COPY HO.pf 'L.
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIESURPRISE ATTACK ON THE" CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE2
CIA HISTORICAL REViEW RELEASE IN FULL
0 Published1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BT SECRET
V.CKt'l
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIESURPRISE ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE2
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGWiM (
the Central intoUigance
Published1
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in producing the section of this estimate covering Direct Military Attack. The section on Clandestine Attack with Weapons of) is based onhc section on Subversive Operations,and Civil Disturbances) was prepared by and has the approval of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.
The members of thc Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on
top Kiicnur
top iincnE'i*
SOVIET CAPABILITIESURPRISE ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BEFORE2
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities for weakening,or destroying the war potential of the United Statesurprise attack against the Continental United States before
ASSUMPTIONS For the purpose of this estimate it Is assumed that:
Soviet surprise atiack on the US would beto cause the maximum possible reductioncapability of the US to wage offensive war.
scale and nature of the Soviet effortUS would not be significantly affected bySoviet military campaigns in
USSR would not avoid employing anytactic because of US capabilities forkind.
TOP OLCllL'i
DISCUSSION DIRECT MILITARY ATTACK Air Attack
Atomic bombardment with long-range aircraft is the most effective among the various types of potential surprise air operations against the US within Soviet capabilities during the period considered in this estimate.
Other possible types of surprise air attack, such asbombing with high explosives, guided missiles launched from Soviet-controlled territory and the employment of free balloons will noterious threat during the period
of this estimate. Although chemical and biological weapons might be delivered by long-range aircraft, these weapons are better suited to clandestine or sabotage attack. It is considered unlikely that thc USSR willydrogen bomb during the period of this estimate.
Long Range Bombardment
s the only Soviet bomber in operational usebe capable of reaching the US with an atomic bombSoviet bases. Considering present estimates ofand presenttrength ofaircraft, it is estimated thatbe in units bylthough the Soviets havea new bomber, little is known about this aircraft, and
it Is unlikely that it will appear in operational numbers by
TOD Bl'iCRUT
f Missions
t is believed that operations of Soviet Long Range Aviation would include night and bad weather missions. The following long-range operations could probably be carried out withircraftomb load0 pounds:
. a. One-way missions, from potential staging bases in northeast Siberia and from bases in the Murmansk and Baltic areas, could reach any important target in the US. There is no evidence that the Soviets have in fact developed aerial refueling techniques. However, one aerial refueling would extend the rangene-way mission and enable Soviet planes to reach any Important target in the US even from interior launching bases.
b. Two-way missions from Velkal (in Eastern Siberia) could be carried out against the small segment of the US northwest of Seattle. One aerial refueling would extend this radius to include an arc passing through Los Angeles, Denver, and Minneapolis. Two aerial re-fuelings would extend this radius to include an arcfrom Galveston to Cape May.
Combat Crew Proficiency
oviet Long Range Aviation has no background of combatsuch as that acquired by the UK and the US strategic air forces during World War H. An intensive training program to overcome weaknesses in long-range navigation, instrument and high altitude flying, and electronics techniques has been under way for some time, Soviet crews could be assisted by planted navigational aids and, if they were successful in gaining tactical surprise, could use US radio and other navigational aids to facilitate navigation, target location, and bomb aiming.it Is estimated that Soviet blind bombing equipment and
top oucnrjT
top orconu'i-
all-weather flying capabilities are not up to US standards, it is believed that Soviet combat crew proficiency and equipment performance are such as to permit an attempt by the USSR to carry out strategic air attacks against the US.
Atomic Attack
he limiting factor in thc scale of atomic attack would be the stockpile of bombs available to the USSR for use against the US. The atomic stockpile12 has beenas follows:
5
The above stockpile figures must be considered as uncertain for the following reasons:
The number and/or size of the production facilities postulated in this estimate may beThe minimum program, which is not inconsistent with the information available, wouldtockpile-pf about one-half the number of weapons(shown'm the tabled On the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expandedfacilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded.
Thc type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by changing the weapon design toincrease or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile,ertain quantity of fissionable material. Such changes, however, alter the kilotonnage yield of the individual weapons accordingly.
TOl' CLCllL'T
POP ODOREE
Atomic weapons available to the USSR during the period of this estimate can be expected to develop fromoilotons TNT explosive power. Their weight would probably be between two and five tons; diameter three to five feet; and length fouralf to sevenalf feeton-ballistic case is used, the length is the same as thehe possession of aircraft, trained crews, and base facilities would permit an attempt by the USSR to deliver against the US the full stockpile of atomic bombs that will be available in the period covered by this
Airborne and Amphibious Attack
The USSR will not be capable of launching an invasion of the US byowever, during the period of this estimate the USSR will have limited airborne and even more limited amphibious capabilities for attack against the US.
It is estimated that the USSR would be capable of seizing selected areas, including airfields, in western Alaska and the Aleutians by amphibious, airborne, or combined airborne-amphibious operations. irborneeaborne forces might be employed in initial attacks.
Because of the problems of resupply, the distances involved, the deficiencies of the Soviet surface fleet, and the lack of adequate routes leading out from probable objective areas, large-scale Soviet amphibious and/or airborne operations against the Alaska Peninsula, Fairbanks-Anchorage area or eastern Alaska are believed impracticable. However, the seizure and retention of areas in western Alaska, specifically of thc Seward Peninsula or adjoining areas or parts of the Aleutian Islands is within Soviet capabilities. It is also within Soviet capabilities to execute harasstng raids, employing surface lift, airlift, or submarines against Alaska.
TOP SECRET
'POP iinCRDT
operations against the US, althoughcould take the form of attacks by speciallyand sabotage teams against important andtargets.
Naval Attack
Surface Fleet
the period under consideration, the capability ofsurface fleet and merchant marine for weakening,or destroying the war potential of thc US byagainst the continental US will remain very limited.
Soviet coastal warfare force of minorwhile numerically large, is entirelya surprise transoceanic attack.
the heavier Soviet surface forces areat an appreciable rate in the form ofcruisers and destroyers, they lackstrength and vital carrier-borne airand support for any large-scaleattack. The USSR will be totally lackingcarriers during this period.
present character of the Soviet Merchantheterogeneous collection of vessels, manycritically lacking in tankers, largely precludesof its employment in any large-scalesurprise attack.
USSR presently lacks the advance basemobile logistic support requisite for an attackUS. Any attempt to establish advanced bases infuture would eliminate the element of surprise.
TOP ^KCKKT
TOP 3ECHBT
Submarines
12. During the period up tohe USSR will have an estimated totalubmarines, ofill be capable ofirect attack against the US, The probable courses of action of Soviet submarines are the following:
on merchant shipping and naval vessels.
minelaying along shipping routes andapproaches to principal harbors.
*
of saboteurs and agents,
of guided missiles and rocketstargets.
raiding or other diversionaryATTACK WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION^/
landestineith atomic, chemical and biologicaligh potential of effectivenessimited number of targets, particularly when employedwith, or just prior to, the initiation of full-scale hostilities.
his sectionummary ofhich may be consultedore detailed discussion of this subject.
or the purpose of this estimate, the term "clandestine attack" does not include either surprise attack by undisguised military forces or the employment of conventional sabotage.
nly atomic, chemical and biological weapons have beensince the state of development of other conceivable weapons of mass destruction is such that their employment during thc period of this estimate is considered most unlikely.
TOP GIXIUIT
top liucrtr.'j
C hmdostine Atomic Attack
USSR is capable of clandestine delivery of atomicby disguised aircraft, merchant ships andand guided missiles.
Disguised Aircraft
of its resemblance to thehc Sovietbe disguised with US markings and employed infor clandestine atomic attacks on high prioritycapabilities ofircraft discussed in connectionair attackbove) apply toas well.
Merchant Ships
The USSR is capable of utilizing merchant ships to deliver atomic weapons into key US harbors. An atomic weapon could be laid as an underwater mine or detonated in the holdhip.
Laying an atomic weaponine would require encasing the weaponatertight container and might also require special laying equipment. The USSR is capable of meeting these requirements as well as providing an accurate time-delay mechanism to permit laying the weapon several days, weeks, or months in advanceay.
IB. Detonation of an atomic weapon in thc holdhip would not involve any special engineering problems.
Smuggling
19. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, could be broken down into relatively small components which could be smuggled separately into the US. Unusual handlingwould not be required and radiation detection would be
most improbable. Assembly of the bomb would present certain difficulties but none of an insuperable character.
Although it would be theoretically possible to manufacture clandestinely within the US all the components of an atomic weapon with the exception of the fissionable material, it would be difficult to procure and proeess the necessary material.
Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or, less probably, even an assembled bomb could be consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or supplies without fear of officialby US authorities. In addition, no government agency is specifically charged with the responsibility for observing the off-loading, processing, and disposition of such shipments. This method would require the closely coordinated effort of several individuals in the US to acquire the weapon and deliver it to the target area.
It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb through Customsommercial shipment, and many types of imports from the Soviet Satellites could be usedcover" for such an act. Furthermore, the number of importing firms in the US is so large that the appearanceew firmhange in the imports of an old firm would not automatically arouse the suspicion of the Customs authorities. Theoretically, there are numerous methods by which the USSR could endeavor tothorough Customs inspection; however, they would involve elaborate arrangements as well as the existence within thc US of an efficient organization to establish dummysubvert employees of bonded carriers, etc. Thesegreatly increase the risk of detection.
A more serious threat, well within Soviet capabilities is the smuggling of an atomic bomb, especially if disassembled,oviet port into an isolated section of the US. Such an
operation could involve the transferomboviet-controlled merchant vessel or submarinemall boat which would bring it ashore. Here it could be loadedruck for assembly and subsequent delivery to the target area.
Guided Missiles
Is estimated that the USSRype missilesof atiles which could be launchedships or submarines. Such missiles couldlow altitudes and could have considerably betterthe German operational missiles of Worlds no conclusive evidence that the USSR has ansuitable for usehip-launched guidedconstruction ofarhead ls estimated to becapabilities.
Clandestine Chemical Warfare Attack
The Chemical Warfare (CW) agents most likely to be used for clandestine attack areerles nerve gases, primarily because of their extreme high toxicity. The USSR probably has sufficient quantities oferies nerve gases (GA and GB) for fairly extensive clandestine attacks.
Clandestine nerve gas attack is well suited for employment against personnel in key installations when the objective is immediate incapacitationigh percentage of the personnel. Nerve gas could be releaseduilding by means of an aerosol bomb similar to those used for insecticides and equippedime mechanism. It would also be feasible to attack buildings by spraying nerve gases in the vicinity.
Tho USSR could attempt to bring nerve gases Into the US by any of the methods of smuggling already discussed Inwith clandestine atomic atlack,iplomatic
-
immunity, smuggling through Customs, or introductionoint outside Customs surveillance. In all instances, the successful smuggling of nerve gas or of the complete aerosol dispensers would be considerably easier than the smuggling of atomic weapons. Nerve gas could be easily disguised as one of any number of commercial exports from the Soviet orbit or transmittediplomatic pouch.
Clandestine Biological Warfare Attack
It is estimated that the USSR is capable ofariety of BW agents in sufficient quantities for extensive clandestine employment against man, animals, and plants.
Many types of BW agents are well suited for clandestine attack, and could be employed by the USSR even well in advanceay as part of an over-all plan to impair the military effectiveness of the US. In contrast to clandestine attack with atomic and chemical weapons, clandestine employment of certain BW agents would entail much less risk of identification as enemy action.
small amounts of these agents would beSuch amounts would be almost impossiblewhen being brought into this country underof diplomatic immunity or throughIn addition, it would not be difficult toBW agents procured and cultured locally bybacteriologist.
effects of BW agents are not apparent untildays after dissemination.
results of many BW agents resemble naturalof disease, and it would be difficult toemployment of such agentsostile act.
-
top iiKcnrcT
BW Attack Against Personnel
It is likely that the only anti-personnel BW agents which the USSR would employ prioray would be those causing diseases common to the US, since the outbreak of an unusual disease would probably arouse suspicion as to its source. The statistics of thc Public Health Service on the incidence of various diseases in the US are made public and undoubtedly are known to the USSR.
In clandestine attack, it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient concentrations of BW agents to produce large numbers of casualties in urban areas. However, BW agents could be employed clandestinely to incapacitate key individuals and personnel in vital installations. Dissemination of some airborne BW agentsuilding probably would cause casualtiesarge portion of the personnel. Similar results probably could be obtained from agents disseminated outsideuilding and carried into the building by air currents soon after dissemination.
BW Attack Against Livestock
a clandestine attack against animals, foot andconstitutes the most serious threat to thisdisease is highly contagious, and thereelativelyduring which an animal with this disease is capableother animals before thc symptoms becomeanyone but an expert. Individual herds could easilybut more widespread dissemination could beinfecting animals in "feeder" stockyards. Widespreadof disease could also be brought about byanti-toxins, vaccines, and other biologicalsthe US for the inoculation of animals.
-TOP GDCItGT
TOP LiLOnET
BW Attack Against Crops
is estimated that the USSR might possibly employof cereal rustlandestine BW attack againstHowever, such attack is unlikely because of thethat this disease would spreadide area.
It is considered that attacks with other BW agents such as blights, insects, and chemical growth regulators would be impracticable.
SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS, SABOTAGE, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCESroups and Individuals Available for Soviel Subversive Purposes
To aid in its attempts to disrupt and frustrate our defensive and counter-offensive efforts in the circumstancesurprise attack, the USSRery formidable ally within our own camp: the Communist Party, USA, The members of that organization, now estimatedy virtue of their total devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the Sovietre committed to defend the USSRith all means at their disposal and at any price.
Other potential sources upon which the USSR may draw (or from which it may obtain spontaneous aid) are Communist sympathizers. Communist front organizations, some Trotskyites,groups, and persons otherwise disaffected. Additional potential sources of manpower for aid in subversive purposes are members of Soviel and Satellite diplomatic, consular, commercial, industrial, press, academic and "cultural" establishments and missions, and UN personnel.
he following estimate has been made by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference composed of thc Directors of the Federal Bureau of, Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; and Office of Special Investigation, Air Force.
-
Ton
top
the Communist Party, USA is well known for"monolithic" organizational apparatus, andBolshevik "ironhe recent arrests of topthe forced hiding of others, have unquestionably causedin the previously smooth-running Partyarrests may be expected to cause additional damageapparatus and lo its subversive potential. However, while
it is realized that such action limits that potential, it stillhreat with which to reckon.
Communist Organizational Tactics in the Present Period
Communist Party, USA has always conducted someactivities on an underground basis, buthatbeen enlarged considerably through the taking ofmeasures" designed to provide additional coveractivities. Now, since the indictment of the National(, and especially since theunepholding the conviction ofembers, the Party has gone even farther underground.
A Soviet surprise attack would surely complete the "descent."
it should be borne in mind thatno desire to go (or remain) wholly underground, except
ast resort; they findondition stifling and stagnating. They deem continued contact with "the masses" to be essential even in the face of what they calleactionary drive to destroy ourheir Leninist principles call for an orderly retreat to regroup their forcesater offensive. They arc mindful of what their Soviet masters declare lo be "thc most important rule of Bolshevik tactics in periods of retreat, namely, toillegal with legal work within Ihe various legally existing workers' societies and" Thus, their organizational
-
top oEewaT
TOP flU
and tactical principles proper to this situation call for aof:
operation, to preservefrom destruction, and
ctivity, carried onand infiltrated organizations and institutionstypes,iew to endeavoring to influencealong Communist lines.
il may be expected that in theurprise attack and also in the event one takes placeactivity will be directed toward more thanThe Party will continue to attempt toits general task of intensifying the class strugglethe "eve of the proletarianttempts to accomplish Communist purposes maydifficult to detect and to frustrate than in the past,of their increased subtlety and heavier disguise.from the charge to the detonator will be longer,and more deeply buried than
Communist Action to be Anticipated in Event of Soviet
the eventurprise attack, the Communistbe expected to make coordinated attempts immediately
will to resist, and
means of resisting.
-
TOP till0ML'T
top uixmriT
sychological warfare directed toward the destruction of our will to resist (or toward causing fatal hesitation or confusion in repelling the attack and launching the counter-offensive) might take the form of widespread circulationhrough newspapers with "forged" mastheads and titles, broadcasts over seized radio stations,f false reports and rumors the strength and initial successes of the enemy; the destructic and/or capture of important cities; the slaughter of millions of military and civilian citizens by means of both powerful andweapons; the surrender of important units of our Armed Forces; the existence of total confusion among our military and Government leaders; and the unmasking (forced or spontaneous) of Communists in high military and Government posts. Such efforts, if successful, might cause seriously disruptive civilsuch as raceevolutionary situation on the home front,owering of military and civilian morale.
o destroy our means of resisting the attack, Communists may be expected to attempt the sabotage of our vital installations and industries. Our highly complex mode of production, with its heavily interdependent operations, offers many opportunities for causing the partial and temporary paralysis of the whole. The long-standing Communist "concentration policy"hc(and placement) of members in basic and key industries, particularly "the heavy industries and thosear character"has contributed to Communist capabilities with respect toNot all Communist sabotage attempts will be directed, of course, toward open, physical destruction. They are well aware that serious damage can be effectedong period bylabor disputes over real or alleged grievances, andlow-down maneuver under the guiseight againstCommunist Party members are now being instructed that although it is desirable that they support by agitation theof workers in industrial plants, the members themselves must be kept in thc background in such agitation.)
-TOP CnCHBT-
TOP OIXRDT
(he Communist threat, the campaignmany major labor unions to expel Communists fromhas contributed to lhe limitation of the Party'sIn addition, increased public enlightenmentCommunist threat to our security has undoubtedly resulted
in greater vigilance on the part of American workers with
respect to the cunning taetics of their Communist fellow-employees.
Protective Measures
well aware of the grave threat to our internalthe Communist Party, USA and related forcesintelligence agencies have taken extensive measuresand if possible, destroy the destructive potential of The most important of these measures are (he following:
arrest and prosecution of top leaders of the Party.
apprehension and detention program based oninvestigation to identify those persons whoseindicate theyotential danger to theand who should be immediatelya time of emergency.
of the character, loyalty, andAtomic Energy Commission applicants andof all persons having access to restricted AEC da(a.
thc protection of resources,and industrial facilities essential to supportindustrial mobilization program,of information to appropriatesubversive activities, investigation ofhaving access to highly classified information,of possible sabotage, furnishing of technicalassistance in formulating policies, standards andfor protective measures.
- IV -
TOP ill!CHUT
TOP ODORDO1
of informants in basic and inand facilitiesiew to identifyingwhootential danger to the security of establishments.
vigorous investigation of subversiveoff fronts and "covers" under which Communistsrefuge and from which they may attemptboveground activities.
to insure security and loyalty ofemployees, military and civilian, includingunder the Loyalty of Governmentset out in Executive
coordination and free exchange ofall Federal agencies concerning mattersinterest.
-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: