NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE USSR
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST TO THE USSR
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The intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency in theof this estimate. All member* of the IntclUgenceCommittee concurred In this estimateovember
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THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR EAST
TO THE USSR*
THE PROBLEM
To assess Lhe immediate and long range strategic importance of the Far Eastf to the USSR.
CONCLUSIONS
USSR derives numerous andmilitary and economicfrom the areas ol the Far East now under Communist control. This vast,land mass provides valuable bases for launching attacks against the non-Communist Far East and for further political penetration of adjacent areas, and also provides defense in depth to the USSR. Furthermore, it contains amanpower potential andthough largely undeveloped,of strategic raw materials.
The loss of Communist control over any presently-held areas would beby the USSRlow to its prestige, and the loss in particular of Manchuria, North China, and/or the
* For the purposes of this esUmale, It Is assumed that the USSR and Communist China wiltany differences in their strategic assessment or the various areas ol the Far East to the pursuit ot their common objectives against the West. An estimate of possible divergencies between Moscow and Pelplng Is Inhroughout the paper, the term "non-Communist Far East" will be used when referring to South Korea. Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia (the Philippines. Indochina, Burma. Thailand. Malaya, andhe term "Far East- rill include the above-mentioned areas as well asChina. North Korea, and the Soviet Far East (east of and Including the Lake Baikal area).
northernmost part of Korea, wouldhreat to its security.
The expansion of Communist control over all of Korea would provide the USSR with the most favorable base foragainst Japan and would deny the West its last foothold on the Northeast Asian mainland.
Communist control of Taiwan would not only eliminate the last territorial stronghold of anU-Communist China and the threat which the island now posesase for possible military operations against mainland China, but wouldthe Westink in the offshore island chain and increase Communist capabilities for operations against other island bases.
Militarily, the expansion of Communist control into mainland Southeast Asia would be of limited immediate value. Over the long range, Communist control over mainland Southeast Asia,if extended to include Indonesia and the Philippines, could be of great military importance to the USSR.
From an economic point of view,of Southeast Asia would be ofstrategic importance to the Communists by increasing their capabil-
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for weakening the West through denying food to India and Japan and denying strategic raw materials to Japan and the industrial countries of the West. Short of general war, such denial would have most serious consequences because Western countries would find it difficult lo adopt sufficiently drastic emergency measures. In lime of general war, the West would probably initially suffer less through such denial than it did during World War If; it is impossible, however, to estimate the effects in the eventrolonged war.
The rubber of Southeast Asia is arequirement for the USSR.of access to this rubber would oblige the USSR to draw on stockpiles nowto exist. Such denial over aperiod would create seriousfor the USSR. Furthermore, access to rubber, tin, petroleum and possibly other materials of Southeast Asia would be important to the conduct of awar by the USSR and would be even more importantajor industrial expansionommunist Far East.
Of the Far Eastern areas not nowCommunist control, Japan is of the greatest strategic importance to the USSR. Japan poses the greatestthreat to Communist militaryin the Far East andey element of the US defense line in the Western Pa* cific. Moreover, Japan, despite serious deficiencies in food and raw materials, would be an important addition tostrength because it has the only substantial industrial plant and the largest pool of trained workers andin the Far East. Finally, it would be an essential element in theof the region's potential for long
range developmenttrong, largely self-sufficient power complex.*
possibility of creating such acomplex is probably an importantin Soviet long-termomplex were created, it wouldof war greatly enhance the abilityCommunists to maintainlarge scale military operalions inEast. Moreover, it would addthe Soviet potential for breachingUS Pacific defenses and foragainst the US and Australia.
The USSR would encounterbut not insurmountable economic and political problems in developingower complex in the Far East even after it secured control over all areas of the region. In lime of peace, tlieof this complex would almost certainlyecade or more; in wartime little progress toward thatcould be made.
Therefore, in its assessment of the strategic importance of the Far East, the USSR is probably more influenced by short-term than by long-termAny partial expansion in this area, in addition to materially increasing Communist capabilities for gainingof the entire region, would have such consequences within the framework of East-West relationsthe Soviet global position relative to that of thendangering US Pacificraining Western resources;mpairing Western measures to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.
' By "power complex" Isountry or group of closely associated countries with an aggregate ol political, economic, and military strengthtoignificant Influence on the world power situation.
DISCUSSION
Geographic Faciors of Slralegic Importance
he Far Baal is for horn Iho major Soviet power centers in western and centralingle railroad line, an inadequatema; inr and air Lranspoitprovide the only means olbetween European Russia and Asia. Thus, poor communications presently limit the direct contribution cither region can make lo the other.
he security of the ccnteis of Sovietwest of Lake Baikal cannot easily befrom Far Eastern areas now Inhands. European USSR is secure from ground invasion launched from tlie cast. That part of the USSR most vulnerable to bombing attacks from the Far East (the area from Lake Baikal eastward) probablyless than IS percentof the USSR'sIndustrial capacity (see
II. Slralegic Importance of Areas Now Under Communist Control
he maintenance and consolidation of the present Communist position In the Far East is probably the most important consideration in the Kremlin's strategic assessment of that are*. Over and above any positive strategic advantages provided by presently-heldareas, the loss of Communist control over any presently held areas, would beby the USSRlow to Its prestige, and the loss In particular of Manchuria, North China, and/or the northernmost part of Korea, would be regardedhreat to Its security.
Soviet Far East andreas now under Communist controlthe Kremlin with numerous andstrategic advantages. The Soviet Far East provides the USSR with air and naval bases from which attacks can be launched against South Korea, Japan, Alaska, and the US. CommunlsL China, in addition to pro-
viding defense in depth for the Soviet Far East, has air bases which permit long range aircraft to strike at Japan, the Ryukyus,the Philippines, the Marlannas.Southeast Asia, and all except tlieeastern and southern areas of thearchipelago (See Map II.) China's long coast line also offers potential for naval basesespecially submarine baseswhich could extend the USSR's naval operations In the Pacific. efensive point of view, however, the coast of China couldormidable commitment upon the USSR In view of the very limited Chinese Communist naval forces. Communist China's large and fairly well equipped army and air force are now an important adjunct lo Soviet lorces in the Far East. In the event of general war. the enormous population of China wouldthe Communistsremendous pool of manpower for eilher labor or military mount of manpower drawn Inlo the military services, however, would beto limitations Imposed by theof the Chinese economy and the ability ot China and the USSR to equip such
oth the Soviet Far East and Communist China have natural resources, most of which have not yet been fully developed but which are even now playing an important role in increasing the Communist war potential In the Far East, barge quantities ol coal ore located In the Soviet Far East and inChina. There are abundant deposits of Iron ore In China and probably also In the Soviet Far East. China Is alreadyarge part of the Soviet requirements for tin, tungsten, and molybdenum, and deposits of nickel and copper are located In the Soviet Far East. This area also has large lumber resources. Oil deposits exist In the Soviet Far East and in Northwest China.
Korea
he USSR almost certainly regardsof Communist control over at least large areas of North Korea as of greatImportance. Loss of the northernmost
part of Korea would Ire regarded byhreat to the securitylow to the prestige of both the USSH andChina. On the other hand.control over all of Korea would furnish the Communists with the most favorable base for an attack on Jajian, and would provide defense in depth for North China, Manchuria, and Uic Soviet Far East.
III. Slralegic Importance of Non-Communist Areas Taiwan
considerations currentlysjiecia) significance to Peiping.of the island would also provide thewith some economic advantages,principal significance arisesthreat that It now poses toase for military operationsChina or raids on CommunistCommunist control ol Taiwanonly eliminate this threat but wouldthe Westink in the offshoreand increase Communistoperations against such otheras Okinawa and the Philippines.
Southeast Asia
the expansion ofinto mainland Southeast Asia,of limited Immediate value.of mainland Southeast Asiadefense In depth lo China'sbut present Communist capabilityuse of even the few naval andin mainland Southeast Asia Isoverland and seawith bases In the area would beand would be vulnerable toEven if control were extended toand Indonesia, thegain few immediate militarybecause neither the mainland norarea of Southeast Asia possesses apool of trained militaryegligible munitionsDefenso of all Southeastpresent formidable difficultiesthe great distances involved, and inade-
quate Soviet and insignificant Chinesenaval forces and merchant shipping, iind the obstacles to developing strongfrom the present resources of China and the Soviel Far East Over the long run. liowcver. many of these deficiencies could be overcome and Communist control over the entire area would provide great military ad vantages becniisc such control would provide protection to lines of communication in Southeast Asia and advanced bases foroffensive action in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.
their sltort run strategicSoutheast Asia, therefore, the USSRmore influenced by thelo be gained by denying iheto the area than by theadvantages which would accrueSoutheast Asia Is currently thesource of natural rubber, tin.as wellecondary source ofshellac, chrome, and petroleum. IIa major source of food for IndiaShort of general war, thewould have most serious problemsto the loss of Southeast Asianbecause they would find It difficultthe necessary emergencyBy the same token, the loss ofearnings wouldevere blow toand indirectly to the US. Thethat would be created inmaterial and in the balance ofpositions of the NATOerious setback in the rate ofIn time of general war,would also face difficulties If itaccess lo Southeast Asian rawalthough the Initial consequencesless serious than In Worlds aof stockpiles, new technicalconservation and substitution, andalternative sources of supply. It Ishowever, to estimate the effectseventrolonged war.
economic and politicalthe Communists would deriveover Southeast Asia wouldn led Japan became more de-
pendent on the markets and raw materials of" this area. The Communists could also use Uieir domination of Southeast Asia totheir harf.auilng position with other non-Communist areas. For instance.control over Southeast Asian food sin pluses and iaw materials could serveever to bring India into closer association with the Communist world and lo obtainol Western export controls.
n the other hand, the immediateeconomic contribution Southeast Asia could make to the Soviet and Chinese Conv murtfsl economies would be limited by lhe fact that, like the Soviet Far East and China, Southeast Asia israw material producing and capital impoiting aiea. NcverUitess, the rubber of Southeast Asiaontinuingfor the USSR. Denial ol access lohber would oblige the USSR to draw on stockpiles now believed to exist and over aperiod would create serious problems for thet present, the USSR and Communist China are obtaining few other strategic materials from Southeast Asia. Present Soviet impart requirements ol tin can be met fiom Communist China. Moreover, the lice surpluses of Southeast Asia arcnot urgently needed by Communist China or the Soviet Far East. Access to the rubber, tin. petroleum, and possibly other materials of Southeast Asia, however, would be important to the conductrolonged war by the USSR, and would be even more importantajor industrial expansionommunist Far East.
Japan
f the non Communist areas ol the Far East. Japan is of the greatest strategicto the USSR and Communist China.scs the greatest potential threat to Communist military Interests In the Far East. Japan is the principal operational base for UN prosecution ol Korean operations. More Important, from operational bases in Japan. anli-Communtsl forces dominate theto the Soviet Far East and northern China and could attack by air or sea all major industrial and military targets In the Communist-held areas ol the Far East. As
long as Japan provides the US with military bases, the ability of the USSR to attack the US from the Soviel Far East would be sharply curtailed. Conversely, under CommunistJapan would pose the greatest threat to the US position In the Western. Japan also possesses the only significant industrialized economy In the Far East as well as Lhe largest pool of skilled workers,und administrators. Its steelcapacity is nearlyercent lhal of the USSR, It has considerable facilities for the construction of naval andhantand. in time, it could re-establish a aircraft and munitions industry. The industrial plants in the Soviet Far East. Manchuria, and China, though small in ic-lalion to Lhat of Japan, comprise the only other important industrial elements in the Far East.
ommunist Japan couldey role in the development of the Chineseeconomy and could supply Soulherjt Asian requirements for consumer and capital goods However, exploitation of Japan's Industnal
plant would require imports of iron ore,coal, manganese, and tungsten, available
in China, as well as such other raw materials
as rice, petroleum, tin, and rubber Iiom
Southeast Asia.
IV. Overall Regional Considcrolions
Pofcnfial for Development into Power Complex
he addition of virtually all theFar East to presently-held Communist areas wen Id provide the USSR with aof countries which, potentially and over the long run, could be developedtrong industrial nnd military base largelyeconomically of western and central USSR
and capable ofignificant influence
on lhe world power position.
reation ofower complex would greatly enhance the ability ol theto maintain sustained large scale milllaiy opetations in the Far East. Communistol the region would deny the resources of the area to the West, and would add etW-
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to Soviet prestige throughout the world. Moreover,omplex, by adding greatly to Soviet capabilities for breaching remaining US Pacific defenses and for attacks against the US and Australia, wouldevere additional drain on US strength
ven if the Communists were able toconliol of the entire Far Eastern area withouteneral war. however. Lhcy would piobably require alecade, aflcr such control had been obtained,ower complex there. The area might be short of petroleum for some time even with lull access to Indonesian oil.on western and central USSR and on the non-Communist world for certain raw materials such as cotton and for highlyindustrial items could not be quickly ended. With the exception of Japan, the region is deficient in technicians andndustrial workers. Above all. owing toeconomic dependence on both China and Southeast Asia, full realization of the area's potential would require constructionarge merchant fleet, as well as the naval and air strength to defend the long andlines of ocean communication (seen time of peace, all of thesecou Id be removed, but only after years of effort.
he creationommunist-controlled Far Eastern power complex would alsoMoscow with the difficult, though not Insurmountable, problem of working out tlie future relationships ol the USSR, Communist China,ommunist Japan. AJapan and Communist China would almost certainly vie wilh each other forin the Asian Communist movement as well as in the exploitation of the moreareas of the Far East. Tlie Tact that Japan wouldrimary industrial base of the Comnun'ii.sl Far East, combined withmodem experience wilhbp.'i*ilyould threaten China's position and influence In the Asiatic Communi&t. movement. The problem ofOr restricting areas ol influence could strain Sino-Sovict as well as Japanese-Soviet relations. Thus in integrating the Far
East, the USSR would be confronted with control problems far more (lifTicull than Ihosc it faces in the small stales of Eastern Europe. Vast distances, inadequate! Uic pressures ot enormous populations on undeveloped rcsomces would fuithci compli-catc Un- problem of maintaining effectiveovci Ihe region and ol preventing the emergence of independent Communist move-men Is.
espite these difficulties, Uic USSR is piobably Influenced in its long range slralegic assessment of the Far East by the region's potential for being developedtrong, largely sell-sufficient power complexexpansion into any area of ihe Far East would materially increase Communist strength in Ihe area and Communistfoi gaining control of Ihe entireand thus wouldtep towardol lliis power complex.
The Region's Rote tn Current East-Weil Relations
n addition to being influenced by these strictly Far Eastern considerations, Ihe USSR is probably more influenced In its strategic assessment ol the area because of Ihewinch it aflords In the immediate framewoik of East-West relations for strengthening Ihe Soviet global slralegicConditions in the Far East, areto the Kremlin in its campaign loand weaken the non-Communist world. The fighting in Korea and throughoutAsia, as well as such issues as IhePeace Treaty and Ihe recognition ol Communist China, can be exploited in anto undermine faith In the UN at an in-strumrnl for preserving world peace. These issues can also be used in attempting: (a) to increase non-Communist fears ol Iheof war unless an accommodation is reached with the USSR; and (b) to create conflict between the US and its Westernallies over lite diversion of US strength lo Ihe Far East
n addition, the nationalism, poverty, and distiust ot the West prevalent in the Far East piovidc Ihe Communists with propaganda
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(or eliciting tlie support not only of peoples In the Far East but even of other areas of the non-Comorld. These conditions also make the Far East one of the most vulnerable areas of the world lo
Communist expansion by political warfare and serve the Kremlin in its campaign to drain Western resources, and lo obstruct Western measures to strengthen Europe and the Middle East.
Map He 1
THE FAR EAST
AIR DISTANCES FROM TOKYO AND MANILA
UN NAUTICAL MILES)
Original document.
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