he suggestion of the undersigned, the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere*wo-day meeting,d1 to discuss tho obstacles (economic, political, psychological andwhich stand in the way of whole-hearted French support of the Western entente (as exemplified principally in NATO). The meeting, or seminar, was organized as an academic enterprise under the joint auspices of the Centre d'Etudes and the Institute for Advanced Study et Princeton. The membership of the group was French, with the-exception of three American auditors, and was cotrposed of civil servants/ professors, journalists, trede union officials, and business men. (See attached list of participants). The discussion was conducted in French,
Attachedf the discussion. The general tenor is pessimistic, but certain things must be remembered if the discussion is vo be kept in proper perspective. First, most French discussions of politics are marked by skepticism and pessimism; the French are not given to the effervescent optimism of Americans. Second, the Americans who attended these sessions drafted tho agenda and purposely put the emphasis on the obstacles which stand in the woy of full French participation in N'VTO and similar International agencies. They did not askalance sheet of assets and liabilities; had thoy done so, the result of tho discussion mjght have been somewhat less pessimistic. Finally, the French participants were asked to speak with complete candor; this they did, making no effort to paint the picture in bright, rather than sombre, colors.
A few high points in the discussion should bo noted:
First, thereeep-rooted senso of social injustice among French workmen, which leadsonviction on their part that they have little stake in the notion; in view of this fact, the surprising thing is not that five million Frenchmen voted Communist out that more did not do so.
Second. there isonsiderable body of French opinion which regards German rearmament with suspicion aid hostility.
here is great needore extensive program of public information on the aims of NATO, ECA, HDAP, and similar programs. There is even greater ncod for en understanding of American motives and
French "opposite number" to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.
purposes ss regards Europe in general and France in particular (most oJ* the well-informed Frenchmen who took part in this discussion were skeptical that the basic American objective was to prevent theof general war and equally skeptical that the American intention was to defend Europe, not write it off in the first instance andit afterward. Occupation and subsequent liberation are the principal nightmare of the French),
Fourth, the essential program of public information must be conducted by Frenchmen, not Aaaricans. Only Frenchmen can convince other Frenchmen of the essential soundness of the program which the North Atlantic powers have undertaken. The suspicion of foreign "propaganda" Is pathological, and the strength of the Communist(which certainly is foreign) is that it is carried on by Frenchmen who claim to speak as Frenchmen and seem to appeal to French interests, whatever their true motivation may be.
All French political parties to the right of the Communist are 'committed to extending the term of military service and to other measures of rearmament (although the Socialists are perhaps less firmly committed than the others). Difficulties will arise over the methods of financing rearmament. Andmeasure of which would seemincrease the already severe social strains inherent in the French economic and fiscal structure. It wouldistake to underestimate the seriousness of tho situation which will arise as thp tempo of rearmament is stepped up, since there is precious little fat in France to sacrifice to guns. On the other hand, it wouldistake to discount the possibilities that the Frenqh effort will equal or exceed our expectations. Nothing succeeds like success- and es the number of French and Allied combat divisions and combat aircraft increases, tho confidence of the French in their ability to survive willarked influence on their will to survive.
Edward Kead Eiurle
List of.
Seminar at Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere1
Henryormer General Secretary, Deputy to the Economic and Social Council (Conseil economique et social)
Raymond Aron, Diplomatic Correspondent, Le Figaro
Pierre Bcsse, General Secretary for the National Credit Council (Conseil National du Credit)
Economic Commission for Europe(Genev George Boris, Permanent Delegate for France, Offiuu Europe-Hir Economic .
(Commission Economiqueurope)
Jean-Jacques Chevallier, Professor of the Faculty of Law, University of Paris
Maurice Duverger, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Bordeaux
Charles Lucet, Chief of the Bureau for Cultural Exchange of the General Committee for Cultural Relations (Service das Echangesa Direction Gonerale des Relations Culturelles)
Jean Gottmann, Geographer, Professor in the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Paris.
Maurice Megret, agrege' de l'Universite. l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Rationale (institute of Advanced Studies for National Defense)
Q. Passe, of the Ferrous Ketals Labor Union,
Syndicalo de la Siderurgie)
Noel Pouderoux, Director General of the Scientific Organization Committee (Commission Generale d'Organisation Scientifique) Editor,uarterly of the Institutpinion Publique
L. Rosenstock-Franck, Director of Prices in the Office of National Economy (Dircctour des Prix au Ministere de I'.Econoode Notionale)
Piorre Uri, Plans Comaissariat
{Commissariat au Plan)
G. Vente'jol, Membership Secretary, Confederation General du Travail-Force OuvTiere
(General Labor Confederation)
Paul Vignaux, Director of Studies, Ecols des Hautes Etudes
Jacques Vernant, Secretary-General, Centre de'Etudes de Politique Etrangere
i
The seminar sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Study at Princoton and the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere, held at Paris onook as its general topic: "French attitudes with respect to the western entente". The discussions concerned the obstacles in "the way of whole-hearted French participation in the Western Alliance and tended to polariae around three major points:
A. Attitudes of the French working-class toward the western entente.
attitudes toward Germanyartner in tho
md social factors which are likely to influencetoward the wost,
1
Attltudcsof the French Working-ClasB Toward the Western Entente Only two sectors of French society, observed ono member of the seminar, are deeply divided on tbe question-of French participationestern groupingt The working-cless and the Intellectuals. The participants egreed, therefore, that it would be most useful to concentrate on the attitudes of those sectors during the first session of the seminar. (In fsct, the intellectuals wore "almost completely bypassed in the discussions which followed).
A trado union official pointed out thet Force, Puvrlere had made its decision in favorestern bloc ns long egohen the.organi-
1 'Civ IIML
zation splitfroa tbo CGT. Ho admitted that FO has not boon ablo
to convert either the Coasunitt aliitrots in the CGT (who constitute
cn "amorphous mass" which accepts party slogans and cannot or will
not examine them critically) or the bulk of non-Conounist trade unionists
who hove long since occopted tho leadership of the experienced and able
CGT cadres. He stressed tho difficulty of building up rival cadres
oxcepteriod of many yoors, and insisted on the primacy of
economic end social problems over political and international probleaa
ln the wcrkingman's mind,
' Members of the seminar raised thoier, of the workers' reaction
to Ccnmunist propaganda on foreign policy issues. Tbe same trade-union
official expressed the opinion that FO and CFTC (Confederation Francoise
dos Traveilleurs Chretiens) elements pre not influenced in any positive
by such Communist arguments. Ho stated specifically that the non-
Conmunist workers, unlike the intellectuals, have not been effected by
Communist propaganda concerning the Korean war or the MacArthur controversy.
He admitted, however, that some FO mecbers regard the Atlantic Pact as a
mechanism created to serve the United States alone. oprosentatlve of
n fire of consulting engineers cited the resultsecent Sondages
*
poll showingf the workers regard the United States as currently the chief threat to pence, whilettribute that role toessoraid thoy would sympathize with Russia in the evonteneral war,oclorod they would sympathize with tho United Statesovo no reply. AfterT7*tfter discussion, it
was concluded that while the positive effects of Communist foreign policy propaganda have been small, the negative effects upon the workers have been very great: the effect has been to implantconfusion and doubt. It was pointed out, for example,arge majority of the workers are thoroughly confused about the origins and accoaplishments of the Marshall Plan. (Over half of those polled some time ago selected "America's need for foreign markets" as the principal.motive for the Marshall Plan).
A second trade-union representativeomewhat different note by stressing the fundamentally anti-capitalist instincts of most French workers, whether within or outside the CGT. Their attitude toward the Atlantic pect, he contended, is closely interlinked with this sentimental heritage. The average worker has no understanding oflean-type capitalism; "he regards Paul Reynaud as representative both of capitalism and of the west in general." The fact, that visiting Americen capitalists denounce tho shortcomings of French capitalists only confirms the workers in their sense of grievance; it does not convince thera that there are two types of capitalism. esult of this basic anti-capitalism, even some of those workers who vote for tho Center pertie3RP) do not support the Atlantic pact policy. Furthermore, the views of top trade union leaders do not necessarily reflect the views of the rank and filehe CFTC's official support of the Strasbourg efforts at European unity). The workers in general are much more interested in British problems and examples than in tho United
States model; thoylosor analogy between British and French problems, and besides the British oxporlroent appeals to their anti-capitalist prejudices. The further point was made that those workers who believe that tbe western worldission" arc hamperedonstant sense of being on the defensive. (As one bember put It, "one party sings the praises of Russia, the other doesn't say too much that is.bad about tho United States").
The trade-union official's remark that "every question except ono leaves the workorsthat one exceptiononsiderable discussion which illustrated the difficulty of examining foreign policy attitudos without constant reference to social-economic conditions and Issues of social justice. Onecited the results of recent polls or. morale factors ln industry undertaVeni on behalf of UNESCO; ho showed that the wage issue always ranked first in Prance except in the cose of one relatively high-wage plant. In American factories, on the other hand, the wage issuo usually stood well down tho list of morale factors. He also observed that Fronch productivity missions to tho United States fail to win over tho workers and, indeed, even boomerang in nony cases. Workora who return with favorable improsslons and now ideas are accused of having sold out to the capitalists; owners who propose new methods areof aiming ot higher profitseduced labor force. missions to countries like Switzerland or Sweden hoveich deoper impact then those sent to the United States. Even COT
workers return from those countries full of enthusiasm and new ideas; and they continue to preach the new gospel even when the CGT takes sanctions against them. In the United States, on the other hand, the worker carries an ingrained prejudice produced by suspicion of American "imperialism" and resentmentich nation which "thinks it can buy Europe". Members of the seminar disagreed as to whether French workers are impressed by the high living standards of American workers (symbolized by ownershipA great many ppear to be attracted by the idea that in Russia the worker i3 the master, whether or not hear.
Part of the responsibility for the coolness of the working class toward the west was attributed to American errors, members of the seminar felt that the motives and achievements of the Marshall plan, for example, should have been explained to the workers by the Frorch Government and not by direct United States propaganda ef'forts- Sometimes this propaganda has been ineptFL pamphlets depicting an American parpdise to counterbalance the Soviet paradise). But more significant is the fact that the whole western bloc idea has core to be regarded as on taericnn policy, and has not been sold to Frenchmenrench policy. France, they feel, hasattleground between two alien policies, neither of which grows directly out of French needs. This dead end might have been avoided, according to certain participants, if tho United States had refrained from direct propaganda activity designed to win French gratitude and to prove the purity of American aims. The result of such
5
Some brief references were made to tbe attitudes of other social classes in France. It was pointed out, for example, that any general sense of hostility "to the "Aaorican way cf life" is confined to intellectuals and the middle class, ond is not to be found among the workers. One seminar member suggested in this connection that mere might be done to make the cultural and ideological aspects of American life known in France, along with the usual stress on technical and economic achievements. The point wob also aaie that American policy on visa casesaurice Chevalier, Philippe Lamosar)amentable effect in France,reat many intellectuals and civil servants had close connections with the Communists during the Popular Front era. '
Kith respect to the peasantry, it was remarked that naps of Comr.unist (end onti-Aceriean) sentiment coincide closely with maps
cf maquis activity during tho roaiatance period. It cas also observed
that Communist hostility to tho west in rural areas often tends to link up with the hcritago of Gaullist resentment toward America dating from the Giraud- Yalta ora. This combination of Carmuni st-Gaul list hostility has been strengthened somewhat by the effort of ex Vichyitos to gain Americann effort which some Frenchmen believe has been at least partially successful.
u
Attitudes Toward Germanyartner in the Vfe3tern Entente Discussion of this topic broughtange of opinions which were more positive yet far more contradictory. The members of the seminar did not agree on what Germany might do once she becomes strong; but mosthem did agree that Germany cannot be trusted with power unla ss kept in tutelage somehow. They alsoendency to doubt whether American policy-makers had adequately weighed the risks involved in rearming Germany.
A leading French political scientist opened the discussion by categorizing French fearstrong Germany (fear of German dominance of the west, fear, that the Germans might seek reunification by force, fear that German rearmament mightssia). He observedthat the Center parties in considerable part are prepared to accept German rearmament, as is De Gaulle's RPF. The Communists are loft as heirs of the old line Bainville thesis that Germany is the hereditarythesis that has won them much sympathy in rural France. He expressed some doubt as to the United States' desire to prevent rather than toar, and as to American determination (in the event war comes) to defend rather then to liberate western Furope. "Only the survivorsar; but Europe next time won't be among thee remarked. He argued that the west should attempt to reunite Germany by agreement, since Gormany as now constituted is not permanently viable, and the lrredentism pro-
k i
duced by division must sooner or later bring war.
This thesis was questioned in various ways by several .other members of the seminar. rominent journalist contended that the idea ofby agreement is totally unrealistic; thatroposal at present comes either too soon or too late. He recalled the Frenchrejectionroposal to that effect advanced by Kr. Kennan8hen it might have succeeded. ivil servant contended that France's major aim should be to'prevent the reconstitutionational Germany; that somehow Germany must be integrated into something bigger. He rejected as illusory the idea of turning Germany into an un-armed buffer state between east and west. niversity professor pointed out that in view of the Pan-German tradition, irredentism might well continue even if the two halves of Germany were reunited. An American participant expressed his conviction that every important American policy-maker, whether civilian or military, seeks first of all to prevent war through strength, ?nd proposes in case war coir.es to defend rather than liberate western Europe. (Several members of the group expressed hope that these assurances about United States policy might somehow be brought home to French opinion at large, in order to dissipate the widespread mal entendu which exists on both points).
Efforts by the members of the seminar to gauge general public opinion toward Germany were admittedly based on intuition rather than scientific measurement. To some, anti-German sentiment in France is still widesprdad and deep; others were struck by the weakness of anti-German feeling so soon after the defeat and the occupation. Most members agreed, however, that German collaboration with western Europe must be assured somehow. They
agreed too that0 proposals to ream Germany vere premature, since
thoy caseime when there were no arms to give, when the Germans could
use the rearmament issue for bargaining purposes, and when "safor" countries
had not been assured of an arms priority. Two participants warned that
tho possibilityerman agreement with Russia in an effort to recovor
German primacy is not to be counted out; another observed that some Frenchmen
fear, on the contrary, an aggressive anti-Russian policyesurgent Germany.
An American participant remarked that all of the doubta and uncertainties
expressed daring the discussion had been raised just as clearly by Americana
when German rearmament was being examined He pointed: out,
however, that these risks had boon weighed against the risks involved
in other policies or in no policy; and that, in the American view, it
isuestion of where the groater risks lie.
Economic and Social Factors Likely to Influence Frenchthe West
From this final phase of the discussion, there emerged 'a general sentiment of concern and even of possiBiiam. Most of the participants felt that social stresses and economic inequities are already serious in France, end that the impact of roarmaaent is certain to intensify these difficulties. The effect on the nation's unity and morale may be severe enough to hamper France's participation in the western bloc.
A trade-union official pointed out that during the past twenty years at least, every wage rise won by tho workers has quickly been absorbed by price rises. Furthermore, tho workers are not convinced that increased productivity will automatically improve their status; rather, they feel that it will mean nothing moro than higher profits for the owners. The
9
non-Conwunist unions havo therefore tarned to the aliding-scale wago formula, bnsod both on prices and on levels of production. The sliding-scale principle hasbeen acceptod psychologically if not logally; thereotential strike movement each time that' prices rise.
A second union representative insisted that rank-and-file trade unionists already laboreep sense of disillusionment. They feel that so long as the French industrial and commercial structure continues to betollized, labor can make no serious gains. Ont result is the fadlcalization of the CFTC's left wing; another is the conviction that labor has no control over inflationary processes, and can do nothing more than try to keep up through automatic wage increases from tine to time. hole series of reasons, the non-Ccoaunist labor organizations are without strength; only tho Communists seem toolution. The noo-Coamiuniot wage earners are so frustrated by this sense of weakness thatoriod of crisis, on anarchical situation could result.
A high civil servant foresaw serious roporcussions from the shift away from Marshall plan goals (higher living standards) to rearmament. To finance reartament without dangerous inflation will be an almost insoluble problem for tho now Assembly. He recalled with approval tho principle advanced some time ago by Pierre Mendos-France: "on ne peut pas tout faire". The formula is at last being taken up by party leadersocialists,ut the Center parties cannot bring themselves to setist of priorities and torastic choice. He suggested anotherredistribution of income through fiscal, reform. But here too ho foresaw on impasse: the only elements which are heavily
10
Mi
favored by present fiecal arrangements (farmers and small business) constitute the bulk of the anti-Communist forces in Franca ond> in addition, have just won the elections. Serious fiscal reform would therefore disrupt the whole social structure. The only alternative is inflation, rising food prices, growing discontent. The future, in the opinion of this member of the seminar,'is heavily mortgaged.
A second civil servant agreed with this general analysis, although he felt that some improvement could be made if future governments were courageous enough to fight certain demagogic slogans. He cited statistics on agricultural prices and incomes to show that the farmers havo made notable'gains8 at the expense of labor; this fact he contrasted with, misleading pre-election statistics used to attract the farm vote. He suggested too that the United States Government could do more than it already has to keep down the cost to France of essential raw materials. Social securityeavy burden, yet unlike the British system it docs not redistribute income in favor of those elements who have been lowest in the scale. He concluded that since fiscal reform is unlikely and since not much more in the way of taxes can be gotten from the working class, the cost of rearmament will be paid by those who already carry their full taxservants, employees of nationalized industry, etc. Ho raised the 'Question whether these elements might not then be attracted to Cotoaunisci.
Some effort toore optimistic note was made by two members of the seminar (one American and one French). They suggested that out of current difficulties it might be possible to carry through sonic
basic changes ln tho French economic structure; that considerable investment of foreign capital in Frmce and in the overseas areas (if France were to admit such capital) tight result in rationalization and increased production, which could absorb much of the cost of rearmament and couldimultaneous rise in living standards. The success of Anglo-American productivity' to-^ms was cited as an example which might bo followed.
Most of tho participants, however, remained skeptical. .'. civil servant observed that tho most likely result of optimistic paper plansreater degree of disillusionmont. The question of economic and social progress is not merely technical but essentially political, he insisted; and inertia is greatest in the very circles which are most anti-Comnunist, trade-union representative felt that.arms production in France would inevitably be inflationary unless whole new factories could be imported to replace the present stall high-cost plants. onsulting engineer placed much responsibility at the door of the industrial elite which doc3 not measure up to its responsibilities and which resists progress and expansion. Ke and other participants stressed the lack of mobilityocial structure so essentially artisan andas that of Franco. With few examples of social mobility before them, workers as well as owners tend to be short-sighted end to bo primarily concerned withituation acqulse.
v * is only fair to observe in conclusion that if the tone of the seminar discussions was often pessimistic and critical, and if- the principal
12
stress was on difficulties and weaknesses, this result was in large part inspired by the agenda presented bynerican participants. The latter were mainly concerned with getting at the problems and preoccupations of Frenchmen with respect toole in the western blocj they wore not seeking an accurate balance between assets and liabilities. In this effort the French participants cooperated dispassionately, candidly, and generously.
Original document.
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