COfl NO. SSISTANT DIRECTOR,
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO A
US AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE USSR
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
51
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONSS AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE USSR
SE-15
1
This docmnanc has boon approved tor roloasa through the HISTORICAL REVIEW FROGRUK of the Central Intelligsnca Agancv.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, thc Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and thc Joint Staffin the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate oneptember.
POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONSS AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE USSR
THE PROBLEM
To assess thc psychological reactions of the Soviet people (as distinguished from thc Communist officialdom)S strategic air offensive, using both atomic and conventional weapons.
ESTIMATE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II
1. There is but little evidence on thc Soviet reaction to Germanduring World War II, and consequently not much basis for judging the probable psyc ho logical effects of heavy US strategic air attacks, including attacks with atomic weapons. Since the Soviet people are Slavs, it may be that their reaction would be different from that of the British, Germans or Japanese, who were subjected to thc heaviest strategic air attacks during the recent conflict. However, certain lessons might be drawn from German and Japanese experience, Ui particular since the totalitarian social and political structure of these two countries was broadly comparable to that of the Soviet Union. While strategic bombing was secondary to front line defeats inAxis civilian morale, iterious adverse effect. It was the principal means of affecting directly the morale of the non-military population. Bombingess adverse effect on Nazi partythe bureaucracy and others closely identified with the regime than it did on thc remainder of the population.
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The initial reaction of all groups to Allied bombing was some heightened antagonism toward thc attackers, but neither In Germany nor Japan did it in the longer run apparently increase hatred of the Allies. Moreover, there is no evidence that Allied bombing caused the population to rally closer around the regime. Instead any popular emotions tended to focus on increased resentment toward thc regime for failing to protect the population adequately against bombing. in thcon-totalitarian country which was not exposed to air bombardment on tbe same scale as Germany and Japan, the effect of German bombing was apparently to increase British antagonism toward thc attacker and to contribute to greater will to fight.
German and Japanese propaganda efforts to counteract the psychological impact of Allied bombing, particularly early German attempts to minimize the damage, were largely unsuccessful, and only increased popular resentment toward the regime. Finally, under continued heavy bombing the population tended to become dejected and apathetic, and their emotional reactions to become dulled.
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki evidentlysheer fear and terror among the local populations, together with awe at the power of the US bomb. However, their effect onJapanese morale was limited because other factors had already severely depressed Japanese morale and dulled popular reactions and because news of thc bombing had not had time to exert Its effect before the Japanese surrender.
German bombing of the USSR in World War IJ wasimited scale. Since evidence on this bombing is meager, it affords no adequate basis for assessing thc probable Soviet reaction to heavy atomic attacks. However, it apparently did not especially affect popular feeling toward thc Germans. ule when militarywere attacked, the Soviet people tended to accept this as an inevitable part of war, although there appears to have been some resentment against the government for failure to meet the situation adequately.
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P ROH ABLE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON SOVIET POPULAR MORALE
most significant psychological effect on the Soviet people ofair offensive would be Us over-all impact on popular morale. Itdifficult to separate the probable impact of bombingfrom that of other important influences which would operate
on Soviet popular attitudes and behavior. Moreover, thc morale effectsS air offensive would dependultitude of complex and closely interrelated factors. Among these factors would be: (a) the psychological preparation of the Soviet people, particularly for atomic attacks; (b) the general state of popular morale at the time of these attacks; (c) the severity and extensiveness of the US air offensive and the target systems attacked; (d) counterbalancing Soviet military successes; fe) the effect of bombing on popular attitudes toward the US and the Kremlin; and (f) the success of Soviet propaganda inthe popular reaction.
While thc Soviet people are generally aware of atomic warfare and of the likelihood they would be bombed in wartime, Soviethas carefully concealed the potential effectsS air offensive and continually underplayed the effectiveness of the atomic bomb. Moreover, while some civil defense measures are apparently underway, there are few Indications of civil defense preparations against atomic weapons, which would serve to increase publicof the results of their use in air attacks. Because of these factors plus thc limited Soviet civilian experience of wartimeand lack of experience of atomic bombing, the Soviet public is probably psychologically unprepared for intensive atomic attacks.
Thc psychological impact of strategic air attacks would also largely depend on the existing general level of popular morale. In general we believe that the stresses and divisive factors in the Soviet social fabric and the lack of popular identification with the regime, all of which contributeelatively low morale among largeof the population, alsoavorable psychological climateurther decline in morale under heavy air attacks. However, a
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distinction must be made between the civilian populationhole and those who arc closely Identified with the regimehe party members, the bureaucracy, the police, and probably most Soviet military officers whose present morale is markedly higher.
wc believe that heavy widespread US airwith mass destruction weapons, would undoubtedly havedepressant effect on Soviet civilian morale, althoughassess how much this might be offset by other The shock effect of mass destruction weapons wouldmarked. Heavy atomic bombing would be likelyshock, fear, disorder and panic in target areas, andsubstantial Indirect effects in non-target areas, largelyon the transmission of news and rumor and the degreeinvolvement (relatives bombed, etc.).
impact on the morale of different socio-economicprobably vary according to their experience of bombing,morale and their attitude toward the regime. Theof the USSR would probably leadilution of anyeffects in regions remote from the bombed areas.the bureaucracy, and others closely identified withwould probably maintain higher morale and showto resist the attacker. On the other hand, thethe unskilled workers and peasants would probably growunder widespread heavy bombing. The morale ofwould obviously decline more than thai of rural groups,
as they would be most likely to be attacked and consequently the most fearful. It is possible that the peasants, who are in general antagonistic toward thc regime, mighl derive some satisfaction at attacks on the cities to which they are forced lo send their grain and which probably appear to them as alien and controlling forces.
decline in Soviet morale resulting from US airbe offset somewhat by various counterbalancing factors. Soviet laud victories and/or heavy retaliatory airtend to bolster Soviet morale. Both of those factors would
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be more indirect and less immediate in their effect, however, than the Impact of heavy air attacks. Devastation and destruction actually experienced would be more important in developing popular attitudes. Should the Soviet citizen become convinced that he wasatriotic war against the attacker and should US air attacks increase antagonism toward thc attacker (seeoviet will to fight would also be strengthened.
oreover, unless US air attacks were to disrupt seriously the various mechanisms of Kremlin control, any adverse impact on Soviet popular morale would be unlikely, at least in thc earlier stages, toajor obstacle to Soviet ability to wage war. If Soviet control mechanisms were seriously weakened, however, the Kremlin might be unable toecline in morale under US air attacks from materially affecting Soviet war potential.
PROBABLE EFFECTS ON SOVIET POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US AND THE KREMLIN
13. An important psychological effectS air offensive, and part of its over-all impact on Soviet morale, would be its effect on Soviet popular attitudes toward the US and the Kremlin. This would also dependreat extent upon thc attendant circumstances surrounding US attacks, such as the target systems hit, the success of Soviet propaganda in conditioning the popular reaction, and US psychological warfare measures. Moreover,eriod of time, the adverse morale effects of heavy, destructive US bombing would gradually dull any initial Soviet popular reactions toward the US or the regime. As in Germany and Japan, these would become submerged in the general apathy, exhaustion, and preoccupation with personal problems which appear to result eventually from widespread and devastating air attacks. We are unable to predict at what point this condition would be reached, but it would appear to be an eventual result of such air attacks.
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Effect on popular attitudes toward the US. US air attacks would probably cause an initial growth of hostility toward the attacker, particularly among bombed groups, but we doubt whether over the longer run they would produce widespread popular hatred of the US. To some extent at least Soviet civilians would tend realistically and even fatalistically to accept US bombing as one of the hazards of war. Moreover, the fairly general lack of strong anti-US sentiment among the people and the difficulty of building up hatred for the US is recognized by thc Soviet leaders, as indicated by their extensive postwar propaganda campaign to build up antagonism. The anti-US reaction to air attacks would be much stronger among groups most closely identified with the regime, which might contribute to greater Soviet will to fight. The developmenttrong anti-US reaction among the general population, however, would largely depend upon Soviet success in convincing the people that the US was the aggressor, and was launching atrocity and "terror" attacks.
Effect on popular attitudes toward the Kremlin On the other hand, we consider it likely that much ofThe initial hostility toward the US might be supplanted, to the extent that Soviet defense and countermeasures were unsuccessful, by an increased antagonism toward the regime. German and Japanese experience in the last war indicates that to the extent the government failed to provide adequate protection to the people and attempted to minimize the extent of thc damage, it aroused popular resentment. If Soviet propaganda attempted to underplay US air attacks it might well boomerang. The heightened popular emotions created by air attacks, which would have littleagainst the attackers, would probably be expended finally on domestic leaders and fellow citizens, particularly if Soviet defenses were inadequate.
IG. We consider it unlikely that US bombing would in itself cause the Soviet people to rally closer to the regime, at least in the long run. The considerable apathy loward the Kremlin which exists among the population and the wide gap already separating the people from their leaders militate against any such development. Only if thewere convinced that the USSR wasatriotic war of
defense against outside aggression would there probably be any growth in popular support for the regime. On the other hand, various minority groups antagonistic toward the regime might be encouraged by US air attacksrelude to possible liberation. Bombing itself, however, would be unlikely to incite them to rebel against the regime, unless Soviet controls broke down.
Effect of the use of atomic weapons. While the Kremlin has tried to incite popular antipathy toward atomic "terror" weapons and would probably play this up in event of US atomic attacks, we areto say whether use of mass destruction weapons would in itself create antagonism toward the US over the longer run. Any unique reaction to atomic weapons might be more likely to lake the form of an increasingly adverse effect on morale. Most Soviet citizens probably realistically acceptar would be waged with all available weapons. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda wouldmake much of US "atrocities" and use of "terror" weapons and might succeed in capitalizing initially on the popular emotions aroused in particular by "area" attacks on population centers.
Effect of choice of targets. The popular reaction would probably be more sharply antagonistic if non-military as well as purelytargets were attacked, particularly with atomic bombs. Soviet propaganda would stress destruction of non-military targets as it did in World War II and the Korean war. Attacks on purely military or key industrial targets would be realistically understood by thc people, as in World War II, and would probablyinimal'effeet on popular feeling. However, in many cases, particularly where these targets were in cities, and where an area weapon like an atomic bomb was used, it would be difficult for the people to distinguish the object of the attack. To the extent that US propaganda could identify the targets attacked in any particular city, popular antagonism might be less. However, it seems clear that atomic attacks on population centers would at least temporarily arouse antagonism toward the attackers, although we are unable to assess how significant thismight be.
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There are conflicting opinions as to the probable popularto attacks on cities of symbolic or cultural significance, such as Moscow or Leningrad. Undoubtedly such attacks would create some antl-US sentiment, although many Soviet citizens mightthc significance of attacking the centers of Soviet control. Theretrong local Soviet reaction to German destruction of key churches and national monuments in the last war, particularly when this appeared purely wanton, and Soviet propaganda wouldstress this theme.
Effect ol popular belief that US or USSR was the aggressor. We are convinced that the USSR would attempt by every means to pin the label of aggressor on the US. The Soviet regime is already seeking systematically to prepare the population for possible war by an increasing propaganda campaign against the US. To the extent that circumstances surrounding thc beginningar permitted the Kremlin to convince the people that the US was the aggressor,antagonism toward the US and patriotic will-to-fight wouldincrease. Under these circumstances the people would probably react more hostilely, at least initially, to US air allacks, depending on the patriotic fervor which the USSR could create. On the other hand, widespread popular belief lhat the USSR was the aggressor would minimize the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda about US air attacks, might reduce any antagonism against the US, and could also increase resentment toward the regime if it inadequately protected the people from US bombing. Popular scepticism toward official pronouncements would undoubtedly increase, creating greaterwarfare opportunities for thc US. The USSR would also make every propaganda effort to convince the people that the US launched the first atomic blow. IX the Soviet public believed that the USSR launched the first attack, however, they would be prone to expect retaliation in kind.
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SOVIET PROPAGANDA REACTION TO US AIR ATTACKS
The Soviet government would doubtless seek by all availablemeans to minimize the adverse morale effects of US air attacks and to utilize these attacks to create patriotic anger at the US. Soviet propaganda would probably seek to: (a) whip up popular anger at US "atrocities" and "terror" attacks, while (b) minimizing and concealing the damage caused; and (c) offsetting it by playing up Soviet "relatiatory" attacks, either real or fictional, and victories on land. Judging from its techniques during World War II and during the Korean conflict, Soviet propaganda would devote much attention to alleged US atrocities, brutality, and use of such weapons as the atomic bomb. The actual effectiveness of US attacks would be minimized and the alleged defensive capabilities of the USSR maximized in order to bolster faith in victory and conceal the actual consequences of thc US air offensive.
Although the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda will depend onintangibles such as the success of Soviet countermeasures, the extent of US attacks, the spread of news by rumor and US propaganda, and popular views as to who is the aggressor, we believe that it would be unable toecline in over-all morale. The spreading of news through the grapevine would reduce the impact of official censorship and propaganda although it is difficult to tell to what extent. The success of attempts to minimize the damage would be largely dependent upon the extent and nature of the US attacks. Once knowledge of these attacks became widespread, it would be difficult to minimize adverse morale effects. German attempts
ide the effects of bombing from the people boomeranged and caused considerable dissatisfaction. News and rumors apparently spread rapidly in the USSR, where the people tend to be sceptical of official propaganda. The Soviet news blackout on the German advance into the USSR1 was apparently unsuccessful and accurate information spread rapidly by the grapevine. Optimistic official propaganda will be more widely disbelieved if, as in Germany and Japan, it is at variance with personal experience. Rumors and tales by refugees may actually exaggerate the effects of air attacks.
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U must be recognized thai because of Uieof the Soviet propaganda machine, Soviet propaganda mightsuccess in building up antagonism toward the USesultair attacks, particularly if the Soviet people could be convincedwas Uie aggressor. The USSR might also be able to capitalizeandUS attacks. To this extent theat least temporarily be able to offset some of the over-alleffectsS air offensive.
EFFECT OK US PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MEASURES
Despite the obvious handicaps under which they would be forced to operate, we believe lhat skillful US psychological warfare measures, especially prior warnings, might contribute materially to countering Soviet propaganda and reducing the antagonism toward thc US resulting from US air attacks. Depending upon the skill and effectiveness with which it was disseminated, US propaganda emphasizing that the US is fighting lo free the Soviet people from their terroristic government, and is seeking only to destroy Soviet war potential might to some extent reduce thc anti-US reaction to US air attacks. It would be most attractive to various disaffected groups. On the other hand, widespread attacks on population rather than production centers probably would produceover this propaganda line. Nevertheless, to the extent that US propaganda can get through to thc Soviet people with accurate news about the purposes and effectiveness of US air attacks, it would tend to counter Soviel propaganda themes.
In particular, prior US warnings might to some extent reduce the popular anti-US reaction to US air attacks. They would also magnify the impression of US air superiority if the attacks were actually and successfully carried out. Emphasis in the warnings on the fact that the US attacks were directed against thc regime's war-making potential and not against the people would bearning program could give theeputation for humanity and fairness which would tend topopular resentment against Uie attackers and, if inadequate defense measures were taken, to increase resentment against the regime. As warnings were fulfilled, people would pay more attention to US propaganda, while Soviet propaganda stressing their invincibility and American brutality might be largely discredited.
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he effectiveness of warnings would depend on the specific andnature of the instructions and explanations given and on whether thc threatened attacks were actually carried out. German warnings to the Soviet population ln World War II apparently were successful because of their timing and accuracy. If the Soviet government prevented people from evacuating areas which they were warned would be attacked, it might seriously increase resentment toward the regime.
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Original document.
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