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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY BY THE END1
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY BY THE END1
SUMMARY
the next eighteen months Communist control over the economic and political life of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) will be considerably strengthened andFormalization of the present "provisional" regime In Eastern Oermany wil! follow the0 election. Sovietwill not be materially affected by this action or by thc granting of "sovereignty" to the GDR.
East German security forces, comprising regular, secret, and paramilitary police, will have their functions, capabilities, andexpandedn air elementwill be added to the ground and maritime paramilitary forces" The paramilitary forces will develop either into an elite Internalforce of the MVD type orona fide East Germany army. In either event, they willotential threat to West Germanyore Immediate threat to
West Berlin. Soviet occupation forces will not be withdrawn.
Economically as well as militarily, the GDR will beetter position to threaten the western Allied position in Berlin and toany countcrmeasures short of war that may be taken by the Western Powers. The USSR, however, is unlikely toull land, air. and water blockade of the citylthough reimpositlonlockade of8 varietyontinuing possibility, it, too. is considered unlikely.
Improvement In East German economic conditions and closer economic ties withEurope will make the ODK less dependent upon the West for items necessary to Itsrehabilitation. Items produced in West Germany which are actually needed by the GDR or those which contribute to thewar polential will, however, continue to be obtainedfrom West Germany either through legal or, If necessary, illegal trace.
The intelligence organ Nations ol the Departments Cf the Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred In thisor dissent of the Intelligence Crear.iza-lion o( the Department of State. The paper contains info una lion availablesf>.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN GERMANY BY THE END1
Politico) Developments
Soviet Policy.
The Immediate Soviet objective in Germany is to make the German Democratic Republiceliable and effective instrument ol Soviet policy. The USSR Is thereforeits efforts to transform the GDRPeople's Democracy" and to integrate it tnlo the Soviet Satellite orbit as an ostensibly equal member. The long-term Soviet objective in Germany Is to bring all Germany under Soviet domination. To this end, thc USSR willto use the GDR as the principal means for penetrating West Germany. Although no action short of direct military operations Is likely to achieve Soviet domination of West Germany, the USSR and the GDR will try to create uncertainly and fear among thc West Germans, particularly among the population of West Berlin, in order to undermine popular support of the German Federal Republic. Some German leaders may at times delude themselves with the hopeeutral,Germany freed of Allied occupation would be acceptable to the USSR, but the ultimate Soviet goal will remain the establishmentniied Germany under an unequivocally pro-Soviet central governmeni.
Unless the USSR is prepared to risk awar with the West, it will notttack West Berlin cither with Its own or East German forces,ull air. water, land blockade. An air blockade ofcould not be effective unless thc USSRto miliiary action againstse of planes, anti-aircraft weapons, and radar jamming. Rcimposition of aof3 variety, which included nointerference In Allied air access to Berlin,ontinuing possibility, is nevertheless considered unlikely. The following factors will probably deter the USSR from thist would substantially Increase presenttension and thus increase the risklobalt would accelerate the rate of US and Western rearmament;
current Berlin food and fuel reserves,by an Immediate token Allied airlift, would make the early successlockade impossible and Its ultimate success far from certain. Periodic harassment of West Berlin communications, short of measures forcing thc US to rcinstltute an airlift, will, however, continue.
GDR Foreign Relations.
In an effort to strengthen Its claim to be the legitimate government of all Germany, the GDR will continue to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the West German This refusal will not prevent GDR authorities from negotiating with Federalofficials on such questions as interzonal irade. The principal activities of the GDR in relation toermany will continue to be the exploitation of unsatisfactory Westconditions and the encouragement of West German elements who oppose thc policies of thc Federal Republic and thc Western Meanwhile, the integration of the GDR into the satellite system will be pressed Into increase the strength and homogeneity of that system
GDR "Sovereignty
Although the GDR will continue to receive periodic Soviet concessions leading tosovereignty. Soviet control will notin effectiveness. The change in the international status of thc GDR will proceed a'.ong thesehe present "provi-sionar government will be formalizedzonal elections scheduled forome form of peace settlement will be concluded between the USSR andast German diplomatic, economic, and cultural integration Into the Soviet Satellite system will proceed along the lines already laid down in recent German agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia,hc overt Soviet controls now exercised by the Soviet Control Commission will be reduced or even eliminated, and direct functional lines of com-
mand from Moscow lo thc GDR Ministry of State Security will be strengthened.
political Control.
In its effort to make thehoroughly reliable Soviet instrument, the USSR wiU push the GDR further on the path toward the single-party stale. This progress willontinued strengthening of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as theof direct Communisti-creased use of Communist mass organizations and cover parties for recruitment andof the politically immatureeutralization or elimination of resistance elements, active or potential.
In order to strengthen the administration, an increasing proportion of the importantand economic posts in the government will be held by persons considered reliable by the SED and loyal to the USSR. An effort will be made to attract the Free German Youth and industrial and agricultural workers into the ranks of the administration.
The SED willore effectivethan it has been because of the gradually rising percentage of vigorous and enthusiastic ynunger Communists among its members. Concurrently, unreliable elements, such as those ol middle-class background,members of the SPD. and deflationists from Communist orthodoxy, will beeliminatedhe party and from pub-
A welter of, organizations and cover parties will be usedn thc majority of the Bast German population, who are noteither in support of or in opposition to theMinc in the GDR, intothe SED program. In addition to thc Free German Youth, thc Free German Trade Union Federation, and the Farmers Mutual Aidof which organize special groups among theNational Front will continue lo furnish an all-Inclusive organization tor the populationhole. The committees of the National Front will be Used bo',nergise .supervision and control over all inhabitants ct the Soviet Zone and to provide rcftdy ptopiiganda support fur actions of the GDft The SED-sponsored National Democratic Parly and Democratic Geiman
Farmers Party will also attempt to increase their hitherto limited success withThe appeal of the SED-controlled mass organizations will be heightened bythe system of privileges connected with membership. Conversely, it will be made Increasingly difficult for East Germans to avoid participation in one or more of the mass organizations without risking serious political and economic discrimination.
The neutralization or elimination ofresistance will largely be accomplished through thc continued strengthening of East German security forces and the specialof State Security in the GDR. Thiswill be capable of coping with any internal security threat. onsequence, nothreat or open opposition is likely even though widespread passive dissatisfaction with the present government will probably persist. This dissatisfaction will be gradually reduced as periodic Improvements in the prices and supply of food and consumer goods occur. to the SED will also be neutralized by mcrcasutg the power of leaders whosupport and obey the SED, as well as by eliminating those opposed to the present regime or to its policies. This process, already well under way In the case of the twoparlies, the Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Party, will beduring the coming year. The Catholic and Piotestsiit Churches will remain the most important centers of passive resistance to the regunc despite efforts by the GDR to curtail Church Influence and encourage closeracnerer.eee political line of the SED. Both the GDR and the Protestant Church, to which themajority of East- reluctant toomplete break in church-state relations
II. Lconomic Developmer-.u
lndus":cil Traduction.
Industrial production in the Soviet Zone, which is estimated to be atittle overercent of6 figure,6 production level by thc endhis figure may be bettered somewhat, depending upon whether or net the GVii ob-
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from Westernufficientof Items in critically short supply.the USSR will continue Its systematic exploitation of the zonal economy for the benefit of the Soviet war potential, formaland occupation charges may beby the USSR, and more Soviet-owned corporations may be returned to the GDR. However, it is difficult to determine the real benefit, because of the involved pricing system and the unreliability of production data. At the same time, the Soviet Zone will receive needed imports through expanded trade with the USSR and the Satellite area, as well as from legal and clandestine trade with West Germany. Therefore, expansion in the major industries, particularly precision instruments, steel, and,ertain extent, chemicals, seems assured, and the economy will be strengthened in proportion. Effective border controls to curtail interzonal smuggling would probably only retard, not stop, this development.
Transportation.
Transportation will remain one of theweaknesses because of Soviet neglect of both railroads and highways, but somewill result from the greaterof materials for repair andEfficient operation will continue to be handicapped by the unsatisfactory condition of both rolling stock and roadbed. of thc projected double-trackingiles of East-West main lines between the Polish frontier and Western Germany will, however, increase both the economic andpotential of the Zone. Baltic portwill be expanded tareater volume ot traffic The stock0 serviceable freight carsocomotives, barely adequate for present needs, will not sufficereatly expanded economy ashi the new Five-Year Plan. This problem wiil be aggravated by the Sovietof taking the limited amount ofmanufactured In Eastern Germany as reparations, thus forcing Soviet Zone railroads to continue to rely on West Germany for parts and equipment.
'
Living Standard.
Private consumption per capita In the GDR. now at nearlyercent of6 level as compared to theercent figure In West Germany, will rise about ten percent, with some reduction In popular dislike of tberegime, as more consumer goods are made available in the state-owned stores. Soviet requisitions, high prices, and arbitraryof foreign trade will tend to retard progress in this direction. Consequently, the standard of living in the Soviet Zone willconsiderably below that of WestAs the standard of living and civilian morale rise, however, the GDR will pressmore vigorously with its Germancampaign in the hope ofWestern German resistance to the Idea of closer associationommunist-managed state economy. Private enterprises,at present for aboutercent of total output, will be progressively restricted but not entirely eliminated as long as the GDRthe idea of peaceful reunification.
Agriculture.
Agricultural production haslower rate of progress In' thc Soviet Zone than has industry, although agricultural conditions at the time of occupation were considerablythan in Industry. Shortages in fertilizer, farm machinery, and seed will probably be reduced within the next two years as thepicture brightens, with the result that the food situation for the general population should, at the ende atf6 level.9 grain cropillion tons orercent of thatith increased supplies of fertilizer,1 figure should reach atillion tons. Mast foods, except meat and fats which will remain far below normal consumption levels, will probably be de-rationed,orresponding improvement in the morale of the East Germans and lessening thefor them of the availability of foodstuffs in West Germany and West Berlin. In view of the recurrent difficulties of agriculture, it is not likely that large-scale collectivization of farms will be enforced Intensive in-
doctrinal ion of the rural population Ls carried on by the state through peasants' unions, farm cooperatives, tractor stations, and other mass-control media, but the lack of success of the collectivization that has been undertaken so far, chiefly Involving estates formerly owned by the Reich or by Nazi war criminals, willa widespread application of
Concluiton.
Al! Indications point to an acceleratedof the Soviet Zone economy Into thc economy of the Satellite orbit. As this process continues, the GDR will become less dependent upon the West for goods and materials. Trade relations between the GDR and the Satellite States arc being continually strengthened, and those with thc West are being progressively reduced as far as possible without interfering with the supply of critical items from the West The impending admission of the GDR into the Satellite Council of Economic Mutual Assistance will hasten this development The GDR will continue to act. however, as afor Industrial equipment from Westto the Soviet bloc until such time as thc latter haaosition of virtualself-sufficiency, which ls unlikely to occur by the end
III. Military Developments
East German security forces are being trained under the close supervision of Soviet ofJlcers and by the end1 will be capable of maintaining effective internal controlassistance from Soviet occupation troops. Even In the eventoviet-GDR peacemilitary factors preclude the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forcesrmy0 security troops,0 air force personnel) despite the propaganda advantages ofove.
At present. East German security forces arc divided into three majoregularecret political police;aramilitary police. Normal police functions are under the control of the Mainfor People's Police. Police groups controlled by this organizationnd include civil police.
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criminal police, border police, transport police, and fire-fighting police. The most Important element controlled by thisBordernumbers0 and Is distributed In varying strengths throughout the five East German Latnder,pecial formation ofround Berlin. Although it Is not yet capable ofits border control missionthe Border Police will have attained this capability by the endt present, it ls nominally responsible for all Soviet Zone border control except Allied traffic which Is handled directly by Soviet forces.
The secret political police under theof State Security appears to follow thepattern. Its functions of politicalespionage, and counter-espionage will be expanded and its personnel Increased
The paramilitary forces of the GDRinclude the Maritime Police (created in Juneunknown) and the Alert Police (ground force elementotal strength of. It Isthat an air clement will be activated by the end
The Maritime Police are underMain Administration for Maritime Police"he exact position of thc MAMP In the GDR governmental structure is not known, but direct supervisory control is exercised by the Soviet Control Commission. The announced functions of the Maritime Po lice are the prevention of coastal smuggling, the protection of East German fishing vessels, and the escorting of foreign vessels Ln and out of East German ports. At least two maritime training schools have been identified but where MAMP units will be based Is not yet known MAMP equipment presently comprises at leastatrol craft from the former German navy In addition.ewly designed patrol craft, atf which are scheduledre being built.
The more important element of GDRforces is the Alert Police, under the command of the "Main Administration for Training"he MAT nominallya semi-autonomous position within the GDR governmental structure bul actually Is controlled by the Miliury Division of the Control Commission- No operational
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is Known to have been assigned to the Alertts present activity, however. Is confined to intensive military training. Of this0 men are assigned to "Alert Units" (field units of battalion typeIncluding Infantry, artillery, tank, signal and engineerhe0 are distributed amongfficer and NCO schools. MAT currently possesses sufficient Sovietm,m howitzers4 tanks) for familiarization training but not enough for operationalThis deficiency could, however, be easily made up from Soviet stocks now in East Oermany.
Although the ultimate mission of thc Alert Police Is not yet known, cither of two possible developments can be expected by the endhe fo.ee will become an elitesecurity organization similar to the Soviet MVD or the Nail S3 and personnel strength probably will not behe force willona fide East German army, probably supported ultimately by naval and air elements. This question will be resolved in part when theof0 men currentlytraining in the schools Is known. These school trainees could be Incorporated into the
existing alert units, replacing or augmenting the present unit personnel, or could be used as cadres for the activation of additional units or for the organ nation of higher tacticalthan now exist. It should be noted that Alert Police organizational structure would have to be expanded considerablythe force could be developedona fide army. Institutionystem of general conscription would provide strong evidence that the force Is being developed Into an army. At present, recruiting isighly selective basis and stress is laid on political reliability.
If It were established that the MAMP and MAT are of equal and independent status (presentlyonsiderable weight would be given to the possibility that theorganizations are in process ofto orthodox defensive and offensive military forces.
In cither eventuality, however, the GDR paramilitary forcesonstantly growing potential threat to West Germanyore immediate threat to Berlin. Thc rapidIn the military capabilities of the Alert Police raises more and more the possibility that they may yet be employedajorof Soviet military policy toward all of Germany.
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ENCLOSURE A
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Tho Intelligence Organization of theshows that the USSR may, through the
ment of State dissents from subject reportof the East German administration,
cause we cannot agree with the reportsto reand and water blockade
tentlon that reimpositionerlinwe are in agreement with ORE
of8 variety ls unlikely. Available
Original document.
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