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SPECIAL ESTIMATE _
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POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES INEASE FIRE IN KOREA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES INEASE FIRE IN KOREA
Number 8
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Vila OxKoanzoi.-xi for reloaas tki^gfe thy HISTORICAL REVJXwfCentral Intallicsacc
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The intelligence nrpaWPaf Inn^ nff State,
the Army, the Navy, tho Air Force, and the Joint Staffin Ihe preparation oi this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimateuly.
POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES INEASE FIRE IN KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To examine possible Communist objectives Inease fire and armistice in Korea.
CONCLUSIONS
believe that, while the Kremlin has probably notitself to any specific course of action, il is likelyprimary Soviet objective inease fire is tomilitary disengagement In Korea. Although the Communiststhe discussionsease fire and thc period ofsolely to Improve their miliiary position prior toof hostilities in Korea, we believe it more likely
that the Communists aim to achieve an indefinitely prolonged armist'.ce. Such an armistice would, in effect, leade facto division of Korea ath Parallel and might, at the same time, servo to improve* the Communists' prospecls of attaining their objectives in Korea and in larger Far Eastern issues byropaganda and diplomatic campaign where military action has been unsuccessful so far.
believe that the Kremlin is fully awareilitaryin Korea would permit utilization of Chineseelsewhere in Asia, and would free Communistfor utilization elsewhere in the world. Thc Kremlinestimate that,isengagement in Korea, theChinese Communist forces in Manchuria would require theof substantial US-UN forces in Korea and limit US-UNfor employing armed forces against aggression elsewhere.
We believe that thc Kremlin considersreatly Increased risk of general war would result If It took the military measures necessary to overcome the UN forces ln Korea. Furthermore, the Kremlin probably believes that thc cessation of hostilities in Korea would put the Communistsetter position to forestall the impending US-sponsored Japanese peace treaty and to pursue other important Far Eastern objectives. Finally, the Kremlin probably believes lhat thc cessation of hostilities in Korea, evon temporarily, would facilitate the achievement of the larger Communists objectives: (a) promoting complacency in thc West, thus slowing NATOand (b) blunting the impetus for German and Japanese
The possibilities cannot be Ignored, however, that thc Communists: (a) if they fall to achieve their objectives in the Far East through political discussions, will resume the Korean operationarger scale, accepting thc greaUy Increased risk of an expanded conflict and even of general war; or (b) will use the cease fire and armisticeover for launching other local military operations orlobal war.
Whatever may be the Soviet motive Inease fire, the Communists will undoubtedly use any suspension or interruption of military action ln Korea to increase their offensive capability and to play upon the probable reluctance of the US/UN to resume hostilities, to enhance their bargaining position at all stages of negotiations.
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DISCUSSION
THE COMMUNIST CP.ASK FIRE PROPOSAL
Onune, Soviet UN Chief Delegate Malik,N program series,ague suggestion that the "belligcrents" should start discussionscease fire and armistice" In Korea. Onune Malik's statement was clarified to some extent by Soviet Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko, who stated to US Ambassador Kirk that theof parties fighting inepresentatives of the Unified Command plus South Korean Command and of the North Korean's People's Republic Command plusof the Chinese Volunteer Units') should meet anda military armistice, toease fire. Such an armistice, Gromyko said, would be limited to strictlyissues and would not involve political or territorialGromyko also said that assurances against resumption of hostilities should be discussed between the militaryformulating the terms of the military armistice.
Peiping's Initial reaction to the Malik speech was contained in an editorial in thc semi-official People's Daily which endorsed Malik's proposal but failed to clarily Peiping's attitute toward the cease fire. This was followed on Juneorth Korean broadcast in which the Communist propaganda line calling on the People's Army to drive the enemy into the sea was changed to driving "the enemy withinhn Julyhe North Koreans and Chinese Communistaccepted General Ridgeway's offer lo negotiate,the sile of negotiations to Kaesong in the vicinity ofh Parallel and setting the dates for negotiations fromouly. As might have been anticipated, Communistin this period has sought to show thai the ceaseesult of the "defeat" of the UN forces and are being undertaken at the latler's "initiative."
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CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA AND MANCHURIA
Communistforcesin Korea have suffered moreillion casualties in thc faceubstantial increase In theof UN forces. At present, the military situation in Korea appears to be stalemated generally north ofh Parallel after two unsuccessful Communist offensives. The Communists can replace their heavy casualties and can continue large scale military operations in Korea if they receive assistance from thc Soviet Union in replacing equipment losses. Unless, however, the Communists commit substantial numbers of heavily equipped troops with strong air support, we believe that they will continue to be unsuccessful in their efforts to defeat UN forces.
There are fairly reliable indications thai some tanks and heavy equipment are being supplied and that some training
in their use is going on in Manchuria. There is also athat the USSR has agreed to train andubstantial number of Chinese Communist divisions. It is even possible that the Communists may soon have available sufficient troops in Manchuria trained and equipped with heavy weapons tothc presently great advantage of UN forces in fire power. Furthermore, Communist air strength in thc Korean-Manchuria area has been steadily increased, especially by the provision ofet fighters supplied by the USSR. otal ofircraft now available and withdevelopment of their Air Force, the Chinese Communists possess an ever-increasing capability to challenge UN air superiority in Korea. Unless, however, the Communists were in fact able to offset UN air superiority, logistic difficulties would continue to hamper the movement of the material and manpower necessary to permit Communist lorces to sustain large scale offensives in Korea.
ODonrjT
There is some evidence of limited Soviet participation in thc Korean war, beyond the known provision of aircraft, radar, mines, antiaircraft equipment and technical personnel. Soviet pilots may have flown jet aircraft in combat and fairly reliable reports state that Soviet crews are manningequipment in North Korea. There are alsoreports of Soviet combat troops in many locations throughout Manchuria, including towns near thc KoreanThere are, however, no firm indicationsoviet intention to increase their participation in tho near future.
Recent POW reports indicate some friction between Chinese and North Koreansad food situation in North Korea. However, the reports also indicate thatmorale in Korea remains generally good.
POSSIBLE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
Preseni evidence permits no firm basis for determining the Kremlin's objective Inease fire in Korea or for predicting the course of action the Communists are likely tot is probable that the Kremlin's plans remain flexible, permitting the Communists to avoidto any particular course of action until they have had an opportunity to study reaction of the West as thedevelops.
In spite of the cease fire proposal, the Communists clearly are striving to improve their military position. They may intend: (I) to use Ihe time gained by the cease fire proposal solely to improve their miliiary position priorewo use the time gained by theand post-armistice negotiations: (a) to improve their military position and then launch an offensive; (b) to permit
an essential disengagement ol their forces and so to free them for deployment elsewhere; or (cjover for the possible launchinglobalo use the armistice and post-armistice negotiationsirst step toward tlie liquidation of the Communist military venture in Korea. If the Communists pursue either of the first two objectives, their tactics will vary depending upon the length of time they may require to improve their military position. If they pursue the thirdthey may attempt to liquidate the Korean conflict by reestablishing the division of Korea alh Parallel or they may proceed from the armisticeoliticalof the Korean conflict and even of broader Far Eastern issues.
PROPOSALEASE FIRE AND ARMISTICE SOLELY TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION
he Kremlin may have made ils cease fire proposal with no intention of carrying through the negotiations toease fire and armistice.
a. Arguments for this course of action:
(i) The Communists may have estimated that the cease fire discussions would resultelaxation of UN military pressures which would permit them to improve their military position in Korea.
(ii) The Kremlin may have estimated that the mere announcementease fire proposal would have an adverse effect on Ihe morale uf UN Iroops in the field and in training.
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(iil) The Kremlin may have reasoned that the mere announcementoviel -desire to bringease fire wouldotent propaganda weapon in the Soviet "peace campaign.
(iv) The Kremlin may also have estimated that the mere suggestionease fire would bring to the fore divergent views on the conditionsorean settlement, with divisive effects within and among the ON countriesreat divergence of views is already evident between Republic of Korea and its UN allies).
cease fire proposal could serveommunist surpriseKorea or elsewhere.
Kremlin may intend to engineerof armistice discussionsto "justify" increased Sovietto the Chinese CommunistsKoreans and possibly theof Soviet forces in combat.
am Arguments apainst this course ol action:
(i) Although the Kremlin will undoubtedly press vigorously the propagandaof its proposal and will be quick to exploit any division which might appear among the UN allies, these advantages would be merely temporary il thein fact broke off the discussions at an early date.
ODOrtDT
il tho Communists took lhein breaking off the discussions,gain little in their efforts toSoviet cease fire proposal to "justify"
a subsequent increase in Soviet support of thc Chinese Communists and North Koreans.
CONCLUSIONEASE FIRE AND ARMISTICE IN ORDER TOONGER PERIOD IN WHICH TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION
hc Soviet cease fire proposal may have been intended lo resultease fire and armistice and possibly in political discussions, which would afford thconger time to Improve thc military positionrelude to the resumption of hostilities.
for this course of action:
ease fire and armistice wouldespite which would give the Communists time and opportunity lo improve theirand tactical situation.
ease fire and armistice would break thc momentum of thc UN military effort in Korea.
a cease fire and armistice werepropaganda and politicalbove would greatly increase.
against this course of action:
(i) If effective inspection arrangements were Includedease fire and armistice agreement, tho Communists would have
difficulty in building up, without detection, sufficient military strength in North Korea to change the military balance of power materially.
(ii) The Kremlin would have to recognize thatCommunist violations of the cease
fire and armistice agreements were detected, the UN might resume hostilities.
(iii) The abrupt resumption of hostilities by the Communists after an armistice wouldthe risks of extending the conflict.
CONCLUSIONEASE FIRE AND AN ARMISTICE IN ORDER TO CLOSE OUT THE KOREAN CONFLICT
The Communists could follow either of two possible courses of action in.pursuing this objective. The first would be toan armistice and to prolong it indefinitely. The second would be to use Uie armisticeirst step towardinal settlement of the Korean conflict or even of broader Far Eastern issues.
The Communists might hope by means of the first course of action not only to halt thc Korean conflict, but also, in effect, to reestablish tlie division of Korea onh Parallel, thuse facto settlement.
a. Arguments forourse of
(i) In the light of the heavy cost of the Korean war thus far, the Communists might well feel lhal de facto control over the area
north olli Parallel represented (lie most favorable terms on which the Korean war could be broughtlose.
It would enable the Chinese Communists to avoid formal renunciation of any of their original demands (withdrawal of UN forces, control over Formosa,eat in the UN) and thc consequent loss of face.
[Hi) It might subject UN troops in the fieldebilitating and demoralizing period of Inaction and create official and popular pressures on the part of tlie UN belligerents to withdraw their forces from Korea In the faceequirement to keep these forces in Korea for an indefinite period.
might slow down the rate ofrearmament of thc free world.
would give the Communists time tothe combat effectiveness oftraining, including such elite forcesbe training with modern SovietManchuria.
would provide the Chinesean extended respite which theyto further consolidate theirChina.
(vil) It would give the Peiping regime lime lo strengthen its east coast defenses against possible Nationalist xssaults, and/orPeiping to build up strength in South China for possible action against Southeast Asia or Hong Kong and in East Chinaossible invasion of Taiwan.
(viii) It might relieve the USSR of the requirement of sending substantial material aid to Korea and also provide the USSR with greaterof action to exert pressure on vulnerable areas elsewhere.
b. Arguments against this course of action:
t would prevent the Communists from achieving their announced objectives in Korea. It might also aggravate existing frictions between the Chinese and North Koreans and bring to thc fore problems of control over North Korea and possibly Manchuria which might eventually strain Sino-Soviet relations.
indefinite postponement ofobjectives in Korea wouldsevere loss of Communist prestige.
might encourage future Westernto Communist aggression.
he iiocond possible course of action in pursuit of the objective ol closing out the Korean conllict would aim at the achievementinal settlement of the Korean conflict and possibly of larger Far Eastern Issues.
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a. Arguments for this course of aciion:
inal settlement of the Korean conflict would permit the Communists to close out what they mayostly andincident.
(ii) It would permit the Chinese Communists to proceed with the consolidation of theirin China and to strengthen and redeploy their forces for possible miliiary operations such as Southeast Asia or Taiwan.
(ili) It would result in the eventual withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and would remove what the Communists havehreat to the security of Manchuria and thc Soviet Union.
would permit the Communists to pursueand subversive means in Koreafailed to achieve by military methods.
USSR might estimate lhal finalthe Korean war would slow thc raterearmament and mobilizationthe sense of urgency whichin Korea have created.
b. Arguments againsi this course of action:
(i) The UN termsinal settlement in Korea will probably include provisions for eventual unification of Koreaopularly elected government. The Communists would probably regardolution as contrary to their interests in this area.
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(il) It is probable thateunited Korea, the non-Communist elements would be at least initially able to outweigh the influence of the reduced and greatly disorganised Korean Communist elements (barring strongfrom the Chinese Communists or the USSR which would presumably be precluded by the terms of the final settlement).
inal settlement tn Korea on UN terms wouldremendous propaganda victory for the West. This wouldoss in the prestige of both Communist China and the USSR throughout the world andin the Far East.
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Original document.
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