: SOUTHEAST

Plant

tons yearly throughput capacity. Plant reported under con-

struction by several sourceshis is likely since location ls the terminus of pipeline from Tuapse and Grozny, continuing north tc other points. NA, London, Rpt2. Wkly Intel.

bi

REGION TRANSCAUCASUS

Ions yearly tiiroughput capacity. ons yearly cracking

capacity. Under expansion, completed3 with modern cracking installation

ECONOMIC REGION: URALS

tons yearly throughput capacity plannednder

construction 5info

dated ,pr.tons yearly throughput capacity. Under construction9

and continuing Cracking plant presumed to have come

from Osipcnko. ,,ar.tons yearly throughput capacity. Topping plant planned.

Started operation, aviation and motor fuelunder construction. .).

). .

ECONOMIC REGION: CF^TTRAL ASIA

high-octane avgas. Administered by Soviet Air Ministry.

.

on* yearly throughput capacity Production of naphtha at the plant is being increased.. "Pravda9 Eco,.

ECONOMIC REGION FAR EAST

constructed. wi>GS Rpt.

e t

Original document.

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