PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO A REMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY (NIE 17)

Created: 12/27/1950

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONSEMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONSEMILITARIZATION OF WESTERN GERMANY

N

ucprooJ for rcln^tfl rarongfc the Cantral intoilisfcaM Agency.

Date HRP

The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forcein the preparation of this estimate and concur in it (however, see footnote onhis paper is based on information available on

PROBABLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO A REMILITARIZATION

OF WESTERN GERMANY

Soviet leaders are probably convinced that If Western Germany should eventuallyondition of completeand at the same time be in close alliance with thc United States and the other members of NATO, the situation would present a'grave threat to thc security of the USSR and to the achievement of ultimate Soviethey doubtless recognize on the other hand that without the use of German manpower Western Europe can neither threaten Soviet security nor defend Itself against SovietA rearmament of Western Germany to the extent now contemplated by the NATO powers, involving the creation of defensive forces only, would presumably not beby the USSR as menacing its security, but it would plainly render important Sovietdifficult and perhaps Impossible of ac-

It is unlikely that tho Soviets believerogram of Western German rearmament, once well under way, will stop short ofremilitarization. They will have faith neither in tho ability nor In the desire of the western powers to limit Germany to purelyforces. Indeed they may wellof the present plans for Westernas partarger US program,also the eventual rearmament of Japan, and ultimately directednitedby the capitalist countries upon the USSR as the citadel of Communism.

The creation of an effective Westerndefensive force cannot be accomplished

Is Uie view of Uie Director of lnlellleer.ee USAF ihat Uie first sentence should read as follows: The Soviet leaders are probably convinced that if Western Oermany should eventuallyondition of complete remilitarisation, and al the same time be In close alliance with the United Slates and the other members of NATO, the sltu-aUon wouldrave threat to theof ulUmale Soviet objectives andhreat to Ihe USSR"

in less than two or three years; totrong offensive military establishment would take longer. "In the meantime, takingof the many basic conflicts in western opinion, and the degree of intimidationachieved, the USSR will have available many courses of action which may. without provoking war. tend to dissolve thebetween Weslern Germany and thepowers, to weaken the cohesion andthc strengthening of NATO, and possibly lo bringnification of Germany on Soviet terms. Thc immediate objective of the USSR ln Europe will be to hinder and delay the progress of German rearmament, and to utilize the conflicts which the problem arouses in Western Europe to gain some ground toward its ultimate objectivenifiedunder Soviet control.

n the Soviet program to accomplish this objective the most important clement, on which Indeed the general success of themay well hinge, will be thethroughout Europe and the western worldonviction that Western Germanwill Inevitably lead to war. Since many Oermans and Western Europeanshold this opinion. Its furthershould not be difficult The USSR has already made clear the seriousness with which it views Western Germanmost recently In. the Prague Declaration, in the note to the western powers askingeeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and In thc notes to France and Britain ofecember. Meanwhile, the Europeanparties have intensified their efforts, especially In Germany, to increase the fear of war and to point out that Germany will surelyattleground in the conflict.along these lines will doubtless beparticularly exploiting the publicity accompanying western negotiation and acts

such as the Increase of Soviet military forces in Eastern Germany and ln the Satellites may be used to reinforce the impression. Suiting their words to their audiences, thewill suggest that Western Germanwill result In Western Germanor that it will become an instrument of US aggression, or even thai it will so gravely threaten the USSR and lis Satellites as to force them toefensive war. Thewill be tolate of general alarm and despondency, in which more positive courses of Soviet action will have their best chances of success.

hc positive policy which the Soviets now propose consistsenewal of their earlier suggestions for peaceful re-cslablIshment of German unity through the device of an all-German constituent council. With this the Soviets are seeking to provide an attractive alternative to the war and destruction which they predict if Western German rearmament goes forward. Against the background of apprehension induced by the rearmamentthis appeal to German desires for unity may welltronger impact now than formerly. The Grotewohl letter is designed to encourage both East and West Germans to take some initiative towards theof unification, and toommon proposal to the consideration of the four occupying powers. The Soviets during the next months will urge not only upon the Western Germans, but upon the world, the reasonableness of their suggestions forunity, and they will continue to by contrast and with thinly veiled threats the inevitable consequences which will followailure to settle the German problem "peacefully" at this time.ajor and increasing effort will also be made by the SovieU to cause division among the western powers, especially bythe doubts and hesitations which German rearmament has already begun to produce among them. ouncil ofMinisters ls held, the USSR will attempt to use it lo further this objective. The Soviets will play not only upon the French fear ol general war but upon the French fear of German military force. Especially in view

of the adverse effects which the Korean situa-liun has had upon French omfltiMMVi it may well be that such arguments will be hard to resist. Even the British may find It hard to remain impervious to suggestionspeaceful" settlement.

If tho methods of diplomacy andthus described prove insufficient to halt the rearmament of Western Germany, thewill probably adopt more drasticInvolving if necessary progressively greater risks of war. Military anddemonstrations will doubtless then be employed, further advertising the seriousness with which the USSR views the problem Such displays may take thc form of ostentatiousof the military strength of Soviet and Bcrcitscliaften forces, mass demonstrations of Communist youth and labor groups, etc.of violence In West Berlin and Western Germany may also be staged.

Western German militarization will be used by thc USSR as "Justification" forand perhaps increasing its own forces in East Germany and In the other Satellites, At the same time the remilitarization of Eastern Germany will be accelerated in order tothe over-all strength of thc Soviet bloc. Intensified harassing tactics in Berlin,to make the allied position difficult or untenable, could be represented as actions of the German Democratic Republic.evolutionary situation in Berlin,enewal of the blockade, must be considered as possibilities. It is unlikely that the USSR will use overt military action against Western Germany until it is ready to accept the gravest risks of general war.

Finally. II is estimated that unlesshas already decided to precipitate general war. the Soviels are likely first to exhaust all other practicable means of preventingGerman remilitarization. The USSR will, however, seriously consider going to warit becomes convinced that progresscomplete Western German rearmament, together with the rearmament of the NATO powers, and toward political solidarity between Western Germany and the western powers, has reached the point where it cannot be arrested by other methods.

Original document.

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