CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA (ORE 71-49)

Created: 12/15/1949

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CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA

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CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA

SUMMARY

present isolation and weakness ot thc pro-Soviet Albanian regime arc importantcontributing to Its basic Instability.neither Yugoslavia nor Greece, whose extensive support would facilitate thcof the unpopular Hoxha regime, is likely to furnish such overt support under present circumstances. Meanwhile, Soviet policy in Albania apparentlyaintaining the pro-Soviet government in powersing Albania in support of peripheralagainst Tito.

The Albanian Government, under closesupervision, has greatly strengthened Its internal control mechanism. Repeated purges of dissident elements in both the government and Communist Party have occurred until only pro-Soviet stalwarts remain in anyot importance. Overt opposition against the regime exists in the country, but as yet it la largely uncoordinated and itsis an unknown quantity. Albanian exile groups must overcome their mutual jealousies before they can exert any significant pressure against the Communist regime.

The USSR is supporting only those sectors ot the impoverished and primitive Albanian economy necessary for carrying out its policy.

Thus,arge part of Uie population existsemi starvation level, thc USSR has been stockpiling sizable quantities of grain In the country. The USSR mustthe economic liability which Albaniabecause of its political and strategic Importance.

A combination of factors makes anyof the pro-Soviet Albanian regimethis winter. Tito, though capable o! ousting the Moscow-controlled government, is wary of makingove because ofSoviet reaction. Pressure from the Western Powers will probably serve toGreece from any military action against Albania. On the other hand the proSovie: Communists directing the Albanian regime, with the active support and assistance of the USSR, seem able to avert any likelihooduccessful Internal revolt In thc near future With little other basis for support theStalinists are necessarily dependent or. the USSR for maintaining their power. In addition, their loyalty to the USSR is under constant surveillance by anOC Soviet "advisory" personnel attached to key positions throughout the Albanianand Communist Party.

Note; Tlie

'X Novemberonavailable lo ciA as ol

CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA

International Significance oflbania,mall and Impoverished country, has assumed unusual Importanceol Its strategic location In an area of shifting power relations. The Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union has served lotlic pro-Soviet Albanian regime from its Comlnform support and surround It withneighbors desirous of Its overthrow, Tito's Yugoslavia, hemming In Albaniae north and cast, Is grooming the Albanian Kossovur minority, as well as Albanianfor use against the Comlnform-backed Albanian recline. In Greece, on Albania's other flank, strong public sentiment exists for eliminating Albaniaase.for further anti-Greek guerrilla operations.

The isolation and weakness of Albania have augmented the difficulty of Its use by the Kremlinase against either Oreece or Yugoslavia. Thc same factors have also served to Increase the danger of retaliatory action from cither of Albania's neighbors. However, neither Yugoslavia nor Oreece Is prepared to undertake at the present time the action required for the overthrow of the Hoxha regime. Although Tito has theof successfully staging an antl-Hoxha coup within Albania, he Is apparently fearful of Soviet reaction. On the other hand,there is widespread sentiment In Greece for terminating Albania's role as the principal guerrilla base, any Greek violation of Albanian territory would serve lo raise the tlircat or major hostilities. Oreece, unlike Yugoslavia, has no sizable Albanian minority which It enn exploit, many groups in Albania being opposed to Greek claims on northern Eplrus. Moreover. Greece would hesitate to impair the past support, by the Western Poweis and the UN, of ils stand against the Kremlin-supported guerrillas by taking any overt action against Albania

The Soviet Union will attempt to maintain ils grip on Albania, because Soviet prestige, as wellesire toaval base on the

Adriatic, is involved in preserving the Iloxlia regime. Albania Is also usefullanking area for supporting Soviet pressure against Tito. With Albania under continued Soviet control,mlin can always returnolicy of Intensified activity against Oreece. In the meantime, the USSR may pursue an Albanian policyaintaining the pro-Soviet Hoxha regime in powersing Albania in support of peripheral anti-Tito pressure. The fact that the USSR has neitherutual Assistance Treaty with Albania nor admitted the latter to themay Indicate that the USSR desires toertain flexibility of action with respect to ils isolated satellite.

nternal Political Situation. a. The Tightening of Party Controls. The concerted efforts of Premier Enver Hoxha to carry out Soviet policy ln Albania are proving to be difficult, even though the Comlnform Communists arc apparently In full control of the governmental organization and the security system. The vast majority, perhaps as much asercent, of thepeople have consistently opposed the Communist group which seized power after the Germans were driven out of the country in the fallince then the Albanian people have been undergoing an increasingly oppressive process of cominimization. Like its pro Communist predecessor, the Hoxha regime in the backward country hastronger neighbor for support.ommunist regime In Albania it was natural lo turn to Tito's Yugoslavia for such support Under Tito's patronage, theCommunist regime managed withsuccessountry which has always had ti low standard of living.

After the break with Tito, and attributable at least in parteverance of Yugoslav supplies, the living standard declined further, making the population increasinglyand restless. Additional factors which

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have tended to increase thc unrest among the Albanian people wiihln the past year haveito's efforts to undermine thc Hoxha regime in place of his former close support ofvidenceeakening of the Communist Party by nationalism;trong Greek pressure against thc Iloxtiafor its support of the guerrillaThc Hoxha government hasfound lt necessary to strengthen its grip on the jicople by tightening policeIncreasing restrictions on tho activities of everyday life, and generally terrorizing the population.

The behind-the-scenes struggle for control of thc Albanian Communist Party between Premier Hoxha and Minister of the Interior Xoxe, which had been brewing since thetook over the governmentroke out into the open Inhe Kremlin allowed Premier Hoxha toas titular head of the government, while Xoxe and his Immediate followers were first dismissed from the government and laterxoxe's trial in9 allegedly exposed his plot to purge Boxha's followers and makeugoslav colony.to the prosecution'soxe had replaced top Communists in thewith anti-Soviet and pro-TitoXoxe was Anally executed In9 and his Immediate followers were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment and to loss of civil rights. The Soviet Union hasup thc Xoxe affairhorough and ruthless purgee entire Albanianuntil few, If any, of the Xoxe appointees remain. The replacements are young. pro-Soviet militants larking administrativeThe purges indicated. Ant, that the Kremlin was determined to maintain in powerompletely subservlenlregime and, second, that In the Internal party struggle Hoxha triumphed by adhering to Moscow's change of policy towardwhile capitalizing on his rival's alleged nationalism The Xoxe trial served as anpart of the Kremlin's campaign against anil-.Soviet nationalism. Staged in the isolated satelliteefiant Yugoslavia, the trial of Albania's second-

'ranklng Communist seems lo have had thc dual purposemphasizing thc effective-ness of Soviet conlrols In Albaniammntlzlng lo the Yugoslav Communists the procedure to follow in purging Tito.

After Xoxe's downfall, the return to power of several members of the government,In temporary eclipse, furthertrengthening of Kremlin control In Alba-nia. Ardent pro-Muscovite Major General Bedri Spahiu conducted the trial agalnal Xoxe. Xoxe's Ideological leadership of the Communist Party has been assumed by Lt. Gen. Mehmet Shehu. Shehu, who attended the Voroshilov Military Academy, was. reportedly on direct Kremlin orders, made Minister of Interior following Xoxe's dismissal lie was elevated toGeneral inther loyal pro-Moscow personalities in thc Albanian Government have had their military ranks raised consistent with thc Soviet policy ofundeviatlng loyalty. Hoxha'spessimistic view of his ownestern observer, may be an acknowledgment that even tighter Moscow control is being developed with his own purge awaitinglight misstep.

b. Factors Tending Toward Instability.

Any government would have difficulty intable nation from the diverse groups making up the Albanian people.ommon culture, religion, orobjective, they have been subjected tocxtcrnul influence. Although ex-King Zogreal deal to eradicate the tribal idea of justice as well as Its practice,feuds and jealousies still exist,thc present political unrest Thc Hoxha regime must also contend with the Orrrily rooted suspicion and hatred of an oppressed population for traditionally corrupt and cruel rulers. The Albanian mountaineer knowsof ideology or politics, but he understands the enforced collection of his produce.

An additional factor contributing to theof the Albanian Government is its isolation from the Soviet orbit, on which It is now entirely dependent. Albania's immediate neighbors are on anything but friendly rcla-

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leaders in Tirana. The Communistmeanwhile, has embarked on aof currying favor among the moreGreek-speaking population InAlbania by establishing Greek language schools.

It Is estimated that, currently, there areeliable members in the Communist Party of Albania, although aat the party congress In80 members0 alternates,ola!0 membersof the population. The party's leaders tuive admitted during the past year theand unreliable character of Its Popular support of the Communist regime Is probably limited to less than ten percent ofopulation. c. Strength oj the Resistance Groups. No large-scale organized resistance against the Communist regime ls known to existAlbania. Although sporadic resistance activity against the government ls widespread. It is as yet unorganized and Ineffective,being held in check by the intensified activity of loyal security units. The strongest ant!-government activity is reported from the northern mountainous areas adjacent to Yugoslavia, less from the Greek borderand weakest in the central areas of the country. Accusations of the Albanianindicate that the Hoxha regime mainly fears an internal revolt with large-scale backing from its unfriendly neighbors Albanian anti-Communist groups in Egypt, Greece, Italy, and the United States have only recently succeeded In sufficientlymutual Jealousies toCommittee for Freective anti-Communist elements among the emigres consist of the Balliationalist group made up of the remnants ot those who opposed the merger of the Nationalist and PartisanI resistance movements during World War II, and ex-King Zog's entourage who form the "Legab'teli" party campaigning for the restoration of the monarchy. on the committee is the Independent Nationalist Party (BKI) whose Influence is allegedly greatest among tho Catholic tribes

- Friction within thc various emigre'or the purpose of divert ng

arising from connicUnB alms,to the West could be only he

served to hinder thc development among0 ,food cormimer goods Aid In the

of an Albanian anti-Communistof light Industrial equipment would have

front. The Issue of supporting ex-King .

around whom centered the difficultiesInfluence In Albania Is par-

panylng former attempts to activate an Plan,wofJKf

live exile resistance movement, hasInefore It was promulgated by

minor importance when comparednment. Tho Flan is designed

mcnt between the BKI and the BK,nuch'C benefit

from their wartime enmity. Although ZogA,banUlncrease production In

the most prominent exile Is notstrengthen tlic state and

among most Albanians, who cannotalign It more closely with the USSR. The

his encouragement of Italian already requLytioncd he

mgestoration of theaiphoning

would probably be accepted by manyProduction of petroleum and some agricul-

bardans as preferable tots to the USSR, how-

nist rule. However, the Albanian exile"ro^HfiE T

represent widely divergentovlet orblt to keePthc HoKha

to reconcile- The settlement of_

among the exiled Albanians to provideAJbau1Ul

shipoordination of effort ls f? ^ orblt

ulsltc for any effective

against the Hoxha government. Not evenfaculties may have more rmll-

turn of affairs, however, would insureeconomJf TaJ"e-

achievement of any successful resistance'ch thal

out material aid from an outside power.in foreign trade will be very small,

combination of factors necessary for thel"ld^ ^almost exclusively

throw of the Hoxha regime is. as yet.thc USSR 1 ortut-

a. Sfondardiving.

conomicstandard of living in Albania is therecent months, the Albanian peopleoffcountry. The fooda decline in the livingsizable stockpiles of grain,hatfrom the USSR, the government hasri Ion? arethM;jmeasures to relieve the presente9 ration.linage It is possibleUU*^afidesigned for futurTm.Utaryart *population, consisting of artisans,

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0 metric tons annually.roduction of nil grainsecord totaletric tons. Imports nf grain since8 have been0 metric tons0 metric tons from USSR, and the remainder from Bulgaria andotal supplyons. Based on prewar rates of consumption, Uie presentrequirements would beetric tons. This wouldurplus of0 Ions, ofons probably would be required to meet the annual cereal needs of the Greek guerrillas either already in Albania, or supplied from that country. On the basis of the above information. It would probably be safe to assume that there are in the0 tons of cereal stocks left from8 harvest and Imports.crop prospects9 ore good. Thus thereizable grain reserve which can be used for possible military or political purposes.

The land reform instituted by the present regime has redistributed the land and limited thc size ol thc holdings to five hectares. This has caused the peasants to attempt to hoard their productsonsequent decrease in thc quantity of agricultural goods available for off-farm sale. The government probablyeventually lo overcome this problem through collectivization. Thus far, however, progress in this direction has been relatively slow probably owing to the antagonism which would be aroused among the peasants.

Lack of necessary materials as well asfacilities for processing fibers and leather account for the fact that clothing and shoes arc very short in supply and extremely costly.

C. Two-Year Plan.

A two-yeardopted byInfter approval by the Soviet Union, calls for sharp Increases8 In thc Industrial and agriculturalof the country. Preliminary official announcements envisage high goals0 production levels, which arc unrealistic. The financial implementation of the plan willdepend on assistance from theUnion and thc orbit countries actingthrough the Council of Economic Mu-

tual Assistance, to which Albania wasIn

Even though Albanian economy mayexpandesult of aid from theof Economic Mutual Assistance, this may not be to Albaiua's advantage,ignificant part of Its production will probably In the long run be siphoned off to the USSR and Lhe satellites. In prewar years, about eightyof Albania's exports consisted ofproduce and petroleum.

It is reported that the number of Albanian non-agricultural workers has increasedhile the total agricultural labor force may have risen to. Largeof those who might otherwise be idle have been employed on public projects, such as roads, canals, and bridges.0 youths are expected to work on variousthis year. In addition to these youthmembers of the political opposition. Idlers, and other persons arc Included among those on the forced labor projects which were openly introduced innn order was Issued requiring theof all able-bodied citizens between the ages of

The impoverished economic condition ofis reflected in its primitive transport system. Although railroad construction has been emphasized during the postwar period, first with Yugoslav and more recently with Soviet help, there are onlyiles inincluding thc Duraxzo-Peqin and the Duiazzo'Tirana lines. The road system has been Increased byiles sinces.urrent totaliles.i!cs of asphalt-surfaced roads. The inventory of trucks has decreasedand is woefully Inadequate even forAlbania.

The merchant fleet Is limitedumber of small sailing vesselsew coastal vessels ofross tons. Attempts have been made recently to increaso this modestby purchase ofon vessels from Italy. Maritime commerce, except for some short hauls to Adriatic ports, is largely

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by foreign bottoms, predominantlyand satellite.

Thc expansion of the transport system,has not been halted by thc Tito<tomln-form rift. Yugoslav engineers who wererailroad construction have beenby Soviet tpeciaitsts, and Sovietof railroad and motor transporthave exceeded quantities previously shipped by Yugoslavia. Moreover, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland have contracted torailway equipment. It appears that the transportation system will gain by the greater orbit assistance which lias been furnished to Albania since thc Tito break with the Kremlin.

That Albania has been Isolated from the Soviet orbit by the Tito rift Is trueartial sense only. Commerce with Eastern as well as Western Europe, even with Yugoslavia, has always been largely maritime, and maritime communications with the Soviet orbit have not been Interrupted.

oreign Trade.

In tlic postwar period prior tolbania had trade relations among the orbit countries only with Yugoslavia. Following the abrogation of thc Yugoslav trade treaty, Albania concluded trade agreements with the USSR and lhe other orbit countries. The Soviet-Albanian trade agreement, signed In8 and reneweds the largest in volume and value, with the Crechc-slovok, Rumanian, Polish. Hungarian, and Bulgarian trade treaties following ln order of importance. Thc chief comrnodities whichwill receive from Ihr USSR and thearc grains, transportation equipment,agricultural equipment, chemicals,equipment, gasoline, and minerals. For the most part these agreements areredit basis since the value of Albanianwould not cover the cost of its imports. Albania exports In small quantities crude oil, bitumen, copper, chrome ores, pyrites, cotton, hides, and tobacco.

In the periodeptember throughhc USSR reportedlyotal0 tons of merchandise toMuch of the material received bywas undoubtedly destined for use by thc Greek guerrilla forces. These shipments con-

sistcd. for tlic most part, of wheat,is trucks.ailroadew railons of rails.illion square meters of0 pieces of agricultural0 tons offertilizer, medicalons of coal, some sugar;0 worth of oil and oil products. There are some Indications that the value of Soviet shipments to Albania9 may beonth, and probably not less than the average Yugoslav monthly deliveries up to

In spite of the announced severance of trade between Albania and Yugoslavia,imited scale have, at least until recently, continued between these twoIt appears that the Soviet Union and the orbit countries. In order to Implementpolicy in Albania, will take steps to bolster Albania's economy and possibly expand it In some categories.

Although Albanian trade with the West is virtually non-existent, that country hasan interest In expanding commerce with the West. The practical possibilities of such trade are difficult to foresee, however, becausehe character and small amount of raw materials, goods, nnd produce that Albania can export,he lack of westernin the Hoxha regime.

4. Foreign Affairs.

a. Soviet Domination of Albania. Despite the fact that Albania hasbeen an economic liability, the USSR for political and strategic reasons In June assumed the close supervision over Albanian affairs formerly exercised by Yugoslavia. Thc Kremlin, however, had anticipated the public break with Yugoslavia as early as8 by raising the Soviet military attache in Tirana to the rankajor general and increasing his staffotal of fifteen officers.the Kremlin-backed Hoxha regime oustedugoslav "advisors" who had been supervising all phases of Albanian public life, and replaced them with Soviet personnel.

The USSR was aided in its assumption of Yugoslavia's previous role as protector ofby the schisms existing within the top echelons o! the Albanian Communist Party,

'Hie tual of Xoxe in3 allegedlythat Hoxha tnniseM Ml on Xoxe'slist, and had It not been for therift Huxlio would In all probability have been eliminated sooner or later. Thewithin the Albanian Communisttrong belief that Moscow would make short shrift of Tito, and resentment by thc Hoxha clique of their treatment by Tito combined to play the decisive role In the decision of theCommunist Party to side with Moscow. The Soviet quarrel with Yugoslavia thus saved thc Hoxha faction within the party fromation by Xoxe. On the other hand the split hi the Albanian party may have been decisive in enabling the USSR to hold Isolated Albania In spite of the Soviet break with Tito.

With no other basis for support the Hoxha regime. In order to maintain itself in power, remains entirely dependent on military and economic assistance from the USSR. The leading Albanian Communists who havecontrol of the security forces, the army, and the government, must of necessity remain faithful to thc USSR.urther factor insuring the continued dominationro-Soviet regime in the Isolated satellite, thc Soviet Union has anoviet advisers in the country. Recent first-handhave described Soviet personnel asa predominant Influence at the top echelons of the Albanian Government The Soviet diplomatic mission In Tirana, headed by Minister Chuvakin, reportedly sendsto the Albanian cabinet ministers, each of whomoviet "technical advisor"attached to his office.

Complex problems In retaining itsinfluence in Albania have arisen and been squarely faced by the Kremlin during the past year. In order toro-Sovietthe Hoxha regime Instituted purges of widespread Titolsl deviationlsm three limes during this period. In an important address to the Albanian Communist Party Congress inuk Jakova. organizational secretary of the Party, criticized the pastof the Albanian Communists andgreater attention to Soviet ideology. Repeated efforts to wipe out anti -Soviet devi-

ation in the Albanian party and to bolster the latler's loyalty to the USSR are indicative of the Kremlin's anxiety regarding tillsSoviet guidance has meant ancampaign to "reorient" the Albanians, through emphasis on Russian culturaland language study.

The Soviets In Impoverished Albania have thc complicated logistical problem ofthe Albanian Army, the Soviet andpersonnel in the country, as well asaid through Albania to the remaining guerrillas hi Greece. With Yugoslav aid to the guerrilla movement apparentlythe burden of supplying and giving refuge to the Greek guerrillas has had to be met by the USSR largely through Albania.anuary andhe Soviet bloc ls reliably reported to haveapproximately sixty shipsotal capacity ofons into Albanian ports. Although no accurate breakdown of cargoes Isizable portion of them ls known to have consisted of warecent study hasefinite connection between the magnitude of past guerrilla operations In Greece and the amount of Soviet-satellite shipping transiting Albanian ports. Soviet anus shipments tomay not only be used for the military support of Albania and guerrilla operations against Yugoslavia or Greece, but also toan arsenal for supplying the Communists In southern Italy.

Air connections between Albania and the Sov-ct orbit have been hampered by Yugoslav restrictions on overflights of its territory,visa checks of passengers. The Soviet Aeroflot which had been servicing Albania three times monthly is recently reported to have stopped all flights. On the other hand, lhe Hungarian Mazsovlet airline, whichiweekly air service into Tirana in the springs now operatingeekly basis. Cargo space in theype planes is taken up mainly by Soviet and Albanian officials, as well as supplies for the Russian colony inRecent outgoing flights from Albania have been evacuating wounded militaryto Hungary.

with the Soviet Orbit.

Prior loulgaria andwere the only Soviet satellites, aside from Yugoslavia, which maintained diplomatic relations with Albania. Albania seemed to be generally regardedugoslav satellite, with the USSR exercising only Indirect control. Within thc Soviet bloc Albania had mutual assistance treaties with, only Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Since the Soviet-Yugoslav rift,has extended its lntra-orbltto Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, and Northern Korea. Theof thc Comlnform bloc have greatlytheir military, economic, andsupport of Albania. Significantly,no additional military assistance pacts with the Albanian Government have been made public by the orbit countries, Of the Comlnform bloc, Bulgaria alone has ft mutual assistance treaty with Albania. Moreover, Bulgaria seems to be giving the Hoxha regime the closest support from among the satellites.

Relations with Yugoslavia.

Yugoslaviaominant position lnaffairs4 untilhen the Hoxha regime suddenly realigned itself with the USSR against Tito. DespiteInternal dissension, the entire HoxhaIncluding thc subsequently purged Minister of Interior Xoxe, officially denounced Tito. Hoxha probably considered that Tito would be unable to maintain his position against the Soviet bloc, perhaps expecting that the Kremlin would bring Yugoslavia back Into the orbit by purging Tito or resolving the existing differences. The Albanianfollowed the Comlnform resolution in renouncing ils past close relations with Tito. Trade relations were officially severed on the initiative of thc Albanian Government inhe Yugoslav Governmentbrogated the Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

Provocative Incidents between the twohave included mutual violations ofdiplomatic Immunities, Albanian trials against alleged Yugoslav espionage andactivities, and discriminatory actions against each olher's nationals.

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Charges and countercharges of hostile activities have been exchanged betweenand Yugoslavia during the past year by both press and radio. There are reportsumber of border Incidents have occurred between the two countries. It Is obvious that Albania and lhe other members of the Soviet bloc bordering on Yugoslavia arc carrying out Soviet directives to harass and pressure the Tito government In every way possible short of armed action.

Evidence is available that Tilo is exploiting the Albanian Kossovar rnlnority. consistingalf million people In the Kosmet region of Yugoslavia, against thc Hoxha regime.propaganda has charged Tito witha number of important Albanianimprisoned while Albanian-Yugoslavwere cordial, and encouraging them toesistance force from the Kosmetfor use in subversive activity against the Hoxha regime. The Albanian minority in Yugoslavia,eriod of persecution by the Tito regime, has recently been grantedprivileges and reforms probably to lessen antipathy for the Tito regime and tosentiment for Hoxha's overthrow, In order to free their countrymen across the border. The Yugoslav promiseemi-autonomous Albania, even though it were governed by Tito's henchmen, would probably secure the supportignificant number of thein Ihe Kosmet region of Yugoslavia. Some evidence Is available to support thecharges that Tito is providingtraining centers for Albanian political refugees. Moreover, meetings of Tito'sleaders with representatives of the exiled "Committee for Free Albania" have beer,tiie purpose of which has been the formationommon anti-Hoxha front. The combined forces of Kossovsrs andfrom the Hoxha regime available to Tito wouldormidable menace to the Hoxha regime, especially if their efforts were timed with Greek pressure on the southern Albanian border.

The virulent propaganda atlacks exchanged between Yugoslavia and Albania reflect thc progressive deterioration In Tito's relations with thc Soviet bloc. Hoxha's propaganda

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lias repeatedly accused Yugoslavia o( colonial lni|iertalism in Its past relations with Albania The Albanian Government alsoMs worsened economic condition, since the break with Tito, to prior Yugoslavof plans for aiding Albania. Yugoslav rebuttals present the Hoxha regimeool of the Soviet Union, blaming lt for theIncidents between the two countries as well as for the chaotic Internal condition of thc country. Tito has publicly promised aid to opposition elements In Albania in ridding themselves of the oppressive HoxhaCominform and Albanian propaganda, meanwhile, accuses Yugoslavia and Greece, with the support of western imperialists, of plotting the overthrow of the Hoxhaand the substitutionascist regime.

Despite tlic virulence of the propaganda war between Yugoslavia and Albania, lt Ls evident that neither government Is anxious toany major overt action against thc other. The Tito government Is reported to be fearful of thc consequences, for Yugoslavia, of any external aggression against the Hoxha regime. On the other hand, the Hoxha government faces complex Internal problems whichany large-scale Albanian activity against Tito. Even without the previousIt ll unlikely that either sldo would Initiate aggressive action with tho UN General Assembly In session. In addition, winter weather will soon prevent any majorby cither Tito or Hoxha. It Is thusthat Tito will not take the actionfor the overthrow of the Hoxha regime prior lo the springubsequentbetween Albania and Yugoslavia will rcflpct lhe deterioration of thesituation.

d. Relntions with Greece.

Diplomatic relations between Albania and Greece have been suspendede Italians invaded Greece via Albania and enjoyed some Albanian cooperation The Greek Government contends that normalrelations with Albania are impossible because Uiat country has waged an undeclared guerrilla war on Greece. In addition, the Greek Government, partly out of internal political considerations, Is unwilling to re-

nounce Greek claims to southern Albania (northernn Albanian census5 shows0 Greeks orpeople inhabit northern Eplrus. Some of them may be loyal to the Greek cause, but many perhaps no longer liave strong feelings having consistently been under foreignCommunist Indoctrination In the past few years has also taken Its toll.

With the growing curtailment of Yugoslav aid to the guerrilla movementhe Soviet Union was Increasingly forced to use Albaniaase to maintain Greekoperations. Thus, by the summer9 someercent of the aid to the Greek guerrillas was coming from Albania. By far the greater part of the equipment and supplies channeled through Albania for the guerrillas originated elsewhere In the Soviet bloc, since Albania itself was both economically anddependent on external aid. In addition to its useupply base for the operations in Greece. Albanian territory was Increasingly utilized by the guerrillas for maneuver and

refuge purposes, andest and training

center.

With thc completion of the successful Greek military campaign against the guerrillas In the late summerew phase ofrelations began. The escape of large numbers of the guerrillas into Albania, raising their total In that country to0 (including those not fit foras resulted in widespread Greek publicfor military action to neutralise Albaniauerrilla base. The Greek Army,thwarted in its attempts to wipe out the guerrillas, through the tatter's retreat Intomight conceivably attempt to invade Albania to destroy guerrilla positions. It is more probable, however, that the Orcekwill leave the solution of thc Albanian guerrilla problem to the Western Powers in the United Nations. Any Greek military action against Albania would serve to unite Ihcwhoraditional nationalist fear of Greek claims on northern EpirusTito, Uie Greeks have no significantminority whose services they might utilize against the Hoxha regime.Orcek action against Albania could also

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lo upset thc uneasy stability between the Coniinform and Tito forces in thc Balkans, with unknown results.

All present indications point to atemporary curtailment of Albanian-based guerrilla activity against Greece. TheGovernment, with tlic apparentof the Kremlin, has announced Itsof interning all Greek guerrillas in Albanian territory. Hoxha ls reportedto have warned the Kremlin of the danger to his regime ln further attempting to use Albaniaase for both guerrilla operations against Greece nnd pressure against Tito. The reported evacuation, from Albania into other satellites, of large numbers of guerrillas may be another indicationhift In Sovietde-emphasizing Albania's role against Greece.

e. Attempts to Renew Relations with the West.

Since the withdrawal of the US and British missions from Albaniarance has maintained the only western legation in Tirana. Yugoslavia assumed thefor thc protection of Albanian Interests abroad, but terminated that service after Tito broke with the Comlnform. Albania'sto renew diplomatic relations with Italy in9 culminated negotiations which had been in progress7 and opened the wayossible economic accord.the negotiations had never achieved any satisfactory result because of AlbanianA subsequent Italian-Albanian agreement was reached for the returntalian professionals and teclinicians who had been forcibly retained in Albania after World War II.

Reliable information indicates that thcGovernment is eager to resumewith the United States. The USSR may thus hope to raise the prestige of the pro-Soviet Albanian regime, render possible west-era support of any revolutionary anti-Hoxha movement more difficult, and obtain relief from Albanian groups In thc United Slates.

5- Military Situation,

The curtailment of relations betweenand Yugoslavia resultedarked in-

crease of Soviet influence over the Albanian armed forces. The latter now provide the main prop for maintaining the Sovict-doml-notd Hoxha regime In power. Yugoslav nul. ltary and technical advisers to the Albanian armed forces were ousted and the Sovietmission to Albania IncreasedRecurring reports Indicate that the Soviet Union has been supplying the Albanian military forces with equipment Including artillery, tanks, and military vehicles.

At present, there arcovietln Albania, many of whom areas advisers. Instructors, andin the Albanian military and security forces which arc estimated to totalo Soviet tactical units are known to be stationed in thc country. Thc Sovietis allegedly attached to the Albanian Army General Staff,oint Albanian-Soviet Inspectorate General of Armed Forces reportedly has been established, permitting high-ranking Soviet officers to make directof all Albanian troops.

Albanian Army training is supervised by thc Soviets who have introduced Soviet drilland tactics as well as politicalAn unknown number of Albanianand NCO's have been sent to the USSR -for advanced training. This group allegedly includes Albanian air force personnel who are receiving flight training.

The Albanian Air Force was first organized7 under Yugoslav guidance. Sovietand Instruction have since replaced that of the Yugoslavs, and most of thois probably of Soviet origin. Some fortyighter aircraft were originally loaned lo Albania by Yugolsavlu and presumably were returned sometime after the Yugoslav-Cominform rift. The Albanian Air Force has degenerated toegree that there Ls no further evidence of an Albanian Air Arm.

Thc Albanian Navy alsoovietgroup, reportedly headedovietecret naval agreement between Albania and the USSK was allegedly concluded in8 Under this agreement thewere granted concessions in certain ports, including Valona. Recurring reports indicate that the Soviets arc constructing permanent

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emplacements on the rocky Knra-burun peninsula and Saseno Island, which guard the entrance u> Volona harbor.pens have also been reported to be under construction on Saseno Island. The Albanian Navy Itself hits no combat usefulness. Its present main function is that of patrolling the Albanian const to prevent communication between Albania and anti-Uozha forces abroad.

An element of the Albanian armed forces-over which the Soviets have establishedclose control is the DMP (Division of Peopleshe security forces are estimated to0 carefully selected men. overercent of whom are reported to be Communist Party members. The Soviets also control the gendarmerie, which is Al-

bnnia's police force Doth of theseare subordinate to the Ministry cf the Interior, inoviet adviser is theof the Administrativeecent report states that Soviet advisers are nowto Uie Chiefs of Police of eachthroughout UieivilianorganizaUon 'Tor the Defense of the Fatherland" ls also being formed In thethrough mass mobilization.

esult of Soviet indoctrination and preferential treatment, the officers and NCO's of the Albanian military forces are generally considered loyal to the regime, but the loyalty of thc ranks is questionable. The Albanian armed forces, however, are Incapable ofaction against any foe, or of defensiveagainst any neighbor.

Original document.

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