ti
ND PIUCTlCilST bAiUVUBU
TABLE OF COVTITITS
I. T
2.
3.
Doctrlnel Baal* nnd
A* Orthodox
Dovistlonlst
The Corrrunlet One-Par^
Intorw-rclatlonahlp of ComuolBa with USSR Foreicn Polloy
n. lUTiortu. co!mjt;et mhos
'2.
3.
4.
IsnbereMp, Reoxuitarnt,
ocruiteent
and Troi-lng 21
21
25
c. Trtlnlnc
arty
g. Principles of
Orf&nlzational
Orrririlzntion for Secretndorrrrorand
Organisation for Secret
i. CreaolOTtion for Ondercpound
Orrenlzational Pro hi one 1 Adjastiaept to Illegal Ccrtditloas ..
Auxiliary Or fEal
i- Labor
t.
ther Organisations
ITT. COWCWTST TACTICS (Genarel)
-1
49
1.
3 U
94
j. Parlianentary IVmruvor-B
rdtel Front Taotice
2.
Coalition Taotica
iferpor of Portias, Rloos
Actios
3.
iototing
Street
' e77 ,
Cornanict Ftrty Ictcllirence Activities 91
a,. 91
General Oixtmi ratio nol bocS Oporr.tion&l 91
o. Overt 92
fj. Covert Information
x. Corsarmlit TjitoUlcttoo* for 94
J. THe Cexnunlat Party Intolllfrooa Appsrefcua 96
g.nd TaohrologlaaJ Jjitolli^ence
fe.
J. Conrarniet
Subversion In tba Arnod Forooe and the
fi. Infiltration at Blfjh
Capture of Control Poeltlone
o. Infiltration into tba
17. ACTICS
-lotionarj
ernorel
liisurrootioa. an
fl.
lha
a, f
X. The Principle of Corxr-aitrotion of
s. Tie ElMant of
i- Die Ame4 rarcee (lHripcrflal, Dtaartsli*E, and fYarrantion of
Concentration)
Practice of Rarolntiorax-T
A. Military Xarti^zaenti
7. RBIT
fe. PoUtioal tutrrnuta
TSlJf.iatCl, ACL7CT
HLUGENCii AGQ1CI ORE
Z80 T: .: ND PRACTICE OF COUUUISXST
I. iffraDLXCTicN
1. Coaaunlat Doc-final Baele and Growth.
Although the firstap in the growth of Concur) ismolitical force occurredesult or the Russian October Sevolutlonhe doctrinal bo tlaour. iaa had ita beginrtinrs as earlyhen Jferxiingela published the Corxajnlft Banifestf). Although thaae teo arsnby oothe firat propagatorseaorder baaed upon state or -society-ewrtrolled - of national rasouroes And re ana of prodtactloa,discarded the comprorJiee of detocratlc evolution end, for the first tire, "scientifically'heory of social revolution.
There are eever.il Iferxlan axioms, the understanding of ahich la neoesssry for an appraisal of the present Co.-cunlst doctrine. By and large, the.ee sre prepositions that have regained unaltered by euoce-slve theoriete. It ia true tMt Lenin, Stalin, Trot iky, and even Tito have charged the In tor-pro tat loo of Ktrjiat theories, have enhanced the ir^ortance of eoae, re- egated others to the teek^round, end created noa ones. Essentially, boaever, llarzlsai remains baeed upon the Coroinlat atonifeoto, the thesesltal
Bote! Thla report ls in process of coo Miration ilUi the Intelligence organisations of the Depert*ants of State, Artsy, Navy, aral the Air Perce. It contains inforieatioo available to CIA aa of
LrJa.
aad the varic-j"tings of both 'isr*xi-ele. a. Ort'iodo* Barxlss.
The roost le port an* pillars of the edifice of Uarxian thoughtprinciples of dialectical ratariallsn, the accinotde Interpretationand the doctrine of the class etrvrgle. Deeply affected tyisr. methods of dialectics,its hiatcrical slanting aith
Material ietlo Interpretation, tarx reasoned that nothing aaa established once and for all, that every dovolcfcent had ite climax ahlch eould be followed by decay, and that it is beyond anybody's power to retard thla sequence. The object of thie eysteo: of reaeoninE aaa to dleprove the rro-
vaillnf idealiar. and replaceaterlal visa of civilisation. Civilisation, IWrx reasoned, haa created certain conditions, not so ouch thrc. influence of Ideas, as through actual facta of life.
This dialectical therunht process opened the aayea interpretation of history, no a* urable sate rial forces, tmrx eleixed, exclusively detencine the developoent of human affairs. If such forces have groan up elthin an establishes eystex, confllcta are bound to eriee ahich, in the end.oolal revolution. The victory ofevolution - nea (eccnc.tlc) principles upon society and change the ahcle eoaaplex of
civilisation. In other words, these foroes aould aork tharaselves out by aayialectical process or, by thsof contradictions" or opposltes inherent In nature and society, resolve thenoeleesea and "higher" statut,.
-2-
&
The ecnflict.the stL-oull for such conflicting processes inociety do not star fron idee per ee, but operate ir, terra of the changing fcrcos of production (tools, sachinse) which plaos nsn ln certain relations with other men (production relatiotai) . It is these relations which determine the social, political, and Intellectual processes
of life and, therefore, will resultefined relationship between The nature of this relationship cannot help but lead to acontinued class atruggloe, for "the history of all hithertois the history of classfundamental cause of all class strur,rlea is to be found in
the economic structure of capitalist society. Marxistheory arrives at tbe conclusion that the value of all ooo.-odltles (goods) is determined by the quantity of human labor expanded on their production (the labor theory of value). Ths only sourceapitalist's profit, therefore, lias in tbe excess of labor-tine be forces labor to work beyond tbe hours needed to produce the necessities such as food and clothing, required to na in tain the labor (tbe theory of surplus value). Capitalist profit, accordinglyvaries ln direct proportion to the arount ofhe laborer is forced to aork beyond that required to earn the subsistence wo^es ho is paid for hla labor-power (tbe theory of exploitation) .
Marx thereby setseries of prnodees which he utilises to explain hoa the capitalist structure will cell*pee. Because of coratarrt
V..
n
technological advanceshl cor^stiticr. or fellon-cspit^llsts, hethu capitalist is coispelled to turn into adaltionalave" andths greater part of tho surplus value- he haa wrested froa his workers (the theory or accusation). This cons tent lncreaee in the racMnes (capital) dldniahes the capitalist's profit (which varies solelythe Aiicunt of labor power exploited). The capitalist compensates forzaller profits not only by coristartlyg the ejiploltatloo ofployees, but also by cheapening conmcdltlca through increasing the site of industrial plants and unite of ccntrol (corporations, holding co=panles, trusts, cartels). In this lire-end-death struggle of competition, the capital lata tond to destroy each other by concentrating ccpltel into feaer and fe*er hands. This developrwnt of highly mechanized large-scale Industry inevitably creates large-scale unes^loyBjenta percanentpopulation,as veil as ths transfer of oo untie as small and piediust-slasd capitalists Into the proletariat,gradually bacons ore and acre Inpoverlsbed and aiserable.
Ir the advanced itages of eapitaliet development,or depressions are createdesult of the inability of thebuy the evar-increasing floe of goods. These crises are periodic,cat-able, and of Increasing severity until they finally culminate In aof the capitalistreakdown produced by the system'scontradictions and by the revolt of the increasingly
proletariat.
f ^
The class struggle is Dot only as eooconic hutolitio&l
cor.et sicca the state is primarily an organ of claaa-otcroian oo behalf
of ths "ruling" class. In todern capitalist society the political and
eoonosdc conflict between the bourgeoisie and the prolatarlat has
the stage where the produotlve power of society has outgrown the system of
J
opart** The azplolted proletarians can liberate thsfnaalves from the yoke of tha bourgeoisie only through the direct aeisore of the (bourgeois) state power and the trsnafomatloo of the oapltaliatocialist system. This aavtlopcont is inevitable Inasmuch as thai oapltaliat system Is doorssd to fall because of theinr^rect la it.
In orderew social and ecornalo aystaa amy ba achieved nd capltaliictruggle to the death between capitalists and workers will ensue because tbe oa pita lia ts, aooording to Marx, will cot give up their fjTcrcfiativea. Thered'ore, once the aarkcrs have soooeeded isapitalistie regime, they ssiat act rest oo their laurels but mostdletatorehlp af the fkroletexict" ahloh, representing too workers* interest, will see to It that all the iwarvante of ths bourgeoisie are llcuiaated. Only after thla haa happen ad will tba tTanalbaa-yperiod beby the final stage of the devslopaact, the CocxBirilst 'classless* soelet'-y. The task of the'stateroletarian dletatorehlp, -which is esaerrtLilly . he ellednatlbn of opposing el acehen have been completed and under Coraamiasi the slate sill "wither away,"
Lenin cur-celved nethods end tacticB designed to iajlenant Larxiar. theory. Uarx hadheorist aith little concern for the
practical execution of his ideas excopt in very general terns. Lenin prevented any seder-ate faction frca compromising eith bourgeois eleeents, carrying out politically and organizationally ihat bfara had demanded in principle. Lenin also adapted Marxism to chan/ed Bocio-polltlcal conditions asas to itr use In Russia; Earxiat theory sas based upon revolution in thi cost highly developed industrial nations anile the Russian Revolution occurred In an economically undeveloped country.
Lenin's rain contributions to both the nature of thetate and the development of internationalainisa are the following:
(a) ingle disciplinednisi.orgonSaod
tne theory and postulates Cf revolutioru Tliis party cast be ths vanjuard of thi working class. It aurt select Itsith oars and b* tbo political loader of tbo tiorking class. It Le tolass, and therefore BlDpgt taa astir* olase (and in tines of var, in ths period oThe entire class) should act under the leadership of our Party as closelyossible." In other words, the party ls also an "organlsard dstachaent of the
class."
an mere lnportant, the Party is ths -Instrument of ths-
Dictatorship of the Proletariat lnaaiouch an lt is the Mgheert forai of the
atrfirtJ-ened by thaf opportunists and devlntlonists, the Party la bound tc become the rcnol ith upon which not only the Corxunlet cover*nt ia built but ic also to be the state -rich It aill create or has created,
(e) the help of the Party, the doctrine which brought about its establlahment must be carried to the masses. Tbe importance of grievances "ill be used when opportune, but the belief in ths secular religion of the Ccmin.at ideology oust be Inculcated, foreroluttonnrj theory, there can be no revolutionary movement."
(d) Uarx based his theories upon the social, political, and econocic consequences of capitalism in individual countries. Lenin developed the thought by taxing into conaideratlon the develocxaanta during the second half ef the nineteenth century. He looked upon capitalist rotational phenomenon butworld system of financial enslavement and colonial oppress Ion." This lv*riell*ai he regarded aa the "highest stage ofhis Mould be followed, he concluded, by aooial revolution sod ths collapse of capitalism, "Imperialism is tbe eve of aoclalist
A country can be imperialistic sithout having hiehly developed
Industry; therefore, revolution, according to Lenin (aa contrasted with Harm's concept) need not necessarily occur in industrially developed countries.
(a) Aa against I'urx' culti-nctional coneapt which - not nerated by hla stress on proletarian solidarity V. .ths world, Lenin created the concept of the world divided intocamps: that of oppressors, and op, re so ed. Therefore, Lenin developed strategy snd tactics to be
app. led in the etruggle of the oppressed against the oppreaeors both on the national and International scale. Herein lies the cost pronounced difference of Uarx' and Lenin's character: Uaoheoretlolan, lanln a
s f
practitioner of revolution. Lenin's thesoa about strategic and tactical leadership are acreere ir^lenentationootrine; they are
doctrine thoooelves.
Lar.in diedha Russian RevolutionJust bt-cirs- to ba consolidated. Tba position cf tha Soviet union, built upon tha liorxist-Leninist doctrinal bases, was week. At thla point, Stalin began to reinterpret Leninism for the main purpose of strengthening tha DbSR internallyase of revolution. O) Stalinism.
Since Lenin'e death, non and unforeseen problems in th* Cortiojriiat world have arisen ahlch have required nodificatloo and extension of Corxaunlst theory. Stalin haa been credited aith all of these csveloprxints. In some inet-moes he has adopted the theories of lenin, Marx, and Engals to the current problem; in cany Instances he has evolred nsa theories as the ne* problems arose. In the nain, Stalin bas, *lth ruthlessaess and singleness of purpcse, eliminated all oppositional elements, and rod if led all doctrine which conflicted with the foil onr objectives:
(a; To establish permanently his personal power and theof his viesa In the Soviet Co man! at Party;
To make the Soviet Conmmiet Party the absolute andinstrument of ruling tha USSR;
To achieve pre-exlnence of the Soviet Cormmmist Party throughovt the Soviet orbit as sell as over all Oo ^runlet parties in ths vorld;
<d) To establish the USSR as the only Cfcxmmunist poser oenter from shlch can be undertaken th* conquest of other parts of the world to ba
f
In order to attain those ends, Stalint reduced vurious revisions ef Larxist-Leniniet theories. His sain eontribjtiona to the codification of the doctrine ares
Precedence sust be given to build inr socialise in the USSR. This is discussed at greater length underage XO -)
orollary: The foreaost task of the foreign (non-Soviet) Coiraunist Parties ia to defend and support the USSR in this "Duildlng period" in order to prevent caplt&Msr. fron crashing the Soviet state; this is referred to as theofniat parties.
(o) Collectivisation of arricultursajor requireaent ln the coiaol ids tier, of poweroviet type or state and rust be achieved rapidly and ruthlessly. Stalin haaetailed plan forountry for collectivization and haa outlined theo be followed in achieving this phass of soclaliasi. These techniques are now being applied in the satellites
(d) In colonial areas, Coarunist cooperation with hourr;oolsnd parties Is pemlssitle arid recoi.rended, provided the Ooaruniet Farty retains undisputed leadership, and provided that the bourgeois groups are nationalistic end anti-foreign.
In addition, Stalin has initiated the formulation of the theory of unification of natlcnal states in (reparation for the formation of the ironollthlo acrid Coanunlst State. This provides for the eventual ln-
corporation of the Satellite* into the Soviet Onion. In the present atego c
the theory calls for cocoon economic and political structures, to be followedommon aoclul structure culminatingoraon languageBusslan. kith the "dying aaay" of national languages, other rational differences will disappear, and nations, as knoan In the capitalist aorld, sill cease to exist.
Ae symbolized by the three pillara of Communist development, the line froir theory to national revolution, and fror there to aorld revolution eeeus logical enough. Interpretation of basic doctrine ia flexible and opportunist; but this does not icean that th*a factor ray be disregarded.
Important oe the differences between the theories of Iterx, Lenln^and Stalin aay be, for the Vest they must be regarded ss one conceit out of which revolutionarynd taotics will be developed and
b. "Deelatlonlst" Trotskylam.
Trotsky's disagreement with Stalin's interpretation cf '.nd Lenin haa resultedodified Cotxuinlst theory which is actively, but ineffectively, propagatedtall group of adherents. Affiliated with the fourth International, tho national Trotsky!te Communisthile professing much la coo-on with Soviet Cosnuniem, nevertheless are in bitter opposition to the Stalinist leadership ln both the USSK and the I'eople'*
**
-
.
Democracies. Is the first rodified toa^unist dcctrino opposing Sortet doctrine which has persisted in any force; Titoisa is the second.
Against Stalin's belief that itnecessary to consolidate the poser of the Communist Party in one.heefore proceeding with the world revolution, Trotsky oontended that Ccsssunism could never be achieved in one country as long as hostile, capitalist covernoents sxijted elsewhere. Therefore, the task of the OSSR sas to promote world revolution, and only after it had eueceeded vould it beosition to transform the TJSSH and other countriesenuine Cocvmurtist society.
The conflict between Stalin and Trotskyifference in timing andheoretical schism ovsr tbe ultimate objective of the revolution. atter of fact, Stalin himself has sodiried his thesis that "soclalisa is possible in one country" by etating that "the final victory of socialism is possible only with successful revolutions in at least several countries" and that "the task of the victorious revolution consists in doing the utmost attainable in one country, for tho development, support, and achlevanent of the revolution in all countries."
Although this difference of opinion betsesn the too nsn and tbelr followers oas an important reason for their oonfllct, another essential factor was their struggle to succeed Lenin. Such other Issues as the probleo of the position cf peasants In the revolution sere marginal.
The Importance of Trotskyism ls not that ltheory superior or Inferior to Stalinism (in so ate respects Trotskyism "Is even less >
cot-pat ibleft*sUrn consorts than izut that it helpsths practicethe USSR and thet lt challenges the
oovlet-Ccflirunist myth oflUlao.
Although Titols.ii at present is the only other ljnportant Cortn,:istic element In opposltioB tc Soviet Ccc-ajnlac^ it has little In cocrton with Trotskyism other than ita hatred for the Soviet Union. otential force coabattlng Kremlin Co manias, Tltoisa ls far sore important than Trotskyism bocause it challenges one of the most vulnerable Stalinist conceptsthe subservience of national Interests to the Soviet state. Ths fact that Titoiam Is representedationegies In poser adds irr;easurably to its prestige, both in thend non-Cozmunlst sorld.
Tlie theoretical tenets of Titoiem are not as yet fully developed. Basically, however, the Tito regime believes that there must be compleU equality among all Communist nations. Thes silling to
concede this in theory, but not in practice, rurthencore, Tito lets regard CoTTunlst theory (aterxisa-tcnlnism-Stal iniart)lexible guide to the application of Coscranlscpecific state, nottrict dogma which must be applied io every detail regardleas of the Local conditions. This the Soviet Onion will concede neither In theory nor In practice.
Ti tolasr passes Trotskyism In its potentialities
for tha alienation of CosrsTnists from the Soviet Onion. Tito ism has
4.
developed in several Comvrur.ist parties out: tdc tht Soviet orbit. t has yet to beccrce an effeclivo force in any ire* other than Yugoslavia. It* support aocrg Coroainists at present ate.ij* mostly fron party intellectuals. In thehe charge of Titoisa is levelled against any element uhlch the Soviet Unionto eliminate. Usually It is difficult to sub-stcntiats the cluu*g* of collusion with Tito, or th* charge that these leader*ito-like policy for their respective parties.
The Oorcrunlst One-Party State.
The Bolshevik attitude toaard the function of political parties determines the structure of the Cofminist one-party state. Stalin, in "Problems ofxplains that "the Party is partlass. Its leading part. Several parties, snd consequently freedOD for parties, oan exist onlyociety in shlch there are antagonistic classes, ths interests
of ahlch are contradictory andin the DSSH
there is no ground for the existence of seveial parties, and consequently for the freedom of Uese parties. In the USSR ther* is rrcond only for one party, the Comruniet Party."
However, during the period of socialist transition, other tartles are tolerated and used ty the Cosruniats until Coacunist control Is strong enough to aarrant ths elimination of the other parti ae. TM* elimination le accomplished by mergers of partth the Ocrsninist Party, purges of strong leaders in the opposition parties, ond various other minor erasures, ahich
culminates in undisputed control for the Ccasunists.
oalition government, aher* the Corriunist Party must tolerate other political parties, there are certain key poeitlone which Oonrunlst* consistently eeek to control. Likewise,n*-party elate haa beer, established, these poaition* are given to the most trusted leaders who are under co stent surveillance by the executive organs of the party. Bsoauss of it* control of tbe repressive inatrjasnt* of the state, the firstiargeth* lOniatry of th* interior, atott are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, snd the Win is try of Education.
Thereight inter j* oh inr, of organisation and function between the party and gorenvnent organsocrurdst ooe-party state. Roughly, it can be stated that the Party determines policy (very often on minor as sell as major natters) and thenit er.ecutes the policy on^ carries out the administrative details related to it. Control of the government apparatus ln the Soviet Union, the tost advanced formommunist one-party state, is diffused through three organs of the Central Committee:
The Orgburo
The Politburo
The Secretariat
(The functions of these organs and their relationship to other Party bodies ar* described in "Rational Partyage AO.)
subject to two different and distinct chains of command that meet at the tor. The ministries operate under orders from the jounell of ministers and report buck to theo. At the sane time, the ministries are subject to constant supervision by Party organs.
The salient featuresosasunist one-party state are thesupremacy of the Politburo In the formulation of policy, the frequent resort to "interlocking directorates" (called In the Soviet Onion scsnestlte'.gtvo) in staffing agencies, and the dual subordinationo both Party and superior governmental agencies) of the organs of the const!tuttonal aaminlstrative apparatus. Socwtlmai the Party even publishes important economic directives In its oen name. Bore often, the Council ofnistars ls as3eclated aith the part; in issuing important directives.
The use of "interlocking dlrectorstss" ls seeo In Stalin's position as head of the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Orgburo, and the Council of Ministers. Similarly, all but two other membere of ths Politburo are also Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ulnistsrs. "Interlocking directorates" ars sdvantogeous because they safeguard Party control against challenge, they econortize on personnel, and insure coordination betseen policy-making and pollcy-implaTenting agencies.
Tbe dual subordination of th*ea of the "constitutional"
results freir Ue need for spscisllssd Party control ovar specific activltiaa. overnment agency ls controlled first by its superior
gover.-jiental department (ouch as the Ministry of Interne!uperior constitutional body (auch as the Bureau of the Council ofnd, in addition by the appropriate Party eection. Party administrative philosophy prefers dual subordination to fusion bet seer, the Party and ths constitutional org ana because it facilitates separation of control and adninistrativ* functions.
Thus,ommunist one-party state the actual and ultimate power resta aith the Politburo, often in the hands of the Secretary General of th* Party, although the fiction of at least partial autonomy for the constitutional organ* of government is maintained.
of Coimunisr. aith USSR Foreign Policy.
,
rief period during ahlch the interestsorld Communiste held pre-eminent, Soviet leaders have consistently3 the aorld Communist movement to the role of an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They have rationalized this courae by saying that the ultimate truimph of Corjnunism demands that Cbncunists throughout the aorld subordinate every other consideration to the *defonae" of the Soviet Union
r. sain bastion. At pressnt, the Kremlin, in an all-out effort to maintain its control over the world Co runlet aovement in the face of the challenge of Titoism, le trying to Isolate Tito and la purging otherf nationalist tendencies.
The relation between the Ccrt-unist concept of the place cfUnion in history, ond their broad theory of history in general,made entirely clear In any of the classical CcTnunistThcees cr the Conclusioncrarat* Peace ofirst suggestion on the character of the Sovietbe rreat capital asset cf the Coramur.lsts inrldia aade clear that considerations of self-determination for scalieraa Pinlnnd, oust be entirely subordinate to the survival of theState. ommon factor underlying all setters of policy Isfor tho Soviet Cnicn as the rain force in the "Ann* of thenot based upon -ere patrioti-j- or national expansion, even thou/'hbe clotked in the language of nationalism. The defeat of theaould ba decisive for the courae cf Conccuniat history,vould be csrely lost skirmishes.
The establishmentonounlst stats, which must not only conform tc international standards for the conduct of nations, butich is elso thef the ttorld Coramunist movement, presents an obvious problem of coordination and organization. The Corninist Internationalhe terporary solution of thla problem. Iteague of Comrrdnlst parties,ecretariat lr.and governedentral Executive Conittee aith full executive posers bstv.een the meetings of its infrequent -
Compresses. It* Cor.-reases,ta Central fcaeculive Cc^ittec, were
always dojninatod by the Corxainlst Party of the Soviet Onion. Thla provided
a solid link in personnel and organisation between the Soviet Union and
the nerters of the Comintern. There was always extensive Interlocking authority, through leading personnel, between the Council of People's
Commissars (the cabinet) of the Soviot Union, the Politburo, and the
Central Brecutivoit tee cf the Communist International (Comintern).
An international organization of Cormsuniem, to give common direction
to Comunlot activities in oil countries, ls very necessary in periods of sharp antagonism. It la not so ruch needed In periods when collaboration with "liberal" and "progressive" elenente In other countries is predominant. The Comintern wis, therefore, an essential Instrument irr ediately after the Russian revolution* It *as scarcely needed In tbe time of the People's Front5nd ir. the period of the alliance against Hitler,1 The period of the ha zi-Soviot alliance was too short for any complete reorientation. The directing organization of the Comintern hadso unnecessary5 that abolition of the top organisation structure (tha UjSR claLrad tMflj liquidation to ba complete sbolition cf the
functions of the Comintern) waaesture, convenient tc suggest the loyal acceptance by Ocasnsdssj of the collaboration sgainat Natlsa.
Although tha lower administrative machinery of the Comintern probably
aaa never the?ished it has been tentatively cor.cludei that it ass abscrbe: by the Bolshevik Party Secretariat, nevertheless, at the conclusion ofr II, the needentral directing union, at least in name,in evidencod. Therefore, in7 nine Communist parties comprising the USSR and the Satellites (less Albania, Prance, andet up the CoTvminist Information Bureau (Co.-lnfonr.). Theoretically this
organization aoc to be tho clearing house for exchange ofng meaber parties. Practically, it Is used bp the USSRront to direct, not only the eight me-ubar parties (Yugoslavia uas expelled, but also
s>
Coiuminist parties in other areas. Soviet direction of the international
CoiTuniem movement can thus be camouflaged under the name of the Oondhform,
an organisation of supposed rfuals. In fact, however. It rust be kept ln
mind that the Ujsr directs the internalicnal Corrmuilst movement chiefly
through its diplomatic consular ana economic representatives abroad.
In support of Soviethe following guneral lines ere
the principal ta Us afo-xunists at the present tire:
the satellites: to Integrate their countries sith the military, poHtleal, and acononic interests.
a>
Asia: to odvance Soviet influence and weaken that ofponers b; armed fores or other aeons In China, through sin Northern Korea, propaganda In Japan, and by sttea-pting tonationalistic and anti-colonial ccve.-vnts in Southeast Asia. is to be applied when possible ln the Near Rest, latin America,
3
(s) tern Euros*: to underrirterahall Man an; the Northlantic Tact by rroia;anoa attacks, political agitation, calls fc: reduction cf urcev-rents, ond whenever possible, by strikes and disorders.
(d) In all areas: to pledge the readiness of Coerrunlst parties and their followers to support the Soviet Union in case of sar, and, at the sene tire, to carry on the Soviet "peace offensive." This proreranda corpalfx la designed to advance Soviet influence strong *ar-ncarv ceases by depicting the Soviet Union as peace-loving and the Us and its allies as aggressive earaongers.
XI. IjiYII/.LiIla ffs-bcrship. Ri^gruitppnt. ore? Training.
(1) Class.
*he rcnborshlp of tho Cocxunist partici is not necessarily Identical wtth tlio class Tihose interestsrporti to ropreseilt, tho proletariat. ilo tha supporters of Ccexs^rcUm, VitsddeSoviot orbit, are prjoVrrl nantly workers and landless pxujoats,history ond OcTslopoont of the parties reveal that onlytinstances has it truly represented tbe irorlrirc class tfcoo spearL-vvi it clains to be.
nisa, and Stalinlsa have considired the Ccnirist parties to bo tho spearhead of tbe revolutionaryfndustrial corkers rioo are singled out as the aoot reli.ble and loyal follonors of tbe ideology. Sacciid,e lanHess paraants; and third, the ir.tellipontsia. The traight of those roups, Jioro-or, varies in doff erect countries. In suchs Gernany, tho industrialized proletariat constituted the rain forco of Gcrxunian in lenln'e tiro. Both the peasantry and inteTigantoia aero predo-ariantly anti-Conmnist. In France, most to tho w.cr-eidarohlo nrober of "bourjoois" intellectuals rare anliotdj in post=or
.y, Juirjo soc lions ofasonto node possible Uio -cnporaxy jtirs of Ccnsinlocnd iphd. In Cliina, mrppcrt for CorrainlsD ins dorived rjoicly free Uie paesants. It should boiat western trade unionist! is not neceocorily ancmnisa can use for Its om purposes. Is fact, recent avonta cuch as Uie eMabliohaont of aIrAornational Traderjaniaod in option to thorld reparation of tradeave aboro that Lonin tas justified in foarins that ecorionlc trade unlcnian wrald adjust Uie Torkora tc oaplt.-Jlm rather than dostroy it*
(2) leadorahlp.
As in all ono-pa.rty states, 1l3 Cctxzinict parties,are in OTJOTj are kept lou in :acriicrship so ls to constituteresponsi'.ile for leaders.tip. Selectivity is also Uie practice- stascar extent*ronot in poTJsr, Uis part; will bo v..r
-any candidates tfucli rsayater date be parjod.
Tho leaders rxistaUior Intolloctual level because the party ie, in looinlituidlnj elite of professional Tevol^taonariofl capableaciontific0 onalysis of tho "Marxist dialectics and tho bis toxical pgrocdshTJ free capitalise to a
ccloty. Cnly this irvJor3'xndlAj cmablac tht partyiritOTpr-Jt and an;uy its arireiplsce XZala the original Isadoraparty -arc clU.oi*ly frau arcnj tho intcUijcintoia, andhavrj contiraied to ba admitted into loadinc partyand tharo, they havo bean ousted,as good
oc laadors vith prolotorifin Daclc^minds toto dovolopod to rcplico than, (Soo stiidy of loadors in Stability.
Isrobarahip grous rcpidly In tines ofdepression, but rtrepe off dsTM tho partyajor defeat or auppcrtc aoasuroa raticb over, the nco-psLitical roco^nxa as prcnotine Soviot rather than national interests* Such lessos ofterm occurred Lxouol^'at fcostorn 'lurcpa beciuso of ths CP cazpaions against tha Lars! .all Plan and the HIP-It hcS boon estimated that the party ls saw off its nasbwo. 2xcspt fol this "hard core" there lsonstant sniix ui
riaziorohipi th? cvaraja Daobar leaving tiw party within tliroe ygars of Joining,cnplotcoccursive tc sovsn-yoar
period,
Lanin etrasaed Uiefhard care of
raTDlutlnnarios" to guard the continuity of tbo noverxrit. nore tridaly casaos are Ora-ac into ths party, tha cere ctshlo tins ktrU croup of nllltints nLTt be*
-
(W Strength.
ihe global nortx)ro!dp, ostlttod ot tnonty cdllion, la no ijxiication of tfic party's strength riiicli is also iiaroLfeetodha Comunlat's enttr-ioinaricaunon sirdlar to roliglcui fervor which :ioJras an active zoalot of every =aabor conbinod nth tho disc Inline thai pcniito no difXoronco of cptrdar. to noalajn the party's ciTsctivan&3S,ho party's ability to lnTluanco non-
tors. This latter ma lllustratxl In> national electdono in Franceoruiniot nfraborchip ofote of lot only froo organized "front" croups anong the youth, wren, and labor la tills strength drasn, but also frco tho foil erring unorganized alcnMts:
Concoaled narisarc who spread CoriAmiot doctrine but are unlmoaa for deceptive purposes;
follow trcrclsro riio sup.ort tho Cocr^rdst prograo but do not Join tho party;
(e) sympathizers oho entertain Irindly feelings towards the party* protect its views but do not Jcinj
oppartirusts who cooporate trith tlic party fcr thair oun selflali reasons and advantages but do not Join for the ecce reasons;
cenfuaod liberals vho beliovo it possible to work with tho 'in for social ends although thoy are tlio first eliiainatcd
shen the party cares to po-.ier, aa indicated by tha sjpjTcsslon of Social Denocratic Parties in fcuropa; and,
(f) well-Manlhg citizens who are deceived by Oocrxinlat propaganda. (See Uecbershlc and Electoral Potential,. Ryrultnerrtt.
Reeraitrientatter of prixe interest and planninr. to the CPhe party is aeare that size strength are its main guards against suppressionistory of me-abershlp fluctuations and periodic "purges" of the inactive or suspected elements requires constant replenishment of these losses. However, as previously indicsted, the CP haa never aired at aita. The bulky,unbers other parties
strive to ottain in order to exert influence are replaced in the CPilitant, dejloyaile rembership trained to provide leadership for the masses That this system works is impressively illustrated in the USSRP aje-.teraMpillionopulation of 2CC million under complete control and in all the other countries dominatedarty.
A chief medium for recruitment is propaganda slanted to foster unbelief in the ideals of denocratlc, Western society, and to
-
build up tba belief that'Till oli^ixato poverty and ocLiave may of tbo acplrationa of tlio "ujderdog" by frooing hla of corx>etition* To this end, Cccruaiist propaganda is prolific and uiaesproaoU Tho Cor>-ninist proas hao universal circulation, underground if need be, in ohich case it is distributed in devious and ingenious rays. Songs, fladfaoytint postero, alogono, picket lines boaring popular appeals on their bacnoro, oven street fighting, have proved to bo effective aeons of attracting prospects, uccessful act of ix^rrroction, oa in CzechoolovaJda, bringseavy band-roson type of ffpflVacta.
Clubs devoted to literature, music aprreclation, foreign affairs, sports or even thosourely social oharactor ore often used tozass groups. All cf those finally got around to include diaci^sion of tha ideologyrx, lonin, and Stalin through the clever ixuiipulation of tho leaders. It is froo such groups that "front" organizations grow, often nUbout the lavroiodgo of eons of their naabars. Anong lndividiialo attracted byr.isl proprar. are:
ocoDcnlcally doun-trodden)
pre-dispoaed to Ccoauniaia through porsoaal
frustration;
young, liioee spirit of controdicirednakas it seen sonehOT glamorous toorcuniet. Ihus may
xi"Tul .CI"orldof 'i:.'XC*ltc Teu-i;rric act. ij*
(a) racial anO cdaorliyoasltlTG to cxaeriaana--ticn atXa. -u"egroes cf tho United States j
(o) clor__il areas riiose iritcrtr: ia aadf Ihrxicag?_igiMc but whosefor national inaopee-dineo are azrloitadha party;
(f) pecpleikjajt'.avinl starr-phcracarar-tor. ita socr&cy and recklessrd Tortaosc ara c! tenture;cuciiy cotplax> orastcldfa/.
ardprvr- _ -Jr.-'vd.- cf
asla? .
dA relirrar irctacs Jfcsaaasl
roars, .cra vicar abrcad wit': parcJlscixt 1ta?aee."
<2) tfdoctriaatico of He-emits*
Sqpartf pick act for cpscaal. tsciocjsi eu3Cc;tiole to tlia GoEzardst-rogras*rc- prrsp.ctave ^eabers arc sur'sotedalculator zathctlsolaticai wM*"'
tuay aiand pialosop/icolelected to develop the belief in tho student that western democracy is incapable of progressr'- voa Linked to this ic on intcrpro tat lot of an "internationalieh aarges tho naUonal in tercets of thoth tho doctrines and policies of tho Cocrxcrdst parties all over tho world until they beeoae identical. Cautiontaken not to reveal doctrinsc likaly toeginner^ Then "party loyalty" replaces tlio principles which first attracted him, tho recruit is sufficientlyfor toonbarship and training* e< Train! mr.
ature and crr-anleod Ceramist parties have integrated educational and training programs designod tor^-disciplined
amy capable offcies. able to keep its collective ncpzili shut; natur-iUyiiar r.or-leige cf tho uso of firo-aiTos an. lie's torowd, end with iovotion tc the revolutionary cause Ziis trairirjbe rcgHy divided into thrso cato-Torios.general, oc-thc -job. and irstitetacral, in ailWmch discipline plays an important role
tl) Discipline,.
Tlio Cccgainist Party ccrfrorigid discipline quite unkrtote. to danocratic parties0 Once the party has landedts decisions, It allows no deviation. Lot only those in tho public eye are forbidden to
dioGeat, bat ovan tho loant of the nenbars nuot accept in detailof th9 party or be subjectedprirondj suspension, orcm. The activi CcroirJart nust adhere"ffect bia xi.cla life. Co cottar how such idealise, op.cror luct for goes into Uio rjjjrincini.it,notivation ofidoolojy offerirc aTor ovory political, social, or philoop.'ileal problec isuala bin accopt this riold discipline. Tho lonjor he is undorUm loos bo is able to thlnli in any bat CcnsriistiepOTcdts ro crlticiscj of his vie-as but Is *vic tills ed" thorebyby "class enemies* "she ore any persons not sparinepoint of
(2) lenoral Trairdn.-.
/ll raccborB raced vj generaltiich in sorao couniries is tlio only off art ever node to brine political education, hora-ovor biased, to tho rassao. While Marxist doctrine, Soviet propaganda, and an international point of viae are tho basis c" this instruction* Cocainisepllod in tho particular country nith special tochnleues to be used there are t rized. -iado of "study circles" daalincdde raojo of subjects lnaliidlns litoraturo, history, scdenca, econonlco.
problcxx or youth,ni fcrning, til ao interpreted by -irx, :nrin,and Stalin, arc sot up, Shis choral trr.intng tokos or. eninua aspocts la cortiiin countries. In Gulo tho party at ono tins taught its aezbers to read and wrlto bofcro launching than intoen aft or aloe ting ocrx oi* then to the loglnlaturo ,the party taught ita legislators parliarioritary law. ikro of the noroural ochoola ia Italy aro socialised fan is tfioro tlio novices do tho work, Cor. advance to tho toco school* where thayo in tho itcoosiler; Ccrzzralstc. la Delglun each old aenber tokosecruit tc train. pecialindoctrination school in Czodioslovalcla ear-its only old neribere whoso farvor has cooled. Cuban schools ore so well organized that cno of than Is usud for oboervers fron other latin Aoerleon countries, while in
..rjonlisa, no forai organize! isstructicn in tilery Is at'.err:tod but
arports lecturenisls cn street fiirtinj, ccr^ndo tactics, and
seoaz-as,
'lOion tho student in jonor.il training espiros tc greater
and responsibility ia tho party, ho is given further crainir^
"on-the-job" or in CP ins ti tutions.
(3. On-the-Job Iraininc.
Inch offoctlve cn-tho-Job tralninc is accomplished by
Keperienco ^linod in penetrating labor urions, dubs, schools, and oven
aovorraents, whore Corzxiristo are ordorod tc assune wliat lonin noreod
Cater
of tho irasox* bylong hcurs or. tbo legitiaato projrxs of the -roups. Ifliay take any Job- attend allings, out-rait tlie opposition In order to pace resolutions after tha nojorlty sees boac, introduco party caxriaijns, andat it until Ccscraniat control of tho organization in _ainod. ConXercncoa held prior to actawilledxirk out in jroat detail Uie tactics to bo usod. These trainees bocano oc quale tod with the orcarlzaUona, and aalco thorssolvcsta very ni&oe of their operation in order to bo ready for cpicb, decisive action at tho ozTftot raonant the partyor It, They areasignad to the ataffa of high official* or acnt oa international -ioslcns ridlo developing aastery of tJiedr Jobs, Oood loaders can use tiieir jrcups forpicketing, recruiting no" loaders for Uie CP press, or for spreading propaganda. They ncrlc hard to 0ain ths confidence of tb-iir associates and are very successful in cbtAir-ire olactivo of.lcos, Tius, for exassele, Ul Cocxuust officials ara xcrv.lected cC'lcars ci tha lb liiritiro Union althouji there are less than 5CO Cor: unlets In thoOCambers. U) Instituti^nsl Troinlr,-.
Ik-st top-flight Ccfisirist leaders attend scJiooln inR at cone tizc. liach national party at ono tla: ozsuota by the fortier Coiiintorn thlCh paid tho traveling Cvseonsoa tounction nor; porfornod probably by tho Soviot Cccreiiist Party ainco Uiat
1
crj -aa -ties haa cpporeflUy uJMC over CauJiterr. duties* .cccrdirv; tc foraor 9tuJanto la mOSOou rtio havo since loft th* party, tlio -antral Caalttao cf each rational party ehoaa thoto attend aoviat schools frcalioso ncobero nho liaO boon active inparty for at least fivo years and Iiad an cdoriantary Jawciedc*Turdst thoorr. .Uthondh aoot of tho information coiscarinj tho opor-tli-r. ond curricula of those schools In dated boforo -orIdt can bo procunod that tils lxpcrtant nothod fcr lj:dcctrliiation and training of Carsuiists still soda-is. "Jillo those ochools nay have chanjod their nanos and aay non bo crap! lasia ire different pissos ofbrief description of tha cost important onoc boforo tnll bo useful,
(a) The boran Institute.
Hie Ionin Institute nns the ncrt isrporuint of tho Soviet schools to train Ccaaunis ve, /Itheujichool for political triinii rany of its ecraroos oeraurely rilitary nature,as net illcjical In viev: of tha CorxianlGt definitions an extension of political scnflicta. At one tine, ton percent of thot9 aussiars; theere foroijn Corrauaists later to be assigned to wort: inmotional plus as of tho party ouch as Uie IntercaUaaal Section of the Scviot CP, tlie Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
-
Asa,
4b
or the national parties, Ihos sold to havo had priority in fclio disposition cf thcso students and coicemod itself with part of their trainirc*
Tho courses vrgro taught in five larcuajos, iSnclish, French, Spanish, Qarnan, and Russian, and dealt in political,and nilitsxystripped to tho utilitarian objoctives of eays and neons of attaininc tho party'a Goals and providing it cith leadership.
Political courses Included studies of thaof Han, angola, Lenin, and ^talin, vdth sorao attention to thoseoearaunist Ta-itera* Avars rare courses on tho official hiatoay of tho Bclsbovil: Party, but aoat cone antra tod on basic Ideological concepts. Co-arses in political tarfore included tochniquos of other parties andof coriflolddation of In tha foruar, cortain tacixiqaasca.au sa trues, have beea successfully etiployed by opecifi-re, the Prench Party ccscolled in infiltration of tha arned forces, the 'iaiuun Tarty in or^aniaation, and tlic Chinese Partyerrilla nurfare; tharoforo their rjethodstandard for tho classesv
Uilitary ccuraes roro many and detailoct. The revolutionary silitajy section of thoInstitute can beet bo described in tho wards of an /caoricon ex-Cosraudat loader, Gitloo, nho otudiod there-
"There is no other school in any part of tliethat
hcrouga,troiaiing in the aethods of fonontiag re volution.onor, sottingictatorship, cud hsswrJing tho fences of opposition. During the throe years tho student rcx.ins tharerilled and troinod in nilitary science, eopionago wort; and aabotaga. Tlio course includes organisation of conbat groups, Ikw te induct poopls into their fornotdono, and tho tralninc techniques vh&jOb roust bo used."
d^terr. University cgrndst University for tbo
woridng ?aople of tba East).
This vas occrecnlythe Stalin University and uos founded5 in lloacoc. It una reported that9 Stalin hin-self taught courses there on questions of loninisn and colonial problerjs. Doth Soviot citizens and forcd,;riora of oriental doscont Tiore trained
there cxc;pt theio Cv-ondodun 1'at Sen University., *he
ior Josi-orr. I'nivsrsity faculty consistedssbers of tho CorsLotcn.,
of .od "rcfa-rcrs.
Thiss strictly for intellectualsuired seven years ofn study anphasls or. theory* The trarsang rns designed tc sako the arr;oly 2CC students aajor pclitlcal strategists. She sealants wore not choc en fron the rational parties but free tho elitorelirdnary t'l^/aj course;od professor mi nio years inlinking.
Yat Son. University.
0 Chinese nore said to attend the Sun Xat Son
rsity. 2ia students pore forced ir.to special dad Drigodes uiicn ora-ollod and nore -Ivor, tho bost nilitary coursoa tho Party had to offer, vith osrphasls on guerrilla fighting.
Frunze 'illtary Acadssy,
ain ochocl for training the soldiers of the USSR, it is eald to havepecial sabotage di vision for carefully screened international Centrists.
Uld-Oaropoan University.
Ihis school catered to Corxair.ists frcn the Balkan coiintrios, andpecified nunc or free iSurope. tlio US, and Canada* The USmnists aont rnny negroes there. Ittudant body ofonrjjniste and uas loeorm as Stalin's pot school nbero ho began laying plansan-Slavic bloc of Ccanonist nations as earlyc) pcrrainast Schools in the US.
Tlxerehain cf ScraTjnist schools stretchingooaring such ho::ored nesss as 2io Abrahaa Idxooln School*itmn School, the Saaual -dans, and tho Jeff organ School of Social Scienco. Sono of these schools bava _cno urxlor ground after being naned as subversive by the attorney General's office, "ibe Daily Sorter describee thoso schools oc "port of tho centiratinc processcruiting and training non youtliful forces for loaders!ip in the CP."
til) Tho *'a,*farser, >chcolls.ce
This la the bigg;st ca"adiocle andO
studaats onnially at its location In lion York cn theacaB of tlio "Ericas. ironente do not exist and foes aro very loc. .rtudonts are obtained free tba Parry (heat half of then carry party cardej and "front" groups. hrorticirg. art ic lac in the party press, andprarjtion in logitlaate universities and urions ore used to attract otJier students, 2. r.Uen.
The Ccaauniat Partyoll-diflciplinod, higlily trained elite carps of revolutionaries elioo join and naintnin controlovomtant through either le el and parliamentary, or subversive ondnethcie,
The Ccexarist Party is theo "organized dotadnsEt"proletariat, Ita purpeee is toan', organised
loadsrslii? in tho struggle of tho .crkinc It reccgnisesticrity other than it3 onn. s conceptingloj aU-peuarful party
is Un negation cf party in'esterr. deseeratic, par-sanentary sense of the cord* Dutariinis- suato only the pa-ty of llarx,nds fit to forgo the ray to tho classics: society of tho futureo
The Party car. fulfill ite various tonka only.
. .if it is organized ln tha noot centralised nannor, only if iron helpline bordering on nilitary discipline prevails
lr. it- -ndarty centerc-.orful authoritative or_ar,to, aiii enjcyiA;univoisal cccflience of the rordwrs of the party." [Ionia, 2)
ccrjinlatorofore, adhere to strict discipline and
foil car certain basic principles of orjaidaation, nhieh rare set
forth by hsnin and interpreted by Stalin,
a. IVlnciploo cf Or.;anloattora,
JoeeoeroticVj,
The cerdiiial principle according to ehich tho l'arty is
cr&iniaed is described officially ascerrtrnliica," Car
doctrine, eacpounded by lonir. uher. the Party ths still an urxlormrc-and,
WTcluUcaiary cra'nnization, orphasieed tho necessity for cer.tralisod
control, "denccracy" eraarjina then tho Party bocano lecal. free.
doctors b/ ballot could datorriiie the policy ofticrsl Party
Congress, This, hocovor, is as far as thoprocess" poos'
the dosislon of the raojorlty of tiio Lionbors of thenol Party
CcsYjross is Marring upon all, no question con bo, or is, entortoajieeU
ecision has boa. reached, no vocal liinority ia permitted,, Tba
Central Cornittoe prescribes the sethods to be follooad in elections.
and usually restricts tho votinglncle list ofapproved" noninees,
oven ia the election by the congress of Doctors of tho Central Cccrattee,
7 -
Itrenty "Jca crv.cy" within the Part;- cvor-
htf its lexers _nJ b; the irecr Ththis cer.tr.)liation has been sun-s follows:
In truer to fur.cticn ircperly -no" to yuiue the :atically, tht i'arty auat to cr;;anized cn tho jrcartralisn.ne jut if rules an- ui.iforaline, one le.ilin: orynthe Party Con, undintervals betweenentralltceParty, the rancrity nust bubrit to the -ajcrity,tc the centre, ondr conizations. hese conditions, the ;nrt;'wurhin; class cuirotd cannot carry outclass. "
.
caunt tt lelieve that their Party can
n effectiveorsj.in- ofule-tar; si. revclu-
fill" -revalls, . t'at tl.iscMWec
without thoironil; lurty rear bars. Slalin
bus elabcrjtod this rrlnol.Jocllo-a:
Iron discipline. . .presur; OCM conscious undfor only. be truly Put afterontestnion las been een exhaustedu (loci si cn has besn
arrived 'it, unit"ll uni uidt'*t;on of'.rtv
**ra era the neevssarycr. withoutoither the Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is ccr.ccivable."
If "iron" d'd not prevail, fictionsevelop, resulting in
. .the breskin- up of tlie unity of till, the aenkenin- and diointe-ratlcn
intttors! ^
Discipline lat; xeanalficcr [articulur ir.frart ions of Party statutes and direct .Vas. Per suchor nor.-jajrent cfdshanalhy-ids, or for conduct reflecting adversely cn thted&ere punished by reprisand, ausrensienf ftr serlersKlf, or by expulsion.
Tha executive authority of the crc.inlzaticn concerned decides such cases, buter.iers an} epieul to the next higher echelon-Crd; the Central Coi.itteerder expulsion; ita decisicnppealed tcentral Comdssion or tc the National
More important and altogether acre persuasive is they influence exerted ly those agencies thatonstant surveillance of ell the activities, associations, ethics, and ideologicalofchars. This work, whether it be done ty tuch regularly conrtituted Tarty organs as the Control Comisslcr.a, or by suchntfhe rcilitants,na" traveling lnaj.cctcrs, preserves theurity areInst deviationis;c, nd itsinat The Cadre irincitle.
One c!st ircport-.nt airs of the Cosmunlet Party is toighly trained and reliable cadre. adrenail nucleus of fully indootrihated, trusted oerhers whonopoly of pollcy-oekine and organisational direction. his "living frejieacrk" Is
tvits-lisoderr, it isstable to assure tr; .nls-ti-Xoll orthodox, and discipline.
S. Grr.ar.isa tic-rial Structure.
The pattern of orc>niiation of the doixwtiat Forty cf the irfwiet Union res, eith alight modifications, beer. Loosed on til other Connrunist parties.
The basic unit ih Um hierarchy is aot at leust tiireeers, known asrty crgans." Orronisei ir.ine, village,fara or university, these todies are charged ailh the duty of propshe ideas and policies ofrty Although fror. the cell level upward the coer-ittaei and congresses are elective, each organ, elected byd:ately beneathull
ever its subcrdin .tea. Thus, ahile there isearanee of rerresentativehe loaer Pjrcy organs actu.lly serve ss cenvenient instruments for carry inf. out the "party line."
The Icidinr. crr.anc of an overt national party are:tior.il Party Congress, Central CoTittee, Control Ccrr issic-n. PoliticalomstL-ies an Or'anlzatiun Bureauecretariat controlling the activitiesroup of -dainistr-tive depart-onts
(1) The Nationalon-ress is the suprane ergon ct the (arty. Its deleg-te* are elected by ragicnal cr.gresses in iro;ortion to the numerical andf esch region, andt rales and
- AO -
le*. prcv'ceongress every two years, but ll* actual ccr.vocaller,wtra-it usu-ily rucb ieis irs'uant. (Tbe last Ail-Ur.iin Gen-res* cf tne CPSU was)
(2) Thf Central Cor.lttee* isead.'nr organ of the Party ir. Ihe intervals between Congresses. Numbering betweenndenters, plus altc-.jate. (orheonsultative vote only, the CC is res.onsible for the elaboration of the Party policy, the enforcement of the statutes, end the execution cf then sitcrt, for the whole operation of the Tarty. It directs its political ond organiiatirnsl work, controls its finances, end represents the Party in its dealings with non-CoriTunist crganixctiona. The CC con-rises rest of Ihe important Party leaders, and is hence the arena Ln shier significantstruggles and clashes cr. policy cccur
Because of ita size, the CC Is called into plenary sessionthe Politluro only two or threeear. Between sessions, thes run ty the Uecretic*lly subordinate bodies cfentral Comities, tne Politburo, and the Stcreturiat, which ere elected frou the CC ne-ibersiiip
In addition to Its general pol icy-aek;nr and executive functions the CC convokes latloml congresses ond conferences and sub-its vc these congresses the prcgraci ehich the Politburo lias drifted. Finally, Ue CC is
* ttjy alsc be called the "Nationals it Is in the US and Brasil
- U
ro.pc-.ciMe fcr the ralntenance of discipline and theon tcanyerber. itost of the work rut out In tho iiaca of the Central Cc.-rittee la actually' done by other bodies such as the Politburo, Secretariat, and OrRburo.
(3/ The Political Bureau folitburo (so.net ires called Executiveirectorate, National Board) consistsern tor- leaders she really direct the Party-
SpecifieiaUy, the Politburo Is charred by the OC with the direction cf party affairs in the intervals between sessions of thebody. It is responsible for the preparation and supervision of the political line, "sobers of the Politburo habitually assure direct eupervislcn over theicptrtsnt al-inistrative uer artcer.ts cfecretariat Oceaelonally, as ir. -Mna, Jarjn, ana Yu-tiUvia, srwller orc-ruaatic:.cilave teen fonaea within the rolitburo.
(a) Ther bureau Orjburo, when it exists (as It does in the USSR,and Italy,',ubconnittee af the Certral Cortittee. It is rtsncr.sUle fcr the elasoratitn and prorsul-.atlcn of the Party's organizational policies The acst inportant function of the Orr.buro is to supervise tha selection, training, and aasi-pvamt of functionaries Ihrcirhout the Party.
I'any national Corssunist parties apparently crut lbs Orgburo.
Ir t cmi policies affectingvia ticn are crcbal-ly deterrinec ty the Politburo, and the current business cf organization is handled by the Organization Departnont of the Secretariat.
Central Control Co-rdsslon is elected in ntst countriesNational Congress, end supervises the ralntenonce of discipline andof the Party line. Its ir.rorta.nce ia traditionally very Teat.
In the CPSU the Control Cornrission operates through boards on the top levels of all Party and nevernzenttl interests; itroups for heavy industry, li;ht industry, naval affairs, fooa and trade, education _uid public health, foreign relations, and carry others. The boards ensureforce?ent cf Party decisions, investigate the work of all Party org.-nlzations, and pnsecute those accused cf violations oftatutes ard discipline.
In sooe parties the tower of the Central Control Coaveission is apparently ltuited. It ra; he charged eerely ait.', fincr.riil supervision. In Italy, it aiparcntly servosourt oi s| :ealecisions af lov.er party erganit.tiona. In any event, sire* the prcbler cf securityelicate one and on internal security skater, is generally uniojular, the aork cf the Control Corxissicn Is always carouflsged.
Secretariat consistsecretary Generalne orelected by theongress. It directs thebusiness of the Party.
<
the sarin! st rat ion of specific area* of Party Interest, the
ci.ly intc UC oaU Uose cone?-red with the Internal affairs of tie Party, such asraniSitiM, and tt;oae which Qd.rirlater party affwirs tcuchinj; the life of theuch as labor, agriculturetation-propa-anda.
The Secretary-General, becauee cf hie close supervision ef allctivities, is usually the cost powerful of its leasers. Stalin dre* his Initial authority from this source. The Secretary, as aell as the heads of the .tob'w important administrative departnants, isrcber of the Politburo.
(7) The Adsdr.lstratlve Derertrgnta. ahich are zrcet cbvicusly essential to the operation of the party machine and the achievenent of Ita political pro^raaiare:
(a) Qrrahlz&tion.
This neiartr.ent is responsible for administrative ouestlona surrounding tha establishment,ollocation,and re^roupin- cf Fartv organisations; also, for the naehinery and teehnivMs o' recruitnent, selection, distribution, and proraotior of functionaries. arty has no Cadre Departrent, as is usually the case, the Organisation Departoant olso handles personnel ratters.
Organizational ectters involve not only the Farty itself, but the structure and activities of auxiliaries, fronts, and fractions as sell. The Organization DejarUwr.i. rout work very closely with other aduinletretive detortcentsouth, -onen'a.hioh are
v.
- I* -
ecvr.u Party Frcr.i siiiarr ia, in craerttxty prosrao and to drati as rainy syrrothisers into tho parlyoe si bis.
although every Cc-cunist Part; has ita cadre,tlesn. jtparate cedre deportrent. "hen one exists, it haa two General
t ia responsible for thr collect Un and collation of personnel statistics of thetarre part in the seleetior.,
nd proiaolion of functionarie- in the rviintenance ofsprit.
and Prira-anda:derartnent is restonaible for the preparation snd
clsserirutlontprop materials -nd pro:-rar3cale (such astlonal Party neursEars* and t? loaer Part; crfans,op work the nationalr ir*nt supervises. Its activitiesecirv;supervisicr. ef the Party school a;nd thr publication cf vt icua rartp nev-a; apers and other printed ratter.
Othert_:ents cf considerable lauxrtar.ee elude Isbor, Colonial Affairs, Finance, Touth,ren.
to the cer.troi direct in- raeUr.ery ore re^icn, district, and cell crtunisatlcru. The territorial organization reflects
clc*ely that of thearty.
* In Co-nunlst ten.irtoio-y, "arit-tion" refers to recruitment activities.
referse continuous indocrin-lion prograa for Party cerA>ers
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<
icr :'cret >n* Undert-vit :e5
crfr-.nlxationo jrir.iat Party lendslly Ic secret tna undevroond octivities. The secret activities, arising frcn and cordlticned by the nature of the party's general approach to political questions, artinto the norral and evert activities of the Party and are usually carried onthe framework of the Party's overt organization, .hen aParty is outlawed, its underground activities con be undertaker, tvrourh the existing force of organization to illegal conditions, a. Crf!nnlv.tion for Secret Activities.
Tha secret activitiesrunists are facilitated by cortain characteristics inherent in the crganltatlon.il structure of all dorcaunist Parties:
irclr-e.
The :adres held theecrets cf the Party anC uce the lower iarty rank ana file as -ere irstrueents in carrying out. tVelr policy. Thus, even under conditions cfhe slgnifiwntef Party work are tirhtly sealed off fix: the rest of the far'-y.
police Organs.
Corjcunist Parties generally rain-sin intra-Perty police or-ens,are frequently identical with the Cadreand the Controlnd which arc designed to preserve ideological and security control. Thus there usuallyonfidential corje cf Party "detectives"perfcrc counter-espionage duties. Clearly, the existence ofarty
police force rust bi ecnce.-leJ, net only, oaten* toh these actlvitias leik in torty octrees, but altoarty me-itbors.
(3) Front Organizations.
The relationship of the activitieso.-xiinist party to Its front and auxiliary organisations is ih many ways parallel tc the relationship of the cadre to the party. Both relationships.rained select group, "ho through this training and the use of secrecy salntsln control over the respective larger organization. orrunist party constantly directs its. asr.ll units of party marbers, into non-Concunietrganisations in an attecpt to gain control of tha organization. Id all these cases of penetrationcr problo- is to conceal Party control and influence over the fronts, fractions, and other groups.
It ls thus apparent that the secret activities of CoTainist parties are an organic part cf Corauniot political ret'ods. They rest cn the party'a atterpt tointernal control, and tc convert part of the rasses to Coccurden without actually preaching it. b. Orranltatlon for Underground ^Activities
A Cornouniet Party prefers to operateegal political party in order that it iray better carry on propaganda and recrultnent. It ails,firht desferately toits legal atatua, and, once drivensill wake every effort to regain legitiaacy. Jiec it la outlawed, however, lt is not particularly handicapped because the aijoe forn of
or- ritstion sanes fcr beta legal wdecnditiorjbec-T< cadcan be trusted tc underjreuno ectlvitles.
and Security.
The maintenance of discipline nod security by special Party organs (Control Cofaeisslon, Cadre Coiniaslon, and otherraditional feature of Party co-gar. Uat lon which can be conveniently adapted to underground oondltlons. (The main factor which endangers the euccessfulrret lon of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extrerely severe police action, morale say disintegrate nnd result inass defections, and penetriiicns.)
Discipline underonditions -'cans not only strict adherence tc tha political and organizational direction cf tho center, but also rigorous oooforsity aith underground security rules govern inr. the conspiratorial behavior of cadre ana eilitants. unctionary aho hasParty secrets under eevere police pressure is punished by the coapetent organs ef the Ptutyreach of dlBclpllne.with no resard for
extenuitlnc circuas-ancea.
Syaten.
Syeto-ntlc exploitation of the call sau-ber's noraalcontacts for propaganda and recruitsent pairposes is an all-important task when the Party is underground. Tho importance of illegal cell activity ,ie intensified by the fact that interra>diate echelons are usually reduced to
hence, fcrth* Ji.rt>fter. ccrsiett enl? tit tin ce tar and theri.ua "front line" cell crr.nizatlcns.
(3) irntcrial experience.
Thrc ifh the Comintern, the Ceramistf Uie Soviet Union fc.aa shared the organizational policy of all foreign Corxair.lst Parties, ana ha; passed on Its can ccr.sideruule experience In undergroundlirauctWOtars of its existence, the Corljitern exhorted and ofcli-c: Its sections to prepare adequately for periods of illegality. The conditions create- by Nazi occupation Inrontributed nuch to thestandinr: of the fw-idanental problems of idle gal activity.
C, Organizational Problops: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions.
The party Being underground eust find neans of carrying onctivities without rieklnr, exjosure to the police. To thiseorganisation of the bureaucratic apparatus is necessary.
(1) fteJuctlcr. cf Party Apraratos.
Tha extent of reorganization is detar.Tined by the size of the Ja*el Party, the severity of repressive actlcn upon it, and general pclley considerations. rall or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drasticallyaas Parjy cay find lt necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization, thln the Units of auchy be take along the following lines:
The territorial oreariz-tico of the Tarty, particularlyugeeonsolidated and reduced. Staff personnelhen be utilised with -reater eccncry, and the Party may concentrate cn cornunieaticnsthe ccr.ter. All levels of territorialegion, district, subdistrlct and section) ray be reduced si-jly through unification cf the various atoff cocruirnJs, and the conbining
of their crireas of jurisdiction.
The Party centeress affected by the rrocess of
consolidation,arty rayarge central organization. On the cell level, consolidation is not practical; although for security reasons, ceils rust be broken upil units if they ore to escape police attention. t the sare tine that territorialay decrease in nunber or disappear alto-ether, the nurbcr of ceilir. theunderground my fjro*.
(3s Seduction of Staffs.
In addition to the consolidation of territorial organ;za-llcns, the mraher of staff position* throughout the Party is usuallyIn the underground. The local Party eonruUteee are arporently
strongly affected by this. Accordingo-intern instruction, the cooxittees ofParties should,ule, consist of no -ere thin
f the executive
buru.u. Ir. jracl.ce, VO*ionc te ix.rt liestic,or. prevailing conditions. Sonetines trey ereentirely end the actual crg-ii ration si and political work is assigned to the executive-administrative apparatus.
(fc) TheFunction:riad Systen.
Consolidation of territorial organisations and reduction ofersonnel can, in some cases, be corbinedpecial organizo-tion of the ccc-and function observable only in underground Parties.o thisroupo of three functionaries say be established
at aU echelons,he national down tc the cell level, vdth tbe two-fold
-ejrc.-sibllity cf supjr/lsinr and directing the Party work, and raintoining
verticil li'.ircr.then, In this lattere trisdc represent the liv-ic;nd in the Illegal Party, whenever ooserved, thesovo consisted of epecialistsfor: (a) political work; (bynd (c) agitation one tropaganda for labor union work.
The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organisations say reraln effective. They arerely si-perizrosed on the illeral Party nacy.ir.ery in order to direct pel icy. Triads at national and territorial levcii have been known to direct the work of the various administrative end executive departcente ondof the Party. However, It cannot be clearly detemined nt present to whatthe nstionel triad nay corhine executive cos and with poliey-_king
furclictui. treste the FcliUvro, bat ir. feet it ray become the actual leadership of the Part;-. The triad irliK-rLt my beet, be applied tc cell erearization. Cella car. bt censtitutei ee three-aan rrc-re, each -cr recruiting andup of three aho are not cell mecbers and aho corrrise sub-coll basic units.
The triad represents an effective con:entraticn of the ecia-and function in the hands of cindividuals. It per_ta -neater centralization and Cc-partnentallzation.
-aintenance of tight co^vtrtnentallaatlon is annd security problem of the first order, since it is necessary tothe police froo learning too mich ahen Partyor fur.ction-ries are arrested. Comnartnentalization istc Party operatiens as folio*
and r'lH'ary Branch.
whenever anParty isosition toiiitary organization, the latter'e staff conpositlon is kept diatinct frox the Party's political nechanlsn. The tao structures nerely coordinate on policy and recruitrant probler* at their hirheat echelons
. Cfi^zatlcna.
As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries reraln cennooted alth the Party through interlocking staff personnel only. They function as independently as possible.
Partyx'liaryi::j.
Party organizations, or tsars for the performance cf
sue* specialized tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and ether apreirCant agencies, and liquidation and terror groups, are established as largely inde;-endent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained on this basis in tires of illegality.
(d) Internal Party Corrpartncntalization.
within the political icechanlSTi of the Party proper, the
desired effect can be achieved by the folio-ins asasures*.
(i) JOl.Tlnation of horizontal liaison. Ko cell and no
territorial organizationfdtted to raintain contact with any other Partyperating on the sane level. Liaison say only be ccncucted vertically with the dealgnated functionary of the superior Party organization, .hose task it is to direct the lower organizations under his Jurisdiction.
(il) Restriction of contacts. The fewerur.etior.ary knotsets in the course of his work, the better.
(Ill) rur.ctlcnal restrictions. An atterpl la guide to define closely the .lob of each functionary and t preventor learning anything pertaining directly to his work.
(6) Section of Party Co-TBittoss.
Ii he hnnds or th* rational and territorial ccnaittees end their aa-ixdstrative cr-ans. en this is the case, the election cf Party coanitteas represents an organizational problen.. The Coicintern advised *ita merner Parties that in on underground situation Party elections
shouldlace in restricted conferences and should be conducted inay that even the conference me-nhers would not knos eho was elected.
cf Centraleas.
Conference abroad is one way of circumventing anti-Cora-aunlat laws. Anotier possible say is asiallar national conference.
Party Co-raltteaa El ectoralis so-at evidence that spscial electoral conrissions
are created under illegal conditions for the purpose of electing Bombers
of territorial Party Coazaittees.
Co-optation as the process whereby nerdcerspechfle cownitteeentral Conrclttee) appoint Party reeahers to vacancies of that conclttee without the usual partv Party .Organ! rations Abroad.
> -or. repressive neaauras become severe, the central Party
IK c, rr set up or,oila) Centrald Central Poparlojnis.
Th* Central Coarlttee and Ita sd-.inistraUYc-executive apparatus (Politburo,pcrtTents, Control Corrdesion' cay be pvtl-'llj or crxpletely transferred. The central organs abroad mat perioric not only a. ccivvmu function but rust also provide the Parly atlth propaganda ond indoctrination nv.terial,uipnent,
*>
funds, epecialists in undergroundertrol repository for files and archives, training faci-it'e: fcr tre cadre, conranicaticn services, antsrunition, safe haven, and financial aup;crt for sailed Party aorkers. In short, the central Party organisation abroad becoaes the chief operational support center for thearty. (It asset therefore frequently create new types of auxiliary and adalnistrativeb) Porelrn Bureau
There ia evidence that in eo?reureau has been set up. Thisentral udnlnistrative-executivs agency charged with the direction ofunctions such as corrur.lcations, production, and distribution of press propaganda, ihlle, theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau rests kith the Central Comdttee, there have been cases where the Bureaus have been the real directing
ft
centers.
-
The apparatus of tho Central Coneittee abroad nay prcve unable to handle all its workload, particularly whan it rust extendountry with long frontiers. Conaaiuently, the coirjtnd and bup-pcrt function fay hovt tc be decentralized, ond several support cantors, opera ting fror, various countries into sectors of the horelcnd, say bo created. Coordination alth the Centralcay be effected through the assignment of CC Beaters to the regional centers.
Organizations for &ri"antg.
Special Party organizations for exiled Corxoinlsts cay be created. They render assistance to exiles and carry out theand training functions of basic Party organization*. They also furnish personnel for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides and the like.)
Party organizations for amirrants should not be confused aith front organizations created b; the Party abroad. The latter, soce-tioes set up instead of special Party organizationsJgrants, serve political propaganda purposes fror. ahich the hoc* Party oay benefit. They are cctjvenient aoney-raialng instruraents for the Party under the pretext furnished by the Pront's ostensible purpose.
Service Crpaniz-itlons.
The party Center abroad usually has to create special organs to facilitateaith the hor.eland. nay
-
--diled. rJrtet oer.tioi of the centsr cr rxripclstedeaucpcrt station Thei-ri^l. zed their distribution via special co._inieation routes ra; have to be entrustedeparate organization,eferred toechnical Service or Apparatus. U auxiliary
uxiliaryorganisation isoi* eontrci by the Party is usually disguised by placing prordncnt non-Comrainista, orruis* their party ef filiations, in the nominal positions of leadership.
auxiliary organizations comprise all the front organizations ahlch attecpt totogether large nurbers or social, econoicie, and political seprtntsopulation to further Cox unist ains. There are, of course, varyingf Co onanist control of these units, amy organizations exist which containbut, for the cost part, are not controlled by the Party. Only those organisations which are utilized by the Cornunist Party for najor Party activities will be considered In this discussion of auxiliary organizations.
parties, ahelher weak or strong, place great emphasisup and utilizing auxiliary organizations. aa. party,groupsfurtherpropaganda, to
acquaint particular ele:er.ts of the population with theond to recruit outstandirg individuals forin the party, ln
a strong party, tha front groups will actively campaign for Comuniata tc be elected to parllairentary positions and sill contribute funds for the printing of Conaainiat propaganda.
It has becor* increasingly difficult for the Coccuniata to disguise their control of these organlsatione. Ths general public is noa rcuch better acquainted with the Ccenunist program snd can identify at least the pre ;nant Conaunlst leaders. The usefulness for Comuunlst purposes,does not end when an organization has been "unmaaked." Although non-Cocnunist edheronta to auch slogans as "peaet" and "laboray
dwindle, the enthuslaatlc activitica of the front groups athnulate at
least the confirmed Corsiinlsts to greater activity.
The oost useful classification of auxiliary organizations ia one which lists them according to groups of population to wh.ch they appeal. Itost of the organizations have both national and International counterparts but for brevity only the international units are raentioied here.
a. Labor.
By far the cost important auxiliary groups which Coezsur.ists either
control or seek to control are the labor organisations. Ths Xkocunlst-ooo-
trolled World Pederaticn of Trade Unions attempts to aaid both Coranunlst
and non-Coiamuniat unionsohesive unit to suppcrt Soviet policy.
Since the wit'idrawal of the Western non-Coatminist unlots fromTD,
Cocmnist organisera have increased their activities in what they call-tha
kepartner.ta: international or-anizations cf torkers by crafts. Trus, anile the British TUC haa discontinued its affil.ation withTU, theontinual to attexfit to establish contact aith British labor through
affiliation of British ratal workers, luaiber aorkera, and others aith
t
' 4
-.1
spprcfr tte "international trade denartaents." Further organisational developrent of thsis indicated byernunent liaison presently ln Peiping, to facilitate Cocruniat penetration Into the Far East.
b. Intellectuals.
The past year haaevival ofInterest in Intellectuals. In the fall8 In Poland, th* USSR organised, on en - -international level, as nany intellectuals aa would give active or rasslve eupiort to the propaganda line of the Soviet Union. on this organisation of intellectuals has been Ut* Soviet "peace propagandahich has led tc the formation oftrolled national "peaceirecting "Liaison Bureau" In Paris. So far, the peace(heavily attended by intellectuals) and the peace coccittees have been used primarily aa propaganda vehicles ln antc recoup the recent Soviet losses in European cass support. C. Other Organisations.
Other organizations no* controlled by the Soviet Union which exploit various social groupe arerld Federation of Denocretic Touth, 'sV.eV-.'i, the International Federationoc ratioths Internet local ^ ^
Association cfurists andtems tional Org-Jiiialion Additionally, in certainorxuristahe peasantry, although since the aar these nationalhave never bean einlganated into an internationalorganisations of thla type play an Ixportunt part in the
conolidation of Cocscuniat power. Corcuniet Party neai.-ership In countries with Coirauniat regime rust be kept relativey ejrall,gh degree of political consciousness and activity. Pront groups eon pens tret* Into groupa who engage in little political activity, acquainting then alth the Co muni st progran and ferreting cut possible dissidents. Recently, anin front work, particularly with regard to wo ran, labor, atudent, and peasant groups, has been noted in the Par East, partly to old in tha consolidation of the Chinese Corruinlst retina, and portly to develop avenues of contact with Par Eastern rwan-Ccesainist areas.
III. CUfeVU. Bl TA TICS (General)
1" PoUtlcaU
a. parli^ntary Maneuvers.
Por th* Coraa-la'-B, for the Katie, oartlelpNtloDreely electedrt has always been nrlmarlly for the vurpoee of eub-vertlng democratic- gorerrosent. Intie rite Oernany th* Cceaunlate often caoblnod elthili In the Kelchetar. and the Proa si in Diet to cause altuatlona shlch vould die credit the1 tee and hasten Ita disruption. At the saae tlae they used the parllasenUry roetrue rincipal stage froa whloh to advwrtlealate and procraa.
Postwar Cxechoalowkia affords en Ulustrstlcn ef tha Coneunlst attitude ten ard, and exploit tloo of, narliaaentary eyrtam. CsechceloTak Coneunlata first den on st re ted their saeentlal contempt for perils "sen tary goverraaant byo delay the transitionlianentaryfor nerrly sixafter liberation of the country, in order to ^prolong the emehseney ays teava rnt sent by decree. rn tram
aore opportunitypuah through eerV>ln parts of their prorraa. They
pen-it tad the eorrtneatlonrevlsdonel aatlonal aniel ly enctober
*
- * 5 orly after Prerident banes hadUna that he would sign no
ttecreea -fUr 1
. -f . attltudu tovard perUanentary ehr-ctioia vaa
on the eva of tha first nostwer election which bus heldor theof lntinid.-ting the elector-teesinder of Sorlet pcwwir to intervene, they were partylan to permitrge body ofayross Cieehoslovakla froa Austria to Germany onay. Tha plan did not succeed because Preoidcct Banes, upon learning of it, acted firaly to cancel it. Caw unletto acquiesce In the free trend of the electorate aaa bv.ii wore strongly deEonstreted ln the8 coup, which found ouch of Its larwdlrte motivation in an anticipated decline of Cob-BTunlat strength in the Inninentdevelopsaint which the coup forestalled.
During the two-year life of parliamentary fOvarnweotthe Cosasuniete often attmpted to useand ertra-parllanent*ry a* ana to force the adoption ofBaasures which would strergther. their hold on the country. An example of this wns the atte-pt of theMinistry or Agriculture in the winter6 to force the adoption ef six decrees desipned to Increase state control over fansers and pave the way for collectivisation. Knowing that these decrees would be blocked by theparties, the sonlstrj distributed drafts of then tont rolled bran ones of tha
DnltedA-isociatlon before Introducing the* In the Rational
Q
At that tine the Assembly waa still powerful enoughdefy suchtactics, and its Agricultural Connslttee refused tothe decree* nnd censured the Minister for resorting toaction." Thereupon, at the instigation of the ainlatry, Cc^unlet-dcHilnated faraera0 ocesslaslona mad* protests to the Assembly in person In an sttesjpt to force the latter to reverse its stand, b. OnltedFront Tactics,
Postwar Chechoclovakian history similarly illustrates Ceesauniet united front tactics The Czechoslovak united front wascecunlst creation, though the other parties agreed to It. Creation ofront wes insisted upon by the Czech Cosaxunlst leaders In aba cow at the tine of President Ben*a' first visit to the Soviet capital lnhen the groundworlc was laidostwarof both the Moscow and London emigre groups. Ths Ce^lSIunlsta, ulterior sin In Insistingnited front was that of using It* fhoade behind which tosnd eventually subvert tbe other parties. In practice they sleo used it es an apparatus by vhich, through skilled manipulation, they could force their own minority denande upon the other parties*
This was accomplished in the following Banner. Within the united
front (celled Katlonal front) of alltlse, ths Cors-roniststha Social Danocrata *nd the Katlonal SoclallaU (thea liberal centrlet party) to Join with thaw in acrhe Sodallat Bloc of "brtcers* Owing to theaod elVdenioc racy by ths left-erlnf* Sodallat leaders, headedthe Socialra tic Party beeane completelyUe Com un lata, who were thereby able to outvote ths National Social 1tha Socialist Bloc. Tbe decisions of the Bloc (actuallycould then be presented to the other parties ae thethe dominant bloc, eo that tha Ccesaunlsta wereosition to force
their acceptance as cart of the prograt of tho entire National Pront.
Thla etratogy aucceeded only pert of the time, and In7 tbe Ccrsunlats sought toore dependable majority for theasolvea in the Katlonal treat. To this end they dsavnded theof Uie Pront to Include representatives of political organisations other thanthe trrde unions, the youth Bovwaant, the
fanners' union, end the portieane. Tbla proposal was vetoed atby the other Coalitionthe war Comunlat tactics In participating in coalition
gove^eaorrts hnve been dotermlnod by tho Internal situationiven country nnd by the etetua of Sc^et-sestern relatione. During end iajoedlately following the ear,policy, reflecting Seviot-leBtero axdty, called for collaboration vlth other parties in coalition govsviusatrU, Aa tension beteeen the Best and lest bas Mounted, Cob-samlsts la countries outside tha Soviet orbit have been forced out of theend Into increasingly bitterwithin the orbit, they have gradually dropped the fiction of coalitionrrmnts and have talcen overdirect snd exclusive control of these oountriesc
o-pean countries directly after the var particippted In coalitionrmraits. ong-rang* objective they hoped to sjain enough strength to vreet control froa tbe other pertiesj short of tbat objective goverruasntaloffered thes an opportunity to influence both Internal and foreign policies to Increase theirand thus lnorniee their aass support. At tha sane tine, however, the Coartunists bolstered their position in lAbor snd front orgsnlsaUone endused extra^arllamflntsry pressure ersinstrsaoits in vMcta they These tactics, along vith the Increasingtension, eventually forced thsout of everyin lestem Europe,,
In orbit countries where they have beeninority, the Comraunlsts bave need bogus coalitions aa the means to talcs control of allf the poverrawent, eliminate politicalrrtsrors th* eooialonoaie struotures of the countries, build op two-gcvwreaental struoturee to facilitate their control, and force extremely pro-Soviet and anti-Western policies upon all other partleSo larger of Parties, Blocs.
The ultimate goal of Ccreainlete la the single-party atate under Cocnnmlit rulsj ellsrina tl on of competing partiee le therefore of first om. The means used vary from simply declaring all other partiee abolished (aa In Russiao variousor getting other partlea to rea.ounce their own Independent functions (as has happened in -oat of the Soviet satellite states since the war}*
One of tbe first 3tope In the elimination atrategy is usually the application of presaure en the ether so rking-claee parties tonited front with the Ccrwounlsts and then to merge wi th the a, with the aid of betrayal by eome of the other partyho are secretly Ccmrauniete, the merger Lo acoc=?liahodt fanfare) ayaboMTrlng theunifies ti on* of the working-olaes movcetent. Tn the resultant monolithic party,mer Socialists are thereafter eliainated as unreliable
ft*1 **
(which thoynsofar aa thay rep re cent In part the patriotic Interests of their coin try in contrast to the Coraaijnists* Invariable subordination of natloml interests to tbe requlreoenta of the power polities of thsnd the party leadership beocnes, in practice, completely
This pattern of poet-liberation relations between thesnd the Social Democrats was followed root clearly inof Poland, where the Ccearanists found the left-wingwilling alliesU and inveigled the latter into beooralrg
nited front for electoral purposes in Hen-ember
Then, in Deoenber lphB, aided by the capitulation of the weak Socialist leader CyreriWewieathe wishes of the majority of his party, tbe maneuvered the Socialists Into an agreement to merget which resulted ln eosplete absorption of the party and relegation of most of Its lea da re toriant positions*, bass Action.
Ccmonlsts rely on the support of large rushers of the population who are either non saaahers or relatively un trained party members inoapnble of playing leading roles ln the The technique of making use of these elements to further Cocnunist ends is known es ma so action-
ah as action nay beal and Ulngel, rod in addition to the positive objective of promoting tha Ccaaunlst cruee. It also haa tho negative nt= of dororalisihg elteableof tha pcvnlation in order to neutrallx*Communists tere theforcee."
The typee of mass aotion which Conmcilata employ are extremely vcrledp ranging frommp la contribution of propaganda lenfleta to organisation of ec,tada of anted etreet fighter* directed totrategic objective in the caae of an armed Insurrection* Types of mess action era grouped under tbe following broad categorise: Comnunist-sponsored Congresses (Peace, Tooth, Womanosnunlet propaganda) oesonst rat ions and picketing; strikes, both political *ndeneral etrikeei etreet fighting and riots* and preparatory techniquea for tha arwed uprialngo
Seldom do any of these typee of mass action occur *lone<. Strikes are eons times combined with eVsmonstretlone and with pioketlng end very often lead to rioting and etreet fighting., Purthortwre, few of the teehniquee listed are exclusively Corsaunlatie, although Corsounists more conaistently and enthusiastically make use of the*.
The theory of raaas action waa developed in' detail by Lenin, and haa been the subject ef Cccsaunistever tine** The Sixth World Congres* of the Third International, for example, called for theJarty to lead the maasesrontal attack against the bcargecd*
8to to by the orfcoiiltation of bass action. "Such mass notion lr. eludes etrltoe, strlkas In connection with oereon strati one, etrftes In connection with arudnd, finally, ths generalcombined with tbe arned rising against the government authority ef the bourgeois la. gcsaPCstrsUcoa.
Ccvaurdete re card oasaons^rRtloneaa ao opportunity to cell publio ettentlera to tbelr prograa, to train Party aeabere In the discipline of
oemcnrt notion and la the Uohnlque of Innuenaingoups of ?ocple,
and alsooral* builder for the Party members, giving tbaa3 re salon that tbe Party le en active, fighting organization. Since all Ccwounlst partlea (with tba exception of the Titoieta and the Trotskyites) are completely eiaieervlent to the Soviet Onion, asset of the lUrge.-cca.lo dsBonat rati one are Vtaged prlwarlly In support of ecese Soviat objective. If itwaonetrrttlon eaytlvated by purely localha scope of the grievance le easily broadened to include aupport of the USSR.
CoBsAtniete avoid direct Identification of the osnaonetration and the cause with tba Cceasunlet Party, tbns attracting to the demonstrationslsDsoteyapathlse with thebat who ar* either antagonistic or apathetic towardnmiet cause.
Demenstretion* may be stagedt (a) locally, (b) elawltaneoualy at erparatad point*arge eatropolltan cana) nationally, la
the Corcunist* hivestrength tcth*--
or tc) internatiorvlly, suchinter-* 'peace derotiBtraticns. Once It haa bean decidedenonstralicn will occur and ite scope has
beer deterrdnod, details such as sic-pesters, speeches, and literature are selsetsd by th* Politburo of the respective CPs. These decision* are nad* knoen to Party functionaries ln the regionalln the various labor unions, and in front group faction*. The decisions car. be co.truni;ated by special nailed lnstructicna, by rcdlo, (eithur legal orr by publication in the party Journals. Instruction* for th* annual Uay Day demonstrations, for example, ar* published in the Party Journal*aye before the date of the demonstration. These announcenents are written ln conformity with the slogans published (and broadcast) ty th* USSR. In executingo-rur.iat leaders apply techniques learned by participation in sir-liar pastrthey hov* been taught at Party school*.
There are many consideration- Involved in the sta-lngemonstration. The issue or occasion rust be decided upon, end the type of gathering (parade, indoor or outdoor seeting* detencined. The date rust be selected to avoid competing events. If the deronstration is to be sr. indoorall oust be rented; if ito te on out*id* deronstrationer-it crust be secured from the proper police
*uthoritie5. Then, effortse divided be teeen the careful financing
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and planning of tha affair and Uie recruiting of "ebsi" attendance. Poth of these nuat be successfullyif the deronstration ia to be successful. The fcrnar includes the developmentll-balanced profraz cf spotkera, male, or entertaihriant; the planning of decorations for indoor gathering; the preparationran placorda to be hung on the halls or carried in the parade. Paginationanae of draaatisa-tlon are necessary for effective mas* appeal. avery available channel ofo ear ruat be put to aork to recruit an audience fro- as rtmy persons aa possible; not only crust the party be thoroughly aroused to action but also tha affiliated organisations must be stimulated Into partlelpeticn.
If the affair ls to be successful, attendance oust be good, and ever) part of tho pro.-ran affective: the speakers, the cerenory, th* color, and the entire staging of the dranatic performance.
Specific Conrunlst procedure for organisatione-onstration is as fclloaa; cell and district leaders alll asaerble the deocnetratcrs in theirneighborhoods. Theyprovide sufficient Corjruniat literature and placards. The demonstrators alii assenble and tl en parade through the central part of ths city. arge nuzber of organizations participate, their places in Uie parade line will have been predetermined.
There are, of course, nany adaptations of this technique dictated by local conditions. In countriesonrunist Party iaU.ere la usually notr. one designated gathering center.
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hocal conditionslio* t'l?toisturbances aith the rolls*. If tro'ibl* la expected, Co:=nini*t*defensesually consisting of five men stratagically placed either snong the crowd or at its. *ds*. Their assignment is to take advantage of the action of the police, or to start fights aith individual police officers aith the objective of urging the ansa to overwhelm the police. This occurs coat often after incendiary speeches have aroused the anger of the masses and prepared then for such action.
In such coses, instructions call for the disarming and disabling of the police. The "defense groups" usually carry concealed light area such as lead pipes, blackjacks, spiked sticks, or small firearms. They have been known to throw narblee under the horses cf the rounted police ana to slssh the horses with tiny, conceded knives, large mrabers of rlacarda carried by denonatratcre are nulled to solid sticks, for use against the police in caseiot or hostile anti-Coarunlst elements.
The following examples typify instructions Issued to Ccateinlst de ferae Toups:
"assbers of tha Defense Corps in action at deronstrstions must be divided into group* to surround the Coominist speakers. The defense corps mashers swat face outward as they surround the speakers in order to be sor* effective tn con batting th* action of police officers try in* to ret tc the apeaker*.
fardliar with tho us* of clubs and brickbats aro toaith th*s* and othor blunt ewpon* but all camber*in tho us* of *uch *Mj,pon* are not to attacipt to arcbut to ua* th*lr fiats instead and ahould try to take the club*
froa the polloe officers and use thee on th* polloe.
"Under no oircunatances sr* clubs to be used Inndividualistic
or terroristie manner.1 Their eol* use is for th* defense of
th* savnbsr* are ho is tine the speakers to their ehoulder*.
they should so* that they ar* closeail or sctcs background that would
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leaTs on* aide lee* to defend. Also,entar* are instructed to divide thsraelvc* intc two groups, ono directly circling the speaker and tho other circling around tho speakersittle distance, the objective be ins to work a* aany of th* eorksrs ln between the two defens* "roups as po**ibl* toort of otzshion and force thsae warkers into action. The accent ths police rake an at tenet tc break up the rase tingze the speaker, the defense corps asctars or* Instructed to ohout and yell. If
grouppolice oonelstlne of, say, sixn attack
ordon of worker* is supposed to *top the police group*
gottlng thooin between defense corps awnbers."
t freejusrrtly used by the CoarasuUrtaction technique, particularly In ths crowed urban srsss of ths United States. If Cconuniste eaticket line, the objective ia chiefly propagandatoegment of tha population vith th* question at leeue and to present forcefully the Cocnuniat point of vies. Setting up of picket
.*alao proTidea experieoce in rasa action for local Cornsunlst
tarecoper le neee useful In sore disorderly eituatlone
are aed* to establish picket lines in the tost
conspicuous placet available. The local Concunist preaa usually announces the tine and place of forsatlon of the picket line and in an accorrponj'ing article sill give the alocans to be used. These slogans link the particular local problea vith the larger Issues of the day, thus ettanpting to secure the aideat poaalble foilowing. Ponphleta outlining the Ccasajnist profTae are distributed to persona in the vicinity of the
picketing.
Coariuniste usually atteopt to keep tbelr pickvtlng orderly end
.1In rare Instances does violence occur.
Street Plr.htlnjt.
V. *
parantilitary forces ordinarily are not adequately emed
oarry cot lugs scale etreet fightlng. Therefore, in order to achieve
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n the face cf forces possessing superior srns, they rust resort to deceptiv* stretagens^
Conminist planning for street fighting takes into account the feet thct th* Cnceuiist group* probably cannot achieve superiority in arusipD*nt, at least not at the outset of th* insurrection, Th*Comuniat par anil itary apparatus is organized ao that am* Bay be procured and hidden secretly. Preparation and training forighting ean take pl*ce under th*f other organisational work, Perlubs will be organized which will engage in calisthenics,oarer; inr, atap reading, or *inilar paramilitary actiTiti**. Under the cover of the clubecture* are given on th* ue* of fireares, handgrenadea, boebs, cin*s, and gas. The calisthenio dub* teach Ju-jitau and th* disarming of pollc* pickets.
(1) Organization.
Preparation* for street fighting usually tak* place within the existing Certain 1st organisation. Special secret sections of th* Party are often organised for specific tactical work in street fighting, forin Cemarry, In the latter parthere acre auch groups designated asroupe. roupa entered hostile organization* to fain Information and influanee free within. o* so obtainedused to plan attack* on oppoeltion party Beetlng* and demonatration*.
terrori3tic) cure jivonniscions. Ihoy TJaro foraeu into Ujiita of fiva aaa liio rare to tahc- tho Initiative in siroet fichtinj. flier/ uoro epocialieto in hit and run taction dosi^ood to disrupt liosi forryiticno.
roups mre assi^nx) cpodal dutios in street fi Jito. Io ODDoadblock ojoinot polico intorvontiontroot battle wis indnot too iiaais. In anotbar case, tliayaai porado rem to.
Cases arc Uncwi inpoups placod snipers co roof tops ocoaauiinj tho routoazl parade* arricade censistinc of throe ooal cars nas erected and then tho ^tarc Troopers mrefced Into the blind alley tha enipore opened firo, trootoor caxiandaored by tha Crmmluna sort joroordjvj into tho nilling etroet throne.
(2) fro curing Area.
Although CooimiGts do not oxpect to obtain aroo and equipnant lnJity rdth tho forcec tfcicu oppooa ther, ncvoriholess they oreatts(3ptisc to acquire oatorial Tfcich rill aid thee inoctriaijt taarkara at aurdtlone factcrles, for oiiarplo, nill szavicle outo-oantitico of orns and eras parts* Quae are then hidden* often in the hcusas of individual Party needbars. Bocauce of tbe security probleu, Corx3un*ots roroly rial: tlio storaje of orne and gjciinltlon in lorrjo, central supply duzps* As the accent for the ir^urrection snprccches, Corrrrnlata nay raid joverraect supply durps in an effort to obtain arnaaonts.
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9
to oraordouo in nalincroodlly aaailableIn Oeonoexy, for axmile, tnon flr^ftrrn and cav-plnedTMond te be ineffeotl-ea, Ccrrxoaxte neat! accwavrthlo oherAcole. Ine^notlcan were to poor etamj oriaonlun ohloride,add, or edrnler cbeTrtoriU on too pcOloe en fear jcnped fron coxa. Bottles; filled tdthcI1m, jejee>eloj or ottmr irxQ/uzable liquids vajre tbrovn Into exnorod polloo anro. OaaiTlnaj sjoejeed boroaac race tore eleo thrown into eoblclee. Aa the polios carsto 2ove out of the area, the re-eultdcc drafts fanned tbe floaoa* Perforated nil If ceno Tore need to eproed ciechaotdhlae lnedde) of polio* otatiooe, nildlixja, end barracks, Tbia Irlffl of tspt^oe) tihtj fl res careful adveaawe plaooDent of tho attookero alone tho streets*
d. aaoto.
hicte cf planr.od cri^Sz. orey the Ca^ar^lstace
irjxxuiiblc tba) local functlonlnc of the authorities, create exniteomt end neee bTvterla, end drira the rasa iaetinet to caatruolaon of public and private pr-xjortj. Ibe Ccrix-iBtfl alll also use epontarawoewxr ponedMe for their cron porpoeoo end soil ononnsl the rloterB aocorddngly. Planned rlota till be oeod to spreod unreet end to sabotac* aida orocs for the pnrpoo* of coecre&tlcc the ontboritlea is pcoer.
She rjtthodej for riotsreat fl^htinc ere not eotfactially different.n/ dietinoticn asUrU It Le orertainnd In thee* criteria:
* riotlno. lena Tlolentjian etreet finbtinrj Individ^riotiua say not aooeeaarily uae firoorosj riotinj io often nor* loc*ll2ad
u co&aricfucad crlrurllycatc
Hsr orgoty :ia*re ao ita objoctiv* tho captu'o crriixfl cr c- -tcra, for spjciXic Comunlst purposoe.
. letscd by Ccsnaiirta to call sttortioo to thalr oauae; -ndcto reorder and dlaoor lent without readoriac tha Cansost Part; ,inarahl2 bo physical end lagsl action. Riots also sorve to trair it.a? roll as to croueo persons opathetlo tooord tho (xuee*
ical CcCTuniot-lncti jetod riot cocurrod in Lbntovldflo, Urujua-. at the Trocodaro tltoatre inpclioeion prcr; 1 aillustration of Co prepoxation for an executioniotcok placeinstt tbeae Iron Curtain".
'ays boforo tho riotj theoabore of therarty lad at theirand autlined th3 plan of action,
-t, tx: mif.it JaA thaaua to taU: pi toeoburdayf Li.-ist-led brigade; rrzra to ctroll alone th* oidaualaa in" the chaatrean uorentra te la front of lie-aai hour. Othot" CcrauuLste rare to stotion theneelvao ini -
lauadant bejaji nben eons of tbo spec ta tore in the theater
ojxjtrDtinily bad odor. At toe sane : too vooern and on* nan lcc" 'heir Boats in tho fourth roc of the lower arofaeetra and hurried outeiu: ho signal ujriod upon. Almost irxxxliately rxxre than
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arwi lad jt-ti.-uad tbcnosjlvx ii front of -ic= .to-', sic; ana lilco "Dor. nithLone, and "Ucuocrseylea; I'OffCattaIn."
rart ci tlio group inrido. te tuoatro orxttsd die ardoretatorc byav4Jy onear, end shoatircloudly- tne Gyrchrccizod cite sirniar action catside"oroke into the auditorial) end rushed through
cfcdac andviolently. Llofcre tho polico uoro able t: (UuU tiio riot, tho claso panolst doors at toe entrance) had ba.t. broken, nany seats bad boon donacod, tho rugs bad bean burnod withnd tbo screen had been destroyedail of pitch ntiiohjsr. against it* Daioath the chaixa of the fourth ro? the polico laterai revsral snail ^laas tu^ec diioh contained -ho residue of tJto chetia'inorated tho odor
quire .ho con^ro^ation oftcxbb of people, and, thari- ait especially ri-ilant police force can usually prevent then.. r.lo, darinj taahe police taethode nereaetivo acsa. at Coaxrrdst ajitators.ere nolioe Doosuree oreccxsiiate try to oonceal the factares croup of peep Is istousuallyty"havinj anall crcepainto theirinc at precisely the sexx) ncceaU
reontanae-is riots, of courso, uunot be chopped by pre-crruncod counter laaurcs. eo nilitaot ComnJsts conicbly charged ^ iot. Iksaco, la eplto of biobly Tagil ant, police^ force*,
Sonusata of tar. sue;aed inob daoardar.
CcazmXrrt tactic* are highly flexlblo. TVn is especially trot in Uioir instigation of riots* Thorofaro, no attecnt bas boon rood* to exhaust tha situations nhich nif*jt lead to Ooxouilat exploitation of potorjilal sjpp violence.
'Ao artaad ggrtajawa
r^rpialst-lnepirpd anxx! npriainc nay ba carriod oat slthsr lrrW pondontly by Corxxaaist parties alth llttlo or no enrtedd* holp, cr aa aa add to, or In coracrnjoneo of, as adxoncloQ Bod ircy.
In tho iterxist Irn^orpratatlon, oraod uprising is tha revolteactionary rarjiaa, sduoad at eeizure ofy tharanks. It Is, also, the first phase of civil ner* 1rust bo aada between, araed revolt and civilrtDC *cohsreot Una of darsarcationhe revolu-
tionaries and their opponents. volirtionary group* ax*n arnaaant, and not free froa favoring elegants. Theourn, ecja" fcross, being In control of police,rooe, and ecurcee of supply, arear better poeition tofavorableo tbe other band,ivil arr tha front* could be aor* clearly dram, bothally and geographically.
Before eedJEinc pcoer, the revolutionary eleaents do not prepor* for civil txt a* auch but for armed revolt, aaaxo
both sides are tJaxiaionod overy^ero, or aratod or. all sides- Thoraforo, araed revolt is not neroly ths atrujelo botrjeon two orjarir yl arnlos icuVch are iiwlated fron tho rest of the Tc^nilotlon but isijrt botooen tw oocrjsnts of the entire papulationict there are no "cutlookarBnj all are pai-ticipantBt even trracn, old non, and children*
Xa his treatise oa "Bevelutlan and Couirtar^orx eat forth tlie falloainc rules for arosd
Ad oprloinc ahould never be atterxjted unlacs there is firn resolve to endure ell its conseefdoncee,
(sacs the revolt hoe started, the offonsivo exist be taken end action txurt be resolute. Defensive action la tha death
of any arnad uprisinc.
and Rlrple rulos far tbe sto-ucjle should beoost lrxxs-tant of uSiich lacourece and
li) laxasrloal superiority sJtculd bo attempted bo cause "the arnad
r&ffarsrrt free vcrcUnoxy" ttox tIiotc the final rictory oounte, tha rictory of toe revolution nay noil depend on tha lniti.il ouccoaoaa of onprlfrirc* It ia quollad, tha pending civil aor nay ba prevented ond tha uprisingl) Preparatory Tocbnjfjueo*
(a) IajG-janja Preparation*
Trairdnc propajntlon for an insurrection ia directed by ao arced forcea oorxitteo and by Ita snjb-occxzlttee, vbich inantructo the aacbara In the use nf tree. nifle, arxxrtlng, and hattlrc clube or*or thia purpoaei often under tho apcr<oc?ablpsbfa*in attaopt cay also bo oodo to have Conoanista Jcdn too Ihtlontl Qaard. both for purpoaoo of iafUtratlon andeana of aocjudrlas practice In tbe use of vnpons.
(b) Pralirdnary lotion Praotioo,
Pre! ltd nary action prao ti ce, waaatTf.lel for tne do voiop-aant of eventual oonbot units, la corgtaxLaed through creation ofonoe croupav. Theee tnlta take part In oaconertratlons, naas ioee*inga, paredee,or pickst oorcittaeo. They nay ootrotective force avjainet the police, or nay bain to transform any of these fame of oaea actioniot* rhoy nay aleo essune leadership In any tarporery occupation of Garmrncect baildinja or, in tiro of rxtaa nnerxalcyiMct, In tho occupation of relief eUtlone and In the eaokinc of food atcreau. All auchhilepoclfio purpcae, are Intended to give the) Maferjee groups* preotioe*
rroucs trainee fcr lraurrcci-icr. ar* axrected.1 ccnsiraraulefr cfleft to hie our. leviceo tcevolver.
ifle. ortain uuantity of erne is usually aeourad through (tirec^ -ureV.ase,or is UVssfl over froa rifle, sports, and hur.tinr.onv ris fcrturht hoa by war vets rare are reconditioned, and usable, amy stocks ere procured. If eufficisnt snail type amanentcttalned in this rawer, the best erred groups will thsn bs in-strut'.td to carry out raids on hardware stores, national Guard posts, and stations. In addition, each group Is taught to sake boobs, handnd "Uclotor eocktells.* The hiding of ams snd anaeiitloo is gtnc*-ily left to the initiative of the various groups and their corrander*.
Since th* striking poeer of the groups and th* consolidation of their,arg* extent, upon their esuipeant, iten: od desirable to provide thanertain anount of heavy equipment. Ir. countries adjoining the Soviet Union, such aqui^cent can be szugglad
1
*crcj: Vie border, often aith the help ofaritln* and
* i
ovnions. In cor* distantrcs my also benlc job* ln cocrarcial aviation.
.'^ Direct rrararatlon.
.th* situationountry be coca* such that, in the"
opinion of th* leaders of th* party, enprising for th* purpose of
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- eaaawaeaw
* i
power baa beccoa feasible, or, in case of war. If rucb activity vould ba of aid to aa advancing Rodaa party will create aaparajcdlltary organisation. Tea Ira ad Forcaa Ccaalttee ail grit than be rainforead by apaclallaU froa Nceeov. Thla Ceaalttee willrogrwa of aetica ead prepare for taa insurrection.
Groupo will bo organised for coabet, consisting of five sen,ixth ln canaand. It la felt that, la action, no aaa can ocaaaand effectively aore than five, and that, ln tba preparatory stages of an uprising, taeystoa is beet becanse of concsalaentToe groop of flvs Iscaaaaod. groups headed byuapany, and flee ooapanlas thus foraad under one eceaandattalion. aker leal coablDatloa beyond that le ocas leered lap root icel for thla type of fighting, although with taa eawelopacut of speedy ccanamlcatioDs, later innovation* aay bare been sane by Coasunlsta addition to tba flee sen ocabat ealte, special groups say be fcreed for the purpose of operating eaptered radio stations or aevspepsr plants. Special groups say slso be created ta capture tba principal leaders of taa go*ornaect. (Tale cap tare is usually acecaplIsbad la tba early bours of the
(ll ire rob, organized ana led by pr* >nal rib. le-rousers, to fa flit, frcttrru-.e, ind O. cnstrato, to fill the streetsJ erects the Irpression of insuperableock troopa, trained rilitary forces tc eerrbat loyal amed forces at strategically vital points;he teehrdcir.ns, to decccedssion vital utilities cr to divert their use to the insurrection. ourththe fare us per ocrvl lty, isseful butossentitl force in insurrection.
The purpcae cf using; aobe in the insurrection varies widely in differing clrcuiastances. The use of tlie nob crentes for the Insurrection the iryth of the ooneran sill, lt gives the uprising the appearanoe of popularity, it draes in the politically inert, and saaila the ehorua to deafening proportions. ightshers apparently united In a
urpcoa coi:eople, unitebe-.ind the dera^cgue, Oauac ttota tc a; cririce their Individual wills and reasoning ond to folios bli-^iy. In addition -ob-eoldler fraternisation ray oause the die-lnte;rv.tion of an organized araed force, the loss of Its will to fight.
Tne tcb aay also be usedcreer. behind which the pro-feasior.a*ay cave alth relative Lsapunity; it cxy be used to capture the si-xbols af power after the power itself has fallen.
The use of the rob has Its difficulties. Cnce arced, it rust be diseroed. It ia undisciplined and difficult to control; when sat in
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notion itapon of chaos and potior Tor therevolutionaries. But its [lace in the insurrection is as old as sccieiy itself. Sorettiaxs, indeed, it is the rob Itself ahlch sets the insurrection in cation.
The particular nob action ahlchevolution Generally gains its Initial successes because everybody,eagrees that reform oust come, and elrrost nobody roalizee that it ie revolution instead of reform that is coring. This opening act of revolution also gains popular support because there is -enerally at the ties soce special cause for discontent (such as shortage of food).
There is one Important reascn ahy seas quite ordinary set of sob violence generally proves to be the start of revolution. It isincocpetence revealed by the governing: class ln the snsrgency. This inceepetence hss longact, but it Is advertisedarticularly spectacular say by the circumstances of the first outbreak.
Ordinarily ahai the action by the _cbecisive effect on the coarse cf insurrection it is because it la led to the decisive act by professional creed leaders acting on orders fror. insurrectional ccsxmnders. The rxb's activities are carefully planned and the whole procedure, far freepontaneous outburst of violence, is ths exact opposite. On such occasions sob violence is used simply for strategic purposes or because store effective forces, such as an aray aovtssnt,egislative decree, are not available atnt.
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"obs whose actions ore decisive In revolutionary crljes are alfjvs to<-ls. (a) Tbe Lob aa a
The nob Im an excellent instruoent alth which to teat the direction of rolltioal winda, to detercine when the tire) for Ineurrectlon ia ripe. Probably no chanter of aodern hla loryne clearer ln-eirjit Into the rover and behavior pattern* of the revolutionary nob than th* Berth inaurrectlon in Pvtrogrwd7 > Thla vaa one of those extremely rare instance! vhen the people vere able to demonstrateonclusive Banner that the state no longer hadent of th* governed. Without any direction, even wit lout any lnoIterant to rebellion, the people of Patrograd von for thalr causa aloost the entirety ofat*'a armed forcea. Thla Incident iaritical examination.
Byha var effort had created an utter disruption of Russia's econcelc life. Transportation had virtually broken covnj the large cities aere faced wit' serious coal and bread ehortagee. The garrisons in auch towns as Pctrograd could hardly be called soldi era. Trained cadres had bean all but exhausted by th* Incredible casualties vhlch the Busslan arey had Buffered since. stoat of the officers vere yourg and inexperienced, the private aoldiers were raw recrulte and foraed In draft battalion*. Long years of adversity had undermined the discipline of the amyhole, bad tree tne nt had given tha privateoraon cause vith the civilians, the offleere had lost faith in the conventional rilitary virtues. There vas no coordinating oonraand, no
c: . ,ire fir
There are,everal spec-fic uses tc which thee used for irutetiiixin" with theirzav*
forcas for the purpose of rwutielisiryjthea or wiirilnretn -rid,-
The ttob isy alsoormed into and used as the insurrectional arnad force if conditions and duration of the uprising and the universillty of its epiearance are sufficient. They ny bt used as the instrument of chaoa by whose destructive actions ths penerr cf the rjovermant ere so. ewhat perolyted, and shoe* action*cr- . behind which the organized forces of insurrection cay work aith ireodon fron. detection (Bogota,
They ray also be ussd purely- as an instrument of intimidation, asalmost always pccjts where mass rertlelpatlcn ia ezteraive and the riweak.
lb) l tat ions.
There are several limitations snd inconveniences in the
use of sobs in an insurrectional operation. Cos of the freatest masters cf insurrectional technljue of the tasntlsth century, Leon Trotsky, fut the question of limitation in this aanrar; Tou can inquire of all the passengers ss to what type of car they like to ride in, but it is impossible to question ther. ae to whether to apply the brakesthe trsin is at fill speed and accident threatens. If theperation
is curried out skillfully, houever, and in tir.<e, the rcw.il cf tha parser-era ii -usrinteec ir. advance." In si.crt, Trotsky believed that popular ascent to insurrectionecessity, hut that popular participation ie an impediment, that the people sliculd celerate the powers of insurrjcticnal tactics to the leaders.
Ihis vas iii strong contrast to the theories of Dscr'inski, Sverdlov, and probably Stalin. "Ir, order to ret possession of theaid. Dserjinald on the eve of insurrection, "ne auat hurl the -eases against the Hcacver, Tretsky son hie point and all the practical work of organI fir: the insurrection was done under his direction. Ths msses, the unemployed, and the desertara who called through the Petrograd streets by the rundrod thousands in those Woverber days unwittingly served as Trotsky's aceen fcr the rnovericnt of shock troops and technicians.
Tms clear lessons emerge concemin- the use cf unorganized -obs: first, the aesir.-bility cf encouragin* acts which -ill prevent the rob fron turninback; second, that conduct of mob action is controllablercdictaMe extent only wheh the aob can be broken upail, nanageable groupe.
enerol Schc.-ae ofity.
The following general echene ofity has been developed by the Conunists:
i.cludin: theaad ot-er lekiin: cffiei-Ashecorrisuiorar, rayor, ana oiieriido tc sirn or ro*doUt<n support
of the
(b) Seisure of the City Kail.
(e) Seisure of the poser nouses for purpose of paralysinfl all transportation and industriss dependent on poser.
or the celn- stations, bus terminals,lncludinc derail inr of trains, andpede the -overrmant forces.
(s) Seisure of the chief oor-ainieation centers: telejhonc, telegraph, radio.
these noaa'tres are Intended to paralyze the governu-nt and its foroes, and to servesyeholo-ieol aaapon to crecte ranie and disorder uiaonr the population, ax Inn affort is expend ad ojainat the so-called "livinc forces." livirv. force" Is an available aned force uhich has not been infiltrated cr demoralised and on which the aovernrant can absolutely rely.
ity has beenea nilitaryis oet up to held it, recruit nor* msn, and lay plans for the seizure of neighboring centers, ill rc:.Air.ln" resistance is lliuldatcd ss reridly as possible.
The ssisureity or theoram 1stuld be
slxost Impossible eithout the element of surprise. The Cocxunlsts frequently
ur.ber of trial nobillzations before thoy rake their genuine effort. The potemcent, responding to these false elarcs, will becoce ae/^ry and my thus be unprepared ahen the real attack takes place.
The actual insurrection usually occurs in the earlyours and groups strike their pre-determined objectives simultaneously.
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J. Ccjawaiiat, Party labcUlgance Aetlwltle*.
tb* Cofjpaalet Parte, if Itadanl**tian, snot bar*nfortettoa laoitucoid *BtlaaU of iteilitle* la relation teoetlle anYlrcnaant la ablcb itad of tte reaocroM of tba oraaniied force* which oppose ltiractical plan of action la tte liftt of earternal cwlltlont and of lataraalnd (c) dla-poa* Ite foroa* la tte acat eeonoarlesl mmj for carrying oat tte plan, *djQ*tlngacUci te nfnjjrt oondltioaa.
Tn* Party aoat tons abet area* ar* ao*pon anl oh to wort jpoBtibllitla* ar*bart| what polltloal, aoocaaio, and otterillearing on ttete plana; whatn ta* form of individuals,rt vlllvtet tba *treagth aad ve*hw**o* of tte oppcaltionhat *opport It caa *ap*ct to rala* froatte naatralad vnateoat profitably e
b. Oacaral Crgmlaatlonal *ad Cpratlonal PriaelplBB.
Oooaral crman1*at1 rnal and oparatioaal principle* followad by tte Parte ta tte nrnnii**arit of lnUlligano* Incite* tte fcJleviagi
landestine latelligeooe proem *aaiit pro free la not vndertatoo vltbout justification. Tte pmm& for aaarat iaf creation Baart te grvat totte risk inrolved to Parte persnnael *nd pcaatlga.
(2) d parlynetwork* are Mt np separateth* polltloal aatchaalsa for reason* of weurity0 There mmy boladlTioV sal oonUot vlth th* lowar ranks of th* pcdltlcsl apparatos, bnt it Is kept to saod directionoan ths chain of ths aetaork ltsslf froaf mctloneiy In thsf. Personal oontast within lb* net, nob ss betweenndarty organisation*, trlnlsns, rsraonnal InrolTed In intelligencestep tbalr overt Party aeti-vitls* and la *os*ay withdrew tbslrr*hlp
(J) CuwawnlnitliiiB and asotlnp an ear*folly aervanad by strict aaovrltynd by tbe as* of ovt-oet*atter-drop* (eelactsd loeetlone for pes*lagnd courier*.
Ol) tte first lnstresaBt ef proowraaant la taaho baaoitlle organisation or sho eorks ln an organization aelaeted a* en erplonag* target. Ther* say be toae"planting- of inforaanta, bet the bsala of PixV organisation lends Itself quite naturally to tba slaple reeroit*aot of tefotwaat* vbo are alreadytb* laslde." tre%leB agent Iscre efflalant lnstrusant for the procwesant of latelll-genoe than tb* out*Ida lnf orwnnt, who aust depaad on peraoosl obeerwation. 4* Cwert Tatolligons*.
Te agltat* with profit, and to eondaat Us political muwi wltb skill, tha Party retires toIsbbs ef preelae inforsaUon.
of tte Party's lnforsatlan requlresant* oeay th*lolUtleD af orart *oerwee. The Parts sashncluding iu aaxiliari**.
frcotx, and circlea ofn iafcaraation systaa aad at tho eaaa tie* ao actlcc organisation, from thaactoryraporta to hla call aacretary ooof work la biaoa tta political icclicationa of hla fellow wort ere, aad on thalr arUvaacea, needs, and atUtod* towarda tha leader* of theirthe Centraleafcsr ebo alt* In the nattcoel parliament and who reporte to the Political Bureau on aattara of bLgb govaridaental plana and aetirltlaa, tb* Party apparatoa la one ef Individ**!
Kuob iafcraatlon la paaeed along the enamel* of tbe polltloel apparatoa In the for* of periodic atatlatlcal, crcanisaUcnal, andeporte aada by the eeereterlea efon tae warlouelerele. Saob periodic and routine reporte, funnelled Into the Or-geniBatlon Departaact or Cadre (personnel) teperteant of the Centralrovide anch of tha baale Infulr*aant. They any bey apeoiel atodiee and eurvwy* en particular probleaa ofoeialr polities*
Sow* partial have eet ep epeoial reeaareh ortaante to direct inf craatist collecting effort* on the overt aide, to aak* cael/aee, and te proeeee report* for th* benefit of the pollny eaaing eleaenU of the Party.
In* natagrfc of Party newapapere,nd eorreepcodent* eon* atltutea en Invaluable Infcraatlcn eerrlo*. Coaaonlat roper tare aad eor-reapoolenta, Uk* tboe* of eny poUtloal affiliation, noraally hare ready
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acceio to repositories of date. They know where to go for lnforaation, and they usually have at loaat ecca "inside sources" which nay ba tappedm of the information thesnarl bare.
Covert intelligence ir.eludes each infcunaatlon eei ictlzate daU on hostile psrsceuslltleejInside" details on the plana end eapabUltlea of hostile political partlea) Infer sat Ion on the plana and aetleltlea of theecurity eerrtoea, eneed forces, end the Internal eaadAlatratlen of gnTarrawarrt. offieee as veil as data cn Industrial oapacltlea end derelop-aenta and en technical progress.
ften difficult Va distinguish betaaeeo tbe aw roes Fart* operations directed nt tbe oolleotlon of overt daU and tbe Park'satlna procurement prograa. The tvo ec tinverlap, and lndlTiduala ere often fovnd to be engaged lo both, aeverthelaea, iteet tbat the Party eceetlsao orsaolaea spec lai eeoret intelligence operations and note for the procurement of necoeeery information which It cannot obtain openly.
InUlllrence for PSB.
Ia sdditlon to ita occasional dlreot intelligence effort, the Coa-saaaist Party can generally ba relied upon to eaalet Scrlet laUlllganoo agencies eperatlng abroad. Saab asalstenoe la usually lara of per-soncel end feelies. Tbe Party provides the Sonet representatives nth aeacera and ayapathlsars abo are willing end able to serve as agente, court are.
nd technician* for pea-tic alar Sorlet-dlractad inUUlrano* opera-tlco*. Party inun oad oiaer watwfront iliinui are particularly rultod for claodeotinerlc**.
g*ncy, toournish acnay, technicaldpo*Et, aad*tlcn* faeUltloBt Rafoge,fsalllti** aadseatingnd falsa rtccwtasnt* amy also be provided for Bsabara of anetwork In ess* ofty.
Th* prcdwet of direct Part/ Intelllsaac* operation* la aattars oflataraat to2 Is also psaaad oa to Sovietparstloa* aay to tasxea ap by tbe Party*Intellixeace systaa at tba raaueat of tba SerialrlatlTss. Ataforav-tlon procured by tba Party la oaad to varlfy tba aooaraay of tbat obtained by Soviet laUlligene* operation*.
Oanarel ssevrlty ocnsideratlno*,dicut* tbat Intallievoo* group* orgaalsad *od oootrollad dlraotly by tba tarty ahouldally Insulated from taain tie* of taaat*ui*ace* systsaa. Thus, tba exposure of ana ofill not eodanger tb* operation* of taa other. Th* dlploaatlo risk la tb* axpeaur* of Sorlat InUlllgano* activltla* la serious, tad it will *smllyewre saparaUcn froa oc*Bx*cadalaf parwonal or orpaalsatlcasl eonaeotion* wltb any branch of ao-Uwlty of tbo local Casaanlst rarto.
sway factor* toar apco ta* axtant,hods, and prooodsr* tbat direct Part/*ffort* will follow. Taa *urraat pollUoal Una,
tic*vJ and cparttlna; tactics andte *tuted* taken toaard Us Party by tteaad by otterte *ff*ctlt*niM of cirii atccrity ecatoels, tte srallabllltr ofta>tl, aad aaay otterad external oiromstaeooo all laflaaaoa tte aay ia ealeb tte Party will organist, plan, and direct Ita osn int*llixano* tjptwatlctst, if it aafler-Uke* tbat at all*ooaylax inn**ccet aate It tat dlffloalt to snU-odxstta, at tay aaa tlaa, tea sad titan tte Arty aay ba expected to trtfaat ta tetallistsaM operation*.
itl*Uno* to Sorlet InttlliawBOt Beads tadtakaeaoe* om thee* af tte Party. This la particularly tows aaea tte OsSa tellstwa Its tw*rorltyof tts Royal Coa-taawlaa ia Osaada, based on tte teatlaony of Uor Ouankn sad otbsrdstMostrtto tbat atarge pert of tte Party's lirtsaiiasaoo eotiTily con tlatt ef fathering tocbaicsl sad lndss trial lafcrBanUon. f. Tte Ootassalst Ptrty latollltenfs tpptrstos.
It la diTfirclt to esrtoot Party fetolllsetace aata at work bananas of tte tbarsaab seoarlty, both organisational sad opanUcaal, thi eh is pet epos th**,
(1) Control.
Two typei of baaloarer tr* arsilsbls for tba exer-cis*otrtrali (a) tte nat aay to plsraatd and directed *aoratly by tte ordinary oaptrtoants *a4 offloas of tba polltloal apparatoa alonfte otter# start,blebport|et aay ba est ap
(
ersted Independently of tba orort political apparatoa, with contcct acl el carefully aaUntalned col* at top level*. Oar*arellyf tba par* i. In tbla svoond type of organisation bora no ostensible eoonectlco vith the Party- They ara drawn frca aaong tba ranka of tbooa wbo her* no raiord with tb* police, or froa aaong eynpethlsere wbo ara not known, aa auch, eotaide tba organisation. arty meaner who baaaallj and with aoaw publicity, eevored bia Party allegiance, will abow opaathararty iaUlllganoe net. Obviously, auch paraona araoaaful against boatila political groups, which way accopt thac into thalr can ranka, bacauee of thalr alia gad defection from tba CosBinlet oauan
Control of Party intelligence) activities ia usually to be fcuc* -stored in eone office at the headquarters level of the Party c taere la usually atroog, tba handful of leading Party functionaries hevinc been tested over long year* sad tbelr loyalty baring bean strengthenedsm of indoctrination and by tbelroal etike in tbe future of the Party. The Secretary Oanarel, as wall asponelble bcede of to* Crger-.sation or Cadreere believed to be frequently concerned with tbe organisation end control of Party intelligence operation*. With thalr card fllea, lndaxee, wide contacts, and comprehensive knowledge of the pi rs crawl, deploynsnt, end organlaetlon of tbe Party, the Crganlaatlon and Cadrede ereood position to plano
iitfividr.ls crs nhc# are secretera of tbe rait; cr cf ir.e its auxiliaries. Tne" arc supported, guided, and controlled cr speri.'i rer8.or.iel. Per.etraliv*ho line of least reaiat^rce. erever an opportunity ia presented it ia likely to be taken. Advantage is taken of personalchips, and jirofeasionsl and social contacts. Secret Party nenbers Join hostile crfirniaations;re electad, appointed, or f'no e. ploynent by then stives in fjoverraxntil institutions. Defectibls eleaenta inside the target cr&inization are subverted (bribed, coerced, cr converted),
It is evei. simpler to penetrate the *rrxd forces. Secret rrealers are drafted cr they enlist. In addition, the Party pje no rally or-nnises youth crranltntions ond youth fronts to attract end subvertarsons the are liable to nilitary duty. Ins special attention acs paid to relief organizations and to youth labor organizations, sul' as the CCC in twe United States. Party interest inndiotr;ccounted for by the fact thut the lerch.nt arine ia drer-r. upon heavily by the raivr durin-rr.ency. Pro: uch elements potential recruits for Party intellirence work can be scrutinized, screened, and licked.
Direction and control of per-etraticn of the arred forcea rostsecret crrrar. aet up at the rational level, often called the Tilitary Co-srlttee" orlitaryetwork of directing functionaries at lower Party echelons. The functionaries ray control theells thct has beer, built up insy directlycurh secure cut-outs) or indirectly,he Iwoel rarty political
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a^pathizers- positions. twar historyseveral European etuatries hownr stratc-loally Lvportant Corrunist vote aill bepen to rut Party ne.-hera Into cabinet or ether positions. Then rore and nore Coisruniate till be -Ivan Jobs in which Intelligence an3 subversive activities cur, be jractloedar.Te scale ln relative safety.
Ihirinr, periods cf "revolutionaryhen the Party ia on the defaisive, or then it le ooneerned latlnly aith axUndirc ite political end orcxnizaticnal Influence, itework" is likely to be alTed chiefly at organizationalat ion-pro pa" an da activities. The intelligence function le usually/ relegatedecondary poaition at such tines.
On the other hand, then tht Party arrives at the conclusion thst It Is rbcut to entereriod o- revolutionary possibilities, or when it la actually entered Inivil mar, or cilltary resist area, then It can le expected to put -ura- of its effort into oollectin? nilitary irteili-ence. It kill. Inrevolutionaryystematise its psnetratlco andpecial nilitary intelllrence aervice.
r^
Tbe usepecial clandestine Party auxiliary directed towards the {enetration of the enevy anoed lervieea for Intelligence and subversive purposesonrainlot revolution le illustrated by the activitiesarty in Southeastern hurt pes
"
-ilea the Tarty erer^eaca'tVineel 1intho1iliars of itaarrijle fifhten aore drafteo into tho arrad services, [vlice,ervices of tho atiito.
(b) In trdor to onsuro their continued alio-lancether.iia-tloiul control k the Party hod otot den, and tc dree as cany nea sen Intocrine us possible, the Party actpecial auxiliary organlaaticn, ooniiotlrc untlrcly of Corxainiats ln the services,irecting ekeletlon of functionaries drawn frost the
(e) In effect, the -llltary organizationeparate Co rr. unlet orcaolaatioTj, aith aninterlocking directorate" aith the Party proper. It had ite own Central Goocdttee, consist ineee responsible functlonariee of the Partr'o Central Courittee,esponsible functionary for each of the srverel regions into ahich the Party divided the country for its own adr_ini strati ve end organizational convenience. The regional heade of tho auxiliary were each rest onelLle for the direction ond control of rasters cf the ruziliary aho so rnlltary, police, or ether units rare otetloned in the rerion.
(d) aithin thehers of the auxiliary were org:niced into three-nan eelle. The leader of each call platoon or co-[any) was responsible to another functionary who directed two or tore additional cell leaden. Por security naeons, these oell laadero were the only rarsons under hie control aith ahor he had any contact. The ear*
principles of con* rol ana LlcitCd contact were repeated ur tha chain cf thl rAlv.ksynd to tha brigade level, at which point the reaponelUe leader of the CoTcunist auxiliary wee responsible to the rerlonol Party functionary, aho ace ordinarilyrcher of the Arry,unctionary of the regional coaadttee of the political epraratua of the Party. a oontaot alth the leader of the brigade auxiliary aaa care fully acroened by the uaa of on* or acre cut-outs.
(e) arty atem'. er vho aaa about to be called into aerviee reported that fact to the leader cf hla cell inlltioal apparatus. Kotlca aas than passed up the channels of the Party proper to the regional organisation in the area In which the prospective recruit aaa to eerve. Here, it aaa pneaed by the regional bead of the auxiliary to the appropriate brigade head, she, in turn, passed lt down through theof the
auxiliary. Finally, the new recruit aas rat at hla atation, and drawn Into one of the cells of the auxiliary.
(0 'sBobera cf the auxiliary were engaged in acta of sabotage, agitation and propaganda, drawing inere practical to do ao, and unde mining the to rale of the other troops. Khan tha Party began its revolution, they attempted to subvert their fellow eoldlere, end oreacijad several cutiniea and aaae desertlone.
(s) By reportroa personal observation and by stealing doouaeate, eauBbara ef the auxiliary kept the party Informed on personalities.
isposition, LX>rsla, and equipment of the troopej arnarnents end installations; technical and oechardsed equipment; eupplyi plans and operation* of units; and on security regulations.
An exampleilitary intelligence organisation under Party control, created under conditions of res laarfare, ia furnishedosnuniat forty In the Balkans duringUar Hi
The Party organised, controlled, andealstanee arnjy that fought the Cercon occupation. It had to aet up an organization for the procurement of military intelligence.
Since the Party aas illegal and had to operate underground except In areas which lt controlled by ita can am, it had to oaks soee provision for counter-intelligence ogainet the police and aecurity agencies of th* occupying power. It alao had to provide for other clandestine services behind the onecyecret conrxxnlcatlone ays tea, an escape and safe-house system, preparation of false documents,rograa of sabotage. Allese clandestine activities, in eddltlon to the etrategic and tactical Intelligence functions, the *erty put under the controlpecial organisation of Information Cents re.
The Central Information Center, eat up directly under the Central Corvaittee of the Party, aas the organizing and oontrolling center for Info rest ion Centers set up in each of the regions of the country.
The regional Center* directed district Centers, each of which, in Ita turn, hod aeverel city or village Information Centers under It* direction.
leJ^ORSe.at th*;oft earriec cut actualem..
(d) At each isvt* or organization, tht .lead of tho Inforcation Centeraltocec er (usually ths Political cr Or-anlzttion Secretary) of Vv local Cor_iittee cf Iho (underground) Party's polltictl apparatus. Fornoticnir.r: of ths Canters, however, direction aas taken, nothe political occjitteo, lit. free the next higher Information Center.
Aa the strength of the Party's arry grew and it took over inc re* sin-fly aider territcrlea, the duties of the Inforrtticn Centers likewise expanded, each center was then divided into four sections, era for each of Vaseil it try espionage end control of the pelil security of the resistanceirected against the Gestapo and ajainst the intell ipe noa and securityf tne puppetabotare, preparation of false docucents, and intelligence eiasiens into one ay-heldine coaaunicaourier systeo.
(f) Each na*or cor.-ond of the resistance trrry had its oar. tactical cili'orr intelligence crgar.ltatlcn. These operated largely in the actual corhat tone, but they alao sent risaiora into eneqy arett on occasion. The network or the Party Information Carters alao operated in all three acne a, and in the tone of oorbat it paralleled the lntellirence organization of tho resistance tray, in higher corranda, the unit intellIrenee officer was also the responsible functionary of the
corresponding Inf creation Center.
nfer&itiensilunit, cade up cf ts. V: en tr.iU protected tho personnelhef the Inf^rta-tlcn Centers and carried out at ever lljuidationrr. rvUslcns were thoxrht necessary by the lnfortaticr. Canters, which byegun to coficentrate or. civilty totles, but which could not yet afford t- cotprocd.se thoir securiy by overt coercive activities.
Industrial org Technological Inteill-ence.
The procurenant of industrial and tachnolorical Intelligenceocouniet Party is facilitated by the fact that the cells areir. Industrial estsblishnents, Uchnologleal research centers,ritice centers. Tlie cells are always useful for tho spotting aod recruiting of arenta. Experience has shown, however, that this potentiality has bean ore often exploited by Soviet intelll-ence arencies directly than by the Corrunist Parties themselves. The interest cf the'Soviets in industrld and technological natters is obviouslyxdiate than that of the Party- Occasionally, however, the Party lias enraged in such operations fcr the benefit of soviet intelligence. entral Daropean Party did ao In thas. The organization was set up, ataffed, and controlled by the Party. The intelligence product aas forwarded to representatives of the soviet intelligence.
ll) The "Industrial Rc-.orti.if" or^-jiizatior.stablished by the party to rrocur* ina-ttriei one Uchnolojicai inte. licence and to koa; ths Party infor-aed on labor-sariageiienl. relations for organisational and .imitation use. Itresponsible to the Central Comitteo of theut was organizedeparet* network independent cf the political appa.atue belcw the top level. The country ass divided into severalnd the Industrial Raporttn* ehlef for each of these had several ratal diary netsrtts.
The agents of the Industrialrgonltatlonsynpath iters and -exbera cf the Party end Its auxiliary to steal plana, rake photographs, write reports, and ocrf-lle statistics on industrial and technological developeiants and processes at their places cf work. lants received special attention.
The product of these info marts was passed up the network through tne regional chiefs to the national chief. At tbe national level the tr-anlzation had facilities for collating and evaluating the inforralion and forocunents. Luch of the product ass r. turned over to Soviet intelligence represenWtivee.
h. Training.
Party nertoer* received professional training for Intelligence work barer* .arid Oar II in special Soviet schools. Intelligence agencies in
1
chieved trereby not only the expertf key personnel elated to work for Soviet intelligence directly, outonsiderable decree of professional las aeon- Uie personnel assigned to work under the control of the var lout national Parties, sines there haa been no evidence to she* that the national Parties are presently operating their can Intel licence echools, lt ia reasonable to conclude that such traininge still bearriedhin the USSR or, possibly. In satelliteccjnarilst Counter-intelligence.
The Party oust protect it* cadres and organisatlone fron th* effect*of penetration by agents and Inforoants of the police and of hostile intelligence agenelee. Zt oust eleo preserve strict ideological and organisational discipline and operational security. Thla ia of prin* lDfortonce ahan tha Party ia Illegal and la forced to operate underground. To cover these needs, tha Partyarticular office or organ alth responsibility for defensive security. These rust not be confusedthe organs sat up tc handle the direct intellIrene* function*. Unqueatlonebly, the experience that aone Party Berbers gain in th* course of their cork in one or another of th* Internal eoeurity organs aay fit thee for service in the direct intelligence organisation vhen the latter ia actually put Into operation, nevertheless, the existenceecurity organisation is not of iteelf proof that the Party la engaged In offenaiva Intelligence ectivitlee.
9*
Party organ* usually chargedthe ealntenance. security ara the Cadre (personnel) Department and the Control Cceaalaaien. The functions of tne too overlap and vary fron one Party to another. The Control CoDBdealeo (or osourlty end Wjctpllne Ccsnleelon, an lt ia aoae-tiawa called) aeons to be devoted ehlefly to investigating the effleia-xr/ of other Party crgtrlsatiore and the efficiency end political reliability of Party functionaries. It nay Initiate en Inveetlgatlon aa an outoovaoutine analyaie of Internal report a, or In reepcns* to allegations aede by one aaasber againstr at the suggestion of the Cadre IavpertBent. The Control Ooardaaicoe dlU orally thecourt" of the Party, and lt near* cases In vhlch It aery haveand In tha preparation of ehargaa. It paaeae eontenee en offenders of Party rtlenlpllns and eeourlty, lncludinej the ear tan ce of expulsion.
The Cadre Departaant (or Cosnisslon) haa broader functions. It collect* end oo Hates biographical information on allon their political, personal, eococalo, religious, educeUonel, endUekyenrrl end It collecte reports vade by their euperiora end ether asscxrlaUa en the vay In vbleh they have handled their yobs. It eeleets, assigns, and doploye the anUltanU ae beat to salt their talents and ths Intsrsete of the Party. It say also be explicitly ebergad with the preaarvatlon of Internal esearlty. To this end. Itlass check en the eocuraey end troth of the biographical data. It atay also arrange for surveillance of Bsnhers suspected of trssaonabls eonmetlons sad take tsstlamr/ of ths eucpceVe asecelateeu.
Fsxtias that bar* no Cadre Peparboent either aesign the personral function to other epproprlate organa (aooh aa the Organisation, Tooth, Weven'i, labor Dep*r oenter it within on* ofhaIfcpartawnt being the neat Ukely epot. The lirvwetlgativw fonction laase la alao glean orer to one of tbe ether offices or to one of tbe Party's auxiliaries, tbe Tooth organisation being fraqcantly assigned the task.
In bob* ca*es, apsolal eoBsdsslona aay ba appointed tc Investigate tba eeourlty of Individual Partysac era and an tire Party organisations* he Araad Forces and the Polio*.
Aay anaad force wMch tba Coaaanist Party doe* not control la oonal-derad by th* Party toortal *raay, and therefor* tha subversion erf th* araad foreee end of the pollenop priority. It ebonln be noted tbat th* polio* fore*sually th* first although not nsoesaarlly ths Boat laportant target. In tb* eyas of th* Coaaronlsta, adlitaryia tba strength of th* ruling claaeee and It la,beeponelMllty of the forces of revolution to attsnpt infiltration long before the actual hour of lnaurrectlon. Also, aooording to aarx and Lenin, praparaUcna anaat bs sad* tosnpsrlorlty ofo be "eonem-treted at the decisive pleoa at ths da del v* acoent" (lsnin). Tha Cos-ararriate realise that the "araadhich anat be fought haw all th* advantage* of organijaUon, discipline end tranUttcnsl authority on their eioej unleee graetar coonsa bs aobilleed against than, defeat end annihilation ar* inevitable" (ata).
Realizing lhatHitnrjnt afhe revolutionary forces stmd no chance in caitparlscr. aiU their opponent, the Coorunists believe that they cnr.t p for their lack of Irr, organization, and arm rant. Thla can be done, they reaeon, not only by nunerical superiority, but first of all, by rathodical infiltration. The Party, therefore, places the fleetest lapcrtance on tha Ministries of Defense anr Interior which usually supervise the arrad forces end the police.
The rethods by which the party seoks to attain ite objectives fere than one ofhowever, xsy be employed
slcultaneoualy, dependent upon the country and the particular situation involved.
a. Infiltration at High Levels.
Infiltration is desirable chiefly because Ccreauniets in high offices can hire their oan personnel for key posts and arrange for both subversion end intelligence collect ion. The activity of the French Conpunist Party in eisploylnf, the eathod of infiltration before aorld Ser II le of interest as en example of these techniques. Only after the USSR aas attacked by the Cera an Array Inid the French Cwvsunlslsto take an active part in the mar against Ceraany. They began to infiltrate French resistance groups and by the end of the var had effectively penetrated large portions of the aovenent. Thereupon they diseeAinated highly exa fx* rated propaganda about the proalnent role played by the Corasunlats in the undergr-aind andoice In the postwar
- Ill -
;eraeant cfe The Co-^eunist Charles Tiiioncintefl "Xiiaivr for Air ir. Ue Gaulle's provisional. Uuring his tenure, the French air forcesextensively infiltrated.
h. Capture of Control Positions.
he standard procedure for capturing control positions has eone similarity with the foregoing oethod, it differs soseahat in that it is assigned to capture hey posts without disturbing the top level positions- This tactic stay be applied to police organisations. The sain effort of infiltration is directed toaard the aiddle and lower echelons. Attemptsc to convert then to Consunisa so as toedge between the higher and lower levele. This net hod has been successfully used In France and pre-Hitler Germany.
In the armed forces the rton-corsdaeioned officer is an iaportant Co muni st target. He is sore esslly accessible to Corjoinist revolutionaries than co-missioned officers and can be of infinitely greater value thsn theho is untrained in leadership, c. Infiltration into ths tanks.
The aathods for infiltration into the ranks apply equallyeed or police forces. This rethod requres tso phases of developnent:nr. the Ccctnunlst Ideology in the minds nf soldiers or policeaen; and (b) recruiting those lndlvlduale who eeee "ripe" for party or espionage work.
liethoda used for Conasunlst Infiltration In the ranks Include
cticr of rrievcr.sar; scroadlic o" dtffcV.lat spirit;r v. destruction of loyalty and patriotism by im'.Qf Jrlngbeliefsation's traditional Ideals. Primarily, the objectives of infiltration ar* to parslyz* the arrvd forces rsfor*re called to strike arainst Corminiaffl, or before Cormunism comes to poaer, owrvnlst regies aovld not rely upon an aroed force which was organized under non-CoTtsun 1st leadership. It would first liquidate theorps, then purge th* ncn-conmiesioned officers and, finally, -old the rank-and-file according to the prevailing Cocsunist 'ormla. It is understood thst any such Coirjnunlst-reorganiaedould b* under rore or less direct ordere of the Rrerlin and of the Soviet Ansy.
1. Tf gory of -evol'Jtlcr-jrj' Action
heoreticians haveizable body cf doctrine on the general espects of revolution and revolutionary activity. Specific theory, however,eitewhat scanty in the publiahed material, and there is rcod reason to telieve that Cornuniat writers heve cone little further in the development of the theory of revolutionary eetivlty than ie readily evallableublished works. Cosrauniat theory, for ezc-atla, calls for the uae of mass action, for agitation, and for sabotage; but tha rsnnar in vhlch these plans are to be. executed le left to the Judgment and experience of the local Co-sjur.isl groups.
Cne or the reasons for the aparaity of detailed theoretical treatment of rovolutlorory action is the cofijle* nature of the political-sociil-eoonc: : problem involved. To develop broad and general planaevolutionary situation ia relatively easy, but to draw up specific re^uirerente in the day-to-day develornents of revolutionary action light eerily lead to nlstakes and 'is--uidance. To interpret and plan revolutionary activity primarily in ternsxperiences in other areas would handicap the of rigidity.
eroan Correunlst pointed out in the late twenties, "Revolution In various countries, or in the aaae country at varioua tlmaa, always t* es place under new conditions. For this reason it is impossible to devise any general foreulas for rethods to be applied during revolt; lt
ir injceil.l* tcoiractivi for revclutlon' in this senae. Rules to be eppllad lnase nut of necessity be extremely general. The eignlfloanc* ef thtsaias in the fact that they cnn she! llrhtature of uprisings, that they aay permit proper insight Into the preblea* of uprising* and thus proarthed for practical evaluation." The detailed cheok list for the process of insurrection,is lacking,
arge extent, then, interpretation of the events laading to an insurrectional situation depends upon the Jud-aeot of the party leadership. The tlalng of violenceelationship to the political astuteness, training, courage, and aeount of lnforaation -osaeaaed by th* national loaders. then att*apting to antlcipat* the anacnt for Ceaanunist violence, consideration oust be given to the fallibility of the Corrranist lnt*rpr*tion of th* polltloal events. Historyo an that CorsEuniste have nie-lnterpreUd the political and acanonic cliaat* of an are* a* frequently aeave Judged It correctly. a. Caneral Theory.
Th* Ceacninlat theory of revolution rests on the basichat Coenuniston to poserrapossible althout violence, lanln developed thi* thas la atgth (In Stat* and Revolution):
"There le no denying that the state is th* organ of class ckxnlnatloo, or that class antagoniasa are Irreconcilable. Bit what is forgotten le thill If th* stateh* product of th*
irreconcilable character of classf itorca atandihg above society, and increasin-ly separatingfroa it, then lt la clear thet the liberation of the oppressed class le impossible, not only without violentbut also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power, which aaa created by the ruling class in which this 'separation' Is embodied." (emphasis added)
Once the Inevitability of violence la established, there are certain concrete methods preacribed for the development of Coosunlat partleaoint where they are capable of precipitating an insurrection.
Two general conditions have been aet forth as prerequieitea forreparation of tha proletariat for Ita dictatorship^he exiatenceeneral crisis in sll ruling and in all bourgeois partlea. In order to achieve the first of these general conditions,nlet theoreticians emphasise that the proletariat auat be trained and educated to take over the orrana of state power. As Lenin explains)
"The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both for the purpoae of crushing the reel stance of the exploiter and for tha purpose of guiding the great rasa of the populationthe peasantry, the petty-bo urgeoleie,tarianein the work of organising Socialist*
The second federalrerequisiteevolution ;r.oncerns the lack of capability of the "upper classes" to rule.esult, they would "pes*overnn-nt crisisegree which would drae even the nest bacicaard aasses Into politicayuptoai of every real revolutionapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the nurber cf oenbers of the tolling and oppressed nasaaehithertowho are capable of waging the politicaleaken the ;overnment and rake lt possiMe for the re volution arise to overthrow lt (Lenin)
In preparing the proletariat for Ita role in the revolution, tha CoBcunlet Party ia constantly engagedrocess of educating and training this class In developing the techniquese action, minor prita-'story densr.dre and demonstrations, strikesgitation are ctrriec cut, in the Bare manner, butrailer scale than if the lnsurrecticn were I* inent "Every strike and every other rass action rust be Tide use of in orcer to stimulate the revclutienery feelLf are-.
tha =asaas, in order to eueoi>rage the masses. In order to orjanlta then better, in order to weld thee together to united fronts and toillion atrong revolutionaryitueation ofontinuous militantin every ease to np, eal to broad" (Kusslnen).
he decreetteirec r.ae; attack;. Ine ai?-re those vacillatln- elenentaalways follow tha strongest force and who always veer to the safest aide" It is necessary, according to Karl Marx, to gain "constant nea victories, ever, though t'.ey be relatively ur. Lane rt ant, and to publicise these victorieshes widely as possible, ln order to rslntaln noral equilibrium."
Vatx established definite principles for the conduct of the revolutionary class during revolution:
"First of all, an uprising should never be attestedre is firn resolve to endure all ite consequences- In revolt ore deals aith highly uncertain quantities whose value rayron day to day. The forces which nust be fought haveefiscipline and traditional authority cn their side; unless greater counter-forcea can be opposed to then, defeat and annihilation are inevitable Secondly,evolution hss started, the offensive oust be taken and ectlon naist be resoluta Defensive ectlur is ths death of any armedthe battle sill be lost tefore it has begjn. The opponent sust be taken by surprise while his troops are scattered; there oust be constant nea victories, even if they are not significant; the coral superiority of the first successful uprising nust be neuntained; those vacillating elerents aho always follow the strongaat force and who always veer to the safest side nuat be attracted; the eneixy oust be forced to retreat before he can con-
it forcesounter-!r: in abort, to quota Denton, the greatest naater of revolutionary tactics known ao far:oourac-and acre courage*.'
Timing.
The conditions necessaryevolutionary situation cannot, of
course, be ooopletaly fulfilled ahan tha daelalon to launch an Insurrection ls taken. For this reason, ths actual no cant when hostilities begin depends on the Judgment of the local Cocmunlat leader*. Coamunieta recognise that eons unusual set sucharliansntary crlaia, an laolatad act of violenceeneral strike aften is the liar*ause of en insurrection.
action is of decisive significance In crated revolution, and the choice of the precise aoaent is one of the sost loportant probleaa of the strategy, the art of revolution. It ls up to the politicalto appraise the situation and to deterclno the proper aoaent for overt action. In arned revolt, aa In any other etruggle, the chances for success are spasmodic They cos* and go, if they er* elloaed to slip. The Offensive.
Once the "Insurrectionary career" haantered upon, hoaever, Ccsnaclete aunt "act alth the greateat determination, and act on tha offanalve. Surpriee your antagoniats shil* their forces are scattering, prepare nea successes, hoaever analut daily)p the aoral
MCtntitnt whichfirst successful rising hss giver,; rally those vacillating slesants to your sidealways follow the strongest icpulss and which always look out for the safer side; force your eneniea to retreat before they can collect strength against In arrasd revolt retreat la alaays coupled with heavy sacrifices. Retreatevolution,once it has begun, inevitably leads to ruthless extemination by the white terror of the revolutionary class's beat forces, regardless of ehether retreat followed on the hell of frenxled battle or whether the araed workers capitulatedtruggle. Counter-revolution knees no nercy." (Stalin)
Lenin, in his critique ef5 Moscow uprising, berstss the leaders of the strike action for not forcing the offensive and developing; the struggle into an arcsd uprising. None of the organisations which called the strike was prepared to lead an uprising. "Tbe strike grew into
ui uprising*esult of the pressure of the objective conditions that were crested after" Then, the unorganlaed street creeds, quite eporadlcally and hesitatingly, set up the first barricades without orders froa the organisations. The nasa proletarian struggle then developedtrike to an uprising. ccording; to Lenin, the proletariat eensed the change in the "objective conditions" of the struggle before the leadership. Practice oarched ahead of theoryipeaceful etrike snd deacnetratione lonediately oeesed to satisfy the
T7
^
workers; thay de-ondedrcl*-te action, Tho Instructions to set ur bcrrleades reecrod th* districtsgly late, when barricades were already being erected In thaBut even this did not satisfy thenthey demanded ectlva measbut they failed to receive instructions for reaolute eaee action." Lenin concludes! ehould have explained to the oasaes that it aaa impossible to confine oureelveaeaceful strive. And now aa auat openly and publicly adedt thet political strike; are inadequete; ae auat carry oo the vldsat agitation among tha masaca in favor of an araad uprising end rake no attespt to obscure this question by talking about 'preliminaryThe Isncndlag revolutionary action auat take the formesperate! bloody, war of extermination."
On the other herd, lt le "eeneelecs" to vint to force the struggle, "to accelerate It, to whip it forward, precieely becauee the struggle is inevitable."
The proper evaluation of the fighting apirit of the masses ls possible only if the Party organising the uprising ia In close; day-to-day contact with the cesses, constantly active among thee, living their life, and, to quota Lenin, "has become merged with the rasssea*" In other words, the Party must be "irmly rooted In the ceases, particularly at the points where the everyday Ufa of tha Masses iahe factoriea and plants, the unamployaoat bureaus end tha workers' district, Superiority of forces.
Lenin wrote:reet superiority of forcea must be concentrated st tha decisive place at the decisive sBment."
ilitaryhe surcressed class Stands no chince in comparison with the opponent. "Tne irxed forcea ehich must be fb'ight have all the advantage* of organization, discipline and traditional authority on their aide} unleas greater counter forces can be opposed to then, defeat end annihilation are inevitable.' (Marx). Hence the sup-reasod class must rjeke up for its lack of training! organisation and srna/aent by nussrieal superiority.
However, it is ths oversell eituation and not that prevailing et local points, uhioh ie decisive for the beginning of the strugglethe aoment chosen to start the armed rebellion.ountry-aide scale the power ratio aust naturally be favorable to the rebels before the contest can begin.
The term "superiority" does not necessarily rein that the proletariat rust be superior in eraanont to th* opponent in order touccaseful rebellion} thst superiority nay be caueed by the diversity of eleoent* not usually anployad In "connon" warfare.
In nearly all sttecpta at insurrection th* asm* phenomenon could be observed! after the prasanc* of national defense battalions becaoe known, troops of workers asoenhlad froa ell nearby towns, aor* oroorly organised but ready to go into ectlon against th*se battalions-Thi* converging free all sides createdry superiority st th* decisive spot where the ooponent had taken poeltlon.
- tt! -
Tht principle of ccmoentratlon ofna that la arned rebellion
tha revolutionary party auat knew bow to assign Ita aotlra ae chine, all ita work, and all Ita forcea to the araad conflict. It doaa not naan that every party senber araat actuallyoc and participate ia the physicallthough ell ehould be ready to do ao. Tha entire activity of tbe Party daring rebellion ehould, however, exclusively aerve the Intereete of araad coabat*
In the hoar of rebellion, the Party of the proletariatartlal party. CcnaequeDtly, the entire Party, notart of lt, neat be firaly grounded lo the condnct of war. In the Party there eaa be no division* of fanctiona, each as between etatiaaar aod geoarala. Ivery Party aanber aaet be both "political" end
Tbo ooneantraticn of proletarian forcea in araad etrugglx ehould be cbaraoterlaed above all, by tbe alarultaneoas eonalteant of force*ountry-vdde ecale end by autual aupport of various areas of rebellion. X' The Sloaept of Snrprlasc
although the elasant of surprise ls very Important In staging rebellions, sapeolslly sben tba snealse1 troops are eeattarsd, thseenal not be saob aa to surprise the proletarian elaaanta. Dndar oo cirotsastancaa aaat tbe eur-prlBlng of the enesy be permitted to lead to tbe isolation of ths fighters.sasaee auat reellee that they are entering en erased, desperate etruggle, with such blood abed ahead. CoBBmsalata bsllsv* that surprlss ls posUbls to
-
- utedto tbetiae of tbe barinning of the fighting; as
to tbend tenpo of action oo tho part of the revolutionary rim-,
end ee te teotioe In tbe Tarious ooabet episode*.
h. Tbe Armed Faroes (DiepereelI Disarming, end Prevention ofne Uchniqe* of revolution provides for toe prerentlon of oonoentretlone end the dispersal end disarming of tbe opponent's eraad foroee0 It should be the eia ofolutico*rUi to defeat the eeaser even beforee ular front. ront is formed, however (for example. If because of insdaqnet* political work among tba peas sets in certain ruralondition favorable to coantsr-rwvolutlcearT activity la created),should be done to harass tbe enaa7 onront. Be should be left wltb as little space, manpower, and aaterlel as possible, ell of which are vital to tbe dwvalocaaent of ann no case meat tbe sdasd-'e li inter land be leftehind the enemy's front ths farces of revolution must elvers be active and seek els integration of hostile strength.
Tbe proletariat must wag* an energetic, rstblaa* battle for the vacillatingof the eraad farces. It aoat strive) to win over to tbe militantae msnj of ths ermod forces personnel ea
lenln cites eome example* of tb* "acat desparate, violentbe reactionary foroa* and tb* Revolution for th* vacillating military* during te rebellion of tba Moscow prole tar uteaber looS. "The Cviernaant resorted to tba meatnd desperate meaaures tob* wavering eoldlars on It* eldei flattery,istribution of watchas, money, etc.
-as>
The sojdlr-rs wen given brandy, they vera deceived, intimidated, locked cc ln the barracks end dlaeraad, end theee vbo vara considered the ecet onrelleble vere ten froa the aldst of their ooen-sdao by force and treason." Tbe resaon tbe Cxjvernaentln keeping tbe upper band vltb tba aoldlars vaa, seconding to CeeaBsalst interpretation, tbat tba reTolntiaasriee did oot know hoi to counter "tba deepente, brutal asesuns of tba Oovenaasnt vltb ea equally satin ead nthlees struggle for tbe vealllatlas;nd tbat, rpealflrally, tbey hesitated to ala tbelr boats at tba cooatarwanlotlcoary officers (vbo laolted tbe soldiers against tae people) end to exteralnau thea.
a. docoaaat distributed la taa otreete of aceecs during tbe days of tea aoeeov "TanamheT Resolution" eat dean tbef tbe 'battle for tbe mUl-tary"i barp llaa be toe en youreoeadae aad year Involuntary, accidental enealas. Deetroy tbe fcraer, span the latter. 9pen tbe infsa-try Insofar as possible, Tbe aoldlars en children of tbe people end do not attack tbe people of tbelr eon free will. Tbey an being Incited by theirnd ooporione Every officer vho leads soldiers ln tbe slaughtering of vorkers will be declared an eaery of the people end an outlaw. Kill hla, wherever yen encounter bla. Ia coabet vltb tbe polloe proceed as followsi thao-ever poeslble, kill all aoperlon op to tbe rank of adaaissar. Dlaan aad arrest all soperrlaon and kill tbeaa known to ba particularly vicious sad brutal. As for ordinary polloeaawa, disarm tbea ead make tbem serve you instead of tba Ooreraeaat.*
1
a. allltary Instruaenta Uaad.
(1) Qanaralc
Coaaraatat aa* of Military forces and weapons la no leaa
scientific than tba allltary acdanoa practicedodsrn analaa* Con-sunirt praetlona reveal tba principle of Integrating all alaoarata of fare* which can ba applied, jost aa an amy and tha industrial poawsration ara ncbillsad for ear, Thar* la, hoe*ear, no rigid role that baa and can ba applied Insofar as Ceasaxnlat aaa of sdlltsry lnatruewrete la concerned. Tha prihclpl* to ba applied, froa tha Coaarunlatla embodied In tha following at*tenant byTo haw* at th* daoielvw Bxaaant, at tha daelaiv* point, an ovarwhelnlng superiority of foroaathla la* of Military* else tb* lav of political rncoeea*"
Tba exact nature of th* Military lratruswratsaU rained by th* specific condition* eocletlng at the tla* and place of the Thee* include th* local* of operation, the tlae of year th* insurrection takes place, and whether ths societynon*trlal, agri-oolturwl or nnaadlc. Terrain, ollaats, and th* els*ountry are also infloanoing factor*.
Tbe Instruments avallabl* for oa* la the eelaare of state power are usually of the aaae type, first, there is the power of en organised end trained revolirUoosry amy, vhoos pereonnel say be drawn fros either the goveiuaent araad forces or frca the civil population, or
Ttfr
bc-b. Second ia the quoted Li tary force, without the formsltico of an nrcjj and the guerrilla and parti tar unite*,
(e) Arnod Force*.
In the eery fee iastancea where Ciaaaaiiata haw* sained power through the ue*ormally organieed envy, this amy has followed dot* or loss orthodox patterns with regard to organisation, functions, and setboda* Ccaanunist poseaseionall-organised end equippedla rare, and if lt doss exist, lt follows the known tech nlques for tbe use of araad
(b) ttoaal-atllltary Forc*a0
ap**nt of quasi-wnMltary groups has been eapbaaised by tho CossTunlst Party. The potential of euoh groups eon be relatively great, aa bee been daavonetrated in Italy, Pranoe, sndonbor of these fornstions now In existence auch as th* partisan group* In Italy- are largely an outgrowth of World liar 7X>
1 oxAfli-etilitary force Is osually ce-ganlsedountry through the form tl on of Corauniet cells In which adlitancy Is both snooursgvd and demanded by the Party, followed by th* formation of additional call* along store functional ellltary linee. Por example, la the ersed forcea, or In unions in heavy Industrlaa, until the stage ls reached where nowhere of the union say be organised along atrletlyy Unas, such foroaa aay be oanaidarad to be quaal'allltary forosa.
Tn ths early stages of development, the organlaatlon of the cpoaal-edlitary foros ls eery lceae. In ssny laapaote beingpaper" organisation^taff composed of trusted Party allltante.
3
A?. nation prozroaser It becocsa rerc foroLlised, enbodyinfia inunctioningracmaitting ite orders to eocponmnte of the fores.
Such foroes develop also along other linee, sa In the Italian Ccassonisteras si-military organisation shiob Is ctsaaonly sneers as the Apparato. Tho Apparatoilitary hssd who is reeponai-bis to ths Italian CcsBurdet Party for military ectlon. This leadertaff organised into rsoranalsed military staff sections, personnel, iirtslllgence, opersticos, ead snpply. The Apparato la organised by regions, eaoh regional nosansnd having Jurisdiction orer Apparato pereonntle area*
(2) Strategy and Tactics.
ituation in which the Conrunlst Party has not bean able to seise the power of tbe etete by political means. It Is poeslble thst power ray ba eoleedead motion. This method was rtudiadby CoBBUnist snd Sorlet lea da re la the period froa0 to* Although there le not yet available coarplet* and con-flned evidencebe strategy and tactics of cfuesi-edlitsry foroes such as vara devw loped end used by the Ddrlet union, there exlste efficient Information from which certain deduotlono may benearning the use of aucb strategy sad tsetlee. snob of this Information la Interwoven wltb the polltloal, propaganda, labor, espionage* and ooltural aepeete of Coa-warnlaBa Therefore theee aspects alsoearlag on the crganiaation end use af araed forcaa.
It la tba custom of tho Cosnraniate to bold critlqueo after each loaurroetioral off art in order to diagnose thoand Its results and to formulate raaierel prinelplse to be observed in future ettsspts. 3 these conferences were held openly, but thereafter the rtrleteet eeourlty aaasuree were oh served, and inform tlcn esteeming tbea beoasaa difficult to obtain.
CcasmnxlsB'a experiences with Insurrections were oon-anmiosted to the neophyte leedere prlaarlly through tbe elaborateschool ayrtea aalntalnad In tbe Soviet Dalhe principal lrartltutlon having been the Lenin Institute In absoosr.^
Thla end eeveral other schools of revolution typified one aethod of dlaeenlnating the lessons learned fron the erltlquee. Party asms la euarsrlslngons learned in oritlquse are distributed to Party aaabera.
1 Carman Cossracist attempted to eynthoalsa ths broadf the oenduot of revolution In general end ths Insurreetlon In particular.. Bis tenetstriking resemblance to certain of tbe recognised principles of warfare i he choice of ths rightoncantretioo of forJ) the attack at any coetj snd (h) prevention of ths concentration of ths enemy.
(b) Specifio Taotlca Afalnst Araad forcee and Police.
Prom theee gsnsral prlndplaa another Ceraan Quasi uiTst formulated specific taetiee to be used against scat of the coercive
i>
apr'TOtue of tht boargooie state. Free the Carrrjilet point of rizrzeleecnt of this epperetue ie the armed forces. HislsUccs described how ths prolstorist willis to dowinat* the regular anay, the flsstt the wsxloos polio- organise tl ana, sod ths voluntary aillU ry orfwslxetloos (leagusa).
"The Regular Arwyt
"The regular amy. If it Is nots the eort powerfulo liable against ths proletarian revolution. It is obvlcni* tbat the oragr opsrstsa to ths beat adrantsge In ths flslds snd in ths daytlrr, Fighting within th* cities, especially st rdght, hinders ths operations of the Tsrloue unite. These unit* as listed below arereater or lesser degree dangerous In ths CosanstLstle fighti
the asperity ofseesc*l| It uses fir* poser aa well aa thst takaaulldlnga and quarto raj lt aepa up Insurgent territory snd ooeupiee oonquared position*,
"The weak points of this era, which the Ccoanmiste auat know how to use, are:
flraars* can be used within th* cities only et relatively ehort nog*.
"it tb* beginning of the battle, the peoul It title* of the town are lit tla known froa the point of wis* of osing then for operations (difficulty of orientation).
ls abny* the danger of beingby hidden insurgentsante, on roofs. In wlndcae, or In attics).
Q one
Infantryoapoeed principally of peasants and workers,, Thli aass la not interestedln dafandlng tbo ruling olessea or tba atiddle olacaoBiarult of thla, fratarniaaticn and agitationcorn lit* tha ccerpany and awing; than over to tbe alba of tba insurractlonietB. Tbe necessity of operating by little groupe la tba street, which are notncer under direct oesnsand, causes certain groups of soldier* to oease to be reliable.ittle goodItelatively easy to swing tbea over to tbe Red aid*. There la also the necessity of putting out of coabet tha iiuesaii>1snt0
i
"This srn s the one which *aka* tba aoat lapreaslon on tb* eases*. However, tb* aaterlal dangwr to tbe Insurgents who know bow to sake us* of cover is quits lnalgrilf leant. There era the saae possibilities of dieorganiaing bare a* we saw la tb* caaa of the
infantry.
Uraored Caret
ar*g*roua to the lnamriaoticr.. To flgbt tbea tba Insurgent* mild use i Artillery, If they ara lalon of anyi hand-grenades andoawrad boabs throws onder the tanka aad esra in grouperitches which are both aid* and deep enough to go across thetreat (width, lj aetersotersi depth li net*reetsrs)0
era Is the newt vulnerable in streetlso its rols in cas* of Irsnrreetlon la Insignificant.
7
erial reoonnslssarice con only Rive inportent results If tho insurgents fron tha Uginninc hevs spoiled only the noet elacanUry Beans of canouflege.
ftaaponai
"The beit offanaa irainst chenloal eras le the aalaure of apparatus by Lnaurgente (gas tsnka nnd equipment) and the destruction of pereconol.
i
"The ertlllery of the float oan be used by the gCTernoent only for tbe purpose of firing on certain buildings or quarters. the crews froa ths fleet. It they are behind the government, can ba used ee forces of Infantry in the fore of sxall detachments. The Ccftranlsts mist look to the die integration oflaner.ts.r
Agencies-
The Lenin Schoolen preceutlons to be observed in attacking police stations or posts:
"Police forces arc notoriously unreliable (froa theviewpoint) for insurrections * Consequently, the city's riot squad, sure to putight. Is studied. If it la on three shifts, the weakest one la picked for attack. If there le suspicion thst police officers ere alert to what is hrewing, ths advice la to telephone than on
6
phony pretext tohey ar* at hone or or. duty.*
Cocnurtlat toctlclani listed acne of tba advantage of the inaurrectionsl troop*j familiarity with the city, aas* of orientation,of existing condltlens. In short, thay havena "to Insure themselves ofrapid attack, to apoear unexpectedly, to execute) successful raids,o) tlce.
Conclusion* ahleh vould aerreule lnlan ef insurrection ahich have been stated by th* Co.-aruniets Include:
"Among th* troop* shoe* thought* *re counUr-revolutionary, w* or* to dlsarn themurprla* attack. In those unit* where thereownsalst cell having acto* influenceortion of theust organise the insurrection ao ss to *li*iln*t* the coDnandsnt are! later on use these soldiers againstnite whichnot yet been decoraed.
the caee there the eurprlee attack hat not been successful, these troops trust be kept In their barracks and must be prevented from spur caching th* city. In this case, ae must us* barricades,
we mustthe siege of tha barracks snd cantcnoants until such
tinethe insurgents will have formed their arnad forces and reinforced any conquarad position*.
"If regular troops have entered th* city to fight tbe Insurrection, ae mustth* tactic* ofeeping thaa thu*ront and at the aaae tla* organise to attack than froa tha rear, from tha windows and rooftops, organise fraternisation end thus
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denoralite tho soldiers,"
In additiontrategic plan eebracinr. tho entire country, there shouldetailed tectlcal plan for eachhlch vould indicate, enceig other thingei
An appreciation of the circumstance" and the relation of the foroes within the town itself.
The date the insurrection is to be set In notion, The principal objectives where the in but pen te
must succeed.
"d. Tha distribution of foroes among various objectives,The missions the detachments crust acconplish after executing their primary mission.
Seme Indication of alternative conduct to be followed In case of failure of one detachment or another.
"4% Usasures to be taken to prevent loyal troops fron other cities or regions froa coning ln.
"h. Tbe fornatlon of regular unite of the Red Amy during the course of the fighting.
"1. The organisation of eovninlcatlons during the
Insurrection.
"j. The location of the general ailltary ecraander end other ccnxianders.
ocial asp of the dty indicating favorable quartoneccording to their eodal ohpraotar.
The detailed disposition of snd degree of loyalty within ths police organization and nilitary associations which are eounUr-revolutionory.
"au The location ofand the force of
their guard.
Whet counter-measures the forces of the city amy logically ervoloy.
Info mat ion on garage a,rucks,eloneing to the state which will be renewed.
The use, during the insurrection, of urban lines
of comunlectlon.
The personnel sndof the revolutionary
forces."
The attacklty Is visualised as beginning ln the euburbe ln the early rcrningeneral and erne*"triok on the central quart*-o, withattack* to begin lr. other Quarters, "hll* the main attack Is going forward, special recovnalssance squads recruited froa soldiers, young Ccsaounista, and specially trained Can-sninlst scout* (Pioneers or Redould esc*:th* distribution of government foroes at arm unit* on magazines, bridges,and who vould also attack and disarmroups of aoldlars, organise revolts in thetroope, and clrculeta ruraore favorabl* to tha
. Theo oisaiona were to be partially fulfilled by women and chlldreri.
Instructlone on etreet flighting gave eopherli to the ssalntanance of ccnrauniceticne and llileon both laterally and froa the front to rear, by telephone,courtera on foot, or using sotorcyoles and autosobllsa.
s vaa plsoed on offensive operations, but ths defensive action vaa to bs baaed on the following principlea.
To rain tine In concent re ting forcei end reso-irceaiew to taking ths offeralve.
"b. To contain ths adversary to certain points aohe seln blear nay be struck et others*
In order to maintain lines of ecrrmrnicfltlon and occupied points.
"d. To oa in tain the disposition ef those units which
are resting."
The prlnary ob>etlve of the Oonmunist tactical doctrine ia that of overcoming tbeead forcesombined assault and fraternisation tochnlquo. Their tootles are baaed on probing the cneny's waakneasees and exploiting them to the utaoet. Planning,and ths Mlntensr.ce of cennunications for maximum coordination
aw
am etressod. aakneae of Ccc-rxilat tcchrlquo Hoe in ita tendency toward Btandenilsatlon which, In turn, nay easily Ised to advance knowledge of preosduree,
Tha plan for fighting goworimwant ferose awry tax* varied forma. Thara nayeneral offenolve with the object of conquering an ama. There nay ba an offensive directed egalnat etretegle points with the obyeot of controlling en area without physically occupying all of It. There anyurely defensive action of the barricade type. These actions nay be used elngly or in various conbinationa. Aalocal situations will govern ths tactics. An open, generaldesigned to occupy end capture an area or city say deviate only eligbtly fron orthodox wsxfare.
Itharacteristic of city snd house fighting that the function of control ie extrsssly difficult, so that the Individual eoldier suet ba thoroughly trained In the operation. (United Statea Amy Fieldcsnanta that each fighting requires "the highest degree of Initiative^ eklll, conning, and courage on the part of thaIndividual soldier").
(d) The Internal Aeoault.
"hen the attackroa inside the city and Is an uprising in the proper cense of the word, the tactics will differ to eons extent in that tb* Insurgent forces em ebls to go directly to the points they wish to assault, snd often- even srrsnge their dispositions bafom the esaault is begun. Tn this way the ob>etlvae say sll be taken einultaneouely.
w
anga of workers arocd with rifles and hand grenadoc who win sarch on ensary positions and on tha officers1 training schools and aurround than."
Actually, Lentn'r plan waa not cxacoted because then Petrogradooeesrul epontar*>ou* uprisings Attack on Key Objeotlwea.
Often the altuatlen will be such that It will not be neceaasry to fight to occupy tha entire town, the Insurrection can be ocnauaaflted by attacking one or aawaral lory allltary object Irein town, which will automatically ellnlnats realstenoa. Thla la aore likaly to be tbewhen the revolution enjoy* wide popular support*
The Bolshevik rising la Petrograd, for which Lenin hadrand assault, ia an instance where capturepecificba Tlater Palace, aaa tba only aajor anted engagement ra>caesary to assure tba capitulation of the gtrvemaent. Karwnsky bad aad* tba aiatake of uaaabling bla gvrnarnaaertingla point and trying to protect it with the aeager forces available. rotsky'* aelsere of the city'aaervicaa, eoabined with what Neuberg later referred toave tba insurgent* control of Petrograd without casualties^ One school of thought Balntalna that tbe capture of tb* Winter Palace and tba Ecvenment therein was aa entirely superfluous gesture elnee tba gui*iiaauit am* Isolated and hence incapable of governing! yet even vara the Winter Pslao* to beero symbol of powar, It* oaptura wssy, for tbe capture of such symbols of power haa an Important psycbologlcel effect,,
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rightingeed forces cc* the soranwnt aay be carried en by guerrilla action, vith the purpece of deacrcllalng gomnsanit forcee. Obrlouely, where the aha ls wletory through deaoxaUsstlon, revolutionary oondltlane nost sxlet to an extiwsa degree before such tootles havenance of eucceeding. At the ease tine, guerrilla warfare ls ths only practlcsl so ana of fighting organised gevernaent troops wham thetrength ls relatively enlauxlred.
The eoldler'e dleoiplinu snd training ehow to beat advantage when heefinite snd visible eneny to OBbatj sniping, sttsoks on individuals or naall groupe of soldiersoa vho strlkse euddenly and disappears into nowhereot offer the crgmlsed allltaryarget, lt nags bin snd aape hie oorale. dspriiee bin of his will to fight. Therein Use tbe advantage of guerrilla action, lb absoov, Deoaaberthe rebale eosbined barricade tactlce vith guerrilla vsn-far* ao affectively tbat they won the city froa tha aarrlsoii, and bald out until freeb govera-aant troops, vith heavy artillery, vere brought against trass frca outelds. naall, swiftly sowing squsds aabuehad poUoa pitrole to get their eras. Posters sere proainently displayed for the lnetjuetion of civilian flgbtsrstnot fans clnstars, but attack In aaaU aroept with lightning epeed| Do not entrench in fortified positions but use thonaghfarss snd street come re toolley end disappear sgalni Build barricades to hesper troop soveaant rather than for defense."
rlnclplec axe atlll buaic lectxine, Thoy "ere uaoo la Caraany etaring the* and aa late aa
The vooeeaa ofreaietane*la oocupied oeuntrlee, for ex&apla. th* Oartnika, Tito'a Partisans, th* Ostael la Tago-elarSa, and the Preoeh aanuls, indicates that Uetlee ofaiiwreal application,
(g) The Soviet Partlaan Ur^eeaant in world Tar IX
Since Vorld War II the Soviet Onlce ha* sponsored aaetlnge of Cosaunist-oon trolled partiean organlaatlona In order to control and further Indoctrinate and etmngthen euch partisan organ! sationa. laaeon* In allltary taetlee, which can be eaad for guerrilla warfare, have been publlahed In Party prcpagrnd* dlatrlbuted to Ckaanadet Party aeabare. Diagrasi* and ekatehee have appeared In Pranoh Coaaunlat Partykatohaanfantry enlt In the attack, the andar portionS tank eoaantarily aipuaad ea ltaall riee in th* ground, and advice on bo* to *aak tb* beet firing poeltlon* from oever or eonoaal-
Durlng World war II partlaan activityreet deal of assistance to the Soviet Onion. Although thl* partlaan aotlvlty eaenrred In theS, It deewJiiaUate* ScvieVCoaaunlat aathoda of guerrilla warfare*
Organisation.
In the falll when tha Oaivan force* had alraedyonaidarable allc* of Russia, th* Council ofr* paaeed,
2 -
AW
underecreefor tte creationartisan aoveaent In the rear eohelon of the enemy foroei. The center of the partisan movvvavot see established ln Hoecov. appointed to head the Central StaffD) ma P. KKMJtnTtO, the Secretary of the QViV (b) (Central Cca-adttee ofaion Coxeurist Party-Bolsherixs) of Byelorussia, sho oocupied the pcoition until the endi3.
The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement mas directlyto the CKVKP (b) (Stalin). ilitary level It aaa llkevies oloeely coordinated directly aith ths Rod Aran* Caneral Staff, end indirectly, vlth the Peoplei* feaari aaarlst for Internal Affalra (NXVD). In theory, the coord ins ti or. of these agendasop larel aaa to provide oomplete beraony of policies and operations. In roectloe, hesarver. It resulted quite frequently ln friction, antagonise and, oomelooally, la host He rivalry beteaen tbo Canerel Staff andO.
Tba adaaiOB of tba CSPTJ consisted of organising, partisan activity la tba rear of tba enemy armies, both wlthla tba tBSR and laterrltorlea. The purpose of tba partisan movement oonslsted not only of operationsurely strategic natore, but alao of polltloal,aad tarrorletlo activityrge Male.
For tba organisation of theee aotivltlea, tbe CSPD vaa eapplaaanted by tba follo-ine seetlcaai
and racennaiaasnea
and terror (including sabotage, provocation, etc. )
and comnrunications
n(,&
Several achoola andourses woreunder the Central Staff for the purpose of training leaders and rank worker* in political, dlTartionary, and terroristic sathods and tactics. Attention wa*t oat exclusively, in view of the urgent need foraotion, te practical croestion*. Th* ooura* lasted froa on* to thra* *onth* in cert cases, after whloh period th* student was considered quallXled. One Central Staff aehool existed for aor* thorough proparatlon of personnelwo-yeariodj only3 elaaa waa ever graduated, boawver. aueong tha graduate* were pertlaan laadera with training in all aspect* of underground activity.
Each aehool and training eouree specialised la one particular phase of work, such aa propaganda, dlveraion, aabotage, latelllgenca, radio, etc. Pereonnel eonslsted chiefly of former KKVD workers, militia aaa and Soviet acnorilstrative eaployecs evaouated froa eraay-eecupled tarriteries. Theirore usually foread to reaala la the rear. The teaching staff ln each ease vaa daUrvlned by tbe nature of training. Tor axacpla, intelligvnae and raooonalaaanse aara taught by Soviet InUlllgenoaOCVTJare vers used aa inetruotora for diversion, terroriaa and sabotagej propaganda sea taught by officials of tbe propaganda apparatus of tba CKVXP
Tha occupied territories vara divided Into sectors of pertlaan laflnanoe,taff for eeoh, subcrdinatad dlreetly te tba Central Staff la aba oca, for axaapls, SPD aUlininekoi Oblsstl, aad SPD Byelorussia.
All partisan organs, inrolved as tbey wereystem of crceo-obannsls and more or lossy eubordlneUan, carriedraaidnally parallel serlsi of sis si ans along the lines of Intelligence political and terroristic Forkj particnlar antoncarjr was enjoyed by the Special Qroupe and tb* SKVD, All partisanbair canroond group* aaong th* local cdTillsn population la tbahich vara used alaoat exeloalvely for operational work in conformity vlth instructions issued by tbe ooriaapcoding partisan organs. Thesegroups aay be classified structurally according to the following typ*ai
a typ* eaployed chlafly by tba fcauacaol. Each
Group oonslstad of three to five men, with one contact aan vbcaa duty was to asks bis way at regular In terra la Into partisan-controlled territories, find the instructor and racaira all Instructions froa bla.
b. Cbain-typ* groups,chiefly by partisan dsUchaaata,roups, vbieh varied extensively In number, vara organised aeoordiagystem whereby each seether knew only the Individual by when ba aaa recruited aad one aaaber In turn recruited by hlaself.
o. HEVD groups, organised according to tha agent ayatoa,esident ohlef vaa sppolatad for each aeotor aad placed in charge of separate groups of agent*.
d. underground grocpe of tbe ordinary type, consisting of aay nuabar of tavabere upach of whoa was Informed aa to tba identity of all other member* la the earn* group 0
i eocothiy fAmeiioTiinc rye-ten ef liaison and cooaizitcation axistodth* purtiaan noveaanrt, th* Party and th* aa"TO in tb* ccaen* rear and th* Central organ* in abeoor. Prinjclpal seaneoronlcatlon vara radio and arlatlon for tha trananlaalon nee aa gee, Intelligence reports, directives end the Ilk*. Pvrtcnrnl var* transported to and fron th*r by alr exclusively. Planes landed In assignedf partlaen activity on laridlnf etrlps specially conatraoted by partisans. Dlvervlcn.
The Soviet Ccssand devoted ootielderenl* attention to the work of pertlaan organ* along dlvsialonary line*. Partlaan diversionranVsrtiant role In th* aotlvltlM of th* Scarlet undergx-ound In enaary-oocapled territory| It* significance, vhlle priaarlly military, erteraded aa veil into the political and eoonoalc epharo.
The CSPP threv en enomoua aaoont of sate rials, aoney, and sauiposer Into tbe field for thef diversion, eacrif icing in anny caaee acaat of their noet eble vorkar* In the lino. Leasee( to be eurc, in tine and Ufa vere proportionately heavier than in any other line of partlaan activity.
flaaaa of PiversJon;
Divara ionary vork vaa acccerpliflhed prisnrlly by aeena of sxploslveB, ahleh. Ilka all other reppliee andara delivered by air to tho area of partlaan activity. Thoee natarlal* vere also enuggled Into citie* and area* tcder eneny control, usually vith the aid of veUV esj&cuflagsd couriers, disguised a* peasant* travelling froa rural dirt riots
ta toim- Uvpona endin varono end <> ti ,
In elelgh runners, in nilk cans, under voaen'e clothing, etc.
fjrplosives were used to prepcrr toluene end enooniee sine*anywhere0 torUogreas. These ninee were set offinsith special electric or nechaniccl fuses.
Anong reedj-cnde war nsterle-ls used for diversionary work the following vere cost frequent i
*,. Itagnsticjy-llnh and /nerlean nodele, with slow-action fuses. oviet-aade negnetie nine appeared, copiedxootly fron theaod el. &jglish end flnerlcan delay fuses oontlnoe to be used however.) Thercitesed chiefly for Incendiary purpoeea. for force end effectlveoees. S< Phosphorousikewise used for incendiary purposes. The userood chcnce to reach security. Inhe pi lie burst into flaae onlypecific tine interval. In addition to the shove, other rxterisie were alao used, howeveresser extent, due to Halted effectiveness i Glass-sand powder, gasoline tanks, end toluene eandlee with Incendiary vicks.
Basic diversionary work, ln particular thtt which Involved conspiracy, use aceonpliebed largely by aaans of the ragnetie cine, vhleh by virtu* of its convenient form and delayed action, proved to be the nost effective end practice! type of aeterial.
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Creratlonol llotbuie of.
Every diversionary sleelon tni preceded by meticulous reconnaieaeaee for tbe purpose of studying tbe target and the eurroundinge, checking the enount of material available, and determining tbe neat favorable tlae for aoooatpllahing tbe act. Roconnoltaring wee usually done by pareone not Initiated into tbe subsequent phaeee of the niealon. Than, on the baela of all availablelan una drawn op with the participation of tba persona vho vere picked to carry It out.
od ae tbe plan of eotlon vaa ccerpoaed, the dlvereloaary Material vaa laced labrougbt to tbe appointed apot, or ae near ae eonditlone peralttad. Material ves selected according to the netare of the target snd the oinanetoneea under vhlch tbe act auat be accomplished. Thus, for blovingailroad track et the ncewntransport ehould psaa, or forighvay, heavy toluene mines vith electric orsntle aecbanloal fusea were used. These alnea vere Installed at the nre-ecrlbed points and left there, mat important allltary trans porta vere destroyed et railroad stations by means of magnetic alnea installed in advance near tbe station.
Zo the fnroar thataneee tbe chief purpoee vaa destruction ofend tracks, while the transport merelyonvenient medlua for the explosion. The executors themselves had no kmovledge of what the transport contained.
Diversion in factories, warehouses, bases, gasoline dumps, teak parks end sotor pool a, aa veil oa tbeoters snd other publio places, ves eooonpllshed
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ilir rvrsetlri phcaphorcua. ht explosives were brought in ahead of time, sometimes several days In cdvencr; thrrc vere caaea, to be sure, of explosion beingduoed iomediately after the in? toilet lon of the rxterial, Forivereionlstheaterriefcase containing several magnetic nines, vlth the fuses set In advanoe. Taa oinutea before the esploelon; be left the theater, having placed the brief cose underet.
In another instance, aelectricianagnetic mine vltb electric fuse to tho notion picture projector. This he did during the corning. In tbe evening, whan the house vas full, the llghte were dissaed, tho projector turned on, end the explosion oeeurred.
Power lines and telephone networks in the eneny zono vera demolished by moans of small thermite grenades, and in they neane of aaws and axes
after accomplishing large-scale diversion in tbe eree of enemy control, the executor, if be were under suspicion, or generally In dangert withdrew into the partisan-controlled sone. When further activities required hia preeenee in the eree regardless of security threats, another method of retreat was followed,ifferent member of the same underground group withdrew Instead of tbe executor. The other member,on-pertleipaat orartial participant ln th* recently aeeonpllBhed diversion, may have been under ausploloa bioselfj or, be may hsve tried to draw attention avay fron tbe reel culprit by leading the enemy to believe be vas the guilty person. As aoon as he had thus placed himself in a
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dangerous position, he retretted into tha pertiaan-controlled eroe, leaving the rest of the underground group free to continue operations, iminpeded by persecution, and the executor retssined in tho shadows.
Sabotage.
It io eleer that thla diversion repreoented all the
saUitery aspects of partlaan activity, directed toward weakening the eooay'a material strength and potential In key spots, destruction of eneny personnel, and oonsolldation of pertlsan control by direct moans. Tho primary purposes of sabotage, on the other band, eonslated
of eneonreging discontent among the local population, incurring the
wrath of the enemy, undermining his authority, end inciting reprisals, uhieh In torn, further provoked the population end proempirit of reaistaneec The effective nalntenanoo of this vicious circle, uhieh could be brought to the point of self-perpetuationlrrlravn of effort on tbe part of the partisans, woa the result of sabotage.
A correlated purpose of sabotage use the organic preservation of the Soviet system in Ita fundamental structure, vhlch vas often es in the case of farcing teoaninua and agriculturaleak In which the enemy occupational authorities unvlttingly eealated. The vide network of agents which enveloped the eneny administration needed only to profit by existing policies and to provide the necessary correctives vberever such policies did not conform completely to partlaan alma.
Thus, by con treat to diversion, the methods of eabotaga were of an indirect nature, vith political and economic considerations takingover the military.
C-Lbot-r* activities wore initiated br all of tho pcrtieon orgoea ibese Include tho EKVD, SPD, Brigades, partisanartr/ end aoaeonol centers, andcroupe. Tbe leading role ln tbe delineation and Initiation of aoat sdaslona, una, however, perfornad by the Partr organisation* at Oblnst and Radonact which farther anphaBlses the political significance of thla type of work.
Sabotageons ware eateoutod en Inly by local Inhabitants. trenuoua attempt was cads to snllst person* occupying key pooltlona of responsibility. Interpreter* and advisers attached to tha military adndnle tret lon and the eecmccde apparatus were usually unfavorably disposed toward the nev regies; even such persons as may hsv* suffered ander the Bolsheviks orviolently antl-Ccamnilat saw that tba Fltirir Intended to preserve the existing conditions of slavery ln Russia, aarely changing the slogans and exploiting the people for their our end*. esult, cany such employees could be draun Into the net-uork of partisans, and tbey cade good use of their opportunity foring eebotage In ths corresponding agencies and Institution*.
Tbe nuaber of aaboUura aaong tbe local population urns svellsd by an influx of special partisan agents Into key institution*. geat-sc bo terms were usually left ln tbe area In tbe vak* of tbe Red Army where tbey poeed ea polltloalnenles oformer eonoentretlon oaap Irantei, ex-Bulaks, and Red Armyhe Ceroans on the vbole were inefficient ln tbe natter of distinguishing genuine peraeontse* from the *aall contingent of izapoatcr* vbo vara
-
numerically vaotlyhe race ot people who hated the Sovieteo violently thatolcooed the Invaders ee Hboretore in the first rxurths of the var.
Agent-saboteur* equipped vith falaif led doounenta ponetratod the occupational adtanietrative apparatue and the local luinlniatantlve agenclea. For example, many Oblnst administrative chiefs, bourgomelstere.
village overseersoctors, egrixnUturalndi ere of polloe were active partlaan sabotage worker*.
Mention should aloo be mode of the cabotage work done by former meebcre of the Corxruniot Party and the Kccieceool vho receined la the occupied tone cither Intentionally ae genuine refugee* or under force of circumstance.
These people vero usually recruited by the underground groupe after they had already obtained employment on thoir own initiative in Important ageneiafl. Recruiting was done by threatening to expose their past to the German authorities unlosB they oonsentod to cooperate tilth tbe partisans.
Vocenarticular part in sabotage just en they did in certain phases of diversionary work. On the pretext of amorous inclinations, they entered into the confidence of prominent eneny officials, whom they Induced byadvice" to carry out various mlaeiona. Tbe off idols In Question rarely realised that they vero being used, or that their Bubeequent notions fittedlan vhlch ve* not apparent in the beginning.,
In addition to the types of workers described above, the CSPD sent out trained eaboteurs whose duty vas to remain in the field and to direct sabotage on the epot.
Sc bo Lare woe carried out In all areas of the occupied territory! however, like dl veraion, It vsa concentrated ln the arena of eaeny oontrol. Terror.
In partisan nance, terroristic sots refer to assassination ol* irportont persons or croups of persona.
Terroristic sets sore oarrled eat on the Initiative of local partisan organs or In special oaeea, by direct order froo ibeoow (CSFD).
Terroristic activity was largely oonduoted by tbe IDCVD fron tbe Obi est level on down, with tbe other partisan or gens usuallyecondary part.
The majority of alsslons were executed by former hTTD workers, or Party meobora who had been subjected to special training in terroristlo methods and operations under the CSPD eebool ayoten in Keeoov and other large cities. Only in exceptional esses were local Inhabitants eoployed for thla type of work, and even then, their functions vere usually of en auxiliary nature, whereby tbey lent Indirect mailstonce to tbe person ooaalttlng the set.
Oporntlona involving tbe seizure of specif lo objectives, such as oonrxoUoations, utilities, snd supply depots differ fron fighting ths arned forces of the government la that tbe purpose is not to defeat aa armed force but rather to tare pes sessionhyeloel object or eerie* of object*. This nay obviously Involve fighting, but it lo the occupation that Batters, and unnecesBary flgbtlng la to be avoided if poeslble.
M*sWaK
J'jQRnt tclffrr-rjiircv.ds,-elccUric power stations, vcter ond ;es lorks era highly ccrrplloctedcapable of bolnc operctod only by hlchly skilled personnel.nlaes tho purpose la to destroy, rather than utilise snobha personnel assigned to take tbeet oust beifferent type entirely free those able nercly toifle. These men aaat be epeoiallete andnd their reorultocnt oftenjor problpo to Coanonlnt forcea.
There are four different nethctde by which key objectivee nay be taken. Ono. the nest obvious and safest, is by prior Infiltration of rrvolutioncry personnel, so that vhen the insurrection occurs, the use of the objective automatically passes to the rebels.
Ahod le by coons of the general strike.
A third and obvious netbod la the taking of they directet bed vrieh nay or nay not be advisable, depending on tbe olrcunetances. ttcre the Insurrection beginsegree of surpriss, it often happen* the* the objective* ere only lightly guarded ot oob-pletely unguarded, soandful of erned Dsn nay ovoreone anyvith ease.
The fourth nethod le the capture of the asalgnod objectlvee by an "Invisibleothod perfected by Troteky.
Trotsky described auch an operation ae followi The operational seizors began et tvo o'clock In the nornlnghen snail
rrs-tiee of IVtrorrod rebels, ocorcirnted under on ovcr-oli plan- occurled sirjultcneouely, or In prearranged order, the railroad otatlons, aleetrie plant, munitions and food storea, the vctorvorkg- the telephone exchange, the state bank, the large printing plants, the telegraphnd the poet office. Trotsky based his tactics on the theory that the insurrection is an art) technical experts arc required to start it and they alone can atop it. Ee had gathered togetherixture of soldlere and Bailorswith technical aklUa) and civilian technicians, and hadpecial etaff to load theoi aoitonov-OvBienko, the leaderoraor Caarlstivilinnioldier; andailor. Tbe ssall groups were organised according to their ekdlls In referenoe to the objective to be taken. All were selected for aggreaslvcneBB and oonplete reliability-
The Intensive preparation of theee small, tightly organized assault fl^it-ds has been deeoribed as follovBt
Red Guard bed been rehearsing In tbe very center of the toun during the paot ten daya prior to (fovenber 7. Antonov-Ovslenko, it vas, vho organized these tne tl cal exorcises, this sort of drees rehearsal of tho coup d'etat, in brood daylight, uhorevar the streets ware thronging vlth Bovenent, and around buildings which were of the greatest strategic Importance io the governmental and polltloal strongholds. The polloe and military authorities vere so obeeBBed by the Ideaudden revolt ty the proletarian masses end ao oonoerned vlth meeting the danger, that thoy failed to notice Antorov-Ovslenko'a gangs at work.
/tffi
cuchl dioorder, vho ahould notice tho little croup cf unerned vorkersj the soldier* end Bailors who vsndsred about in the corridor* of the telephone and telegraph exchangea. ta the Control Poet Office, In the Covernrjent offioes and generalalcing note of the *rr*nge>aent of tbe office* ond seeing hov telephones and light* were fitted*? Tbey visualized and reoanbared the plan of these buildings end studied tbe Deans of getting into then suddenly andonent'a notice, 'hoy reckoned with tbelr chance* of suooeaB, eetlnatlng the opposition, and looking for the places of leasthe weakest and noet vulnerable places ln the defensive or gcnl ration of the technical, nilitary, and secretarial aervioes of tbe State. In the general confusion, vbo should notice boob three or four sailorsouple of soldier* or stray uork-cen uonderinc around aarm buildings- going ln or aliasing the atalrsi people vho did not evenach other vhen they net? lb one even Buopceted these people of obeying prodae and detailed orders, of carryinglan or of undergoing exercises directed against tba strategic point* in the state's defense. Later tho Red Coords vould strike effectively bocanse they bad oorjduoted their invieible maneuvers on tbe very ground vkere tbe battle would shortly begin. Trotaky auooeeded ln getting hold of tbe plan of the town's technical Bervioes. Dybenko'a Bailors, aided by two engineers and engine roca ertifloera, Boatered the underground gas and water piping, the electric power cables and the telephone and telegraph eysten. Tvo of then explored the drain* under the headquarters of tbe General Staff.
isolation of the uholc district orcrc rroip of heuaos bod to bo node practicableeuo Trotsky divided tbe tovn into sections, determined which were tho strategic polste, and allotted tbe work, seotion by section, to gangs of eoldiera and skilled uorkere. Iochnloel experts were necessary as well ss soldi en. The oapture of tbo railway elation In Ibooow una allotted to tvo acfxids consisting ofatvianoll era, andailway nan. Three pangs of Bailors, workmen and railwayen In ell, wero ordered to take over tho Warsaw station. For the capture of other suctions, Dybenkonnber of Bqimds ofen each. alegraphiat attached to every squad controlled moverjenta on the rellway linen. On Octobernd fkrgecbercting under ordere from Antonov-Ovaienko vbo vas la close touch with the nmncovara, all the gangs rebeorBed tbe capture of tlie railway stations, and the general rehearsal mis perfectly veil ordered end precise In every deteil. On that day, three sailors vent to tbe tfein Electricity Plant near the port] tho Plant, run by tho oity'e technical services, was not even guarded. The manager asked the Bailors whether they were the men when he had asked the corrarrcr of the equere to send to hin. Be hsd boonuard for the last five days. The three aoilore took over the defense of the Electric Plant, In case of insurrection, they said. In the eoneew gangs of engine room artlfioere took over the other three annloipal plants*1
order to overthrow tho modernrotsky hadtorming parly, technical exporte and gonga of armed men led by eaglneere
The Stella Svnthepjjj.
Trotsky's tactics were appliedity scale, UuBOliai transposed thornationvido scale, and both Hitler and Stalin endeavored to apply the patternorld-vlde scale. The feels, of oenrrae, failed; but Stella has btdJt. through the ayaten of Coenonletin allorps of Insurrectional techniolane trained to seise ths technical nppsrataaatioDignal fron hbaoov If condltiona are favorable.
An example of how this organiBation la to work le oontained in the alleged instructione given at the Lenin rohool In hbaoov for the capture of such cities as Chicago. Ccccnnist ope ratio na aro performed not by para troop technicians but by local Cccmniat organirations. Tbe airborne troops ore to be the amy of occupation.
Tha plans call firstigh degree of preparationhorough knowledge of the technical Berrices of the city, down to tbe noat minute detail. The organization snd routine of the polioe le studied minutely. Liata of politically 'hindeairable" oltlsens provide for the liquidation of acne ond the use of others while their faniliee are held hostage. Squads assigned to capture each objective are trained In each particular operation. Their final instruction will be tbe ennouncenent of the hour and minute for the strike.
To prevent calls for outside help, ooanuniestlona are interrupted immediately. Railroads are wrecked eeverol miles outside of the city,
Sb3
either by sending out unrfcimod loeoco'ivoo or by bloving op lnccdngroad equode eelt* and bold the airports, awaiting incoming troops*
Captured radio statlonaeneral etribe after power plant* are *eia*d. Tbehief ofnd all leading offlolal* are InBsdlately captured. Tbe rayorursued *d" toreviously propnred proelamtlon over tbe oaptured radio. If be refuses, which wane bla iBaedlate death, soeaoneoice alxdlar to bla reads it.
Ta* entire operation tekeaours, at the ead of whichreviously selected goverrrwrt la in operation.
The FaafortlBl Wnfrrr* of Salmra.
Tba role of the teohnieal fee Hi tie* of tba state ara vital to
goternoont. These nut be seized by tbe insurgents In all eesee where tbe go serenent does not readily sbdioete and band then over, or where the worker* In theee installations aay br bo*tile to the aav revolutionary government. Tbe vail-organized uprising will take pains to allooat* personnel to poaition* giving control of tb* teebnioal facilities before tba operation, or,ery alrdnum, strike et thos* facilities Irjnediately so that surprise will provide tbelr capture Intact. Bo government, revolutionary or otherwise, la oafely entrenched without ccaplste control of the technical apparatus of tbe stat*.
Although arrest or assassination alone does not aooompllsh the coup, except underunatances, there is no question of tba coco salty of
V.ii. lac tne pcrconnel of id* covorrticnt, list only do theco peoplearying degree* of ootuel power, but, porno, pa nor* irjrortant froti tbt viewpoint of tho public et Ilt^c, tbey are symbols of power acd tbe etate. Thus, even cXter Trotc^'a Red Guards bad oaptured retroio-cd, they rttll found It aooeescry tc capture tbe Winter Palaceritten deraxaotlon frcn tbe rnaistera before thoy eould ejcavlaso evsa tbe leaders of tbolr ova Party thtt the lneTirreetieo bus rxceeded. H> violent Insurrection or coup sueoeeds ubImb the ruZiAC figures ere arrested, killed, or driven into exile.
Often, tbe entire euaoaee of the plot will bingeuooeesful aas^fdration or sxrect, as In the oobg of tbe Rseolt of tba Geraaa Gciur-ala Many of tba key figures nee ee aery to the plans off'^ed their cooperation (or tholr benediction) only on tbe provieo thec Jitler was deed. Hhen the bonb iirtonded to kill bla failed, tbe ir.su:-rational aacbino groundraJdnc halt and aaty of the pivotalssorted Cm ccune. Conversely, iohen the ocfrc country of Rxcania was In ths hands of tbe rebels, it vas not until Carol bad aetnally signed bis abdication that tbe battle vas considered van.
In the event arrest is to he aed to neutralize or eliminate the Rovera'.sntal leaders, the following aspects are pertinent:
Aside from the factan ai.aUened rrcn sleep la ordinarily net su'ficiently alert or perpared to offer rosletenoe, there appears to be aonsthiog psychologically desmrallain; abort being attired in night clothes whileall-arned nan. The averege person those prestige rests on hie public impress lor, sill ordinarily take peine to avoidarrassing situation In public and when he is taken off guard, he Is,ertain extent, morally disarmed ond humiliated.
The Technique of Assassination and Terror.
In certain situations, particularly ahere the revolutionhange In the ruling class, ths rflvernaentel leaders mill be considered implacable fosenace to the revolution aa long as they live. Here, murder or assaaainatlon replacea arraat. Thla cethod also has the advantage of creating terror end thus breaking tha realatance of those leaders shs are apared.
Assasaination requlrea careful planninr. There ehould be several
sets cf alternative plans in caae the first one fails, as selllan of
aotion lr. case of failure of the entire operation.
The first teak of the caae terrorist ie to destroy group solidarity,
which he eccoapllehee by labelling ee eooial crimes ell acta alth ahich hs disagrees. Propaganda, ahich publicises terroriatic ecte eo aa to amke tha
cam
.9
papulae* no reften been eaployed by tbo Coevainists. Surcease is oTfored If the populace accedes to the terrorieta' domanda, namely, Joining the CDnsunlet Party.
Political lnetrunenta ueed. The case of CzechoSlovakia,ommunist coup d'etat sea carried out Inllustrates this type of Ccctainist maneuver.
A principal determinant of tha tiring of this coupprobably the sain detercinantass ths steady decline of Oooeuniat prospects in the Torthecilng elections (scheduled for Hay IHuR) together with the ObsannlsU* Increasing difficulties ln cutnaneuvering their felloa-partias la the National Front, particularly the Social Damoerata. eeting of the Conrsunist Central Coscdttee onhe party head, *lf'-'. Cottesld, served notice thai the Party eould not aoquiesce In this trend of affairs. He raised the accusation that the other parties had been penetrated by secret agents of react too and sere conspiring to briar, about an early govcrnnental crisis inovernsant of technicians, omitting theould be formed.
The succeeding steps leading up te and through tha Ooessuniats' eeicure of poser sere the folloaingi
bandoning all pretense of hoping toa Jo rity In the forthco.'dng. election, the Consuniet*randloae prog ran of rs'ioal legislation, going far beyond anythinr agreed to by thoth-in th* National Pront, The pro gran left the ron-Coiaxuniet parties aith
-Km
only Uo alternatives! to accept thla program mhlch would have completely undercut their Influence, or to resign froa the government.
(2) Attempting dellbereUly to provoke the other partlea to choose the second alternative, the Cominlete In8 arranged for aonater meetings of their edherente. Aoongress of factory councilscalled for Februaryo demonstrate for Cbcjounlat denanda for furtherational congress of the OoeYjnnlst-eontrolled farmers' oonalaslona vas oalled for Februaryo demand the enactment of Cocsxunlet-eponeored agricultural legislation that had been steadfastly rejected by the non-ConaninietB. both oongrcecos vara te press fcr acceptance of the draft constitution sponsored by tbe Oorsaanlsts, to vhlch the other parties vare oprceed.
O) At the sane tine the Comnunlata continued to strengthen their hand In the eeourlty police (ahich they controlled at thend prepared tbe Workers' Militia for action. Large-scale replacements vara made of noo-
CoBBniniat personnel In ths Security Corpaj ectivity of amenta provocateur; on the local level aas Increased, and dlaooveriee vare tade of allegedplota. These aovse convinced the naderate parties that the Cecannleta vere determined to use ell available neant to gain an absolute majority Inoot Ions.
(A) By this naans tha Concur!sta provoked the national Soclallste (the leading abderate party) into taking the initiative against than. In an
o sidetrack t'con the Constitution, the National Socialist Party introduced the leaa* of Ooierunlat control of th* polloetln: of th*ront onth th*
additional ale ofhowdown *ith th* Coesninlata atdch wouldforoa than to hack dovo or provide th* pretext for holding election* in adlaUly. Th* National Soclelleta introduced th* polio*
l**ue in the Cabinet on enandad that th* (fcwaDunlst lUnlater of th* Anterior rescind an order for replacement of all regional Security Corp* of floor* by Cocmunist*. Lhan th* CtaxsaalsW erased thla demand, th* Nationalthdrew froa th* government,abinet crisis.
(5) Ths Coraimist* salted sdvantags of thi* erlsis to create aaaa disturbance* and aalas power. Thay declared they aould not coeeidara government with th* National Socialist tin later* ate had left. Their nethoda of forcing tb* appointmentncoalnantly Coaantniat gowernaant included! (a) prevailing on tb* Social Democrat* to support theai (b) holding naa* deaonstratlons to intimidate the and ara taa; (c) aeiilng by force all govarvaacat offices aad preventing noo-Conr-unltt arployeei androa attending to Ueird)th* haadquartera of th* National Social ut Party throughurityn ohargealot;prevent in? all nor^Corr-jni*U, inducing Presidentroa brcadoaatlng by radio to the nation; (f) breaking up meeting* ofndtbelr printing
164
plants;) letting it bs understood that the USSR stood ready to
intervene acainst reappointmento derate government. In the letter
connection, it is noteworthy that the Soviet leputy 'oreirn .'inleter.
Viler Sen Zorin, arrived in I'ra^ue onateneihly on otlier
official business, end remained there Uroufhout the crisis. It seecs
Indubitable that his remarks to variola Czech gov an cent officials played
e port in influencing President Denes end theo capitulate.
The result of theae preeeures ass that President Penes eppointed
e predocdhsntly Corounlat cabinet on
(l) The Pattern of Ccerainlet rartlolpetlon in Coalition Governments Since the .gar.
Coasajnlst participation in coalition oablnete alth bourgeoie partlea has beoooo en Integral part of Conraxnlst tactics alnea nurld ear IX. The nature end purposes of thla pertlelpction have been determined by tsohe internal alignments facln; the Ceoresnlsteiven country end the deannde ef Soviet foreign policyiven aoaent. These factors, in turn, have varied aoecrdlng to .tso types of eountrleei
(a) Hpn-orblt. where western Influence le aseendant and the CoasDunlst chances for obtaining control are Halted; in these countries, the Coexunlete have participated only In genuine coalitions in ahich the Ooinsanist Party has been aersly one among several equal or atroog er partlea;
(b) Orbit, share sovist occupation or prsconinanee has assured Cosxtinist dominationogus coalition in a" leh oUer parties have only nominal equal itv.
After the German attaok inad brought the IBS*
and tha Jest together as Allies, developments ines of countriesliilar pattern as Oorrxmists everywhere emphasised tba necessity for the Joint efforts of all parties and croups eg inet fascism. The CoBsamists took part ln all-party national comsdtteii which later became national They propagated nationalist slogans, contributed to national resistance movenente, and denied their dependence onhange aynbolized by the formal dissolution of the Comintern la
In the period immediately fello.lng liberation and Allied
occupation, the Conaunlsts continued this policy of participating la coalition governments. On an International level. Big Three agreements called for the formation of governments representing all democratic elemente In the defeated and ln soma- of ths liberated count rise. Internally the Cozvounista eere too weak out aide the orbit to seise poser and not strong enough inaide the orbit to carry out their program. Ifcreover, in contrast to the prewar Covauniat policy of noD-partlolpetlon la cabinets
1 Hotever, despite this emphasis on unity, it should bt noted that the Comounlste tried wherever possible to build up their own foroes, some-tiaas even at tha expenae of the fight against fasolaa* In Xugoslavia and Greece, for example, Co.icunist-led partisans fought rightist groups ss sell as Germans and Italians. The problem of arced Corrsaiiet groups continued to vex tbe governmente snd occupation foroes ia France snd Italy following their liberation.
or of parliamently alliances with other parties (Popularhe CcTDunlsts apparently decided that* more advanta-eoue to workovernoental partyrather than in oppositionin order to expand thalr national strength and influence the country's foreign policy.
the history of Ceenuniet participation in coalition rpvernoents since the ear haa reflected the transition fron.tire SovIetM/astern alliance to the rradu.il widening of the chase betas an East and east.
he Corownists foreswore taking part in bourgeoia oabinets, they did not preclude participation In cabinets in which theclose parties"ayorlty, aa In the case of local Carman governments Hoaever, It ehould be noted that Corrunlat weakness end the reluctance of the other parties to give Conrsaniata cabinet posts soda the question largely acadeado before the war. Spain, where the Coesajnists did take posts6peclal case because of tha civil war.
In non-orbit countries,esult of the et rehich fcaat-West tension a, together alth Internal developments, have oeueed In Conrunlet relations with other parties, the Coracaniata hare been pushed out of the forcer coalitions end Into Increasingly bitter opposition to their res peot ite gorerncente. as relations bet seen the USSR end the seat hare deteriorated, the CoffsunletB hare had to consider the alternatives of coalition or of opposition. The other possibleoup d'etat, has noa been precluded at least in Tie stem Europe, both because of internal aeaknsss and because of the serious international repercussions ofove. By theutterhe Cosauniets were forced out of every government in tEeatem Europe* Inesult of bosooa'a
Insistcneo ct the Reotins of thehe French and Italian Corxiirlaleive precedence to the Soviet campaign against thelan rather than to their local aapiratlona. They have aince atteapted tt, redefine their nationalism in core openly pro-Soviet terms, have be co re more anti-Western, and aeer. do ten ined to force the political aituatleoeft-Right dlchctony In vhlch they hope to assume the leadershipeftist coalition.
In the orbit countriee, worsening Bast-nest relatione accelerated hbscov's desire to ooneolldate it* position in the territories under Soviet Influence. esult, the Cornunlsts gradually dropped the fiction of coalition government, end general Oonrnnlet predominance haa been or ia being tranaormed into exclusive Coanamiat control. At th* Cominform meeting oftdecided that even the bogus coalitions In vhlch the other pertlee had only nominal autonomy vere to be replaced by unified mass People's Pronte under Conaunist direction. The tenpo has varied fron country to country. In Czechoslovakia the foraatlonogue coalition vae not possible until after the Coenunist coup of In Northern Korea and Eastern Germany, Ceeaniniet tactics have been conditioned by the possibility of eventual union between the Soviet andZones and by the desire to maintain contact withn Western Zonee and to build up the impression that Soviet Zone partlee acre representative of the vhole country.
Sine* the Tito rift inoviet Coninfora goadii, as pushed the Cooainista into assuming mM active and exclusive leadership of the ass popular fronts. The obligatory oriantation of all parties toward the USSR has been given greater arehaaia. At the eaaa tins, the Tito affair haa rl-blighted the question of hoe far abacas oan dictate Cerauniit taetlos generally snd aith respect to the organisation of Cecacuniat control. It is laportant to note that Yugoslavia aaa the only country of any aiae in eastern As-ope ahere therained poaer mainly by their oeh ef forte. Xa other orbit countries, tbe prevalence ef Uoscoa-trained pereonrtel oho arrived la tbe sake of tbe Bad Aray and the dependence of Cueajunlats on the USSR for tbe attelnaeat of poser have sade It easier for abaeoe to daUraiae the nature of Ceemuoiat activity la these eosHtiona,
V. COqjTIDKS Dl HOM-QREIT COWTRIES.
The high point of pes tear Oonssanlat participation in non-orbit coalition genrernments cane ia the period Immediately following tbe aarthe Co-asunlat partlea sere operating as "national" partlaseriod of conparatlve Soviet-Western aadty. lot being stronf enoufh to aeeuse poser, tha Cussaudste Identified themselves aith specific national tasks on shleh they couldntly aith other partiesi for eaaaple, purges ln vsrious oountries under fascist snd collaborationist Influences, tbe struggle In Belgium snd Italy against tha monarchy, and reconstruction everyshere.
By thus operatingational partyourgeois coalition, the
+
Ccrrur.ista hoped to reap several benefits.
They hoped to increase their nase support for the first post-liberation elections. They *anted to take advantage of thehey had gained by their disavowal of revolutionary alas, by their work in the resistance ecvemente, end by Soviet prestige that caae alth victories in the They aimed at widening their appeal among niddle-eless snd agrarian eleosnta. In this period when reconstructionotional issue, they did not want to alienate the support of non-Co-'oainist aorkinr-olass elenente. Ifereover, when British and American troops aere still present, as for example in France and Italy, the Cofrcuniete felt the necessity of convincing the US and Britain that the Conpuniat Party ass not rsvolutionary in order to inaure participation in the postwar elections in vhlch they expsotsd to neke gains.
The Cocsajniete, by their very preeence in the government, aere able to influence foreign policy. The other parties aere obliged to weigh the consequences for social stability and international praetlge ehould the Coomunists be forced into opposition. Such considerations were particularly Important In the case of France, for sxa-iile, during the hoacoa dlaaussions on Germany in Whlls the Ooennnists aright not here expected to orient tovardR countries In ahich they aererinority, they cay have ho; ed at least to neutralise these nations in the riein: 2sst-3eat conflict. Ifereover, participation in the cabinet opened up to the Corr unlets sources of information and no* avenues of espionage regarding foreign policy
natters. It should be noted that the Corj-cuniat attitude toward assu-rin: the responsibility for foreign policy haa depended on the individual situation. Thus, in Italy,6he Coawunlsts shoved no fredileetion to accept any blame for the peace treaty being ne.^otiated.
They attempted to infiltrate whatever adnletriee they did procure end to use th*ir position In the ;ceern*ant to enhance the position of the party. The tempo of their operations depended on the opposition they net fron the other partlea. Perhaps) the beat example of COtnuniet infiltration was provided In Czechoslovakia, which, though in the Soviet orbit, before the coup d'etat In8 resembled the non-orbit countries politically. Here the Cocnaanieta placed their earn In the erny, tha seeret police, and in eeonoale poaltlona which facilitated the execution of the February coup.
In several lnatancee the Gcneaiaista tried to correlate their participation in coalition oabinete alth propoeala for United 'rents with Socialist parties in the hope of being able to establish Ccesaunlet suprsTacy over ths worklnr. class. Such unified action was slned atleftlat parliamentary atrength against the center and right andalthough theirinst the Socialists at the tine were mutedto Oorinate Socialist policies and to aean the Socialist rank-and-file fron its leaderahlp. however, Coevaunlst policy In this connection has varied
considerably. The United Front did net lact lon- in Franca. Inestem europear. etatas, the Corrurials sere not anxious for such unity aince It often meant that thoy eould be subordinated to the sore powerful Social Democrats, Moreover, it should be noted t. at since their elimination froo. the Restem European governments, and folloming the forvntion of the Coflinfora, Communist profeseionsesire to re-enter various coalition governments have been sccompanied by strong attacks against the Socialists,
As long as the Conrunlsts have considered participation ln the government efficacious for the achievement of theee alassnd ehile they
have been too weak to seise powerthey have often been ellling to attenuate temporarily both their political and economic objeetivea. TJhile they have been especially anxious to receive cabinet posts such as those of the Interior, Justice, National Defense, snd Information, shieh eould place them close to the ooureee of power and persuasionodern aoclety, they have been milling to accept less. Thus in Prance, their apprehension over the initial successes of the all-Socialist Blum government in7 and their general fear of being isolated led the Coatcunlats toational Defense post hedged by restrictions, along withunimportant ministries. In addition, actuated by the desire to prolong their participation in government, the Oorauniats have temporarily laid aside certain aspects of their economic program. In Prance and other oountriee, for example, they tempered their insistence on nationallsatloa
i:.tnat pressingt split the coalition.
Co runist tactics, however, have juaHy beet, eubtle. an
Sc- -'. cabinet ministers have vtted fcr ns-.euree ahich aere at variance alth their stated aire, the Cormruniste hereclnatasi-rea in other aays. Forearlyrench Co-mniat mlnlstera ostensibly supported the rovernrant nro(7ax on price reduction, ah lie the Concuniat-led General Confederation of Labor carried or extra-pari iaaentary agitation against it. Thus along aith their activity in the government, the CoasBunlata have attached primary Lrportanee to organising pass aupport outside'. They have been esi>ecially eager to aeeure control cf
the trade-unions and to create fronts or infiltrate already cxletent mass organisations of all typeea omen, youth, ear veteran, peasant, cultural aoclatles. Strlles or the threat of strikes have been used to exert pressure on the government. The front organlsatlona have participated in deronst rat ions to ahoa alleged popular approval of Coaaninist demands. Another Cerjsunist eeohanlaa for potential extraparllaeentary use haa been the national ooesdttee auch as the anti-Da Gaulle "vigilance coenittee" in France, ahich aay repreaent the equivalent of the eotion comulttccs uaad by the Cormunlsts In tha Csech coup. These Committees aere formed rolloaing Coirouniflt exclusion free tha government In France and apparently have not gained xesa aupport.
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