co
FOH THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR REPORTS AMD ESTIIIATES
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
copy of this publication is for the information and use of theon the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho require the information for thc performance of their official duties.elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State
of Intelligence, GS, USA, for thc Department of the Army
Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission.
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for thc Joint Staff
Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for anyor Agency
copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to thc Central Intelligence Agencywith thc Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
f thc President National Security Council National Security Resources Board Department ct State Office of Secretary of Defense Department of thc Army Department of the Navy DeparUniMii of the Air Force Joint Oilers ol Stall Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board
TOP iBfHET
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST FOREWORD
set ol estimates regarding criticalIn thc Far East was prepared in responseequest from thc President. The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of these estimates and concur ln them.
The estimates follow in this order:
of Full Chinese Communist
Intervention in Korea
of Soviet Intervention in Korea
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Formosa
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Indochina
Capabilities and Threat
ln the Philippines
Soviet and Chinese Commu-
nist Intentions and Copabllities in the Far East
Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with respect to these particular situations in the Far East depend in part on the possibilityoviet decision to resort to g'obal war. thc latest agreed estimate concerning thatls Included as Section G.
TO^ECHET
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
A, Throat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
of the Problem.
estimate the threat of full-scaleCommunist intervention In Korea.
Chinese Communist groundlacking requisite air and navalare capable of intervening effectively,necessarily decisively, in the
Bearing on Intent.
Indications of Intentions. Despiteby Chou En-Ial, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges otand border violations, there are noindications of an actual ChineseIntention to resort to full-scaleIn Korea.
Factors Favoring Chinese Communist In terveniion.
if resulting in defeatajor gainfor Communist China, confirmingthe premier Asiaticonstitutegain for World Communism withincrease in Communist China'sIn the Sino-Sovietesult inof the possibility ofestern-type democracy;permit the retention of sources ofelectric power along the Yalu River.
even If not resulting indefeat of UN forces,thc Chinese Communists to utilizewar as an explanation for failure topreviously announced economicbe consistent with and furnish strongto anti-Western trends in Asia; anda claim for maximum Sovieteconomic aid to China
with or withoutfinal victory, might serve the cause of[>arlicularly the cause of thc So-
viet Union, in that It would Involve theblocostly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.
d. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly faceajor setback in the struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.
actors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.
Chinese Communiststhe consequences of war with thedomestic problems are of suchthat the regime's entire domesticand economy would be Jeopardizedstrains and the material damagebe sustained in war with the US.forces would be encouragedregime's very existence would be
would minimize theof Chinese membership in the UN andseat on the Security Council.
intervention would beunless protected by powerful Sovietand naval support. Such Sovietnot be forthcoming because itSoviet intervention.
of major Soviet aidPeiping more dependent on Sovietincrease Soviet control in Manchuria toprobably unwelcome to the
unsuccessful. Chineselay Peiping open to Chinesethc grounds that China would be actingSoviet caUpaw
a military standpoint the mosttime far intervention In Korea has
g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt intervention, while
avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:
Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US;
Promote the China-led Asiatic"revolutionaryhile ostensibly supporting peace;
Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chineseneeds ln Korea;
Satisfy thc "aid Korea" demand In Communist circles in China and Asia
CRET
generally, without risking war with the US.
IV, Probability of Chinese Communist Action.
hile full-scale Chinese CommunistIn Korea must be regarded asonsideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion thatoviet decision for global war, such action is not probableuring this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.
TOP
B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea
Statement of the Problem.
L To estimate the threat of direct Soviet military intervention in Korea
IL Capabilities.
armed forces now ln the Farcapable of Intervening overwhelminglyvirtually without warning.
III. Foctors Bearing on Inlent.
Indications of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no Indication that It intends to Intervene directly In Korea. Since the beginning ol hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its ofllcial statements and In its propaganda to give the impression that It Is not involved ln the KoreanMoreover, the USSR has taken noor military actions that constitute direct armed Intervention In Korea.the Soviet Government for some months has been Increasingly improving its military capabilities in the Far East as well as In other strategic areas.
Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention. The defeat of North Korea wouldajor setback for the USSR. It would Involve:
loss of ft Satellite, nndestern-oriented stale on thcof Communist China and the USSR.
the Western Powers abridgehead which the Kremlinregardhreat to theand military centers ofand the Soviet Far East.
the Soviet military andposition visa-vis Japan.
loss to Soviet political prestige Inwould demonstrate that the Kremlin Isto support its followers effectivelySoviet-Instigated action.
loss to Soviet military prestige inwould leadendency, whether or not
justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.
eduction In the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding Its politicalby means short of war In that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet- Inspired aggression.
Opposing SovietIn weighing potential gams and risks of
intervention, the Soviet leaders mustas an overwhelming consideration, that their open intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an Issue on which the Western world hasew degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would beby the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater.ecision toopenly ln Korea, in the ultimate analysis,ecision to risk Immediate and probably global war with the US.
Soviet leaders may estimatewill be possible, without assuming thisrisk, to salvage some of thc lossesfrom the Korean situation. USactivities could be obstructed byguerrilla action, which might involvein an extended and costly occupationcould contribute to Soviet effortslnacial enmity towardand the Western Powers.
IV. Probabilities o( Soviel Action.
t Is believed that Lhe Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses In Korea warrant direct miliiary Interventiononsequent grave risk of war. They will Intervene ui the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, bul on the basis of over-all considerations, lhal it is to theirtolobal war at this time.
C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa
of the Problem.
estimate the threat of Chineseinvasion of Formosa
Despite certain definite Chinesedeficiencies in naval and air forces and probably In amphibious training andthe Communists are now capable of launching an invasion against Formosa withroops and moderate air cover. The USSR couldinimum furnishadvice and technical and logistic support.
Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient in number and materiel to defend Formosa, lack of staying power, poorstructure, lack of inter-servicequestionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition make their defense capabilities questionable.
Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the Chinese Nationalist defense forces are capable of holding Formosaetermined Chinese Communist invasion.
Bearing on Intent.
of Intentions. Frequentstatements of the Chineseclearly indicated their intention toof Formosa. However, availabledoes not indicate theirdo so in the immediate future. Anfactor bearing upon the intentis the degree of control the USSRof exercising over the Chineseand the Soviet intent withFormosa.
Favoring Invasion of Formosa.
a. The occupation of Formosa wouldthc symbol of Nationalist resistance;otential source ol coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist regime;
and would seriously diminish continued anti-Communist resistance in China andSoutheast Asia.
or continuedof an attack on Formosa would resultloss of "face" to the Chinese Communists.
would provide themall but significantforeign exchange,otentialrice, thereby contributing somewhatCommunist capabilities for
Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.
would be improbable.
attack involves the risk of warUS as long as US forces areFormosa and thc mainland.Communist leadership would beto jeopardize Its popularachievements, and internalan attack on Formosa that could leadair attacks on Chinese cities, toblockade uf the Chinese coast, tosanctions, and to protractedcould sap Chinese economic strength.
Chinese Communists faceproblems, including banditry,unrest, guerrilla opposition,agrarian maladjustments, andinvolved in consolidating theParly's political control. Forthe danger exists that, iffail or prove unduly costly, thesolidarity of the Communistbe subjectedevere strain.
view of current UN Interest inthe Chinese Communists have someto hopeavorable political solution
IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Invasion.
is believed that,ovietto precipitate global war, an invasionby the Chinese Communists willattempted during the remainder
TOP^C
TOPJMTCRET
D. Threathinese Communist Invasion of Indochina
Statement of tho Problem.
t. To estimate the threathineseinvasion of Indochina
IL Capabilities.
From forces presently deployed near the Indochina border, the Chinese Communists couldroops for an invasion of Indochina withoutdditionalCommunist troops could arrive at the border in support of an Invasion within ten days. Reinforcements and supplies might be moved by sea to rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. It ls also within Chinese Communist capabilities to furnish air support for an Invasion.
These capabilities could be exercised without jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations in the Far East, except to thc already Inadequate air supportimultaneous North Korean or Formosan intervention.
If the Chinese Communists shouldIndochina, it is almost certain that the defending forces under the French would scon lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.
III. Factors Bearing on Intent.
of Intentions.
construction and Improvementrailroads, and air facilities; theof technical and trulnlng assistancepersonnel; present logisticthe border provinces ofand Yunnanall these mightas positive Indicators of aninvasion These activities, however,be indicators of an increase in theChinese Communist aid to the Vietrather than of Chinese invasion.
Chinese Communistspropaganda support lo the Viethas been no public Chinesewhich could icasonablyommitment to invade or aslor Invasion
Favoring Intervention.
Chinese Communist invasion ofwould be the most rapid means ofa Communist Indochina.
fall of Vietnam to thefacilitate establishment ofover Burma and Thailand.
early Communist victory inwould in part offset the loss ofCommunist prestige occasionedreverses In Korea.
Chinese Communists, operatingof International Communism,Indochina with the hope that, evenintervention should deprive them ofvictory. Western bloc forces wouldin inconclusive warfare in thc
Opposing Intervention.
Chinese Communist invasion ofwould greatly increase the risk ofCommunist involvement In warWestern Powers or the UN. as well asof global war.
Viet Minh military successesthe probability thatof Indochina can be ultimatelyresort to Chinese Communistproviding there is no major Increaseplanned external assistance toand their supporters.
Minh capabilities can beincreased without resort to open
of Indochina by Chinesetroops would arouse localand coulderious sourceconflict between Peiplng andleadership.
Chinese Communist invasionto antagonize the presently neutralAsia, particularly India.
ommunist China's prospects forin the UN and UN-sponsoredwould be jeopardized and thefor the establishment of diplomatic rela-
10
with powers outside the Soviet orbit would be curtailed.
p. Chinese Communist Invasion ofmight provide the US with an impelling reason for retaining in the vicinity ofmajor objective of the Chinese CommunistUS Seventh Fleet.
IV. Probabilities of Chinese Communist Invasion.
It is estimated that an open Chinesepossible and capable of being launched with little or no preliminaryImprobablet Is highly probable, however, that the Chinesewill Increase the substantial military assistance already being given to the Viet Minh forces.
TOP SJTCRBT
E. Communis* Capabilities and Threat in tho Philippines
Statement ot the Problem.
estimate the Communistthreat in the Philippines.
||. Capabilities.
Huks. The Huks (Hukbongifg Bayan) are today the armyCommunism, led by avowedwho follow the policies and seekthe objectives of Worldarmed strength is estimated athc Huks areguerrilla organization, utilizing "hittactics; making maximum use of thcof surprise, choice of terrain, andand avoiding frontal engagementforces. The Huks, who arealmost exclusively to infantrythe capability of mounting0 men)attacks simultaneously againsttargets.. theytheir areas of operationand lo other islands of therecent months they have carried outand more widespreadHuks have terrorized localinterfered with travel. They canintensify Ihcir operations, particularlydefended provincial areas, andstage another series of coordinatedbefore the end
Elements.
a. Support of the Huk movement, apart from that derived Trom unorganized lawless elements, is found among large numbers of pcasanLs, who willingly or by force andcontribute to the Huk movement.source of support is round in thelabor movement, where low real wages and poor conditions of work permitof the union movements by Communist organizers.
the Communists havein China, lt is believed that athe approximatelyillionhave already aligned themselvesPeiping regime. Such Chinese arefacilitating Communistfinancial support, andaid to the Huks.
intelligence does notthe Huks have received, or are likelysufficient assistance fromsources to alter their militarysignificantly
Countermeasuris.efforts to deal with the Hukbeen ineffective thus far.have been and are able tointernal security but are unablelocal areas where dissident groupsRecently reorganized armedbe able to deal more effectively withbut little improvementisillusionment with'ineffectiveness has causedwho arc not active Huk supportersindifferent and uncooperativeefforts to stamp out theThe government, moreover, hasdisposition to adopt and implementand social reforms which mightconsiderably the number of peasantsthe Huks.eductionmeasurably Huk capabilities and theof their operations, but would notthe hard core of the Hukwould continue to pose aproblem.
IV. Conclusions.
the Huks are capable ofwidespread, coordinated raidscentral Luzon, and creating somein the Manila area, lt is estimatedcannot overthrow the
F. General Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East
of the Problem.
estimate general Soviet andintentions and capabilities inEast
Soviet Union and Communistthe common objective otcontrol throughout the Farboth would preler to secure thiswithout resort to general war.Union includes In Itsommuntzed Asia,While the Chineseobject to such Kremlin control, theyno overt indication that they do notthe primacy of Moscow in
Short of Direct Employment of Armed Forces. The Soviet Union and Communist China have the capacity, through aof measures short or war, further tothc strength of Communism in all areas in the Far East except those occupied by US or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that in no area of thc Far East, except Tibet and possibly Indochina unless presently planned external assistance is Increased, do Ihey have, the capability of establishing completecontrol0 through such measures.
With Full-Scale Employment of Armed Forces. In the event of war beginning
Soviet Union acting alone has theof rapidly occupying Korea,Okinawa; ofubstantialInvasion of Honshu; andharassing attacks on theKyushu, Formosa, the Philippines,Islands In the adjacent waters, andcommunication.
China acting alonecapability to overrun Tibet andof the mainland of Southeasttotrong attack on Korea.
combination, the Soviet UnionChina have the capability ofpractically all the Asiaticpossibly of occupying all Japan
IV. Intentions.
Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have clearly indicated that they intend to pursue without pause their goal ofCommunist control over every vulnerable area ln the Far East by every means open to them short of direct use of their armed forces Neither has given concrete indication of anto employ0 its own armed forces outside its own boundaries.
It Is estimated in particular that,oviet decision tolobal war, the Soviet Union will notirectly with Its armed forces Inhostilities, and the Chinese Communists probably will not0 attempt to invade Korea. Formosa, or Indochina.
With respectossible Sovietto precipitate global war. the latest agreed conclusions are set forth in Enclosure O.
G. Conclusionsossible Soviet Decision To Precipitate Global War
Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxist-lenIntst-Stallnlstby considerations affecting thethe Soviet Unionorld power.made clear that their long-termto establish World Communism underol the Kremlin. Theirhowever, are:
c To maintain the control or the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.
strengthen the economic andano defend thc territory of theUnion.
consolidate control over theAsian Satellites (including
make secure thc strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent thein Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.
eliminate Anglo-AmericanEurope and Asia.
o establish Soviet domination overand Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.
On the basis that Uie long-term object of the Soviet rulers Is immutableamic, and that the Western Powers are notto succumb to Soviet dominationa fight, there is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between thc Soviet Union and its satellites on thc one hand, and thc Western Powers and their allies on the other.
Thc Soviet Union will continueits aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western nations.
The Soviet rulers could achieve, and areair way toward achieving, tlie first three parts of their object (see a,bove) without risk of Involvement In direct armed conflict with the Western Towers.
Parts d, e, f,f their object are improbable of achievement without theof armed force, though there are still factors in thc existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, in certain circumstances, and In tbe absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overtof Soviet armed forces.
In pressing to achieve parts d, e, f.f their object, the Soviet rulers will, atstages, inevitably Impinge upon thc vital interests of the Western Powers and so incur the risk of involvementeneral warthrough thc necessary reactions of the Western Powers.
In tlie belief that their object cannot be fully attained without Involvement in awar against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberatelyaroment when. In their opinion, the strength of thc Soviet Unionis the Western Powers is at itsIt is estimated thateriod exists now and will extend from the present4 (Noteith its peak at about halfway.2
From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union Isosition toeneral war ofduration now If Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.
While intelligence is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise itsand capability loeneral war, in view of the foregoing It must be recognized that thc riskeneral war exists now and
blanki
CRET
TO Parties
at any time when thc Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens, wholly or In part, the vital Interests of the Western Powers.
NoUSS4 being the date by which It is assumed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization force* In Europe will be built Hp totrength that Uiey can withstand the Initial shock of surprise attack; and when
etween the rclaUve strength of tbc western Union forces and those of thc Soviet Union will hare begun to contract.
hen the Soviet Union has made good aome essential deficiencies In atomic bomb atockpUe, and In certain types of aircraft: and before thc North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganlzaUonully geared to the war effort.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: