POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY IN 1950 (ORE 2-50)

Created: 2/3/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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COPY NO. THE ASSISTANT [lIlirCTOR RSPOKTS AND ESTIUATES

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY0

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S EORKT

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY0

SUMMARY

possibilityomplete Soviet troop withdrawal from East Germanyit cannot be entirely discounted, is slight. The USSR may, however, consider-

ably reduce its East German occupation force0 and propagandize trip reduction as the first step toward complete withdrawal o! its troops from the area.

Note: The Intelligence organizations of the Departments ol State. Army. Navy, and thc Air force have concurred in this report II contains Information available to CIA as ol IS

SECR

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY0

an attempt to increase the prestige ot the new East German Government, the USSR has granted it diplomatic recognition,the passageeneral Nazi amnesty law. and promised early return of all Soviet-held German prisoners of war As intimated by German Communist propaganda at the time of the creation of the German Democratic Republichc Kremlin mighta more decisive move: the unilateral withdrawal of Its troops from East Germany.*

The Soviet Union would obtainomplete troop withdrawal This action, ostensibly the result ofwith the Pieck Government, would raise thc prestige of the GDR and might result in gradual West German pressure for aol Western troops from Oermany. It would relieve the USSR of direct responsibility for GDR police state tactics, would eliminate the "contamination" to which Soviet troops arc subject in East Germany, and could beby Soviet propaganda as proof of the USSR's "peaceful intentions."

The principal advantages to the USSRomplete troop withdrawal do not, however, outweigh its principalweakening of Soviet control in East Germany Tbe USSR docs not nowontrolwithin the East Germun Statein itself to insure continued Communist control. The USSR might be able0 to improve Its present control apparatusoint of security where On combination with

oviel decision loroop withdrawal In nut believed to be dependentrior peace treaty between thc USSR and Hie ODR.

the capabilities of its troops in Poland to lend moral and. If need be. timely physical support) it could safelyomplete troopHowever,ecurityin an area as important as East Germany is not likely to satisfy the Soviet Union'ssecurity consciousness. Furthermore, if re-entry of Soviet troops into East Germany to support the Communist regime became necessary, the result wnuld be to destroy quickly and effectively the advantages of the original withdrawal and simultaneously tothe true status of the GDR Therefore it Is more likely that the USSR wouldell-tested security apparatus,ery high capability oi control withoutmilitary assistance, indispensable totroop withdrawal. In view of the above considerations, the possibilityomplete troop withdrawal0 appears slight.

On the other hand, the appointment ofMarshal Rokossovsky as Polish Defense Minister and the current Soviet effort toEast German paramilitary forces, which are probably preparatory measures for an eventual complete troop withdrawal from East Germany, mayeduction of the Soviet occupation force0 The USSR can considerably reduce Its present occupation forceithout endangeringcontrol and, by calling this reduction the first step In complete troop withdrawal, couldavorable propaganda theme Because many of the units withdrawn would probably be redeployed toartial withdrawal would not fundamentally change the offensive or defensive capabilities of the USSR in the area.

SEC

SIBT.LI.TY QV SOVIET TRCOP WITHCRAWAI,

?rcOK easty a

Ooneroi

auggeet that, in addition to the factors considered

ln this report, soviet airfield construction in Eastern Germany ic not to be reconciledull-3cale withdrawal.

Original document.

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