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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate, and State, Army, and Navy concur Inissent by the Intelligence organization of the Department of the Air Force is appended as an annex. This paper is based on information available onecember.
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA
Korea at the time of
ASSUMPTION: That hostilities have not spread beyond the bordersecision to employ Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea.*
The Chinese Nationalists haveask-force0 troops for service In Korea and possibly couldreater number without jeopardizing the security of Taiwan. Nationalist troops have undergone extensive and prolonged training, but due to ineptand poor living conditions there is some question of their morale. The majority of Nationalist troops on Taiwan have come from the more temperate zoneB of China, and afor Korea probably would require training and some re-equipment before being committed to combat in cold-weatherIn other respects, the initialcontingent for Korea would be well-equipped and could bo transported to Korea in fourteen days. The Nationalist troops are experienced and familiar with Chinesetactics. Nationalist units shouldcomparatively efficiently under good leadership and adequate supervision, but might be susceptible to Communistandubstantial number of defections if permitted to operatetn areas beyond the Immediate tactical control of UN commanders.
he presence or the absence of Chinesetroops in Korea in the limitedestimated to be available within thefuture would notajor factor affecting the ability of UN forces to establish
This estimate considers only theof lhe immediate employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the present situation and does not deal with the consequences of eventual employment of Chinese Nationalist troops either in Korea, in later and changed circumstances, or on the Chinese mainland as partargerAn esUmate (NIE-'lO) Is In preparaUon on the more acncrwl question.
andefensive line across the peninsula against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces.
rotracted defenseeachhead is undertaken, the presence of Chineseforces couldubstantialprovided they were operating under good leadership and adequate supervision.
Whatever the military outcome in Korea, the employment of Chinese Nationalists there would, in the eyes of other nations, further identify lhe US with the Chinese Nationalists and wouldoral commitment for continuing US support of the Chineseregime. In addition, theof Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea would immediately raise difficult problems involving the feasibility of continuing the US policy of neutralization of Taiwan,with respect to the employment ofnaval and air forces other than In Korea nnd in Korean waters.
A majority of UN nations would probablyS proposal to use Chinesetroops in Korea. Thereeneral apprehension that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops In Korea would giveor at least provide the pretext formilitancy on lhe part of Communist China. This militancy would Increase the dangereneral war with Communist China, which In turn might developlobal war. In addition, the Westernnations would feel strongly Hint the US was Jeopardizing the first-priority task of defense of the European continent byinvolved in protracted hostilities in Asia. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists would alienate other Asiatic countries, which
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the Chinese Nationalists to bepolitically Incompetent, andrepudiated by their own peopleUS action in using Chinese Nationalist troops would Intensity these feelings.he use of Chinese Nationalist troops tn Korea would remove whatever chance might remainolitical solution of the Korean conflict. Although it Is evident thatChina strongly supports general Soviet strategic objectives, this support might become even strongeresult of the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea.
he USSR would probably welcome aUS decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea as: (a) further embroiling the US In hostilities with Communist China without engaging the USSR: (b) dividing the US from its allies; and (c) providingfor International Communistconcerning alleged US militaryand support of reactionary regimes.
s EjCRET
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ANNEX
Director ofin
In general, this estimate has emphasized the military and political disadvantage* of the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces ln Korea, and has failed to point out adequately the advantages which would accrue toU.N. campaign In Korea by the use of such forces. Specific points are as follows:
discussions ln this paper appearbeen governed by the acceptanceationalist troops asthe total number availablein Korea. This officenumber to be far less than the
estimate does not give sufficientto the fact that ChineseForces offer the only readilyfor major augmentationorea. In fact, such insufficientfails to give planners groundsupon the availability of thesea factor influencing the determinationwhether oreachhead should beall.
arge number ofNationalist troops could make acontribution by providinginfantry toU.N.eachhead were retained.
office does not believe that tbeof all the various Asiatic nationsemployment of Nationalist troopscan be assessed with sufficientwarrant the conclusion that thesewill be irrevocably opposed toof these anti-communistthis respect, more deference is paid into the attitudes of the governments,in the respective countries, thanelements which fully recognize themenace and would be encouragednew opposition to Communism's advance. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that even In Europe, public opinion might learn to applaud firm opposition, whether tt be In Europe or in Asia, and in fact might prefer the fight to be made ln Asia.
e. The estimate indicates that the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would eliminate any remaining chance of unpolitical solution of the KoreanThis dissent ln no way is intended to contradict this conclusion. However, Itto this office that the law ofreturns has set in with respect ioatisfactory immediate political conclusion. The discussion in the paper does notound conclusion as to whether or not utilization of Nationalist troops would prejudice or aid an eventual political solution.
The estimate implies that the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus to, or provide the pretext for, increased militancy on the part ofChina. It is reasonable that anyin militancy, if such is possible (other than against Hongould bemore by Chinese military capabilities and their own time-table than by anywhich might result from theof Chinese Nationalist troops ln Korea.
There appears to be Insufficient data to justify the conclusion inf this estimate that "the USSR would probablya. decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea."
This office would revises Indicated below:
a. Reference p.ar.evise as follows; "There It no immediate crisis in KoreaChinese Nationalist troops toisaster, but this opportunity to begin the dynamic exploitation of any anti-Communist forces whose commitment couldavor-
ible effect on the Korean and possibly theFar Eastern situation should be given careful consideration. The Chineseforces on Formosa provide the only visible means for such exploitation.or absence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea In the limited numbers eotlmntod to be awau able within the Immediate near future and later would not be anajoeaffecting the ability of UN forces toandefensive line across the peninsula against numerically vastly superior Chinese Communist forces, unless the US-UN introduced reinforcements directly."
p. I, par.dd at endas follows: "An importanttn Korea is for additional infantry.Nationalist infantry as apresent UN forces in Korea couldmore effectivelytrikingeachheadobilewhich can counterattack quickly atof greatest enemy prauure."
par.mendew sentence as follows:military outcome in Korea, theof Chinese Nationalists there would,eyes of certain other nations at thefurther Identify the US with theand wouldegreecommitment for continuing USthe Chinese Nationalist regime. Attime this act wouldo utUae anti-Communist forcescapabilities, and as such might hare apsychological effect of potentiallyupon anti-Communist forces."
eference par.evise ashe presentajority of UN nations would probablyS proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops In Korea. Thereeneral apprehension that theof Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would give impetus, or at least provide the pretext, for increased militancy on the part of Communist China. Despite the repeatedof the US-UN to respect the Man-churian borders and the maintenance of the embargo against Chinese Nationaliston the mainland, Chinese Communist militancy has alreadyigh level in committing the Fourth Field Army, which represents the best available Chinesemilitary force. It is difficult to see any new form which this militancy could take (other than in Hongim-militancy would iiuweaae Therefore, there probably would be little increase In the danger of awar with Communist China, whichurit might davaloplobal warexists. This, too, probably will have little direct effect upon the developmentlobal war. At least In the beginning, the Western European nations would might feel strongly that the US was jeopardizing the flrst-prlorlty task of defense of the European continent by becomingontinued involvement In protracted hostilities in Asia. Later however, they might come to appreciate the determination of the US to takeaction in an area of vital importance in the struggle against Soviet directedaggression. The employment of the Chinese Nationalists would might alienate those element tn certain other Asiaticwhich who consider the Chineseto be reactionary, politicallyund already repudiated by their ownOn the other hand, the employment of the Chinese anti-Communist forces cindd hearten the anti-Communist elements of all Asiatic countries and increase their will toCommunist aggression. aettati-in using Chioeeo -Kationalli weoM intensify these-feelings. In addition if the other nations should determine that it is necessary lotand in Korea, they wtll be more amenable when they recognize thisethod of relieving tlicm of the necessity of providing more forces themselves."
e. Reference par.mend as follows:ime of delicate negotiations the use ofNationalist troops In Korea-would remove whatever chnnge-tntfiht lvmain-of might have prejudiced an immediate political solution of the Korean conflict deriving froma evidentongty snppoftg general-Soviet strategic objectives, -this- wtpport might fca> come even> result of the use-of Chinrse Nftvtenalist. This
would not necessarily have precluded,ater political settlement It was, 'therefore, importantecision to me Nationalist troops be deferred until theof obtaining an acceptablepolitical solution were gone. However, Chinese Communist interventionassive scale isact, and an immediate political solution deriving from presentnow appears to haveoint of diminishing returns.
i. Reference par.elete entire"The UOflR would probably welcome uregime."
Original document.
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