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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WTTH RESPECT TO GERMANY
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY
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theIntoiUgoncrt Ag*oey.
The InteUigence organizations of the Departments of State the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. For dissent by the Army, see footnotes ton pagehis paper is based on information available on
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY
To estimate probable" Soviet courses of action with respect to Germany.
CONCLUSIONS
Objectives in Germany
Thc Kremlin has the ultimate aim ofunder its control the strategicallyarea and resources of Germany. The Kremlin regards any substantial part ofnot under Soviet control, particularly If associated with the Western Powers,ajor obstacle to the realization of thisaim and possiblyhreat to its own security. The Kremlin will not consider as satisfactory any solution of the Germanthat does not promise to bring all ofwithin the Soviet orbittep in its aim for world domination. Currently the Kremlin is pursuing interim objectivesto further the ultimate Soviet aim. Foremost is thc aim to undermine the Federal German Republic, to forestall its rearmament, and to prevent its political, economic, andassociation with the Western Powers.
Because of the strategic, economic, andvalue of Eastern Germany to the Soviet orbit, the Kremlin will continue to strengthen Communist control within the GermanRepublic, exploit its economicdevelop its military potential and forces, and further integrate It Into the Soviet orbit. The Kremlin will continue to use the German Democratic Republic to the utmost to bring pressure on the Federal German Republic and even on the Western Powers.
The Kremlin intends ultimately to gain complete control of West Germany. Unless or until the Kremlin is prepared to precipitate armed conflict, It will continue its efforts to intimidate the West German population, dis-
rupt the West German economy, draw West Germany's trade to the East, undermine and discredit the allied occupation and the Federal German Government, and developmachinery for future subversion and violence.
Kremlin plans ultimately toWestern Powers from Berlin and tothat city as the undivided capital ofDemocratic Republic anda Satellite Germany. Meanwhile,will use Berlinressure point.
Courses ofGermany
Kremlin will further strengthenCommunist control over theand economic life of the GermanRepublic. It will continue toeconomy of the German DemocraticInto that of the Soviet orbit Inof its determination tostrategic position with respect to thewill continue in East Germany tomilitary installations and toones, and it will increase theand capabilities of all branchesAlert Police. The Alert Police mayan effective military force, andprisoners ot war may be returnedunits specially trained In theaugment Alert Police strength.
Courses ofGermany
West Oermany, possible courses ofaction run the gamut from politicalto the use of armed force. Initially,
the Kremlin will continue to seek its ends by political maneuver, accompanied bymenaces and shows of military force. It will exploit four-power negotiations andbetween East and West Germans. It may even seek bilateral understanding with the Federal German Government If and when, through the lifting of controls by the Western Powers, the Federal German authorities should beosition to enter into such an understanding. It will Intensify its efforts to intimidate and demoralize the West Oermans and tho Western Europeans. It will-try to distract, divide, and confuse the Western Powers. It will continue to use Communist parties and front organizations in Western Europe or elsewhere to foment revolutionary outbreaks and Instigate or support additional military operations In Asia or Europeand wherever the Western Powers appear least capable of taking effective counteraction.
he USSR will in the first Instance direct its efforts toward frustrating West Gorman rearmament, and probably estimates that Its chances of succeeding by methods short of military action are favorable. Theand divisions already created among the Germans and among the Western Powers by the more proposal to rearm West Germany would appear to give the Kremlin good grounds for such expectations. Nevertheless, we estimate that the Kremlin, in order toWest German rearmament, will not be willing to give up any of the elements of its present control over the German Democratic Republic or East Berlin which it considersor any of Its capabilities for gaining control of all Germany. We estimate further that the Kremlin would regard prevention ot West German rearmament merelyirst though necessary step toward attainment of its ultimate objectives In Germany. Wefinally that the failure of West German rearmament would not remove the danger that the USSR might resort to military action in order to secure its objectives or to forestall any unfavorable shift ln Its power position.
f,eriod of time, the USSR came to the decision that It could not prevent theof West German rearmament, the establishmentowerful Westernand the close association of Westerntherewith, lt would regard theofew European power situationarrier to Its European ambitions and possiblyhreat to tho'security of the Soviet orbit. The Kremlin would then either adjust Itself to the restorationowerin Western Europe or resort to military action to prevent It. The first alternative would oblige the USSR to forego for anperiod Its European ambitions and to lose the remarkably favorable opportunity created by the postwar power vacuum. The second alternative would involve acceptance .by thc USSR of the yirtual certainty of global war.
The Kremlin has declared categorically that lt could not reconcile itself to theof West Germany. Nevertheless lt is impossible for us to determine at the present time which of the above alternatives the Kremlin would eventually choose. In making its decision as between these alternatives, the Kremlin will undoubtedly take Intothe relative global power position of the USSR (including atomic capabilities) as well as the rearmament of Germany and Western Europe. We believe that if the Kremlin viewed the scale and nature of theof Western Germany in conjunction with the rearmament of thc Western Powers as likely to constitute nothing morearrier lo further expansion of the Soviet orbit in Europe, it might logically adjust itself for the time being toituation, whileto exploit Its current advantages in other directions. We believe that if, on the other hand, Western German and Western European military, economic, and political power appeared to the Kremlin as likely to develop sufficient strength tohreat to the security of the Soviet orbit, the Soviet Union would probably resort to military
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action, at the time and place mostand might decide to resort immediately to
tageous toform of military action. It might, for
If the Kremlin should decide to resortatlempl to postpone global eon-mllllary action, It would not be obliged toturnlnB ltsgainst West immediately. Sb.ce West German andunder cover of existing mutual as-cm rearmament would necessarily takepacta directed against German "ag-before reaching dimensions consideredthat the Western gerous by the Kremlin, the KremlincouIdlective collective ac-prefer to use this period for Improvinghallenger On the other tion ln atomic and other weapons,the USSR, in order to achieve maximum its own vulnerability to air altack,and quick success, might resort to strengthening its industrial potential,Soviet attack, accepting Immediate continuing Its attempts to underralrfewar. We have at the present time no progress being made by the Westernfor determining whether the USSR, in
The USSR, however, might concludea decision for military action, would it would lose more than it would gain byimmediately or prefer to wail. *
*Thc Office of tlie Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army, agrees thatewpower situation emerged from the close asooclauonearmed West Oermanyowerful Western coalition, the USSK. would be faced with the alleraaUva* of adjustment or resort to military action to achievet objecUves tngrees, further, lhat the first allernaUve would requires sji. lo forego IU ambitions In Europe for an In Oeeriod and that thealternaUre would Involve the virtual certainty of global war.
elieves, however, lhat the Kremlin, onceecognized thatituation was emerging, would be unlikely to decide lhat It constituted "nothing morearrier" lo which it could adjust iUelf only "for the timehe Soviela already view the Allied occupation forces tn Western Oermany, the Western orientation of the Bonn Government, and the existence of NATO as "barriers" to further ex-pan-Jon ln Europe, but the Soviets' tactics have indicated their belief lhat these barriers possibly could be overcome without recourse to military acuon. The emergence of the power sltuaUOa postulated above, however, would require the SovieU to conclude that Itomplete block to Communist alms andhreat to Soviet-orbtl security which could not be overcome by non-mtUtary measures.
The pollUcal. economic, and military regeneration of Western Europe, which this prospect would Imply, would require an adjustment by tha Kremlin not "for the tune being' bul for an indefinite long-termthus losing for the foreseeable future the remarkably favorable opportunity presented by lhe current weakness of Western Europe. The development of Increasing Western power in Europe could then only be checked by dynamicby adjustment. Such an adjustment would be Id consistent with the presently confident, uncompromising temper of the Kremlin, which Is effecUvely supported by Bonn armed forces In an advanced state of readiness for war. Thc maintenance and Improvement of this state of readiness for war by the Soviet armed forces, and thc steady reorganisation, Improvement IneffecUveness and expansion, even beyond treaty limitations by the Satellites, indicate an aggressive and dynamic policy rather than one of peaceful adjustment to Increased Western power. This aggressive policy ts also indicated by the curranl Soviet Insistence on solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further their major objectives, accepting risks which might precipitate global hosUllUes. Such an adjustment would also be Inconsistent with our belief that the Kremlin considers Ihe attainment of control over all of Oermanyecisive step toward domination of allain which could not be adequately balanced for an Indefinite period by exploitation of advantages ln other dlrecUona.
rrom Uie considerations statedelieves II more likely that the Soviets would decide on resort to military acUon rather Ihan make the requiredecognises lhatB. wouldIts global power poslUon, Including atomic capabilities. In making Its decision
he OfSce ol the Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army, does not believe lhat the USSR, would reallsUcally consider that Iteasonable chance of postponing global conflict byIts Satellites against Westernelieves that even under present eondlUons the SovieU would consider that auch an action would quickly developeneral war.
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tot onorot
he Kremlin views the allied position in Berlinajor obstacle to the attainment of long-term Soviet objectives ln Westand Western Europe, and as aimpediment to the Communist program In East Germany. The Kremlin has, however, indicated for some time that it considers the problem of Berlin subordinate to thathole Whatever further courses of action the USSR may resort to will depend on its estimate of the extent to which such courses of action would contribute to orwith realization of Its over-all policy. In addition to continued and intensifiedof the Western sectors of the city, it may pursue the following courses of action, listed in order of probability: (A) Partial ordenial tq the Western Powers of access to Berlin; (B) Direct attack on West Berlin by German Democratic Republic forces;ttack on West Berlin by Soviet forces. (A) Partial or complete denial to the West-cm Powers of Access to Berlin. Both the USSR and the German Democratic Republic have the capability toallied land communications with Berlin. Such Soviet action would be designed to:
Affect the morale of West Berlin;
Strain the economy of the West-em sectors;
Force the Western Powers toin dangerous and expensive relief operations;
edeployment ofaircraft of the Western Powers;
Provide the Kremlinounter for political bargaining, not only on Berlin, but on broader Issues; and
Possibly serverelude to Communist insurrection In West Berlin.
The USSR may relnstitute limitedlike those, if only
for the purpose of exerting pressure. More likely, however, the Kremlin will estimate that even more drasticwould not involve serious risk of general war. The USSR wiU therefore supplement its earlier restrictions. It will adopt measures such as Jamming communications and other covertfor obstructing an air lift. If thc Western Powers maintain air access to Berlin despite these obstructions, the USSR may engage in antiaircraftpractice" in the corridors and later may openly attack Western aircraft with fighters.oviet fighter attack would be undertaken, however, only if the Kremlin were willing toa general war.
Direct Attack on West Berlin byDemocratic Republic Forces. In the near future. If not at present, the German Democratic Republic forces will probably have the strength to overwhelm the garrisons of the Western Powers in West Berlin. The Kremlin must be aware that such an atlack by German Democratictroops on West Berlin wouldcounteraction by the Western Powers which would be almost certain to lead to general war. This course of action therefore appears unlikelythe Kremlin had decided to accept general war with the Western Powers. It is possible that the USSR in anto occupy all of Berlin and yet avoid general war might first withdraw Its own occupation forces and then use the military forces of the German Democratic Republic, possibly In con-Junction with Satellite forces, to achieve that objective.
Direct Attack on West Berlin by Soviet Forces.oviet course of action would demonstrate Soviet willingness to accept general war with the Western Powers.
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Original document.
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