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german attitudes on rearmament
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
GERMAN ATTITUDES ON REARMAMENT
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Published1
The intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in thisonay (however, see footnotes on,
S TURRET
GERMAN ATTITUDES ON REARMAMENT
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the factors underlying West German attitudes toward rearmament; the conditions under which rearmament can be obtained in association with the NATO powers; and the effects of such rearmament on West German foreign policies and objectives.
CONCLUSIONS
West German people, despite strong anti-Soviet feelings, are not now in favor of rearmament, primarily because of three factors: (a) their fear that it will provoke the USSR to make war, and that the ruin of Germany will be completed by war; this fear is intensified by thethat the Western Powers at present lack the military capability ofdefending West German territory against Soviet aggression; (b) theirof the implications ofdislike shared by other Western peoples, but stronger in the Germansthey are asked to rearm before recovering national independence and equality; and (c) their feeling that West German rearmament in association with the NATO powers would indefinitelya peaceful reunification of thenation.
The two main political party leaders of West Germany are both firmly anti-Communist, and neither has fundamental objections to rearmament on grounds of political principle or pacifism. Thebetween them on the subject is one of tactics and timing. The Adenauer Government favors rearmament,certain conditions are met, and it is willing to negotiate these conditions with the Western Powers. The leader of the Socialist opposition, Kurt Schumacher, maintains on the contrary thatis notubject for negotiation as long as West Germany is an occupied territory and exposedoviet invasion which the West has no power to repel. Schumacher has put himself at the head of non-Communist opposition to the measure. If rearmament is viewed as less dangerous and more advantageous to West Germany than Is now the case,opinion wiil become less averse to it, and Schumacher will then probably change his position.
e believe that the West Germans will notrogram of rearmamentsubstantial concessions are granted under the four following heads; (a) "equality" for the German military(b) virtual independence for the West German state; (c) enoughAllied forces stationed in or near the Federal Republic to give the Germans an increased sense of security during the period of rearmament; and (d) financial assistance.
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Assuming that an agreement with the Western Powers is reached. Westla likely to be prirnarily concerned, during the first years after reannament begins, with recovering completeand with strengthening its initially weak position within the NATO grouping Tt will seek to become the dominant continental European member of NATO.
As West German power and influence grow, the policies of the government are likely to be increasingly directed toward objectives not shared by all members of the Western alliance. Foremost among such aims will probably be theof Germany and the recovery of lost territories, including the Saar. The West Germans will probably try bo use NATO as an instrument for achieving their eastern territorial objectives. If they are unsuccessful in this respect, or if progress seems unduly slow, they mayeal with the USSR to accomplish their ends. In any event they will probably use the threat ofeal to try to bring pressure on the NATO powers.
earmed and sovereign West Germany might at some future timeeal with the USSR or attain anstatus between East and West cannot be predicted with certaintythe factors which now appear to control the situation may change. It now seems clear that for the predictable future West Oermany may be expected to see its security principally threatened from the East, and must therefore beto continue its alliance with the Western Powers. Should it feel it might achieve its primary foreign policyoutside the Western alliance without being drawn under Soviet control, it might seek an independent positionthe East and West. However, we believe that the maintenance ofosition would depend upon an increase of West German military and economic strength of such magnitude as to bewithin the calculable future."
DISCUSSION
Factors Underlying West German
Attitude. Toward Rearmament
ontrary to the policy of tbe present West German Government, the majority of the West German people are not yet in favor ofThis popular reluctance certainly does not spring from pro-Soviet leanings, for the West Germans are strongly anti-Russian and very few of them have any disposition toward Communism. For reasons to be discussedtheir aversion to rearmament maybe overcome; for the time being, however, it is unmistakable. It arises primarily from three factors which together outweighto the USSR.
a. The first and currently most important factor influencing the West German people
Office of the Assistant Chief of, Department of the Army prefers the following version of this paragraph:
earmed and sovereign West Oermany mar remain aligned with Uie Weal, but llieroo assurance that It will. There is no evidence to luMIfy mlinK out Uic possibility thatnyest German Government may reach an understanding with the USSR which would nullify In fact II not In form the Wen German alignment with lhe Western Powers. While progress tn integration wtUi NATO may well act to restrain West Oermany from abandenlag the eooneelwn. such restraint would be on* relative and not decisive Should West Germany decide to modify her poatoon be!wee- East and Wastegree .natender her prev.ee* alignment wtth the Wert meaningless, il avuld be difficult. It not Impossible lo prevent her by force from taking nich acUon.
ii E E
against rearmament is their belief that it may provoke the USSR to war, and that the ruin ot Germany would be completed by war. Pear of Soviet military retaliation is sedulously fostered by Communist propaganda, and finds firmer basis in the various official Sovietagainst GermanThe West Germans are acutelyof their weak and exposed position and of the present inability of the Western Powers to defend them against Soviet invasion.
b. The second important factor is sheerto accept the burden of military commitments; it is inevulsion from the idea of remilitarization.eeling is of course not peculiar to Germans; indeed it may be more superficial among them than in the populations of some NATO powers. Strong pacifist and neutralist elements exist ln West Germany; again, however, they are no moro decisive than in many other Western countries. IL is possible that the shock of defeatarticular aversion, for the time being, to new military endeavors. Several million Germans who had been genuinelyto be rid of the military caste andand who agreed with Allied opinions as to its menacing features, felt that theto rearm conjured up the ghost of the military state. These genuinelyGermans have little belief in their ability to establish firm democratic civilian controlesurrected military caste. What gives unusual strength to the popular feeling, however, is that West Germany has been asked to take up the burdens and risks of rearmament notovereign state,for Its own national interests in equal association wilh allies, butependent and inferior member of an alliance consisting of former enemies. The Germans fear the Soviet Union, but they also feel strong resentment against the Western occupying powers. Hence the first reply of many, when asked to rearm against the USSR, was to cry "ohneount mehis attitude may be expected to dimmish as Germanincreases and the West German state recovers political and economic health. It will hardly disappear, however, before theIs given sovereign independence and equality.
c. The third factor influencing the Westpeople against rearmament Is theirthat it would indefinitely postpone aof Germany. Desire for national unification is perhaps the strongest positive political emotion In Germany. The people recognize that, for the present at least,can be accomplished only with theof the USSR, and such consent would plainly be out of the question if West Germany were to be rearmed and firmly allied with the Western Powers. The USSR understands German sentiments in this respect, and has exploited them skillfully by invitations to unity which have impressed the West German people, leading many to believe that at leasthile the door should not be slammed shut by adoptionrogram of rearmament.
Although West German public opinion is permeated with the feelings described, it is not unalterably fixed against rearmament and the two main political party leaders aretrong position to influence the final decision. Both Chancellor Adenauer and Dr.leader of the Socialist opposition, are firmly anti-Communist and believe that the interests of Germany will ln the long-run be better served by cooperation with the Western Powers than by "neutrality" orwith the USSR. Neither believes that the USSR will offer any acceptable proposal for the peaceful reunification of Germany, with or without continued disarmament as aNeither has fundamental objections to rearmament on grounds of political principle or pacifism; the difference between them which undoubtedly exists, is one of tactics and timing.
Adenauer and his colleagues have publicly signified that they favor rearmament,certain conditions arc met, and they are willing to negotiate with the Western Powers concerning these conditions. But Adenauer's Government restsmall majority, both in Parliament and in the country, and the Chancellor considers this majority an insuffi-
cient basis for the momentous decisionsto rearmament.*
Schumacher maintains that, as long as West Germany continues in the status of an occupied territory and is exposedoviet Invasion which the Western allies would be powerless to repel, rearmament is notubject for serious negotiation. He hasput himself at the headarge body of non-Communist popular opposition toHis position has been politically rewarding; it has appealed not only to those segments of German opinion which are still war-weary and averse to new militarybut also to the rising nationalism which demands that if Germany is to help the West it do so as an equal and sovereign power. Schumacher has almost certainly caused Adenauer toigher price in political concessions from the Western Powers than the Chancellor would otherwise have posed infor German military assistance. Finally, though Schumacher has expressed the opinion that little or nothing is to be expected from negotiations with the USSR, his generalhas in fact reinforced popular sentiment in West Germany that no decision should be taken on rearmament until at least one more attempt has been made toeaceful reunification of Germany, by agreement with the USSR.
Proposals for rearmament are unlikely to obtain popular acquiescence, much lesssupport, until rearmament seems lessand more advantageous than is now the case, and, so long as German opinion is averse to rearmament, Schumacher will continue to exploit this reluctance. Certainlywill not feel it expedient to change his position before the possibilities of peaceful German reunification have been thoroughly explored and until the Western Powers have
* The Office of Uie Assistant Chief, ol, Department of Ihe Army, believes this sentence should read: "Bui Adenauer's Government reslsmall majority, both In Parliament and In tlie country, and the Chancellor considers thisar. insultlcient basis for the momentousleading to rearmamentilitarywith Ihe Westernranted the minimum German demands forndhen the possibility of peaceful Germanfades, and If the Western Powersmeet the German demands outlinedwe believe that German opinion will no longer be strongly averse to rearmament. Then It Is probable that Schumacher will give his support to, or at least acquiesceolicy of rearmamentestern alliance.
Probable Conditions of West German Agreement to Rearmament
The conditions under which Westwould agree to rearm in association with the NATO powers cannot be stated withthey can at best be indicated within limits,ew set forth as minimumGerman public opinion on the subject will plainly depend not solely on the merits of various proposals consideredacuum, but also on concurrent developments in the worldgrowing orfear of war; the status of other problems between Germany and the Western Powers, especially France; the development of the domestic German economic situation, and so on. Moreover, the responsible Germanin part leading and in part reflecting public opinion, retain much flexibility ofthey could hold out for conditions attractive lo their constituents, they could agree to rearmament under conditionsbut not attractive, or they might evenodest beginning of rearmamentcale not calling for much public notice. Finally, since the agreement would bewith the Western Powers, Its details would doubtless take various forms in accord with the progress of discussions.
It Is noteworthy that the Germanshave refrained from precise definition of their conditions. Both Adenauer andhave left themselves wide freedom for maneuver. What appear to bo the essential conditions of rearmament have beenthroughout Germany in three or four phrases, each of which Is left studiously in-precise. These phrases are: (a) equality for
the German military contingent;or the West German state; <c) protectionoviet invasion during rearmament; and <d) financial assistance.
a. "Equality" for the West German military contingent appears to mean, in general, that there must be no obvious and invidiousagainst ll in equipment,command, sector assignment and deployment In general. On the one extreme, however, it is clear that the Gerrnans do not Interpret this to mean Uiat they are to use atomic weapons, lor example, or have aair force. But they make strongon other matters, especially that their units be at least of divisional size, and not limited to infantry: on these particular points they are unlikely to give way. Some formula of "equality" in the agreement will be an essential condition of its acceptance by tho West Gerrnans. but this will certainly beless than complete equality with the forces of the US, for instance. We believe that the details of this problem can be settled by negotiation, to the reasonable satisfaction both of the Germans and of the Western Powers.
b. The Occupation must be based onagreements which will leavu West Germany largely independent. We believe that the Germans will be satisfied withless than complete sovereignty, but. on the other hand, that the obvious signs ofand subjugated status must beThe West Oerman people. If they are to support rearmament, mustense that In every important particular they are masters of their own destiny, as far as the citizens ot any state can be said to be so.
c. It Is plainly Impossible to provide thewith complete protection against Soviet invasion; nevertheless German leaders have in effect posed this demandrecondition of rearmament. They have not stated, in numbers of allied divisions, the amount ol protection they would consider adequate. We interpret this position toaneuver of negotiation. But the German fear of invasion is genuine, as is their feeling thatmight provoke the USSR to invade Accordingly, enough allied land and air forces must be stationed In or near the Federalto give the Germans an increased sense of security while rearmament is In progress. Doubtless the real protection from invasion, such as it is, will consist In factors other than the allied forces on German soil. Forreasons,onsiderable reinforcement of the present occupation forces is essential.
d Financial assistance must be provided the West Oerman stale to aid it in carrying out rearmament. Thisemand specifically stated by Adenauer. The exact amount and method of financial assistanceuestion of the greatest complexity.
f the West Germans are to give active supportrogram of rearmament, wethat the Western Powers will have to give them substantial satisfaction within each of the four categories described in the preceding paragraph. Doubtless thewill aggressively press their demands in the negotiations. Doubtless also they will accept less than they will demand; they arc aware that once the first step is taken and the process of rearmament gets under way, subsequent improvements In the power and status of West Germany will be relatively easy to achieve. In arriving at the minimum terms of agreement, moreover, the Influence of the West German political leaders, and especially perhaps of Schumacher, willgreat importance. Neither Schumacher nor Adenauer, of course, will attempt to carryrogram of rearmament on terms manifestly unacceptable to German public opinion. But if negotiations reach theareasoncession, one way or another, seems just sufficient to tip thethe views of the politicians becomeand their Influence on publicdecisive. Asoint Schumacher's terms would doubtless be stlffer thanif Schumacher should be in power he would be harder to deal with.
n the broader sense, it Is clear that forces outside Germany will largely determine whether West Germany does or does notin association with the NATO powers. For example, the USSR could undoubtedly prevent or postponed Oerman rearmament by
irm offer of German reunification, with genuinely free elections, upon condition of continued demilitarization; to such an offer German public opinion would probablyfavorably. Or the Western Powers could prevent German rearmament by failing to grant the minimum demands of theunder the headings described. It is conceivable that the USSR mighthreat of ultimatum of such grave character as to bring about atostponement of West German rearmament. To estimate what courses of action the USSR or other powers will follow with respect to West Germanis outside the scope of this paper. If they or any of them do not actanner and on the scale necessary to prevent it.we believe that West Germany will eventually agree to rearm and toizeable contingent to the military forces of the Western alliance.
probable development of west gorman foreign policies assuming that rearmament takes place
Certain factsearming andWest Germany appear almostIt will strive to increase its power and extend its influence as rapidly and as far as possible. The West German people, if they are to support rearmament, will have to see itymbol of the end of their subjugated status, and as the beginningong road leading their nation eventuallyosition of primacy in Western Europe. During the first years after rearmament commences, West German foreign policy will doubtless bemainly with attaining completeand gradually Increasing German influence and power in the councils of the Western alliance. We assume that Westshortly after rearmament commences, willull member of NATO.
While the basic Western German desire to remain free of Soviet domination willto be paramount, the attitudes andof the West German Government and people will be increasingly influenced byother and more specific objectives,among which will be to reunite East and
West Germanyovernmentindependent of Soviet or any other foreign control, and to recover lost territories. Including the Saar. It is safe to assume that as scon as the minimum requirements ofindependence and security have been met, whatever power and influence the West German slute is able to command in foreign affairs will be largely directed toward these
roadly speaking, two courses ol action will be open to the rearmed Federal Republic in order to remain independent, to unifyand to recover lost territories: (a) lt can remain allied to tbe Western Powers, depending upon the power of tbe alliance to maintain lis securiLy and possibly to produce concessions from the USSR either byor by military coercion; and (b) il can try toeal with the USSR.
the military capabilities of NATOand the German influence withinbecomes stronger, the Westmay be expected to argue that theof the alliance should not bedefense of Western Europe at theof demarcation, but should extend toof Germanyecovery oflands. This does not necessarilythe West Germans would urge theforthwith into an eastwardprobably they would try to havestrength of NATO built up to abeyond that required for defense, andit as an Instrument of powerdiplomacy directed towards special
the NATO alliance should fall toas quickly or as completely aslike, the West Germansa deal with the USSR toeal might be unmorect,the detachment of Germany fromreturn for territorial concessions fromThe Germans would nola deal If they believed it wouldacceptance of Satellite statusan arrangement could ever in factwould depend upon the course ofIn general, and upon Lhc development
of Soviet and Western policies as well as upon the attitudes of the West Germans themselves.
he fact that West Germany will be the only member of the Western alliance whose anti-Soviet objectives are not merelybut Irredentist will prove troublesome to other NATO powers. France, for example, will hardly give back the Saar willingly, nor will the French wish to employ their military and diplomatic power for the sake of reuniting Germany. Because of its eastern territorial objectives. West Germany would probablyunreconciled to any settlement or modus vivmdi with the USSR which did not satisfy those alms, however much such anmight be desired by other Western Powers. Within NATO the West Germans will be likely to think of themselves asindispensable. They may attempt to treat the organization as in effect aalliance between the US, the UK, and Germany, thus irritating other powers. Finally, whether or not the West Germans ever come to the point ofeal with the USSR in order to achieve their territorial aspirations, they will use the threat ofeal to try to put pressure on their NATO partners.
earmed and sovereign West Germany might at some future timeeal with the USSR, or attain anstatus between East and West,be predicted with certainty. The factors which now seem to weigh so heavily against these courses of action may in the course of years lose their weight, or other factors may intervene lo alter present calculations. It now seems clear that the threat to Westsecurity presented by the USSR must for the predictable future overbalance the pull uf German eastward interests. The power of Germany relative to that of the USSR has greatly diminished; with it has diminished West German ability to renounce Western connections without falling prey to the USSR. Moreover, West German chances of achieving eventual primacy amongWestern European nations appear promising. We do not doubt thai Westwill seek, in pursuit of Its policyto exploit its central position between East and West. It is apt to be an exacting and difficult member of the Western alliance Nevertheless, we believe that the Westwill continue,onsiderable time after rearmament is accomplished, to And that their national security Imperatively requires the maintenance of dose association orwith the Western Powers, and that the achievement of an "independent" position between East and West would call for such an incrcaso of their economic and military strength as to be beyond reasonable
* Th* Office ot the Assistant Chief ol Staff, a-epartment of ihr Army prefers the followinc slon ot thU paragraph:
earmed and sovereign Weal Oormany may remain aligned with the West, but there ll nolhat it will. There Is no evidence lo lustily ruling out thr possibility that at anyestQovttmmcni may reach an understanding with tho USSR which would nullify In (net if not In form Uie West German alignment with the Western Powers While progress in integration with NATO may well set to restrain West Oermany Iromthe connection, such restraint would be only relative aad not decisive. Should West Oermany decide lo modlly her position between East and Westecree that would render her previous alignment with the West si caningould be difficult, if not Impassible, to prevent her by force from taking such action.
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