NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE SOVIET MOVES TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT SITUATION
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE SOVIET MOVES TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT SITUATION
NIE-15
thsTEW FROSRtt rf
the Centralers=y.
n-3
The Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on
OBOnOIP-
PROBABLE SOVIET MOVES TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT
SITUATION
treatment of Koreanindicates that they assess theirmUltary and political position as one of great strength ln comparison with that of the West, and lhal they propose to exploit the apparent conviction of the West of Its own present weakness.
Moscow, seconded by Peiping with regard to the Far East, has disclosederies of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation:
a. Withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and of the Seventh Fleet from Formosan waters.
o. Establishment of Communist China as the predominant power in the Far East,the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.
c. Reduction of Western control over Japantep toward Its eventual elimination.
d_ Prevention of West German rearmament.
Moscow has given no real Indication that it will compromise on any one of these points. At the same time It has shown that lt Intends to press without pause for such closelyobjectives as destruction of working unity among the Weslern Powers and thereby isolation of the US; the splitting of thepeoples from their governments to the immediate end thai Western efforts to rearm and the Western will to use atomic weapons will be undermined; elimination of thefoothold in Southeast Asia; theof British-American influence In thc Near and Middle East
Moscow has indicated that in attempting to capitalize on thc present situation Itto rely primarilyontinuation of pressures rather than upon negotiation. As in previous tense situations, Moscow has continued to assert complete willingness to meet with the Western Powers at any time
andovember specificallyour Power meeting on Germany. On the other hand, several of the evaluationsbeing publicized by Moscow suggest, through their emphasis on US confusion and Western European pressure forremlin estimate that circumstances strongly favor Soviet success in any conference that might be held. The Kremlin has given clear indication that Its pose with respect to the desirability of big power talks Is designed to strengthen its pretentions as theof "peacefulnd does notoviet intention actually to relyonference approach, or to treat aas anything morelace togains already won or being won by direct action.
It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking towardassuming virtual Western surrender is not Involved, the Kremlin plans aof Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN isA determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course,oviet re-estimate of the situation.
The scope ot Soviet bloc preparations and the nature and extent of Soviet Communist official statements and propaganda raise the question of Soviet or Satellite moves in other areas. The points that appear most critical are Berlin and Germany, Indochina.and Iran.
The Soviet Union has gone on record that it "will not tolerate" and "will not allow" West German rearmament. It has made clear that it considers that thc only means through which it can be assured that Germanwill not in fact be brought about is through thc establishmentnitedin accordance with the Praha program
inay as to Insure Communist domination of the whole of Oermany).
The Soviet Union Is currently Increasing greatly the tempo of its pressure and agitation over Germany, particularly concentrating on buildingar scare In West Germany and Western Europehole. Although there is an unusual note of urgencyefinite element of threat In the current campaign. It has so far not actually broken with thethat has been followed for some time. It appears, therefore, lhat Moscow Is stillto achieve Its objective of German unity under Communist domination through breaking the will of the Western Powers to resist and through intimidating the WestThe present trend, however. Is of such nature as lo suggest that these measures may soon be supplemented by more drastic action, possiblyenewal of thc Berlin blockade, "revolution" in Berlin, andviolence In West Germany.repeated Communist emphasis on the parallel between Germany and Korea, It isin present circumslances that theUnion will repeat the Korean pattern in West Germany unless It intends lo precipitate general war.
An intensification of Communist efforts to secure Indochina Ls to be expected, regardless of developments elsewhere. The Viet Minh has clearly Indicated thai its objective is to drive the French from Indochina at the ear-llesl possible dale. The Chinese Communists have at the same lime repeatedly expressed their support of the Viet Minh. They have, moreover, officially claimed that Westernto the Viet Minh is directed against Chinese Communist security. The Chinese Communists are already furnishing the Viet Minh with materiel, training, and technical assistance. If this assistance provesto enable the Viet Minh to accomplish its objectives, it is estimated that it will beas necessary, by the introduction of Chinese Communist forces Into the conflict, possibly ashe extent of this Chinese Communist Intervention, and whether it takes overt form, will probably depend on the degree of outside assistance furnished the
French and the extent of Chinese Communist commitments elsewhere.
Soviet-Satellite pressures on Yugoslavia have not notably increased during the current crisis, although long-standing economic,and psychological pressures have been somewhal inlensiflcd. Under presentsuch tactics probably will beleaving direct military invasion ofas the only way In which the Titocan be overthrown. Satellite forces would be capable of achieving Importantsuccesses, bul, assuming effective Western support of Yugoslav resistance, secureof that country and the establishmentugoslav regime subservient to thewould probably require the direct use of Soviet forces. Present Indications do not point *at an imminent Soviet Intention to launchatellite or Soviet-Satelliteon Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union,remains capable of launching an attack on Yugoslavia virtually without warning, and the possibility of such an attack cannot be
The Soviet Union probably will not invade Iran unless it Intends deliberately toeneral war. Present Soviet policy toward Iran appears designed to wean that country away from US nnd British influence,it more closely with the Soviet economy, and induce it to forego any thought ofWestern armed strength to be Introduced into Iran. This policy, which has so far met with considerable success, plus the disposition of present Iranian leadership to avoidwith US policy and the military defeats of the UN in Korea. Is probably considered by the Kremlin to be adequate assurance that Iran will notase of operations against the Soviet Union. Unless the Soviet rulers have decided that general war Isand that they must immediately secure every strategic approach lo the Soviet Union, their probable present intention Ls to continue to keep Iran weak and distracted whileefforts toriendlyto power.
Beyond the danger of furtheraction In these several local areas.
! T
thereossibility that the USSR may seize upon the present crisis to precipitatewar with thc US. Moscow and Peiping have consistently and consciously stressed the threatew world war emerging from the current situation. At the same time the Kremlin continues preparations for action by its own forces. While the motivation involved may be to maximize war scare pressures in
order to reduce further the will of the West to resist, thc over-all situation is such that the possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR has alreadyecision for general war and is in process of talcing stepsto its inception. We are unable, on the basis of present intelligence, to determine the probability ofecision having in fact been made.
Original document.
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