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^tfw WO
ciysla of Soviot and Satellite PmpsajiinTu ITi pfjrj
to or cheat
To analyse Sorlotollite psvpafiindo diroctoc te rafoolarla. in ordv te dlatincnlaB isjuiiiit treads cad to coin* out lntfflnttona of unytaDd-cp
U cacicsiost lag ofleaaius rrasB^Hite aaaasaaag fro Ceaia-fora rodloo haaoan! antra ea attaafe aaalost raaaalavla
aaald tab* plaae vdtfaoa* additional apaaaajaBaa lavjpazatiotw tha
luteaduatlon af artdUtonal aaaaaaaajs. faotere rovolvlneaonreto JnotlfloeUoa. far tha attacka tawful, tot not raacntlnl, prior te aa outbreak of
f tho foUowlnc rrport feenrlbeu tho Tro^*ndu rietorw as It etends to date.
3. actio XI baSlaatoE aha types of jis|isa<iil those*holvnwBnov larraly ebawAthc* olfM hato Inoroeac mi relations between Uie LOTdnfam aaa fepaelxwia aon-Untie to fl<-Vtriore.to. These Indicators point oat in aaaa detail hov rod; rwfchor both mutes* parttoolsjrly Toeoolarln, aaa yet ep In their oamvlnUan of the epree-ag old*. If poexrdlOe,1 In the future be raffxler reporte basedooUrednz aa-Iptfe of bctuooand rO "lndlaetor* of warMtlated-asar-clav tad .'Jotellite rt-dlfl nr^conda. om of ttwfw report- uould he to civrs ^anjAon any turkM ohHacT' In brordgoata (sootranden lores Insreoa* In Own or slas "liKUer-tora ofvfclefc airjbt nannelUte attoeb. ifereaver,on roliabln saaalo ofdc mti*-tol heesroes aTrOarJa for eyateesrOe tnd Is-te'ielve studyuhlan li nob nev 'caoihloit any ha pogaihie to dlaUrtfitrfim nrsndnj: In wr-of-ocrw "wttjitVIb slatentSan to atteefc rur**einvla.
grrncT oLunCi
IA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN8
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i. fttsart bvidwcss or uchbases thbiob
1. Increaitdof AccuBStlcofl
The Tolweof chargee attributing nrllte preparations and aspirations to th. oppoalng .Id. hae aarkedly increaeed. It Mb exoeeded prerlous war-of-nerTes ceapalgn period, eonalflerablr 3ecauee of the absencene le tent saaple it le rleky to etteapt to ea7 whether the rolun* ie now increasing or tapering off.
2- Attention to Teotlcel ae Distinguished fronPreparations
aae of the Boat noticeable characteristics of toe current war-of-nerree phase le the greater concentration on orertly military preparatlone. Leas attention li giren to oialms thater aide alma to ororthrow the source'e gorernaent, acquire part of Ita territory, or force lt Into a colonial- etatus, or that it baa "hoetile intentions" agalnet tha source!
Thoae SstaUlU ohargeallltery nature heard before the Korean -ar gar.to ectlTltlea which were strategic in nature. Building war fee tori ee suppliea, extending atratogio highways, expending porta and airfields,military Instructors, standardising ana, and tbe Ilk. vera the klnda otin earlier phaiea. Although these basic and preparetory-typ* chargeo hare by noout, thepointedly tactical type of charge hae of late beoou* aorechargee lnolude contentiona that the other aide haa called up reeerrtete, haarelease certain clauses of. holding large-scale nneurera, launite at certain frontier points,
The locue of these more lradiate and threatenlng-aoundlng actiTitiaa haa alao tended to oove nearer the frontiers. Thus Tito's radiohort tlaa ego that Bulgarian troope complete with medical unite left Sofia in th. direction of tha lugoalsT frontier.
Each side has said that the other has Infiltrated agente across the border with mnwroue
salons (propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and evenosily aaaasBlnatlon). Inherentof lack of efficiency ln proTentlng auch Infiltration do not aeea to bare -terred the propagendlete froa Bering auch accusations.
*. Concrete and-Specific Chargee
The scot obrloua difference between theount lon. of aggreaalTe Intentions and preparations and earlier chargea Ilea In the degree of epeclflcity in the reporte. By and large, chargee during paet ncruel phases have been quite general lnhat "TltT la preparing an attack against the Hew Deaocraciee." Little waa aaid of how theae preparation, were to be carried out; the charge wae enunciated, and per ha p. the aotireatho Intention wero sectioned (and often llnVed with 'Yjggroaalre"ut notnore waa added. Alao, auch chargee were oftenncidental to the sain theae. of the passages in whloh they eppoared.
The current phase haa aeen the use of such aore specific theae* which glr. aubatanc^ce preeunably conrlction, to the chargea. Daring the past aonth Tito baa been accused ofe froa Geraany, building fortifioatlona along Satellite frontiers, using the Geraan General Yon Klelat to plan an at tick on Albania,nit lone faotcrlee away froa frontiera, billeting troope in frontiernd the like.
Thus, while general chargea alao increase, th. focus of attention center* much aore on tbe steps neceaeary to lapleaent the usual rogue chargea.
**. Proliferation of Hew^'Chargea
Although during the prerlous war-of-nerrae period new epeclfic chargee were by no Beans absent, 'tine, the current upsurge Tito and particularly the Satellltea harearge nuaber of new chargea not. heretofore used.
During the prerlous noraal phase, the single aoat epeclfic ailitary charge used waa that the other aide hadorder incident. While theae proTocatico charges war. filled out with concrete "facts" on the locality of the attack, tbs nuaber of troope inrolTed, description of the action, and the like, aUegatlona of other warlike actlTltiee did not usually aocoapany such lncldente.
JiCilET
of Preeent Warlike Actlooa Rather Than taat Actlcca or Future Intentions
airing the preeent campaign, an increeaed cumber of the warlike ohargea heard froa both aides are phreeed ln the preaant Inatead of the future or peat tense. Preperations for war are said to bajyder Incidents are aaid to ba provoked "in ewer greaterhe extenalontrfftfglo highway la aaid to hare been "apaaded op." This Is true of ares the general ohargea of aggressIre preparations, whioh are notilitary fraae of reference And tha aore apeclflo ohargea ara likely to be Illustrated by acre recently initiated aotlar Concomitantly, interest in what tbe other aide hae dona in the peat or in whet lt "Intends" or -hopes" to do in the future drope off.
Clalae of Active Father Than PeasIre assistance In Yugoslavia
Even during "noraal" periods the Coalnfora radios frequently charge that reslata nee to Tito (usuallyague terse) is widespread, and, less often, that hla aray la disunited. When beeaed to Tug onlay audiences, thla theae night be interpretedlreot attenpt to impair Yugoslav ailitary morale. Such olalaa are aore speclflo now than before, and Badlo Belgrade haaer god the Coalnfora with pr ope gandi ting against the Bray; but in the absence of an actual count, it cannot ba definitely atated that an increase haa occurred.
("either aide, apparently, baa yet claimed that guerrilla aotiwitles are going on la the opponent's countryside, although the Coalnfora haa said that aaaa TugoalaT peanuts here "taken to tbe)
Attention to 7oraatlon of True" Coagnnlet Party ln TugoslaTle
qualitatiTely new development in recent weeka la an Increasing aaount of Satellite attention to anti-Tito realetanoe In the apeclflo fora of tbe foraatlontrue" Cooaunlat Party in Yugoslavia, wholly different froa and opposed to the renegade Party of Tito'a "faaolata."
H. TBBIGF-ntDICATCBS WHICH MAT JJTCREASE IB THB FUTuBI
It la hoped that at an earlyontinuing ana lye laof wersdndednessin Yugoslav and Satellite radio propaganda, whioh might aeslat in anticipating attack, will be poeelble. eoondary purpose vould be to document tha naturewar-of-nerree" campaign (Ita components, its aaount of variation froa week to week,ackground in relation to whloh any new derelopaent could be evaluated. It le desirable to be able to distinguish aa eherply as possible between the ordinary fluctuations In the routine war of nerreeew derelopaent whloh alght be based an aotnsl expectation of laainent war. This inrolrea reliable aeeeureaent of shifts of emphasis and of differences of eaphasis between different basseetween what Belgrade beeas to tba boas audience and what lt beeaa to Satellite audiences). Such evidence la not now available.
Thle continuing analysis would probably be of auch greater value than the preeent inter ia report, necessarily, the preeent report la ncn-quantitative, incomplete, end not ss reliable as later reporte (baaed on en adequate sample, systematically analyzed) would be. An inter la report aaaaa worth while, however, for two reasons: oth Yugoslav and Satellite radios have during recent weeka stepped up their propaganda hoetllltleeevel definitely higher than bad previously been reached. This development aaaaa ominous enough to warrant asescription of It aa la now poeelble, even though tbe deecription ia necessarily non-quantltatira. t least oo tba Tug osier side, preaant propaganda ie still chare cterixed by noticeable restraint in treating tbe Soviet world. The ways in which thle propaganda le restrained are worth noting, both ln order to describe tbe preeent altuatlon aore adequately end aa background for possible subsequent reporte.
It should also be noted that thla inter la report does not etteapt to discuss critically tbe rationale underlying the choice of certain factors as "indicators of waralndednees." lacuaalon would of course be included in the first of tbar lee of pubUostions glrlng quantitative data on auch factore. Tbe preaant report will be limited aalnlyrief doBoriptlon of the feote, with aoae euggestione aa to what the facta aay Been.
Sone of tha indicator, below, lt ahould be noted, nay not be need et all, or at beet only rarely. Sound conclusions oan only be baaedonelderatloD of the rate at which all tmoee the.ee ere elaborated .hen consideredroup. arked deterioration In relatlv between Yugoslavia and ita neighbors nay expresa itself In diverse vara (each aa lnoreaaed .ntenaity or frequency of denunciation, appearance of newhe audience* to whlah material la beamed, ate,).
While tha abore propaganda oonrponente Inall of which could perhape be looked upon ae Indicator* of tension) have apparently lncraaaed ln frequency, all of then ooold ln the future increase much more than they have. And, in addition, tha following liet of poaelble tenaion-indioatara, none of which haa recentlyarked change, night increeae, For convenience they are here dividedroapa, military and nan-nilitary; the former preeuanbly, would be sore likely to be aaaoolated with expectation of lnanasot miltary aotlon.
It vlll be noticed that nest of these refer to both the Tugoelav and tha Satellite radloo, and that aone refer only to the Yugoslav radio, Thie caUa for explanation ln view of the faot that the aggreeelTe nilitary action anticipated aa poaelble la only on the Satellite aide. There are, howerer, two reeeone for conalderlng the Yugoslav aide also:
Since there la reeaon to think that Tlto'a Intelligence aouroee ln Albania and Bulj^rie ere particularly good, it la reaaonable to auppoae that he night be Informed of nilitary preparetlone for aggreaalon in thoae areae before we were, or at laaat ^hat he would be eure of then before we were eure. If he were thoroughly frightened, he night be expected to show lt In certain aspects of hia propaganda. Inaae he night or night not sake an urgent secret appeal far Wee tern aid. Propaganda analyale night poeelbly Indicate whether Tlto'a appeal waa founded on genuine fear oreelre to take advantage of oninoua Conlnfom propaganda. The analyale couldn tribute to an intelligence eetlnete of tbe eerlousnese of the threat.
Apart fron tbe poealblUty of Imminent aggreaalon, lt would be dealrable to have additional data on Tlto'a total relationship to hia Satellite neighbors, to tba Soriet Onion, and to the Weat. At preeent, while the Satellite radios haTe gone fairly far In thalr denunciation of Tito, he hae by no neana gone equally far in hia denunciation of then. This night change ln the future. For lnetanoe, while not anticipating an imminent attack, ha night nevertheless lose hope of winning substantial aupport anang Ccemrunlete by his present refusal to aupport openly the Western "imperiallata." If ao, hia propaganda night change radically in certain respects. (Thia applies primarily but not exclusively to the noo-nilitary propaganda ocDoponenU Listed below.)
A. Military TsMlon-Indloatora
Deacrlptlona of Bome-front hatr Preparetlone: Satellite radios have not described fcrtl-fl cat lone aa being built in Yugoslavia; but ths free Oreeoe radio hae said that thernment hae begun to build alr-rald aheltara.
Dasorlptlone of Enemy Beconna'aaance. eto. ln Speciflo Areae; ftfeept for the border provocation charge, activities by nilitary unite Involving croeelng the frontier, euch aa raooonaleeance or scouting, have not been reported,
Detailed toecriptlcn of >np Troop Movenenta: There haa not yeteallywar soars ln term of alleged lntenelve preparationa for an larnlnent attackarticular border area. Much acre publicity could be given to threatening troop deploynente, logiatlo bulld-upe on the frontier, routea of attack, eto.
*. Concentration of Border-Provocation Charges, eto. ln One Area; Ro kind of nilitary activity, even the border provocetione, which haveWndard ingredient of radio propaganda on both aides, haa been said to be concentrated ln any one locality. Hot hae any nn* nf th. very nuneroua border lncldenta (the Albanian radio countedf then sa of laet Decenber) been given an exceptional amount of attention.
5. Coordination of Chargee by the various Satellite Radios; There ia no aubatantial evidence of propaganda coordination as yet, although if Moscow were planning actual eggree-elon there preimasbly would be aucb coordination. For Instance, free Greece obergea of en intended Athena-Belgrade attack on Albania and Bulgaria have not been picked up and need by Satellite radios in any great quantity. Unusual Satellite oonoentratlon on alleged Tug oa lav persecutionsinority might Indicateretext was being created.
- tEUHLI
* -
o. Satellite Charges of American Involvement: In addition to the very frequent general chargea that Tito la eubeerriont to Wallaokey of the imperialists, etc, there ara now moderately frequent ohargea of apeclflo American military aid to Yugoslavia, and of apeclflo American Intentions toar is the Bailor na. The letter might considerably increase.
Statements to tbe Home Audience: Tito's reesaurence atatemente--thatIs united, calm and strong--heretandard component of hla output to hisfrom the beginning. In the event that he expected en Imminent attack by thereaaBuranoe statements might lncreeae markedly In volume, and he might add to themof reassure nee whloh hae not as yet becomeclaim that hahe United Betlona). Satellite radios, confronted with morale problems ofmight show an Increase of the same sort.
That the Sneer/ Is Militarily Weak: Apart from their claims thst there IsYugoslav resistance to Tito, the Satellite radios have only rarely deacribedaa militarily weak. orale measure, if they anticipated actual war agoinetwith. backing hia with alr-atoadohese radios might feel ato belittle hla or his potential American aupport, particularly to their own people. side this need might be felt even mare acutely; however, he baa aa yet onlysuch claims about the Satellite..
of Attack aa Imminenti Apart from the frequency and apeolfity ofthe Imminence of the alleged attackhird dlaenelon which couldmeasured. Chargea of Imminent attack, though now more evident, could stillup considerably.
being eble to claim that they were coming to the sididespread "deaocretio"oaent in South tores; their crossing ofh Parallel looked acre like out-emd-out aggression than it would hava if they had bean able to claim that "the people" in South Korea were already in revolt against the puppet Syngaan Ie.ee Government. Whether or not thiaifferent etrategy aight be adopted in the psychological preparation for en ottaok on Yugoslavia; propaganda might claim (with or without faotusl juetlficetion) that tto"people were rlalng against Tito. The frequency of the "reel stance-to-Tito" there ln the Satellites' preaant propaganda alao suggests thlaosaibility. It is therefore relevant to note that they have not yet deacribed preparationsarge-seals uprising, nor claimed that guerrilla war was already going on, nor appealed explicitly for auch action, nor (of course) deacribed such action aa already in progress.
Appearance of Serious Chargee of YupoelaT Aggression Simultaneously in Satellite Brxd-casts to All Audiences, Inoludlnp Their Own Home Audiences: In general, Moscow doee nota partloular kind of propngr"ndsarticular beea; there la little "beam-differ entlatlon. " Yugoslavia haa been to acme extent an exception to thle lnarticularly large proportion of all Soviet broadcasts about Yugoslavia haa bean beamed to Yugoelavia. In other words, non-Yugoslav audiences hare ln general heard relatively little of Moscow'a case against Tito. (Evidence is not available aa to whether thla la true of the Satellite radios as well, nor le there evidence aa yet with regardossible recent change ln this respect.) Presumably, if actual aggression were Imminent, the Satellites would went to Justify themselves not only ln the eyes of th* Yugoslavs (who would perhapa be tha most difficult tout also in the eyes of Communist-sympathising peraona throughout the world, and eapeclally thair own home audlenoea. If so, immlnsnt Satellite aggression should be eccompsnledelatively great lnareeae of accusstlons of Yugoslav aggreealon in hroadoaflta Deemed to ncn-Jugoslav audiences; and uue would yrvmuamvijiiaultc-ccosl;r most of tha Satellite radios. It has not yet occurred.
3. Sen-Military Tena lor-In dice tor a
Aa indicated above, Tito hae by no asses engaged in all-out denunciation of either the Soviet Union or his Satellite neighbors. Especially beforeis radio maintained tho poee of the injured party to the dispute, whose only wish was for Justloe and "correctana between aoolallst states." Instead of taking the offensive, ha usually oonf in ed hla-aelf to answering the eocusaticca hurled at hla. Beoently thle has been leas true; Belgrade
hae lncreeelngly taken the offensive. Sly digs at Soriet failings appear acre often and with .ncreeslng boldneaa. (Witness Tlto'a Stlp epeeoh in0 concerning "those abrced- vho under the golee of vigilance, anapeot ererythlng and ererybody.") e oould greatlyumber of non-military aa well ea military tenaion-lndloatore In hia preeent propaganda treatment of the Soriet orbit.
ajor reason for hia retioenoe haaope of gaining aupport among Satellite Comunlete who remain Ccranunieta, and who would be repelled either by oritlclen oftheir^ countriea aa auoh or by an out-and-out abendonment of the Communist "camp." Tito has apparently hadaa one for not playing oertaln critical themes too heerlly. arked increaae In theae themes, then, mightose of hie long-term hope of winning -osaauniBt eupport outaide hia own country,eeling of danger great enough to warrant abandoning all long-term purpoees In order to achieve abort-tarn ends.
It will be noticed that all of the following nan-military propaganda components refer to Belgrade, and that only tho first two refer alao to the Satellite radios.
J- Explicit Charge* of Ethnic Far grit lam by Either Side; Although both Tito and tha Satellites hare given conaidereble play to charges that the other aide la auppreeelng verioua national minorltiee and denying their rlghta, such aocusations are only rarely made in explicitly ethnic terms. Rare also ara aocuaatlons which state that ethnic rights ere Buppreaaed In favor of another nationality. Chargee ofGreater Bulgaria" and the like are infrequent, but increaalng. Ae both eldee cane conaldered vulnerable to auch olelma in terma of the appeal such contentions oan be aald to have among the traditionally hostile nationalities of the Balkans, the growth of this theme in the future would perhaps indicate that either aide (or both) had thrown prudence to the vinda ln ita eagernese to attack the other. (Whether Belgrade has already Inoreesed lt* use of thia theme ln Ite output to the Satellite* cannot be determined et present.)
2- Cherfiea of RoUgioua Persecution or fevorltlam by Zither Side: Although Western sources -have rumored perlodioelly that Tito would releaee Cardinal Stepanlc from priaon, Comlnform tranamittars apparently hare not picked up and condensed this elleged intention. This would st leeet seen to suggest that the Comlnform la eeneltlve to the religious prediepositlona of the Yugoslav people. It la not Inconceivable that the Comlnform might indirectly begin to use the weapon of religion to increase the hostility between the Orthodox Serbs and the Soman Catholic Croat* and Slovene*. In like faahion, Tito oould play up th* persecution of the Church in Satellite countriee. Again, however, ea with the ethnic theme, both aides are vulnerablelvlelve strategy of thie aart. The eppeersnoe cf the theme in the context of their mutual quarrel night therefore eerre to indicate that both were reeching the bottom of the peacetime propaganda barrel.
3* Tugoelav Criticism of Satellite Internel Affaire; Belgrede ha* given intermittent attention to poor conditions In Uie domeatlc affaire of Ita neighbors, aometlne* attributing auch conditions to Soriet domination. arked lmoreeae ln thia might indicate that Tito no longer hoped to win eupport in that area, or that he bad begun to eppeal to the "paopleW. rather than to the Ccrernnent* in the Satellite oountrlea.
Tugoelav Denanclatlon of Soriet Xonlnetlon in the Satellites: Beginning laat fall andreater extent laet winter, Tugoelar output hae used the destination them*. Jtooncnio exploitation receive* th* bulk of th* attention, except for Albania, chargee erf Soriet domination of internal political affairs, eev* where it re lata* to Tugoelarave been aecondary. Soriet domination of various front organltationa haa alao received treetnent; for example, Satellite prlxe-fighters are aald to have bees ordered to throw fights to Soriet
contestants, Soviet domination of local Ccmmrunlitowever, has received only
peripheral end limited sttention; and, with th* limited exception of Albania, SorietSatellite military nachines hae received only scanty attention. Thie field thusto greetiy increased protntatodo exploiUliuu SrteasiTS uas cf thc there
in any future war-of-nerves campaign would obviously be especially enbarrnaalng to tha Seriate, considering their currant denials of military aid to Berth Korea.
5. Tugoelav Crltlclana of Internal Soviet Affaire: Tnoreasing criticism of domestlo fallings ln thadate principally confined to Ideological and Party ahortcaadnga--nay serve torowing aerlousnass of the quarrel. Moscow oan be expeoted to be eepeolally eenai-tire about charge* in this sphere, while anti-Stalin Satellite audienoee nay find euoh accueatlone oonelderably more aatlafylng than the usual fare of CotsEunlet radios.
Appeals to ca- Approval co* the West: There haa apparently baan no expllolt approral of tha West In monitored Yugoslav broadcasts to date. Instead, Yugoslav trenamittera hare tended to refer. "Imp aria Ham" In somewhat the same terme es aro need In describing the "hegenonlstic" policies of the OSSB. Increasing approral of the West, particularlyay therefore be best measuredecreasing amount of disapproval. At any future time when Tito might oonsider himself seriously threatened, criticiama of tha Vest might be expected to drop aharply,
7. Yugoslav Attention to CoanunlBt Orpinl sat Ions Abroad:
a- Approval of theLeft as suoh. Ths Belgrade radio has only rarely alluded to sympathy'toward Tito.(Last June, DJllas referred to opposition to the OSSB on the part of Mnrkos, Rsjk, Gcaniika, and others, and last fall Tito personally aald -that Bulgaria and Czechoelorekia were more sympathetic to him than were otherith these and other acattered exceptions, Tito has not hinted at the existence of Tito-Ism among Communists. In faot, DJilas laat NovemberEW YORK TIMES correspondent that he had "no information" on the strength of "anti-Ccimijrform" forces in the Satellitee. Albanian Communist dissatiefaction with Enror Hoxfaa has bean referred to in Yugoslavian output, but erenTugoelar propaganda hae consistently been most vitriolic--Tltoiam in the present tense apparently has not been claimed.
As for Titoism outside the Satellite orbit, there have been more Indications of Yugoslav recognition cf it. Although the desire toew Internatianale has been denied by Belgrade, Yugoslav propaganda--eepecielly ln its foreign output--haa continually played up visits of foreign socislist delegations snd expressions of approral for the regime from many quarters. Of late, Titolet output has extended its field of comment to remarksfor example, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and German Communist affairs. Foreign activities of Tito-supporters hare been given locreeeing attention. Last Horember Kldrlc, speaking to some Italian left-socialists,tatement which would seem calculated to appeal to the non-Communist left. Yugoelaria, he said, wishes to build socialism, butegimented aooiallsm,gray* socialism where human Individuality is So far, however,"Belgrade hSB not alluded to sny organization for coalescing pro-Titoiat sentiment, notwithstanding PiJ*defa recent trip to Western Europe, snd In epite of the faot that Satellite and partloui.rZy Soriet propaganda hae increasingly denounced leftist "visits" to Yugoslavia,
appeals to Satellite rank-and-file Communists to oppose their leaders or In the main, Tito has implicitly distinguished between his Stellnlet enemieBpotential friends in the international Cotnauniat movement. At least to date he an automatic identification of the Satellite Parties with the campaignhim by the Comlnform, Even with regard to the Soviets, he uses the term Usually he identifies his opponents, for example in Bulgaria,Bulgarian Comlnformr "those In Bulgaria who Generally, though deereaeingly, his propaganda avoids branding SateUitsby name (always excepting Barer Boxha). Llkeviae, distinctions betwoon thethe Party end the leaders have so fsr been made only rarely.
Whet might occur in the futureore expllolt distinction between his enemiespotential friends,ore outspoken appeal to the^
of Satellite leaders' subservience to Moscow. So far Tito hasuse of the lino that Satellite Cora unlet leaders are mere Sorietof these references hare been implicit, but now and then (snd Increasingly)condemns thie subserrlence. Usually this occurs In the context ofcampaign against Yugoalarls. The theme can be useduch greaterthan is now the case.
Original document.
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