COPT HO.OR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR yOH REPORTS AHO ESTIMATES
CONSEQUENCES TO THE US OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
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CONSEQUENCES TO THE US OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
domination of mainlandAsia would not be critical1 to US security Interests but would have serious Immediate and direct consequences. The gravest of such consequences wouldpreading of doubt and fear among other threatenedcountries as to the ability of the US to back up its proclaimed intention to haltexpansion everywhere. Unless offset by positive additions to the security of non-Communist countries in other sensitive areas of the world, the psychological effect of the loss of mainland Southeast Asia would not only strengthen Communist propaganda that the advance of Communism is inexorable but would encourage countries vulnerable topressure to adopt "neutral" attitudes in the cold war, or possibly even lead them to an accommodation with Communism.Domination of the Southeast Asianwould Increase the threat to such West-em outposts In the Pacific as the island chain extending from Japan to Australia and New Zealand. The extension of Communistvia Burma, to the borders ol India and Pakistan would augment the slowlyCommunist threat to the IndianThe fall of ttic Southeast Asian mainland would increase the feeling ofalready present in Japanesult
' Assumption: (a) that major US policies la the Far East will be Implemented substantially as now conceived; and (b) that Communist control of Southeast Asia will result In denial ol the area to US and pro-Western nations.
By "would not be critical to US security Interests" Is meant that the loss or Lhc area to Communist domination would notecisively adverse effect on the capabilities of the US lolobal war.
of Communist successes In China and would further underline the apparent economicto the Japanese of associationommunist-dominated Asian sphere.
The countries of mainland Southeast Asia produce such materials on the US strategic list as rubber, tin, shellac, kapok, and teak In substantial volume. Although access to these countries Is not considered to bo "absolutely essential In an emergency" by the National Security Resources Board, US access to this area Is considerednlimitedaccess to the strategic materials ofSoutheast Asia would probably befor the USSR but would not beessential In an emergency'" anddenial of the resources of the area to the Soviet Union would not be essential to the US strategic position. Communist control over the rice surpluses of the Southeast Asian mainland would, however, provide the USSR with considerable bargaining power In Itswith other countries of the Far East.
Loss of the area would Indirectly affect US security interests through its importantconsequences (or countries aligned with the US. Loss of Malaya would deprive the UK of its greatest net dollar earner. Anconsequence of the loss of Indochina mighttrengthening of the defense of Western Europe since French expenditures for men and materiel in Indochina would beto fulfill other commitments. Exclusion of Japan from trade with Southeast Asia would seriously frustrate Japanese prospects for economic recovery.
Communist domination of mainlandAsia would place unfriendly forces astride the mostdircct and best-developed sea and air
'lhc Office of Naval intelligence has concurred In this estimate: tor dissents of the Intelligence organizalions of the Departments ol State. Army, and the Air Force, see Enclosures A, B, and C, respectively. The estimate contain* information available lo CIA as of
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routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. The denial to the US of Intermediate routes in mainland Southeast Asia would be significant becausebetween the US and India and the Near East would be essentiallobal war. In the event ofar, the development of Soviet submarine and air bases in mainland Southeast Ada probably would compel theof US and allied shipping and airIn the Southeast Asia region vialonger alternate routes to the south. This extension of friendly lines ofwould hamper US strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the major non-OommunLst bases In the Far Eastthe offshore Island chain and Australiafrom existing bases In East Africa and the Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on the Indian sub-continent
Besides disrupting established lines oftn the area, the denial of actual military facililies In mainland Southeastparticular, the loss of the major naval operating bases at Singaporewould am T
compel the utilization of less desirablebases. Soviet exploitation of the naval and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia probably would be limited by the difficulties of logistic support but would, nevertheless,the threat to existing lines of
The loss of any portion of mainlandAsia would Increase possiblliUes for the extension of Communist control over theThe fall of Indochina would pro-Tide the Communiststaging area In addition to China for military operations against the rest of mainland Southeast Asia, and this threat might well inspireIn both Thailand and Burma.Thailand's loss, the already considerable difficulty faced by the British In maintaining security In Malaya would be greatlyAssuming Burma's Internal collapse, unfavorable trends lit India would beIf Burma were overcome by external aggression,tiffening of theof the Government of India towardCommunism could be anticipated.
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consequences to the us of communist domination of mainland southeast asia
Consequences of the Lou of fhe Entire Mainland
Psychological Effects.
The most serious Immediate and directresulting from the loss ol theAsia mainland to Soviet-dominatedwould be psychological and wouldirom the proclaimed US intention to halt Communist expansion everywhere.of all the countries in mainlandAsia, hasublicly declaredof this US determination. Inthe loss of Southeast Asia would spread doubt and fear among othernon-Communist countries throughout the world. This unfavorable reaction would be lessened to some extent, however, if events In other "sensitive" areas of thefordemonstrated that the advance of Communism was not Inevitable. To the extent that the loss of the area was not counterbalanced by significant reversals for the forces of Soviet Communism"neutral" attitudes would beand some countries on the perimeter of Soviet power might well accommodatetohe loss of mainland Southeast Asia would add to Communist prestige Internationally, the more so because the area is remote from the USSR and has long been exposed to strong Western influence. The loss would lendthroughout the world to Communist propaganda regarding the inevitability ofand the International Communistwould be encouraged to strike bolder and harder blows at other areas o( the non-Communist world.
Strategic and Political Effects.
If Uie fall of the Southeast Asia mainland should precede or accompany an outbreak of eenctal East-West hostilities. Soviet forcesIn the area would beosition to threaten US lines of communication in the
Far East. Unfriendly control cither under conditions of "cold war" or following theof hostilities would directly threatenand India and increase the pressures, primarily psychological, already being exerted from China on the Philippines. Bothand the Philippines are importantin the island chain which represents the outer perimeter of US defenses In the Pacific and controls access from mainland Asia to the Australia-New Zealand area.
The fall of mainland Southeast Asia would increase the susceptibility of both theof Indonesia and the Philippines topressures. Both subversive actionfrom the mainland and economicwould have increased effect following the loss of faith in the West snd the anxiety inspired by the proximity of aggressivemilitary power. Although the twomight not succumb to Communist pressures Immediately, the stage would be set for their eventual voluntary or InvoluntaryIn the Communist orbit. The out-come of tills eventuality, in turn, would be to place both Australia and New Zealand within closer range of Communist military andpressures. This increased threat would not, however, alter the domestic ororientation of either of these two Commonwealth countries.
The extension of Communist controlto the borders of India and Pakistan would augment the slowly developingthreat to the Indian sub-continent. Covert Communist activities would beindigenous Communists would beand the two major nations of the sub-continent would be exposed to directmilitary and economic pressures Tlie attitude of the Government of India toward International Communism would probably be stiffened, however. If any of th* Southeast Asia countries, particularlyBurma, were overtly attacked by Com-
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China. On the other hand, the trend toward Communism on the Indiancould bet should appear that the fall of Southeast Asia was brought about by indigenous forces in fulfillment of their nationalist aspirations.
To the north, Japan's feeling ofa result of that occupied nation's weak and dependentalready been aggravated by the Communist victory In China. Although this feeling has notapparently willing Japanese support of the OS-UN position In Korea, Communist acquisition of mainland Southeast Asia would undoubtedly strengthen grave concern in Japan over its futureime when efforts are being made by early peace negotiations to assure that country's future on the side of the West. The apparent economic advantage of associationommunist-dominated Asian sphere would impel an unoccupied Japanourse of accommodation with International Communism.
Economic Effects.
Rubber, tin, shellac, kapok, and teak, which are produced in substantial volume In the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, are on the US strategic list. In the case of each of these commodities, however, one or aof the following factors apply:or synthetic materials arc available,sources of supply exist, or present US stockpiles are at levels which are reasonably adequate to permit the US to wage war in the near future.esult, the NationalResources Board and other US agencies concerned with the acquisition of strategic materials do not consider access to mainland Southeast Asia as "absolutely essential In anhailand. Malaya, and Burma are designated by these agencies as areas to which US access Is "desirable" but notBecause of the paucity ol strategicavailable for export irom Indochina, that country Is not regarded as one to which access is necessarily
' Areas to which Access by the VS in War isor Desircbieesult ot US Deficiencies ir. Resources af Vital Materials. NSRB, MaterialsApril rj^QjiiiMlirT
Unlimited access to the strategic materials of mainland Southeast Asia would probably (using the terminology of the NSRB study cited above) be "desirable" for the USSR but not "absolutely essential In anonsequently, solely from the viewpoint of strategic materials, denial of Soviet access to the area would not be essential to the over-all strategic position of the US and Its allies.
in addition to rubber andhe mostcommodity that the Communists would obtain by control of mainlandAsia would be rice, Thailand and Burma arc the largest rice exporters in the world; Indochinaarge rice surplus In the prewar period and could do so again under conditions of relative stability. Theseconsequentlyost important role in the economies of the food-deficit areas of Malaya, India, Ceylon, Japanesser role in the economies of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Communist control over the rice surpluses of mainland Southeast Asia would give theowerful political andweapon in its relations with otherof the Far East.
An indirect but nevertheless extremelyconsequence of the loss of mainland Southeast Asia would be its effect on British plans for achieving the full economic recovery of the sterling area.esult of huge US purchases of tin and rubber, Malaya is the UK's greatest net dollar earner. The loss of Singapore's profitable entrepot trade would
' It Is believed that Lhc present flow ol natural rubber lo Llie USSR and its Satellites, together with the output of synthetic rubber. Is sufficient to meet current requirements and provide additions to stockpiles. Hence, unlimited access to and control over the rubber producing areas of Malaya and Thailand would not appear to be ot great urgency to the USSR at Ihis lime.
The Soviet orbit requires Imports ofmelric tons of Mrs annually to meet Itsrequirementsestricted basis and tosome stockpiling The USSR may bemuchons ol tin annually Irompresent and probably can acquire all of ItsImport needs Irom this source within theyears. Unrestricted access to the outputfromonseven from
0 tons Inwould provide the USSRarge surplus of this strategic metal for possible re-export to Satellites and the West.
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also hare serious Implications for the UK's still tenuous economic position.
An Immediate consequence of the loss of Indochina mighttrengthening of the defense of Western Europe since Frenchfor men and materiel In Indochina would be available to fulfill other
Japan, too. would be adversely affected, grriminn of Japan from trade with mainland Southeast Asia would seriously if notfrustrate Japanese prospects ofrecovery which would permit Japan to achieve economic Independence and anstandard of living. Furthermore, unless Japan were able to trade with thebloc, the additional dollarfor requisite imports would Increasedependence on US aid.
Military Effects.
Communist domination of mainlandAsia would place unfriendly forces astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the western Pacific Ocean area and the Near and Middle East (see accompanyinghe denial to the US of intermediate routes In mainland Southeast Asia would be significant becausebeiween the US and India and the Near East would be essential In global war. In the event ofar. the development of Soviet submarine and air basesosition to interdict war and air transportation through the East Indies, together with the extension ol Soviet naval and air capabilities into the Indian Ocean, probably would compel the detour of US and allied shipping and air transportalton in the Southeast Asia region via considerably lonRcr alternate routes to the south.
'Ihe loss olwould close the Straits of Malacca, while the proximity of potential Communist bases would necessitate theol friendly shipping in the narrow alternate passages of the East Indies. These factors would probably force the use of the long route south of Australia.
Loss of mainland Southeast Asia woulda gap in the chain of available airfields which rim lhe Asian continent and provide mobility to Western air power. Muigaladon near Rangoon and Don Muang near Bangkok, both of which have facilities for4 transport aircraft, lie on the most direct route between Karachi and Manila. The denial of this route and the loss of Singapore would mean that air traffic between allied bases in the Near East, the Asian offshore Island chain, and the US west coast would have to be routed via Australia.
This considerable extension of friendly lines of communication In the Southwest Pacific would tend to Isolate the majorbases in the Faroffshore Island chain andEast Africa and the Near East as well as from the Indian
The loss of mainland Southeast Asia would not eliminate communications between the US and Uie Indian sub-continent since air and sea routes from the US over the Atlantic represent substantially shorter lines ofif,esult of globalthe Mediterranean were also denied to US and Western shipping. Uie Cape of Good Hope route would probablyore desirable alternative to routes south ofAn active submarine menace in the Atlantic as In World War If. however, would probably necessitate Increased routing of shipping over less vulnerable Pacific Ocean routes. Air transit via North or Central Africa will. In any case, continue to be the shortest and quickest route from the US to the Near East and India.
Communist domination of Southeast Asia would deny actual and potential militaryto the West. Singapore is the only major naval operating base betweenand Sydney or Yokosuka and its loss would compel withdrawal of naval forces in the rcRion of Southeast Asia to less desirable peripheral bases al Sublc, Surabaya, and/or 'rrincomalee. Although there are no airfields in mainland Southeast Asia currently capable ol handling medium bombers, thereumber of installation* eurrenUy able tolarge transportew of these installations are capable ol development into medium bomber bases. Their utilization, however, would be against secondary rather than decisive objectives
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Soviet exploitation of naval and air bases In the area would Increase the threat tolines of communication. Sovietin this area would probably be confined largely to submarine and air activity Inwaters. Larger-scale militarystaged from Southeast Asia bases would be unlikely, however, since such operations would have to be supported from industrial bases west of Lake Baikal over long, circuitous and poorly developed lines of communication.
2. Consequences of Partial loss.
Events in Indochina and Burma will strongly Influence the means and timing of the extension of Communist control over the remainder of mainland Southeast Asia.
Indochina.
If It Is assumed that Indochina would be the first portion of mainland Southeast Asia to be lost, It would provide Internationalwith several important advantages. Indochina has become the symbol of USto resist the expansion of Communism in Southeast Asia and the defeat of the French despite widely publicized US aid wouldthe Communists with such valuablethemes as the defeat ofby the forces of nationalism and theof the West to halt the steady advance of Communism. The forces of International Communism wouldtaging area from which mililary operations could be launched against other countries inAsia, whether on the mainland or across the South China Sea.ommunist-dominated Indochina, political pressures could be exerted In Thailand, which, unless substantial outside aid were forthcoming, would probably result hi the completeof that country to International Communismatter of months. Finally, control over Indochina would make available to Communist China the substantial ricewhich Indochina is capable ofunder conditions of internal stability.
Burma.
Whether it is assumed that Burma would fall betorc or after Indochina, control over that country would give the Communiststo its large rice surpluses. It would also provide themase from which political pressures could be exerted against India,and Thailand. Although the terrain makes large-scale military operationsInfiltration of neighboring countries by armed troublemakers wouldelatively simple operation.
If the loss of Indochina accompanies orthe loss of Burma, political pressures against Thailand and military Infiltration of Malaya would probably result In the whole of mainland Southeast Asia falling underdorrxlnatlon within two years, unless large-scale outside support were forthcoming.
Communist control of Burma mightunfavorable trends in neighboring India. If Burmaictim of overt aggression from China,tiffening of theof the Government of India towardCommunism would probably result, although popular reaction might tend toward accommodation.
Thailand.
As indicated above, Thailand, in the absence of substantial outside support, would probably submit to Communismear after Communist victories in either Burma orIf Thailand were under Communist control, the already serious security problem presented by the Thailand-Malayan border would be aggravated and would add to the difficulties of the British Security Forces in Malaya, already heavily occupied.
Although unrestricted access to Thailand's tin and rubber is not essential to the warof the Soviet bloc, it would cushion the USSR's economy against the effects of an extended and costly war. Thailand's large export surpluses of0 tonsould meet the import requirements of the food-deficit South China0 tons annually) and place the Soviet blocowerful political and economic bargaining position among the rice-importing countries of
Because of the close political ties that have developed between the US and Thailand. US prestige would suffer severely In the event that Thailand is lost to Communism.
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Although unrestricted Sorlet access to the rubber and tin ol Malaya Is not essential. It wouldesirable contribution to the Soviet economy. IX It is assumed that the rubber and Un resources of Thailand would beto the Sorlet bloc prior to tbeof Communist control over Malaya, It Is probable that the Soviet bloc would findraction of the Malayan resources worth exploitation-Possession of Singapore, the most important naval base in the Far East, would increase the operational capabilities of the Soviet Navy, particularly its submarine fleet.
Because of Its proximity and close relations with Indonesia, increased infiltration offrom Malaya to Indonesia would occur.
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ENCLOSURE A
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
do not necessarily disagree with the major conclusion of this estimate as stated In the opening sentence of the Summary and conclusions, but we feel that the narrowgiven the terms of reference makes It impossible to reach this conclusion with the certainty suggested by the present paper. Determination of the seriousness of the fall of Southeast Asia Mainland towould appear to require much more detailed consideration of the snow-balling effects of such an event, primarily in terms of Its Impact on other areas and on the world position of the US. It Is realized that the resultshain reaction are difficult to predict The estimate does, however, contain sufficient indication ofeaction tomuch closer attention to the factors that are involved.
In addition, wc would also consider asand ^dispensable to the estimate:
A more thorough evaluation of the significance of the area to the TJS world position and;
A consideration of variouscircumstances under which the loss of Southeast Asia Mainland might occur, and of how these circumstances might affect the US world position.
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ENCLOSURE B
DISSENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of, Intelligence, Department of thelssenls fromRevised) for the following reasons:
a_ The principal conclusion In this study, that Communist domination of the area would notecisive effect on theof. tolobal war, does not appear to place sufficient emphasis on the seriousness of the long-range consequences to. of the loss of mainland Southeast Asia.
b. It Is felt that while Communistof mainland Southeast Asia, considered in vacuo, would notecisively adverse effect. military capabilities tolobal war, neverthelessommunist gain would Immediately, directly, and most seriously affect. strategicand might ultimately become "critical" to. sccurily position when considered in conjunction with possible losses in other areas.
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ENCLOSURE C
DISSENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
The Director ofas reviewedRevised),to the US of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeastnd dissents from subject estimate for the following reason:
a. The estimate is seriously misleading,because It falls toalanced presentation of the consequences to the Unitedand long-range as well as short-range -of Communistof mainland Southeast Asia. Whilemedium and long-range factors areIndividually In the text, these are not adequately reflected In the Summary and Conclusions. It is believed that, from the medium and long-range points of view, the strategic, political, military, and sociological effects of the loss nf mainland Southeast Asia may well be more serious than the immediate and direct psychological effects and couldritical effect on the capabilities of the United States tolobal war. The losspecifically designated area of the world cannot be assessed adequately withoutIts effect on the entire globalIt Is'the view of the Directorhat the loss ofSoutheast Asia, when taken inwith the resultant weakening effect on adjacent areas and adverse developments in other parts of the world, could be critical to United Slates security interests.
t Is recommended thatfe deleted, and that the first sentence of the Summary and Conclusions be rewritten as follows: "Communist domination ofSoutheast Asia could be critical to United States security interests; it would have serious immediate and direct, as well as long-range, consequences."
Original document.
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