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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CHINA
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE COMMUNIST CHINA
NIE-l0
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Nary, and the Air Force participated In the preparation of this estimate and concur In it This paper is based on information available on
sec
COMMUNIST CHINA
problem
To estimate tbe stability ot the Chinese Communist regime. Its and Its probable courses of action toward the ncn-Comiauiiist world.
relations with the USSR,
of the Chinese Communiit Regime.
the foreseeable future the Chineseregime wfll probably retaincontrol of mainland China.there la undoubtedly muchwith the Communist regime indoeseasure of support orand la developing strong policeNo serious split in the CommunistItself Is now Indicated, inregime has effective control of thearmy. There are nocurrent anti-Communist effortsa successful counter-revolution.basis of the alight evidence available. Itthaten may beactive resistance operations,local banditry to organized guerrillaThere is insufficient evidence eitheror deny Nationalist claims thatnumber of these axethe Nationalist regime on Taiwan.aro creating widespread disordershandicapping the Chinese Conmunistdespite the fact lhat they axelack effective top-level leadership,far have developed no constructiveBy themselves and underthese resistance forces do nota major threat to the Chineseregime.
General Objective* of Coramunia China
main objectives of the Chineseregime are to establish and perpetuatecontrol over all Chinese territory andInommunistsocial order. The Chineseat eliminating Nationalist Chinese and Western power from China and contiguous territories aa rapidly as possible. Withof tha USSR, they aim further at the final victory of world communism and atleadershipommunist Far Bast.
Slno-Soviet Relations.
The Chinese Communists are clearlypolicy and acting In closewith the USSR There la between Pel-ping andefense treaty. There is also at the presenttrong bond ofInterest In Jointly protecting the security of the two regimes, In eliminating Westernfrom Asia, and in furthering theof international communism.
The current Soviet program of economic and military assistance la contributing to Communist China's ability to progress toward Ite military objectives. Western counter-measures against Chinese Communistwould render Communist China more dependent on the USSR for such furtherand military support as the USSR might be able or willing to provide. It lathat such measures would result In Com. munlat China becoming an economic liability to the USSR
atent possibilities of conflict Pulping and Moscow exist In such questions as: (a) control of Chinese border territories like Sinklang and Manchuria; (b) ultimate control over Korea; tc) Soviet efforts to hv filtrate and control the Chinese Ccmmunist government; and (d) failure of the USSR to meet the economic and military requirements
of Communist China. But these elements cf potential conflict between Chinese national interests and Soviet imperialistic policy and tactics are unlikely to develop at least so long as Communist military operations against the "common enemy" continue to be
Soviet strength should declinerelation to that of the US and Its allies,at the same tune, the Chinesebecame convinced that It couldpower through an accommodation withand its allies, the Chinese Communistmight conceivably attempt to breakwith the USSR. This situationto develop in the foreseeable future.
Immediofe Chinese Communist Threats To US Security Interests.
The Chinese Communists areourse of action designed to destroy usInterests ln the Far East and to reduce the worldwide power position of the US and Its allies In relation to the joint powerof the USSR and China.
The scale of the Chinese Communistin Korea and the unwillingness of the Chinese Communists toiplomatic settlement except on their own terms indicate that they intend to drive UN forces out of Korea; they have alreadyarge proportion of their best troops for thisand are prepared to commit additional forces.
he Chinese Communists have Indicated their Arm intention of capturing Taiwan In order to complete the conquest of Chinese territory and eliminate the last stronghold of the Nationalist regime. The Chineseta have the capability for mounting an amphibious attack on Taiwan. So long as the US Seventh Fleet is available to protect tbe Island, however, It Is unlikely that the Chinese Communists would undertake such an operation.
he Chinese Communists at present also have the capability of intervening effectively in Indochina. They have been supporting the Viet Minn for some Ume. Directin strength is almost certain to occur whenever there Is danger either that the Viet Minn will fall to attain Its military objective of driving the French out of Indochina, or that the Boo Dal government Is succeeding Inthe support oi the Viet Minh. Kven if they do not openly intervene inthey can and probably will Increase military assistance to tbe Viet Minh In an effort to make tbe French position untenable.
he Chinese Communists are also capable it securing Bonk Kong at any time, and they are likely to do so whenever they havethemselves that there Is no longer any advantage in leaving Hong Kong in British hands and whenever they are willing tothe consequences of hostile action against British territory. Similar considerationsto Macao. In the ease of Bong Kong, tbey might stay their hand so as to utilize tbe Hong Kong problemontinuing wedge between the US and UK or to preserve the flow of trade through Hong Kong.
Chinese Communists have furtherof attacking Burma end ofsubversive activities in other countriesAsia. It Is estimated that attbey do not have tho capabilities forattack upon Japan.
nder present circumstances, the Chinese Communists probably have the militaryof concurrently carrying on theirin Korea, intervening effectively Inand Tibet, attacking Burma, andHong Kong, while continuing toopposition groups within China.
Vulnerabilities of Communis! China.
of Communist China's wellenormous numbers of ground forces,extent of Its territory, and theof its communication routes forWestern-type military groundthe counter-measures to whichChina is most vulnerable are the
(a) Support of Resistance Forces.
By supplying the active anti-Communist forces already present in mainland China with effective communications, militaryand logistical support, Communist m
tsry strength could be sapped, and theirfor operations elsewhere could beEven under these circumstances, these opposition groups would be aoiUtcty to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime In the absence of ar.oliticallearcut organization, competent leadershiplan for action.
of Nationalist Forces.
The Nationalist Chinese Government cm Taiwan has an army In beingroops. There la considerable doubt, however, as to tbe reliability andof the Nationalist forces under present Nationalist leadership. The morale and combat efficiency of these forces could doubtless be substantially Improved under US training and supervision. Given adequate logisticarge portion of these forces could be landed on the mainland. There Is considerable question as to whether the Na-tIdealists could mobilise popular support on the mainland or command the effectiveof present guerrilla forces. They might, however, be able to capital Ire ondiscontent with the Communist regime. Such an operation wouldime occupy considerable communist military strength.
Warfare and Limited
Although the economy of China is mainly rural and operates at the subsistence level, the urban segment of the economy Is largely dependent on overseas and coastal trade, and by reason of its concentrationew tocali-
ties. Is particularly vulnerable toand bleckade. CurtaCmect of foreign trade by Western eccroccoc controls,ci by naval blockade, would create urban unemployment and unrest, hinderproduction and development, andserious financialampaign of aerial and naval bombardment against selected porta, raitndustrial capacity and storage bases. In addition to economic warfare measures, would lerioualy reduce the military capabilities of ComraunUt China fee sustained operations, would Impair the ability of the regime to maintain Internal controls and conceivably might imperil the stability of the regime Itself.
of UN Operations Incontinued maintenance of UN military
operations In Korea would resultlgnlfl-caut drain on the Chines* Communists, would pinarge portion of their crack troops and reduce their war-making capabilitiesIt could have other far-reachingsuch as weakening the present feeling of invincibility, reducing the prestige tne regime is gaining from current successes, encouraging internal opposition and straining relations with the Kremlin.
of CoMcurea
The measures ouUfned Ine) and (d) above. If applied to combination, wouldthe Chinese Communist regime These actions would, however,rave danger ol Soviet counteraction and wouM increase tbe dangerlobal war.
Original document.
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