ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA (ORE 20-50)

Created: 9/1/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

213

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

copy of this publication ls for the Information and use of theon the front cover and of Individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho require the Information for the performance of their official duties.elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorised by the following:

Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State

of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of theChief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission.

eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencywith thc Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA

DISTRIBUTION: Office of tbc President NaUonal Security Council NaUonal Security Reaourcrs Board Department of State Office of Secretary of Defense Department ot tne Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air force Joint Chief* of Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board

SEJJiPBT

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Importance of the Yugoslav Economy.

The stability of the Titoarge measure on Its ability totable economy and to makeImprovements, both In industrialand living standards. Yugoslavia's break with the USSR prompted various Soviet economic, as well as political and diplomatic, pressures by which the USSR apparently hoped to unseat the Tito Government and replace itoviet-dominated regime. Present Indications are that the USSR will continue Its economic pressures againstand will seek by all the means at itsto exploit Yugoslavia's difficulties in the hope of hampering the lattcr'sprogress, fomenting internal unrest, and undermining the government. Thus far, the Yugoslav economy has withstood the shock of these measures and, with Western assistance, has made economicThe strengthening of theevere political andsetback to the USSR, the repercussions of which cannot yet be fully evaluated. The exampleormer satellite state which has broken with thc central authority of the USSR and which ls showing economiccannot be overlooked by other satellite and near-satellite nations, nor by Communists throughout thc world. Thc damage to Soviet prestige has beenby the general realization both that Western assistance has brought more benefitocialist country than Soviet promises and that the West has not Interfered in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs.

in addition to this political and Ideological setback, Yugoslavia's defection has denied to the USSR certain positive economic andbenefits. The USSR can no longer uti-

lize Yugoslavia's economic-strategic potential to strengthen its own power position in the Balkans. Most important, thc USSR will also be denied the strategic benefits which would result from the development ofports and bases on the Adriatic, airfields, rocket launching sites, roll lines, roads,depots, repair shops, and certain lines of munitions production. Secondarily, the USSR and the Satellites can no longer obtain much-needed Yugoslav non-ferrous metals, particularly copper and lead; while Western Europe, particularly Western Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK will derive new economic benefits from Yugoslav trade.

Eitimate of Economic Trends.

The Yugoslav economy hastrong recovery from the effects of Worldnd byad demonstrated its ability to make thc adjustments necessitated by the break with the USSR Production In the three principal segments of the economy-agriculture, forestry, and non-ferrousabove prewar levels. Output ofmetals, ferro-alloying elements, coal, electric power, petroleum, chemicals, textiles, and machine tools has reached, and in many instances surpassed, prewar levels.in most lines is continuing to expand. The transportation system is supporting more than twice the prewar volume of traffic and is, in general, capable of meeting the needs of an expanding economy.

On the surface, therefore, it would appear that the Tito regime should have no difficulty intable economy capable of supporting the populationevel at least as high, if not higher, than the prewarThe basic tenetsocialist regime, however, have impelled the Tito Govern-

The Intelligence organisation* of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Alr Force have concurred In this report. It contains lnlormaUon available to CIA as of

merit to embarkrogram of rapidexpansion. Thus, the Frre Years originally conceived, and even as amended following the break with the USSR, represents an ambitious program-Attempts toil the plan are responsible in part for some of tbe Immediate problems confronting the Yugoslav Government Any effort of this magnitude, particularly whenby leaders with little experience In managing an industrial complex, could not fail to produce such "soft spots" as excessive use of equipment with inadequateand replacements, shortages ofmanagers, engineers, technicians and skilledigh rate of labor turnover and absenteeism,ow standard of living. Thc Tito regime, however, will probably be able to alleviate most of these troubles within the next few years.

Tito's success In strengthening andYugoslavia's economy will depend primarily on the extent to which he realizes the basic limitations on the rate and extent of economic development possibleountry of Yugoslavia's resources. Yugoslavia has considerable resources In agriculture, forestry, and non-ferrousnot onlythe principal Yugoslav exportsarge portion of the nationalhas ample but not fullyresources of water power, iron ore, manganese and chrome ore, low-grade coal, and non-metallic minerals such as pyrites, cement, and salt. Yugoslav resources,are adequate to support gradualexpansion considerably beyond prewar levels.

Yugoslav economic expansion, however, limited in rate and scope not only by the sire of the country, but by its deficiencies inraw materials, as well asroad variety of capital equipment. Important raw material deficiencies include cotton, wool, metallurgical coking coal, high-gradecoal, certain feno-allaying elements, crude oil, and certain raw materials forMoreover, the timber industry will eventually be weakened by overcutling and inadequate reforestation. Theshortage cuts across all lines of Indus-

try, agriculture, and forestry. The lack of fabricating faculties and technical knowledge makes it necessary to purchase most capital equipment from foreign sources. In addition, replacement parts to maintain existingin sound operating condition must also be purchased abroad.

Committedrogram of IndustrialTito faces the complicated problem of finding sufficient foreign exchange toalanced economy. Currentof agricultural, forestry, andmetal products are Insufficient to pay both for capital expansion In these industries, which have high export potentialities, and for equipment to Increase the country'sIndustrial capacity. Moreover, Uie need to Import the necessary raw materials and semi-finished and finished products tothe growing Industrial machine isfurther strain on thc foreign exchange position.

At the enditoerious foreign exchange crisis primarilyesult of extensive purchases of capital equipment He was temporarily extricated from thisby financial aid from various Western countries and by an International Monetary Fund loan. It ls not likely, however, that these loans, coupled with expected foreign exchange earnings, will make up the Yugoslav balance-of-payments deficit for at least three years.

Much of the financial aid already received has been assigned to the purchase of specific equipment to increase Yugoslavia's export capacity and to reduce Yugoslav dependence on Imports. However, this equipment is not likely to materially alleviate the foreignshortage before the end1 In view of the time that must elapse before much of II can be produced, delivered, andsay nothing of the difficulty of training personnel in time to operate the equipment effectively. Meanwhile, foreign exchange earnings from current exports, which are not linked with specific purchases, as arc most loans, must be carefully allocated to purchase the materials and productstoradually expanding economy in balanced operation. In its eagerness the

Yugoslav Government has alreadyisproportionately large share of Itsfrom current exports to the purchase of capital equipment, and recent Yugoslavof0 capital equipmenttogether with0 tradethus far concluded Indicate that this practice is being continued. Thus, unless the Tito regime lowers its industrial expansion sights. It will be unable to derive thebenefits from the loans already received and will probably seek Western aid beyond that presently contemplated. Meanwhile, in Its efforts to increase industrial capacityand to protect Yugoslavia's foreign ex-

change position, the Tito regime has thus far sacrificed the people's standard of living (still belowopular dissatisfaction with living conditions poses no real threat to the government as long as it uses police state methods, and living standards will rise only slowly If present emphasis on Indus trialIs continued. Although allocating greater supplies of food and materials to consumer Industries would force Tito tohis Industrial expansion program, theof the government would Increase and labor problems such as absenteeism and rapid turnover would be alleviated.

ANALYSIS OF PRESENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

and Forestry.

Agricultureemarkable recovery alter the war. reaching prewar levels in most categoriesurrent grain production provides an exportable surplusetric Urns, and other crops,the Industrial types, have Increased slg-nlflcanUy. Livestock numbers, with theof horses, reached and in some cases exceeded prewar. Althoughesult of UNRRA aid8 number ofas double the prewar number,in restoring other farm machinery and equipment has been slow. Theprogram bos been progressingapid rate8 and the government's control over agriculture is being strengthened through cooperatives.

The Umber cut ls greater today than at any time In the history of the country, and the value of forestry products exports Is greater than that of any other commodity. Current government efforts to obtain equipment abroad ore designed further to expandof scmi-flnlshed and finished wood. The major weakness in the generally satisfactory condition of the lumber Industry lies in the present practice of overcutting and the lack of adequate reforestation.

Industry.

Yugoslav non-ferrous metal resources rank among thc largest in Europe and provide an Important percentage of national Income and foreign exchange. Although non-ferrous mines and plants were severely damaged during the war and complete rehabilitation

or PHC-numo*uivn 'viiuxct. and Aumi.ir

IMS-It

[lllJUl

tdlmliun

iiiiii

lMk3

not yet been attained, productionis tho highest In history, and exports of copper, lead. zinc, mercury, and bauxite currently make up betweenf the total value of Yugoslav exports. Further increases in production arewith the installation of equipment purchased with the proceeds of variousloans.

Although ferrous metal production isabove prewar levels. It does not supply domestic requirements. Raw materials for iron and steel production are plentiful with the exception of metallurgical coke, but the old and inefficiently operated foundries and steel mills lack sufficient capacity to satisfy industry's needs. Domestic production must be supplemented by such imports as scrap

LEAD

ZINC

BAUXITE

* Not Available

reliminary estimatelan8

iron, cast and rolled iron, rolled steel, steel bars, and special high quality steels. Present plans to modernize and expand existingand to construct new installations arc heavily dependent upon foreign assistance.

Production of chromium and manganese has made large percentage gains aver prewar, but only chromium among the ferro-alloying elements is sufficient to meet internal needs. Resources of manganese and molybdenum, and possibly vanadium and titanium, arefor domestic requirements. Untilhowever, small quantities of these metals must be imported.

Production of fuels and power is generally above prewar levels. Coal output9 was approximately double9 figure and the relatively minor shortages that exist are the result of lower quality and IncreasedElectric power production has also more than doublod over the same period. In the Qcld of petroleum, crude output Increased since prewaretric tons toons. Meanwhile, refinery output is still aboutercentnd steps are being taken to purchaserefining equipment. There are no cracking faculties- Yugoslavia must stillcrude oil and petroleum productsaviation gasoline and lubricating oil.

/

Except for petroleum and metallurgicalcoal, Yugoslavia is self-sufficient in fuel and power resources. Large quantities ofand brown coal ore scattered widely over the country, but good grades of bituminous are scarce. Coal, together with the adequate supply of fuel wood, furnishes betweenndercent of all fuel and power requirements. Less thanercent of Yugoslavia's largewater power ls presently developed. Petroleum and natural gas fields, however, would probably not produce enough of either product to satisfy increasing requirements, even if fully exploited.

The major lines of chemicals reflect aimprovement9 over the prewarlevels War damage in the chemical industry was largely restored by the endespite the fact that much of themachinery Is old and many of therelatively obsolete, it is estimated that the main goals for increased capacity by thc end1 are generally feasible, The goals for production in some coses will not be achieved, however, because of thc shortage of materials, the lack of export markets or the Inability to use the commodity domestically.

The presently small chemical Industry can be expanded to permit Yugoslavia to approach self-sufficiency. Enough progress has been

1/ / /

reliminary jailmate. riginal plan. en Bed PI an-attainmentYugoslav official figures place producUon9t and0no evidence is available which would Indicate that capacity has beensince Ihe war lo permit this level of output. On the oUier hand, coke8 and coke aad scrap requirements listed9ndicate thatbe higher than estimated In this550

'3B 48

reliminary Kstlmate.riginal Plan (Attainment improbable)

ugoslav official figures90t0 mt. respectively. Allhough this does not agree with lhc estimate or this

report, this production might possibly be650

jjmT-i

in the expansion of productive capacity for calcium carbide, wood distillationand tannin to permit small exports.surpluses also exist In caustic soda, soda ash, copper sulphate, and pyrites, but they toomall part of foreignearnings.

Productive capacity of sulphuric acid,ammonia, and chlorine is sufficient to meet domestic requirements. There ls,no coke oven battery to supply theof the steel and carbide industries and to produce by-product coal tar for utilization in the output of benzene, toluene, phenol, and other derivatives. Tlic absence of thesealsoependence on imports for

pharmaceuticals, dyes, plastics, and otherderivatives.

In the past, Yugoslavia has had to import salt, potash, and phosphate rock. Although present agricultural production is notupon substantial foreign supplies of the last two Items, any long-range plan toagricultural production and exports would require extensive use of fertilizers and greater imports of potash and phosphate.evelopment Is not likely soon as it would have to be precededrogram for educating the farmers ln the use of such

Yugoslaviamall rubber industry.continued imports of natural rubber will be necessary to supplement synthetic pro-

10

CalrtumSoda

0rrHrelnarf* Ftfuro not available, a- Capacity will be lufllcirnl lo alUIn ml.

UH

b- Atlaiiuacni ol ml drptrtF on rrnlpt

Instillationnrw equipment, c- AlUtiuwnt ol ml

sufficient fabricating capacity exists to meet demands for most finished products.

Current production of textiles has increased over the prewar years. Output ls still small, however, and production does not fulfillrequirements.f the raw materials, principally fibers, yarns, and thread, must be imported in order to maintain production. The shortages In raw materials which developed after the Cominform rift will probably behe industryelativelyrole in the economy of the country, although operating exclusively for the home market and competing with the handspun and handwoven textiles produced by the

One of tho Greatest obstacles to Yugoslavexpansion Is the virtual absenceachine tool Industry and the tremendous shortage of production equipment andtechnicians to set up and operate the equipment. Most of the machine toolsavailable In Yugoslavia ore dismantled reparations equipment; If substantiallythey couldozen or more large factories and satisfy the immediateof maintenance shops. Yugoslavia Is thus in no position to manufacture theequipment upon which all the major programs for expanding industrial,and forestry production are based. Pro-

duction of machine tools is limited byIn special types of metal workingelectrical equipment, anti-frictionabrasives,ide range ofparts.

Industrial expansion ls further hindered by the shortage of technical manpower toset up, operate, and repair equipment. Installation of industrial equipment isscheduledore rapid rate than domestic engineers, technicians, and skilled laborers can be trained. The service of some Germans and Italians has alroady beenbut will not solve thc problem and Yugoslavia Is currently mtensifylng Its efforts to recruit more assistance. Capitalimported from the West will not beutilized unless such assistance is

The present high rate of labor turnover and absenteeism arising from workeris creating additional problems in thc labor force, but the government will probably be able to alleviate this situation In theyear. Measures were taken early0 to tighten control.

Living Standards.

Consumption levels are below prewar.costs have increased faster than wages. Practically all consumer goods and food are

skcjwTt

and housing conditions arebut are still below prewar In urban areas. This disregard ol living standards as opposed to emphasis on developing heavy industry is typical of planned economies patterned along Soviet lines. As long as strong police state methods are used to keep thc populationcontrol, however, the regime will not be seriously threatened.

Tronjportalion.

Yugoslav railways carryon-kilometer basisercent of the inland freight Aof over-exploitation and inadequate maintenance and replacement of track and equipment haseavy strain on tbe rail system. Thc addition of some new lines and equipment, and improved trade control, however, have permitted rail traffic to more than double the peak prewar volume.emphasis on the production of railwill gradually strengthen the system and enable It to meet the needs of theeconomy.

The Corainform break greatly reduced Yugoslavia's Danubian commerce, making the inland fleet, previously under strength,for domestic traffic. Planned Increases ln domestic waterway traffic will relieve the railways, particularly in the Sava valley, through which the heaviest rail traffic moves.

Motor transport is insignificant though It has some function on short hauls, Roads arc

primitive; motor vehicles are few and ln poor repair; maintenance equipment andare Inadequate, and motor vehicleand repair are dependent on imports for many basic components. Nevertheless,transport is being developed and iaIncreasing the flexibility of the orans-portatlon system. Civil air transport is of minor Importance. Its significance lieswholly in its military implications and its ability to provide some rapidfor government officials.

Domoitic Finance.

7 tbe State Budget became anof State Planning and has sincethe direction of government economic effort and expenditures.9 the planned budgetary expendituresillion dinars were almost double that7 reflecting both the Increased role of government In the economyise In prices.

The largest expenditures9 were marked for the operation of and Investment in state enterprises and for national defense. These categories accounted forndercent of total budgetaryrespectively. The defense figure does not include that part of thefor State Administration which ore marked for "security" organs nor does itthe value of services rendered by other Ministries to the armed forces. As previously noted, these heavy allocations for investment

R AI f, FREIGHT TRAFFIC

Brail passenger trafficB

Thousand Passengers Million Passenger Kilometers

FREIGHT AND PASSENGER9

Metric Ins. Million Ton KiloEstimate

S#rf?IUST

the military haveeterrent toliving conditions and were financed primarily through tho turnover tax whichthe purchasing power of the consumer, thereby limiting thc Inflationary pressure.

NaUonal income9 totalledillion dinars and wasbove thathis was primarily the result of production Increase and to aextent was probably also attrlbutablo to price increases. The high ratio of Investment to national income is another reflection of the intense effort to expand the productive capacity of the economy. Although lt had dropped from aboutercent8ercent0 plan callsevel of investment overercent of national Income.

Foreign Trade and Finance.

Yugoslav official statistics. Approximate,

Yugoslavia's currently tight foreignposition stems basically from the fact that Yugoslavia's exportable surplus does not earn enough tohe equipment needed to meet planned increases in tbeof exportablehe raw materials and equipment needed to keep the expanding economy In balance;he imports needed loapid industrialization of the economy and an increase In the standard of living.

In comparison with the suddenness of Tito's political split with tho Cominform, trade ties were severed gradually from8 to the springhus permitting Yugoslavia and Satellites to adjust to the new situation. Immediate stoppages were principallyfrom Rumania and Albania, cotton from tho USSR, and, obviously militarycoke deliveries were sharply reduced. Although there have been numerous reports of attempts to continue Indirect commercial relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the small volume of trade that has continued appears to belearing up of old commitments.

0

Meanwhile, trade agreements withall the OEEC countries were eitheror expandedith most of thc trade conducted with the UK, Italy, Austria (excludinghe US, Netherlands,Western Germany, and Switzerland. Leading exports. In order of value, were:and timber products; wheat and com; and ores, metals and metalivestock and livestock products, tobacco, cement, textiles, and some chemicals were exported In smaller quanUtles. Imports, other than capital equipment,agricultural products, raw materials for textiles (notably cotton andheml-

"lil'iinT i

13

and pharmaceuticals, natural rubber, fuels (largely petroleum and metallurgicalnd some ores, metals and metal(especially semi-fabricated Iron andconomically, Yugoslavia ls already benefiting from the shift of its trade from the East Except for Czechoslovakia andesser extent Hungary, the Soviet areaoor source for capital equipment and for certain semi-finished and finished products. Furthermore, the Western countries havereplaced the Soviet orbit as suppliers of essential raw materials. The West, too, will benefit from this reorientation of trade, particularly through imports of Yugoslav grain and timber. Western Germanywille-establishment of the important prewar complementaryIs indicated by the current annual Yugoslav-West German trade pact5 million and representing the largest single Yugoslav trade agreement

Following the break with the Comlnform countries lnugoslavia's gold and foreign exchange holdings (US and Canadian dollars, Swiss francs, and pounds sterling) steadily declined, and by0 hadow5 million, including the deposit of almostillion with the IMF. This drop was largely caused by the necessity of financing purchases of Western industrial equipment and materials and finishedwhich thc East had failed to supply. The grant ofillion in Western financial assistance during the last half9 andillion US Export-Import Bank Loan granted In0 prevented the complete exhaustion of Yugoslavia'sexchange reserves, and partially removed the greatest threat to the continuation of Yugoslav trade plans.

Yugoslavia still faces the problem ofthe large volume of its outstandingThe direction of Yugoslavia toward the West has made the settlement of prewar debt and nationalized properties claims anissue. Ashis question was the main obstacle torade agreement with France and was becoming an important factor inwllh the US. Under the monarchy.

Yugoslaviaonsiderable foreignat1 million nowit stopped servicing,for occasional payments, with the advent of the depression. The Tito Governmentthese obligations by stating that schedules for any future payments would be dependent on the progress of the country's recovery. The Yugoslavs have alsoa debt0 million for properties nationalized under6 nationalization law oresult of settlements since then. In addition, the postwar advances from the West, particularly thc US,izable obligation-Probable Future Developments.

Yugoslavia will continue to expandand to collectivize ogriculture. Over-all industrial Increases are expected even though some of the plans will not be fulfilled on time. However, if an intensive program for further developing an armament Industry Is Initiated, as Tito has Indicated might be done, It will be done at the expense of Industrial development

During the next five years steady progress will be mode toward collectivization ofEven though peasant opposition tomay temporarily decreasesomewhat, the government will have greater control over the procurement andof agricultural produce andecline In production will not necessarilyexports- Income from agricultural shipments will probably expand because of the higher proportion of processed foods.steps will also be taken to diversifyIn order to further Increase production of Industrial crops andigherof self-sufficiency.

In an attempt to provide additionalovercutting of Yugoslavia's forests will continue. Success in the drive to export more semi-finished and finished timber products will depend largely on increasedmade possible by current loan

Some progress will be made in the iron and steel Industry, but achievement of planned goals by the end of the Five Year Plan is

14

Even If Yugoslavia is successful in procuring necessary installations andfull operation of facilities will not be attained before tho termination of the plan.

Loans from thc US Export-Import Bank and the UK and the contemplated IBRD loan all provide for equipment for the non-ferrous metal industry. When imports based on these loans materialize, thc industry can beand expanded, thereby permittingproduction and exports. The fullof this equipment will not be apparentut substantial increases are expected and In general planned goals will be attained.

The capacity of the chemical Industry will be Increasedut the Industry will still be dependent on foreign sources forsemi-finished and finished products. The over-all planned goals for Increased capacity are considered feasible, and completion of the first coke oven batteries at Zonica and Luka-vac couldarge part of requirements for coal tar derivatives. The syntheticindustry win still be dependent onof natural rubber.

In the fiold of fuel and power, coalwill continue to increase but willbe unable to keep pace with long-range industrial expansion unless the quality of coal mined is improved. Output of crude oil will also continue to rise but will not satisfyrequirements. Refining capacity will also be short of internal needs and it is not likely that there will be any cracking capacity by the end Electric power output wil' show further increases,eavy emphasis on the development of water power. The original goal5 billion kwh will not be achieved, but gains will be sufficient to satisfy domestic demands.

The general shortage of productionwill stillasic limitation on economic expansion at the endquipment requirements for most major linos of Industry and for agriculture and forestry must be largely satisfied by imports, because domestic production of equipment willto be inadequate and will be retarded by shortages of machine tools, engineers, tech-

nicians, and skilled workers. Spare parts for replacement on existing equipment must also be imported.

The transportation system will be lesson foreign supplies than otherof the economy because of the increased domestic manufacture of transportation

equipment. The system will be capable ofIts capacity and will keep pace with the increasing demands of the economy.

Problems arising out of the shortage ofmanagers, engineers, technicians, and skilled laborers will be ofssistance from foreign(Italian. West German, and possiblyducational programs, and experience on thc Job will improve efficiency. Nevertheless, present schedules call for installation of new equipment atapid rate that it will outrun the availability of trained personnel.

Other labor problems arising from worker dissatisfaction, such as the high rate of labor turnover and absenteeism, will be modified by more stringent government controls. New measures to meet this problem wereat the beginning Thehowever, will still have the problem of improving working conditions and theof living. Although the living standard should gradually improve, the rale of progress will be slowed by continued strenuous efforts to develop heavy industry. Moreover, when the program for collectivization of agriculture is put into full effect, Irving standards willparticularly in the rural areas. This program willecrease in agricultural production and the government will make its greatest effort to keep up the living standard of thc industrial workers.

Future economic development within the basic limitations of labor and materialwill dependarge measure on the receipt of foreign loans and the properof all foreign exchange resources. To continue expansion,alanced economy, and meet its foreign financialYugoslavia must Import equipment which can be utilized to increase exportable surpluses. Current loan agreements have given suchigh priority, but most

of this equipment will probably not be Inwill not be able to increase exports

eration1 and will notargeother sources of foreign exchange suf-

in correcting the present import balanceto correct the import balance for at

that date. It is estimated, therefore,three years.

APPENDIX

INDEXES YOR SELECTED)

Minerals and Metals Iron, Steel, and Term

AUoyi;

ore

a.

Iron

steel

steel

ore

Metals:

a_

a.

a.

a.

a.

and Power

oil

power

carbide

soda

ash

add

a.

and wwriea fab-

,.

Transportation

trafflc (metric

kilometers)

traffic (metric

trafflc (pas-

kilometers).

as-

>

Projection on basis of present trends andfuture

Plan.

0 wtU be determinedlla-bility of raw materials and remilrenvenU forand export. Capacity ls sufficient to permit expanded output.

RolledL

MINERALS AND METALS PRODUCTION Iron and9 and 1USS1 (metric tons)

Tear

Ore

Iron

Steal

a.

9S-H

0

(metric tonsl

.

9metric tons)

')'

' Preliminaryriginal plan.

' Reviseddoubtful.

- Yugoslav official figure* place production9t and0l; however, no evidence Is available which would Indicate that capacity has been expanded sufficiently since thc war to permit this level of output. On the other hand, coke Imports8 and coke and scraplisted9) Indicate that production may be higher than estimated In this report.

'Attainment of plan Improbable.

'Yugoslav official figures90t0 rat. respectively. Although this does not agree with the estimate of this report, this production might possibly be achieved.

17

MINERALS AND METALS PRODUCTION (Continued)

Non-Perroui Metals and. Non-Metallic9S1

(metric tons)

Copper

Zinc

Bauxite

Aluminum

Mercury'

Antimony

Pyrltea

Gold (kga)

Silver (legs)

0

0

0

a..

a.

a.

SL

a.

=.

a.

Preliminary estimate. "Plan.

la available to produce more but plans Indicate crease output at this tunc.

flasks of

FUEL AND POWER PRODUCTION

Year

9SS1 (metric tons)

Production

Year

9illion KWHI

Production

0

J0 US

Preliminarylan

"Original Planestimated to beto have been towered.

Preliminary estimate.

9I (thousands of metric tons)

i

3

Bituminous, brown coal and lignite.

' Preliminary estimate.

SEPTET

19

CHEMICAL0 AHD1

(metric tons)

Estimated Production

Capacity Plan

Calcium carbide

acid

ash

"

soda

sulphate

fertilizers

N)

plastics

Preliminary estimate.

'Capacity will be sufficient to attain goal.

" Attainment of goal depends on receipt and Installation of newttainment of goal likely.

RAILROAD FREIGHT AND PASSENGER9

Traffic Tons'

Ton-kilometers'

Passenger Traffic Thousand passengers Million passenger

kilometers

1 Metric tons.

' Preliminary estimate.

0

0

'

'

90 meters)

Cotton and woolen

' Preliminary estimate.

FORESTRY

Annual Timber Cuts and Utilization lor Industrial9

Year

(cu. meters)

Industrial Purposes (cu. meters)

Preliminary estimate.

SEPTET

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION9

Crops

Cotton

Beets

Numbers

Preliminary estimate.

AGRICULTURE

Producfton o/ Selectedveragethousands of metric tons)

Wheat Rye Corn Barley Oats

Total

Industrial Crops

Cotton Hemp

Sugar Beets Sunflower Tobacco Potatoes

'Preliminary estimate.

Numbers at the End ot the0 head)

Horses CatUc Hogs Sheep

Total Poultry

'Preliminarylan.

4

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

O

0

0

0

S

GOLD AND FOKKIGX EXCHANGE HOLDINGS*

of February

ioUart

vaults

Monetary

EXCHANGE

Currency

dollars

dollars

Sterling

Francs

In foreign

Official Yugoslav report.

'Head Office of thc NaUonal Bank Only.

'Restricted Foreign exchange, not Included above, equivalent to USoreign exchange under reserve, not included above. USPreliminary data.

OPmillions ot us dollars)

All currencies Imports Exports

Trade deficit Net invisible pai/mentt

Imports Capital goods OUier

Total Imports Exports

Trade dentil Net Invisible payments

Current account Net capital receipts Dollar deficit1

46

4

1

45

3

42

Probably covered by gold, foreign exchange, and loans.

'includes SO million payment on nationalized property and S9 million International Monetary Fund drawing.

"Tables relating to foreign trade and foreign exchange should be used with caution. These tables are not always comparable because, as noted In the footnotes of thc Individual tables, some are based on Western trade statistics and some on Yugoslav figures. The problems arising out of cross rate discrepancies, differences in reporting trade data (Ci-F. andifferences In methods of collecting data and the incompleteness of some data,eaningful comparison.

S EflKKT

RET

GEOGRAPHICAL COMPOSITION OP FOREIGN TRADE

(millions ol US dollars)

Comlnform East'

!

Oermany

(Sovzone Austria)

East*

Countries'

Based on Yugoslav statistics.

'Statistics taken from official Western sources and converted at official rates of exchanges; nomade lor freight. Insurance, and other charges.

' Trade for first nine months. Trade for last three months relatively Insignificant. 'Negligible.

trade with Latin Americansufficient data to permit estimate.

7

7

LMPORTS

Foil

5 65

4.7

1.0

Cominform Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Rumania Sovzone Germany USIA (Sovzone Austria) USSR

Non-Cotnbiform East' Finland

15 ILS

4

2 63

1

1 J

3.8

8.9

>

OSEC Countries' Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Italy

Netherlands

Norway

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

UK

0 IJ0

Of her'

. 80

Canada

Egypt

India

Israel

US

Miscellaneous'

' Based on Yugoslav official statistics.

'Statistics taken from official Western sources and converted at official rates of exchanges; no adjustments made for freight. Insurance, and other charges.

'Trade for first nine months. Trade for last three months negligible. 'None.

'Mainly trade with Latin America (Argentina) and Middle East (crude oil). Estimated.

ET

COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF FORKION TRADE

(millions of US dollars)

PLANNED STATEContinued) (billions Of dinars)

Plannedeconomic operations of andIn State 0

tu

h'xporta

Plant and plant products (largely

wheat and corn) Livestock ond livestock products Timber and timber products Ores; metals, and metal conce:

trates

Other (mainly chemicals, textile fuel)

Total exports

Imports Agricultural products (except

hides and leather) Hides and leather products Textiles

Chemicals and pharmaceuticals Fuels (mostly POL) Ores, metals and metal products Capital goods Other

YUGOSLAV/

8

I94S'

0

boaslng program)

and Culture

dispensed through Repub-

budgets) Social Welfare and Health

163

financed from Republic

Defense'

to be primarily for Min-

of Finance, Interior. Posts

Telegraph, and Foreign Af-

Yugoslav official trade data. 'Yugoslav official estimate of requirements and export capabilities.

PLANNED STATEbillions of dinars) Planned Revenues

State Economic 0

Turnover

Profit from sale of state

Social Insurance (employers'(working funds and savings in

Subtotal Population Sector

Income

Social Insurance (employee's

Estate and gillloan

Offices and Institutions

(Traditional fees andSecetpfs

(Includes sale of reparation goods

and custom Receipts (From preceding

TOTAL

Reserveadjustments Insubsidies, lncludlDg thosedeficits of certain

TOTAL

' Includes only direct National Defensepara-DUlllary and other expenses for tne armed forces, such as education, security, and labor battalions, and certain types of Investment areas equaling overercent of direct defense appropriations.

' Expenditures9 amounted toercent3 billion dinars) of those planned. Thewas caused by an Inability to fully invest funds as planned owing to the Cominform economicand certain economics in Administration and NaUonal Defense.

NATIONAL INCOME AND' (millions of dinars)

Percenfacfi of national Income

TOTAL

3

evenuesillion dinarsplanned receipts.

Yugoslav officialpproximate.

E QaTE T

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA