CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

Created: 12/27/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

;'. .'v NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. EST IM AT E

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

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Onlce of rho PciaaiBni Nationaliuil National Becurttj IWojurcra Hoard Department of Stale Office of Secretary ot Defense Department ol tn* arm) fMpirtmcni of tbe Navy Department uf the Air Pokh Atonic Bnervr OMnrabaMn JeCot Chief* ofceii'. Borcan ot Investigationmuen and Development Board Mur.Hlons Hoard

haktsffitdH AUG

national intelligence estimate

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

Nic-ia

Tho MiMaestMtKBMWUaEaef Bat Prr^rtmarru ol State, Ihe Array, the Nasy, and the Air Force paittcipaled in the preparation of thla eatbnate. and state. Army, and Navy concur Inistent by the mteUigenc* nnianCaion of the Ihrpaftesent ol the Airppended a* en anuex Thisased on information available onecember

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA

ASSUMPTION: That hostlliUcs have not spread beyond tha bordajs of Korea at tne timearlstta to emuioy Crunew Nationalist (wees In Korea *

rolracled dslenaeeachhead la undertaken, tha presence of Chinese Nation-

rBoperatini under good anr. adequate supervision

hatever Hie military outcome In Korea.

1 of Chinese NatMcailsU there

nd would,

continuing ITS support of th* tionallst meat of would

mvotflxig tha feasibilitypolicy ot neutralization of Taiwan,wlUi respect to the employment ofnaval and air forces other than"g-too

1 The chhaese Nauonalists bin catered a andefensive Unaha task-force0 troops for service in Korea against numerically vaiUynd possiblyreater number Communist without leoiwrdtnng In* security of Taiwan. Nationalist troops haer undergonena prolonged teelnms. but due to tnept lead-

CT^Mp sUttd ifrXUTasfTY 1ft ttitft

ajority of UN nations would psobeblyS proposal lo use Chinese Nation-Thereeneral ledWeor at least provide the pretextreased militancy on the part of Communist China. This militancy would increase the cancer of Onna, which to global war. Is, pean nations would feel strongly that the US was jeopardising the firat-prioiily teslc ol defense of the European continent byinvolved In motraeted hostilities in Asia Th* eiaaricymam of the Chinese Nationalist* would niienate olr.er Asiatic countries, wnic".

OUeaOon of their morale. The majority ot NaiWinalUit troops on Taiwan havo come from the more tempera le sane* of China,r.mt for Itorea probably would require tramrng and seer- le-eeulpmenl tetoee baang committed to combat Ine*th*rIn other respects, the initialoonimgent lor Korea would be well-equlpped and couM be transported to Korea in fourtesn days The Nationalist troops are experienced and tanuilar with ChineseUc Ues- Nationalist units shouldcomparatively efficiently under good leadershipflrquale ^suparvls^^but

tMnalUtrrcepT In Kane. In the hers estimated to ba available within the Ira-medlale future would notajor factor alTc.-ung Ihe ability of UN forces to establlsli

cuewai ii( Ihe imaMlste DOirsnt ol

HiOonallrt treopi la <wh In (he prevent oluaUin una ants mil deal wlUi Uv>ofstuwfcUii Irocpa ellhie

i ipannter naflw Aa Msnuteparatnn on the mil* ircneral question.

area/bcyorid the immediale tactical (il UN

conssswr tbe Chtrasee Nstkmaliste lo bapoUUrallyrepudiated by their own people.US action in uilng Chinesewould Intensify these feelings.

Tlw uaa of Chinese Nationalist troops In Korea would icinor* whatever chance might remain ofpolitical solution of the Kin ran conflict. Although it Is evident thatChina strongly supportatrategtc ob)ectiwea, this support cughl

wruit of the use of Chmes* NaacnalUl forces in Korea.

SSR would prota btyni-Latrral US decision to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea as: (a) further embroiling tho US in hOilUibes with Communist China Without engaging the USSH; (b) dividing the US from it* allies; and (c) proridmgfor latemailonal Communist propa-candaalleged US rrXllarvand support of reactionary regimes

ANNEX

Director of TntHltprnee.bi NIE-12

In general. IhU estimate ha* amphaalaad ihe military and political diaadvanUgrs ol tha employment of Chlneaeores* In Korea, and has railed to point out adequaiely the advantages which would accrueie irs.-uj* campaign tn Korea by the uh of audi iceecs. Speclflc pom la are aa follow*:

a. Tbe discussions In thU paper appear to have been Eoverned by the aooeplance of0 Nationalist troop* at being eraentbiliy Ihe total number available for employment In Korea. Thisstimate, thia number to be far teas than the total available

t> The Mtimate dcea not per saflsrstntIhe fart thatior.-

"f iBmi I

e. Introductionarge number ofauontlfat troops couldub* slantlal contribution by providingInfantry toU.N. campaign In Korea,eachhead were retained.

d. This office does not believe that tho le action* of all the various Asiatic nations to tot employmentationalist tronpt In Korea can Ik assessed with stsseaHll

nation* win be rrn-Toeably opposed to the utilisation re these anttcommunutn loss respect, morehai paper to the attitude* ol the gcreerimenti. or ma kniiira la the respective coon trie* than le the elrrarnti which tnuy recognise the Cora munUt menace and would be encouraged by

Iras new oppcslivm to Communism'sIt is not beyond tbe bounds of paeaiMUy that even in Kurooe. public opfclon might bam to applaud firm opposition, whether It be In Ruiope ot In Asia, and tn fact might prefer the fight to be made in Asia.

t. The estimate Indicates that Um uh of Chinese KaUcaalist troops in Korea would eliminate any leaudi.lng chance u( anpolitical solution Of the KoreanThis dissent In no way Is Intended to contradict this conclusion. However. Itto Hub odV; that theof dlMlnish-me returns has set in with respect u> the prob-abuityatisfactory unmedlsta pollttcal ojociuskai. The Discussion In tha paper doe* notound etntf oaten as lo whether or not utilisation o* Naturalistild prerodk*n trentnal raatttlcal sotutKn

3 Theimpliesthe ernployrjenl Of OUnese KaUonalus troop* In Kara would give impetus to, or proeidr the pretext for. knereased militancy on the part of Comrau nist China. It Is rsascnable that anyare In militancy. If such is possible (other than againat Hongould bemore by Chinese military capabilities and II*lr own tone-table than by any provo-ratton which might result from theof Chinese Nationalist troops tn Kotoa.

here appears to be msuffldenl dnU to lustily the conclusion 'nf this estimate that "the USSa. would probablynilateral VS. decision to use Chinese KaUoruusrl troops in Korea.-

b. TIjs ofTVee would rente NIE-Il ai Indkratad

batcw:

se asThere urseasadlrfr crrsu fa cTceea re-oaeiap Cauwese fcHomslo:Uesfrr, tmt MI* opptrtvaita todKwggfaA ixpKXtctkm olirowim*nuta* co-nnlOnanf couldror-

aUtot the Kmmn andht tnttre far Zastim iituoluni should beareful MiuhWratfon. The BMW national-ut [arret on Form Ota pr.-nide Ola ontf tillbir means for ,nch trpiotatontuuiice ol ODBMM NatiDnalirtlo Korea

Ktlnlo immM( memr

falern importantaftectln. the ability of UKoand holdline aama *bc peninsulaunwrVally *aatly i'-peilor Chines* CommunUt farcw. nnfm the US-UN mlrodaced W'wiwifi dtreetlf."

t. Reference p. f.dd at endaragraph hiAn Importantnf inar cddKWnoi Wfanrey fi> nslng Hal.imalal tnfaalryereemng lone, prenmt US forces Ot Korea couid be But) mare egeetiotleinkinghe defenseeachheadobilee whvh can counterattack qntckfy at Ihe point! ol oreatett enemy prttatre"

r. Selemce par.mend ftaft itntenr* andewWhaterer llio rmliUiy outcome In Korea, the employ-mrnt ot CtUncw NaUonaUaU Um would. In Ihe eye* of certain otter nation* at Ihe pruent lime,idenlMy the OS with Ihe Chinos' NaiMualiata and wouMegree ol

of the Chineseejnme. At the name ttma thtt ml uexdd tdrnH/jrMen.

it* capaUMiei. and as sveh night naae apsychological edect of potentially grtet ealnennCmmmvnUt foroet "

d. References foDowiiiU the prreent time it majwlty of UN nation* would pnaVblyS pfopaaa! lo use Chinese Natiocjlul troop* in lOh-e* Therernrrjl apprehension that tho employ-nvnt of fT.tnev NationallM troop* in Koreagvre Lmprtoa, Ot al least pctrrido tbe pretext, for Increased militancy on the part of CummiinUIe Wieframe* af the CS-UM to reepeet the Man-thertan tnederi aad the maintenance of the ruibttrgu oonmit Cltneie ffafioriauifoai fla -nalntoad. CAmeae Comment

mmtorm hata high irxele rova rialffjAvA rttprnev'j tha Mi(Chlntxemilitary force. ItliilttRcuU tout any nam fen*tktt wulUcncy comld take /other than in HongttU awawSWtf Therefore, there! bf Milehe dar.getlUi CooanuaBthKa c

lags

.fletne Western European nation* rail might feoi itrenslr thai Uathe nm-prionty tuk of defm* ot the European continent byonlinnfd lnooiaement In prouartcd hOBUliUn In Asia. Latermight coma tohe determination of the VS to take cenetnie-tn* action in aa area, of vita! importance In thr anggle agenit Somtet directed Co-rant-nUt acgr#von. Thet tha ChlnewtoUd might

flll*ts to be reacttonarj, polit';Mly Incompe-tmt, and alreadyy theirte On the ether had. the em%dO$ment of the Chtmei* antMtommnnHt force* could hearten thettmenU of all

re-

inAe other nations tkoald determine thatotand In Korea, thtg wtUore amenableg reeogniee thia meaufkod of relitetng them of the seceetiig of providing morn forces themtelvte.'

1 Reference per. S. Amend aa lollowa:pc of delicate negetkUicms tbe use OtNationalist trcop* In Koreaw irme whaterrr rhannO rnt^il. temnfmrf might Boue prefadaaa. am fWafghfi poHUrnl KanUon of the fa-ear conflKtmetneoo-lialioni tMtnrotftH lant-Gon> mu-

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Original document.

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