EASTERN EUROPEAN PROBLEMS: USSR-EAST GERMANY

Created: 10/20/1950

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EASTERN EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

USSR-East Germany The USSR is unlikely to use the recent

East German elections and the'sovereignty" being granted to the German Democratic Republic (GDR)retext for concluding in the near futurenilateral peace treaty or treaty of mutual assistance with the East German state. The USSR may, however, parallel Western action byermination to the state of war with Germany. Furthermore, in an attempt to increase the prestige of the GDR, It may remove overt Soviet controls from the East German economy and permit the Soviet diplomatic mission to the GDR to carry on the duties of the Soviet Control Commission. As the USSR Will retain its overt status as an occupying power, It Is likely that the USSR will limit the role of the "sovereign" GDR to minor harassment of the Western Powers.

A unilateral peace treaty with the GDR would give the USSR no significant additional advantages, and would present the Kremlin with certain difficulties which It Is under noto face at thiseace treaty would gain little support from the German people and would produce littleadvantage unless accompanied by the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces. In view of present International tension, the Western-decision to increase occupation forces in Germany, and the probability of limited West German rearmament, it is not likely that the USSR is contemplatingeduction in its occupation/forces.eparate peace would openly violate the Potsdam Agreement and weakenasic Soviet propaganda contention that the division of Germany is the result of Western violations of the Potsdam Agreement. Finally, the USSR may not desire at this time toegal barrier to foture four-power consideration of the German problem.

With regardutual assistance pact, the current preponderance of Soviet military strength makesact unnecessary at this time. Moreover, the Kremlin probably wishes toormal military commitment because of Its realization that the struggle for Germany will alwaysrave risk of global war.

he continuing and deliberate acts

along the River. Aside from

of provocation Inltfhted by Bulgaria against Greece and Turkey, as well as Yugoslavia, not only demonstrate the Kremlin's policy of using its /Satellites to create tension and unrest but also point up Soviet ability to pursue mutually contradictory tactics. Bulgaria has recently added to its routme/propaganda attacks, diplomatic pressure, and minor borderemand that Turkey repatriateulgarians of Turkish; ancestry and an attempt tomall piece of Greek border by changing the coarse of the Evr the advantages of inciting unrest, obstructing the Turkish and Greek economies, andretext for possible aggression, it Is difficult tp see what profit the USSR expects to gain from these provocative acts. They are patently Inconsistent with the Soviet peace campaign and serve to lessen any effect it might have in Greece and Turkey. Moreover, by arousing Greek and Turkish/nationalist feeling, these acts tend to Increase Greek and Turklsa popular resentment against the Communist movement