8
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
'ED FOB RELEASES
Published0
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CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST FOREWORD
set ol estimates regarding criticalIn the Far East was prepared in responseequest from the President. The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of these estimates and concur In them.
The estimates follow in this order:
of Full Chinese Communist
Intervention in Korea
of Soviet Intervention in Korea
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Formosa
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Indochina
Capabilities and Threat
in the Philippines
Soviet and Chinese Commu-
nist Intentions and Capabilities in the Fnr East
Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with respect to these particular situations in the Far East depend in part on the possibilityoviet decision to resort to g'obal war. the latest agreed estimate concerning thatis Included as Section O.
TOj^SECHET
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
A, Throat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
of the Problem.
estimate the threat of full-scaleCommunist intervention In Korea.
The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacldng requisite air and navalare capable of Intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict-Ill. Factors Bearing on Intent.
Indications of Intentions. Despiteby Chou En-Ial, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges ofand border violations, there are noindications of an actual ChineseIntention to resort to full-scaleIn Korea.
Factori Favoring Chinese Communist In tcrvention.
if resulting in defeatajor gainfor Communist China, confirmingthe premier Asiaticonstitutegain for World Communism withincrease in Communist China'sIn the Sino-Sovietesult inof the possibility ofestern-type democracy;permit the retention of sources ofelectric power along the Yalu River.
even if not resulting indefeat of UN forces,the Chinese Communists to utilizewar as an explanation for failure topreviously announced economicbe consistent wilh and furnish strongto anti-Western trends in Asia; anda claim for maximum Sovieteconomic aid to China
with or without(lnal victory, might serve the cause of|>flrlicularly the cause of theUnion, in that It would involve theblocostly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.
d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly faceajor setback in the struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.
Opposing Chinese
a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of suchthat the regime's entire domesticand economy would be Jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be
would minimize theof Chinese membership in the UN andseat on the Security Council.
intervention would beunless protected by powerful Sovietand naval support. Such Sovietnot be forthcoming because itSoviet intervention.
of major Soviet aidPeiplng more dependent on SovietIncrease Soviet control in Manchuria toprobably unwelcome to the
unsuccessful, Chineselay Feiping open to Chinesethe grounds that China would be actingSoviet caLipaw
ilitary standpoint the mosttime lor intervention In Korea has
g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt Intervention, while
avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:
Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US;
Promote the China-led Asiatic"revolutionaryhile ostensibly supporting peace;
Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chineseneeds in Korea;
Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in Communist circles In China and Asia
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generally, without risking war with the US.
fV, Probability of Chinese Communiit Action.
hile full-scale Chinese Communistin Korea must be regarded asonsideration of all known factors leads to tbe conclusion thatoviet decision for global war, such action is not probableuring this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.
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B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea
Slalement of tho Problem.
L To estimate the threat of direct Soviet military intervention in Korea
IL Capabilities.
armed forces now ln the Farcapable of intervening overwhelminglyvirtually without warning.
III. Foctors Beating on Intent.
Indication! of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no Indication that It Intends to Intervene directly ln Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its official statements and in Its propaganda to give tlie impression that it is not Involved tn the KoreanMoreover, the USSR has taken noor military actions that constitute direct armed Intervention in Korea.the Soviet Government for some months has been Increasingly Improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as In other strategic areas.
Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention. The defeat of North Korea wouldajor setback for the USSR. It would Involve:
loss of ft Satellite, nndestern-oriented stale on theof Communist China and the USSR
the Western Powers abridgehead which the Kremlinregardhreat to theand military centers ofand the Soviet Far East.
the Soviet military andpositionis Japan.
loss to Soviet political prestige Inwould demonstrate that the Kremlin Lsto support its followers effectivelySoviet-Instigated action.
loss to Soviet military prestige inwould leadendency, whether orto re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.
eduction In the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding Its politicalby means short of war In that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-Inspired aggression.
Opposing SovietIn weighing potential gains and risks of
intervention, the Soviet leaders mustas an overwhelming consideration, that their open intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an issue on which the Western world hasew degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would beby the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater.ecision toopenly ln Korea, In the ultimate analysis,ecision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.
Soviet leaders may estimatewill be possible, without assuming thisrisk, to salvage some of the lossesfrom the Korean situation. USactivities could be obstructed byguerrilla action, which might involvein an extended and costly occupationcould contribute to Soviet effortslnacial enmity towardand the Western Powers.
IV. Probabilities of Soviet Action.
t Is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses hi Korea warrant direct military interventiononsequent grave risk of war. They will Intervene In the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of over-all considerations, that It is to theirtolobal war at this time.
C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa
of the Problem.
estimate the threat of Chineseinvasion of Formosa
Despite certain definite Chinesedeficiencies in naval and air forces and probably In amphibious training andthe Communists are now capable of launching an invasion against Formosa withroops and moderate air cover. The USSR couldinimum furnishadvice and technical and logistic support.
Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient in number and materiel to defend Formosa, lack of staying power, poorstructure, lack of inter-servicequestionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition make their defense capabilities questionable.
Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the Chinese Nationalist defense forces are capable of holding Formosaetermined Chinese Communist invasion,
Bearing on Intent.
of Intentions. Frequentstatements of the Chineseclearly indicated their intention laof Formosa. However, availabledoes not indicate theirdo so in the immediate future. Anfactor bearing upon the intentis the degree of control the USSRof exercising over the Chineseand the Soviet intent withFormosa.
Favoring Invasion of Formosa.
a. The occupation of Formosa wouldthe symbol of Nationalist resistance;otential source ol coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist regime;
and would seriously diminish continued anti-Communist resistance in China andSoutheast Asia.
or continuedof an attack on Formosa would resultloss of "face" to the Chinese Communists.
would provide themall but significantforeign exchange,otentialrice, thereby contributing somewhatCommunist capabilities for
Opposing an Invasion ofSuccess would be improbable.
h. An attack involves the risk of war with the US as long as US forces are interposed between Formosa and the mainland. The Chinese Communist leadership would beto jeopardize Its popular support, domestic achievements, and internal program by an attack on Formosa that could lead to retaliatory air attacks on Chinese cities,trict blockade of Ihe Chinese coast, to strong economic sanctions, and to protracted warfare that could sap Chinese economic strength.
Chinese Communists faceproblems, including banditry,unrest, guerrilla opposition,agrarian maladjustments, andinvolved in consolidating theParly's political control. Forthe danger exists that. Iffail or prove unduly costly, thesolidarity of the Communistbe subjectedevere strain.
view of current UN interest inthe Chinese Communists have someto hopeavorable political solution
IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Invasion.
is believed that,ovietto precipitate global war, an invasionby the Chinese Communists willattempted during the remainder
D. Threathineso Communist Invasion of Indochina
Statement of tho Problem.
estimate the threathineseinvasion of Indochina
It Capabilities.
From forces presently deployed near the Indochina border, the Chinese Communists couldroops for an Invasion of Indochina withoutdditionalCommunist troops could arrive at the border in support of an invasion within ten days. Reinforcements and supplies might be moved by sea to rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. It Is also within Chinese Communist capabilities to furnish air support for an invasion.
These capabilities could be exercised without jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations in the Far East, except to the already inadequate air supportimultaneous North Korean or Formosan intervention.
If the Chinese Communists shouldIndochina, it is almost certain that the defending forces under the French would soon lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.
IIL Factors Bearing on Intent.
of Intentions.
construction and improvementrailroads, and air facilities; theof technical and trulnlng assistancepersonnel; present logisticthe border provinces ofand Yunnanall these mightas positive Indicators of aninvasion These activities, however,be Indicators of an Increase in theChinese Communist aid to the Vietrather than of Chinese invasion.
Chinese Communistspropaganda support lo the Viethas been no public Chinesewhich could icasoriablyommitment to Invade or asfor Invasion
Favoring Intervention.
Chinese Communist Invasion ofwould be the most rapid means ofa Communist Indochina.
fall of Vietnam to thefacilitate establishment ofover Burma and Thailand.
early Communist victory inwould In part offset the loss ofCommunist prestige occasionedreverses In Korea.
Chinese Communists, operatingof International Communism,Indochina with the hope that, evenintervention should deprive them ofvictory. Western bloc forces wouldIn Inconclusive warfare In the
Opposing Intervention.
Chinese Communist invasion ofwould greatly increase the risk ofCommunist involvement In warWestern Powers or the UN. as well asof global war.
Viet Minh military successesthe probability thatof Indochina can be ultimatelyresort to Chinese Communistproviding there is no major increaseplanned external assistance toand their supporters.
Minh capabilities can beIncreased without resort to open
of Indochina by Chinesetroops would arouse localand coulderious sourceconflict between Peiping andleadership.
Chinese Communist invasionto antagonize the presently neutralAsia, particularly India.
ommunist China's prospects forin the UN and UN-sponsoredwould be jeopardized and thefor the establishment of diplomatic rela-
lions with powers outside the Soviet orbit would be curtailed.
jr. Chinese Communist Invasion ofmight provide the US with an impelling reason for retaining In the vicinity ofmajor objective of the Chinese CommunistUS Seventh Fleet.
IV. Probabilities of Chinese Communis Invasion.
It is estimated that an open Chinesepossible and capable of being launched with Uttle or no preliminaryImprobablet Is highly probable, however, that the Chinesewill Increase the substantial military assistance already being given to the Viet Minh forces.
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E. Communis* Capabilities and Threat in tho Philippines
Statement of the Problem.
estimate the Communistthreat ln the Philippines.
||. Capabilities.
Huks. The Huks (Hukbongifg Bayan) are today the armyCommunism, led by avowedwho follow the policies and seekthe objectives of Worldarmed strength is estimated athe Huks areguerrilla organization, utilizing "hittactics; making maximum use of theof surprise, choice of terrain, andand avoiding frontal engagementforces. The Huks, who arealmost exclusively to infantrythe capability of mounting0 men)attacks simultaneously againsttargets.. theytheir areas of operationand lo other islands of therecent months they have carried outand more widespreadHuks have terrorized localinterfered with travel. They canintensify Iheir operations, particularlydefended provincial areas, andstage another series of coordinatedbefore the end
Elements.
a. Support of the Huk movement, apart from that derived from unorganized lawless elements, is found among large numbers of peasants, who willingly or by force andcontribute to the Huk movement.source of .support Is round in thelabor movement, where low real wages and poor conditions of work permitof the union movements by Communist organizers.
the Communists havein China, it is believed that athe approximatelyillionhave already aligned themselvesPeiping regime. Such Chinese arefacilitating Communistfinancial support, andaid to the Huks.
intelligence does notthe Huks have received, or are likelysufficient assistance fromsources to alter their militarysignificantly
Couniermeasurts.efforts to deal with the Hukbeen ineffective thus far.have been and are able tointernal security but are unablelocal areas where dissident groupsRecently reorganized armedbe able to deal more effectively withbut little improvementisillusionment with'ineffectiveness has causedwho arc not active Huk supportersindifferent and uncooperativeefforts to stamp out theThe government, moreover, hasdisposition to adopt and implementand social reforms which mightconsiderably Ihe number of peasantsthe Huks.eductionmeasurably Huk capabilities and theof their operations, but would notthe hard core of the Hukwould continue to pose aproblem.
IV. Conclusions.
the Huks are capable ofwidespread, coordinated raidscentral Luzon, and creating somein the Manila area, It is estimatedcannot overthrow the
F. General Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East
Statement of the Problem.
estimate general Soviet andintentions and capabilities inEast
IL Objectives.
Soviet Union and Communistthe common objective ofcontrol throughout the Farboth would prefer to secure thiswithout resort to general war.Union includes In itsommiinlzed Asia,While the Chineseobject to such Kremlin control, theyno overt indication that they do notthe primacy of Moscow in
III. Capabilities.
Short of Direct Employment of Armed Forces. The Soviet Union and Communist China have the capacity, through aof measures short or war, further tothe strength of Communism in all areas in the Far East except those occupied by US or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that in no area of the Far East, except Tibet and possibly Indochina unless presently planned external assistance is Increased, do they have, the capability of establishing completecontrol0 through such measures.
Withployment of Armed Forces. In the event of war beginning
Soviet Union acting alone has theof rapidly occupying Korea,Okinawa; ofubstantialinvasion of Honshu; andharassing attacks on theKyushu, Formosa, the Philippines,islands in the adjacent waters, andcommunication.
China acting alonecapability to overrun Tibet andof the mainland of Southeasttotrong attack on Korea.
combination, the Soviet UnionChina have the capability ofpractically all the Asiaticpossibly of occupying all Japan
IV. Intentions.
Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have clearly indicated that they Intend to pursue without pause their goal ofCommunist control over every vulnerable area in the Far East by every means open to them short of direct use of their armed forces. Neither has given concrete indication of anto employ0 its own armed forces outside its own boundaries.
It is estimated in particular that,oviet decision tolobal war, the Soviet Union will notirectly with its armed forces inhostilities, and the Chinese Communists probably will not0 attempt to Invade Korea, Formosa, or Indochina.
Wilh respectossible Sovietto precipitate global war. the latest agreed conclusions are set forth in Enclosure O.
G. Conclusionsossible Soviet Decision To Precipitate Global War
Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxist-LcnInist-Stallnlstby considerations aiTccttng tliethe Soviet Unionorld power.made clear that their long-termto establish World Communism underol the Kremlin. Theirhowever, are:
c To maintain the control or the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.
o strengthen the economic and military position ana defend the territory of theUnion.
consolidate control over theAsian Satellites (including
make secure the strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent thein Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.
eliminate Anglo-AmericanEurope and Asia.
o establish Soviet domination overand Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.
The Soviei Union will Iry to pursue these objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.
On the basis that tlie long-term object of the Soviet rulers Is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers are notto succumb to Soviet dominationa fight, there Is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on the olher.
The Soviet Union will continueits aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western nations.
The Soviet rulers could achieve, and areair way toward achieving, the first three parts of their object (see a,bove) without risk of involvement In direct armed conflict with the Western Towers.
Parts d, e,f their object are improbable of achievement without theof armed force, though there are still factors in the existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, in certain circumstances, and In tbe absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overtof Soviet armed forces.
In pressing to achieve parts d, e, f,f their object, the Soviet rulers will, atstages. Inevitably impinge upon the vital interests of the Western Powers and so incur the risk of involvementeneral warthrough the necessary reactions of the Western Powers.
In tlie belief that their object cannot be fully attained without involvement in awar against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberatelyaroment when, in their opinion, the strength ol the Soviet Unionis the Western Powers is at itsIt is estimated thateriod exists now and will extend from the present4 (Noteith its peak at about hairway.2
From the point of view or military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union isosition toeneral war ofduration now if Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.
While intelligence is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise itsand capability loeneral war, in view of the foregoing it must be recognized that the riskeneral war exists now and
lanki
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at any time when the Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens, wholly or in part, the vital interests of the Western Powers.
NoU ll ISS4 being the data by which it is assumed that North Atlantic Treaty Org animation ICirce* In Europe will be built Up totrength that Uiey can withstand the Initialof surprise attack; and when
Note 2:
gap between the rclaUve strength of the Western Union forces and those of the Soviet Union will have begun to contract.
hen the Soviet Union has made good some essenUal denclenclei tn atomic bomb atockpUe, and in certain types of aircraft; ud before the North AUantlc Treaty Or-ganlaaUoo economy is fully geared to the war effort.
Original document.
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