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FOB THE ASSISTANT .DIRECTOR FOR; REPORTS. AND; ESTIMATES '
'
m CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN
THE FAR EAST - t
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CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
FOREWORD
set of estimates regarding criticalIn the Par East was prepared In responseequest from the President. The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in thc preparation of these estimates and concur In them.
The estimates follow In this order:
of Full Chinese Communist
Intervention ln Korea
of Soviet Intervention Ln Korea
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Formosa
of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Indochina
Capabilities and Threat
In the Philippines
Soviet and Chinese Commu-
nist Intentions and Capabilities ln the Far East
Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with respect to these particular situations in the Far East depend in part on the possibilityoviet decision to resort to global war, the latest agreed estimate concerning thatis included as Section O.
TOy^BCRET
CRITICAl SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
of the Problem.
estimate tbe threat of fall-scaleCommunist intervention In Korea.
Chinese Communist poundlacking requisite atr and navalare capable of intervening effectively,necessarily decisively, in the
Bearing on Intent.
o/ Intentions. Despiteby Chou En-lai. troop movementsand propaganda charges ofand border violations, there are noindications of an actual Chineseintention to resort to full-scalein Korea.
a.avoring Chinese Communtsf
if resulting in defeatajor gainlor Communist China, confirmingthe premier Asiaticonstitutegain for World Communism withincrease ln Communist China'sIn the Sino-Sovietesult Inof the possibility ofestern-type democracy; and
permit the retention of sources ofelectric power along thc Yalu River.
even if not resulting indefeat of UN forces,the Chinese Communists to utilizewar as an explanation for failure topreviously announced economicbe consistent with and furnish strongto anti-Western trends ln Asia; anda claim for maximum Sovieteconomic aid to China.
with or withoutfinal victory, might serve tho cause ofparticularly thc cause of theUnion, In that it would Involve tho West-em blocostly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East
ti. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Sovlct bloc particularly faceajor setback In the struggle with the non-Communist world if UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory in Korea.
actors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.
Chinese Communiststhe consequences of war with thedomestic problems are of suchthat the regime's entire domesticand economy would be jeopardizedstrains and the material damagebe sustained In war with the USforces would be encouragedregime's very existence would be
would minimize theof Chinese membership in the UN andseat on the Security Council.
intervention would beunless protected by powerful Sovietand naval support Such Sovietnot be forthcoming because ItSoviet intervention.
of major Soviet aidPeiping more dependent on Sovietincrease Soviet control In Manchuria toprobably unwelcome to the
unsuccessful, Chineselay Peiping open to Chinesethe grounds that China would be actingSoviet catspsw.
ilitary standpoint the mosttime for intervention in Korea has
g. Continued covert aid would offer most of thc advantages of overt intervention, while
avoiding its risks and disadvantages, ('overt aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:
Avoid further antagonizing of the UN and reduce risk of war with the US;
Promote the China-led Asiatic"revolutionaryhile ostensibly supporting peace;
Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chineseneeds in Korea;
Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in Communist circles in China and Asia generally, without risking war with the US.
IV. Probability of Chinete Communist Action.
hile full-scale Chinese Communistin Korea must be regarded asonsideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion thatoviet decision for global war, such action is not probableuring this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.
B. Throat of Soviet Intervention in Koroa
Statement of the Problem.
estimate the threat of directintervention ln Korea
D. Capabilities.
armed forces now ln the Farcapable of intervening overwhelminglyvirtually without warning.
III. Factor* Searing on Intent.
Indications of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no Indication that It intends to intervene directly ln Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought in its official statements and In its propaganda to give the Impression that lt Is not involved in the KoreanMoreover, the USSR has taken noor military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea.the Soviet Government for some months has been Increasingly improving its military capabilities in Uie Far East as well as in other strategic ureas.
Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention The defeat of North Korea wouldajor setback for the USSR. It would involve:
a. The lossatellite, andstem-oriented state on theof Communist China and the USSR.
ft. Giving the Westernotential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regardhreat to the industrial, communication, and military centers ofand the Soviet Far East.
the Soviet military andpositionis Japan.
loss to Soviet political prestige Inwould demonstrate that the Kremlin isto support its foliowers effectivelySoviet-instigated action.
loss to Soviet military prestige inwould leadendency, whether orto re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.
eduction In the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its politicalby means short of war In that It would demonstrate the delerinination and capability of the nor Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-Inspired aggression.
Opposing SovietIn weighing potential gains and risks of
intervention, the Soviet leaders mustas an overwhelming consideration, that their open Intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an Issue on which the Western world hasew degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would beby ihe US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater.ecision toopenly Inhe ultimate analysts,ecision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.
o. The Soviet leaders may estimate that it will be possible, without assuming this all-critical risk, to salvage some of thc lossesfrom the Korean situation. USactivities could be obstructed byguerrilla action, which might involve the US in an extended and costly occupation and which could contribute to Soviet efforts to develop Inacial enmity toward the US and the Western Powers.
IV. Piobobililies of Soviet Action. "
is believed that the Soviet leadersconsider that their prospective losseswarrant direct militarya consequent grave risk of war.intervene tn thc Korean hostilitiesthey have decided, not cn the basis ofsituation alone, but on the basisconsiderations, thats to theirtolobal war at this time
C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa
would seriously diminish continued anti-Communist resistance in China andSoutheast Asia.
or continuedof an attack on Formosa would resultloss of "face" to the Chinese Communists.
would provide themall but significantforeign exchange,otentialrice, thereby contributing somewhatCommunist capabilities for
actors Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.
would be improbable.
attack Involves the risk of warUS as long as US forces areFormosa and the mainland.Communist leadership would beto jeopardize its popularachievements, and internalan attack on Formosa that could leadair attacks on Chinese cities, toblockade of the Chinese coast, losanctions, and to protractedcould sap Chinese economic strength.
Chinese Communists faceproblems, including banditry,unrest, guerrilla opposition,agrarian maladjustments, andInvolved in consolidating theParty's political control. Forthe danger cxjsis that, iffall or prove unduly costly, thesolidarity of the Communistbe subjectedevere strain.
d. In view of current UN Interest inthe Chinese Communists have someto hopeavorable political solution.
IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Invasion.
8 It is believed that,ovietto precipitate global war, an invasion of Formosa bv the Chinese Communists will not be attempted during the remainder
D.
hinese Communist Invasion of Indochi
of the Problem.
estimate tbe threathineseinvasion ot Indochina
forces presently deployed nearborder, thcroops for anIndochina withoutdditionalCommunist troops could arrive atin support of an Invasion withinReinforcements and supplies mightby sea to rebel-held sections ofcoast, lt Is also withincapabilities to furnish airan invasion.
These capabilities could be exercised without jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations in the Far East, except to the already inadequate air supportimultaneous North Korean or Form own intervention.
If the Chinese Communists shouldIndochina, It is almost certain that the defending forces under the French would soon lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.
III. Fcchxi Bearing on Intent.
of Intentions.
a. The construction and improvement of roads, railroads, and air facilities; theof technical and training assistance and advisory personnel; present logistic support from tbe border provinces of Kwangtung. Kwangsi, and Yunnanall these might be construed as positive indicators of anmvaJJon. These activities, however, might tlao be indicators of an increase in thc flow of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Mlnh Communists, rather than of Chinese invasion.
Chinese Communistspropaganda support to thc Viethas been no public Chinesewhich could reasonablyommitment to invade or asfor Invasion.
actor* Favoring Intervention.
Chinese Communist invasion ofwould be the most rapid means ofa Communist Indochina.
fall of Vietnam to thefacilitate establishment ofover Burma and Thailand.
e. An early Communist victory lnwould in part offset the loss ofCommunist prestige occasioned by Communist reverses in Korea.
d. The Chinese Communists, operating on behalf of International Communism, might invade Indochina with the hope that, even If UN Intervention should deprive them ofvictory. Western bloc forces would be involved in Inconclusive warfare ln the Far East
7 Factort Opposing Intervention.
Chinese Communist Invasion ofwould greatly Increase the risk ofCommunist involvement in warWestern Powers or the UN, as weU asof global war.
Viet Mlnh military successesthe probability thatol Indochina can be ultimatelyresort to Chinese Communistproviding there is no major Increaseplanned external assistance toand their supporters.
e. Viet Mlnh capabilities can beincreased without resort to open
of Indochina by Chinesetroops would arouse localand coulderious source of
command conflict between Peiping and Vict
Mlnh leadership.
Chinese Communist invasionto antagonize Ihe presently neutralAsia, particularly India
China's prospects forin the UN and UN-sponsoredwould be jeopardized and litefor the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with powers outside the Soviet orbit would be curtailed.
g. Chinese Communist invasion ofmight provide the US with an Impelling reason for retaining in the vicinity otmajor objective of the Chinese CommunistUS Seventh Fleet.
IV. Probabilities of Chinese Communist Invosion.
It is estimated that an open Chinesepossible and capable of being launched with Uttle or no preliminaryimprobablet Is highly probable, however, that the Chinesewill Increase the substantial military assistance already being given to the Viet Minh forces.
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Communis* Capabilities and Threat in ihe Philippines
Statement ot th* Problem.
estimate tbe Communistthreat in the Philippines.
I!. Capabilities.
HtJu. The Haks (HukbongNg Bayan) are today the armyCommunism, led by avowedwho follow the policies and seekthe objectives of Worldarmed strength is estimated at The Huks areguerrilla organisation, utilizing "hittactics; making maximum use of theof surprise, choice of terrain, andand avoiding frontal engagementforces. The Huks, who arealmost exclusively to infantrythe capability of mounting0 men)attacks simultaneously againsttargets. , thaytheir areas of operationand to other islands of therecent months they have carried outand more widespreadHuks have terrorized localinterfered with travel. They canintensify their operations, particularlydefended provincial areas, andstage another series of coordinatedbefore thc end
upporting Elements.
a. Support of the Huk movement, apart from that derived from unorganized lawless elements, is found among large numbers of peasants, who willingly or by force andcontribute to the Huk movementsource of support is found in thelabor movement, where low real wages and poor conditions of work permitof the union movements by Communist
the Communists haveln China, It is believed that athe approximatelyillionhave already aligned themselvesPelping regime. Such Chinese arefacilitating Communistfinancial support, andaid to the Huks.
Intelligence does notthe Huks have received, or are likelysufficient assistance fromsources to alter their militarysignificantly
overnment Coantermeasvres. efforts to deal with the Huk problem have been ineffective thus far. Government forces have been and are able to maintain over-all Internal security but are unable to control local areas where dissident groups are strongest. Recently reorganized armed forces may be able to deal more effectively with Hut activities, but Uttle Improvement Disillusionment with the government's Ineffectiveness has caused many persons who are not active Huk supporters to become Indifferent and uncooperative toward government efforts to stamp out the dissident forces. The government, moreover, has shown Uttle disposition to adopt and implement basic agrarian and social reforms which mightconsiderably the number of peasants who support the Huks.eduction would lessen measurably Huk capabilities and theof their operations, but would notthe hard core of the Huk movement which would continue tourdensome security problem.
IV. Conclusion 1.
hile the Huks are capable ofwidespread, coordinated raids particularly in central Luzon, and creating somein the Manila area, it is estimated lhat they cannot overthrow the
F.
of the Problem.
J. To estimate general Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities ln the Far East
he Soviet Union and Communist China share the common objective of establishing Communist control throughout the Far East. Logically, both would prefer to secure thiswithout resort to general war. The Soviet Union includes in its objective Kremlin controloromunized Asia, Including China While the Chinese Communists may well object to such Kremlin control, they have given no overt Indication that they do notthe primacy of Moscow in International Communism.
III. Capabilities,
hort o) Direct Employment of Armed Forces. The Soviet Union and Communist China have the capacity, through aof measures short of war, further tothe strength of Communism ln all areas In the Far East except those occupied by US or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that in no area of the Far East, except Tibet and possibly Indochina unless presently planned external assistance Is Increased, do they have the capability of establishing completecontrol0 through such measures.
ith Full-scale Employment of Armed Forces. In the event of war beginning in
a. The Soviet Union acting alone has theof rapidly occupying Korea, Hokkaido, and Okinawa; ofubstantialinvasion of Honshu; and of conducting harassing attacks on theKyushu, Formosa, the Philippines, and other Islands In the adjacent waters, and lines of communication.
h Communist China acting alone possesses the capability to overrun Tibet and substantial portions of the mainland of Southeast Asia, and totrong attack on Korea.
c. In combination, the Soviet Union and Communist China have the capability ofpractically all the Asiatic mainland and possibly of occupying ull Japan and Formosa.
(V. Intentions. B. Both the Soviet Union and Communist
China have clearly indicated that they intend to pursue without pause their goal ofCommunist control over every vulnerable area in the Far East by every means open to them short of direct use of their armed forces. Neither has given concrete indication ot anto employ0 Its own armed forces outside its own boundaries.
It is estimated ln particular that,oviet decision tolobal war, the Soviet Union will notirectly with Its armed forces inhostilities, and the Chinese Communists probably will not0 attempt to Invade Korea, Formosa, or Indochina.
With respectossible Sovietto precipitate global war. thc latest agreed conclusions are set forth In Enclosure O.
fits/ -
G. Conclusionsossible Soviet Decision To Precipitate Global War
Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Mar^^nlnist-Stalinistby considerations aflecting thethe Soviet Unionorld power.made clear that their long-termlo establish World Communism underof the Kremlin. Theirhowever, are:
maintain the control of thethc peoples of the Soviet Union.
strengthen the economic andand defend the territory of theUnion.
consolidate control over theAsian Satellites (including
make secure thc strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent thein Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.
c. To eliminate Anglo-American influence in Europe and Asia.
o establish Soviet domination overand Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these objectives simultaneously, ln case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater Importance to the first four listed, and in that order.
On the basis that the long-term object of the Soviet rulers is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers are notto succumb to Soviet dominationa flght. there Is, and will continue to be. grave danger of war between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on thc other.
Thc Soviet Union will continueits aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western nations.
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The Soviet rulers could achieve, and axeair way toward achieving, the first three parts of their object (see a,bove) without risk of involvement in direct armed conflict with the Western Powers.
Parts d, e, f,f their object are improbable of achievement without thcof armed force, though there are still factors in the existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, in certain circumstances, and ln the absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overtof Soviet armed forces.
In pressing to achieve parts d, e,f their object, the Soviet rulers will, atstages, inevitably impinge upon the vital Interests of the Western Powers and so incur the risk of involvementeneral warthrough the necessary reactions of the Western Powers.
In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without involvement in awar against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberatelyaroment when, in their opinion, the strength of the Soviet Unionis the Western Powers is at itsIt is estimated thateriod exists now and will extend from the present4 (Noteith its peak at about hallway,2
From the point of view of military lorccs and economic potential, the Soviet Union isosition toeneral war ofduration now if Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.
While intelligence is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise itsand capability toeneral war, in view of the foregoing it must be recognized that the riskeneral war exists now and
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at any tune when the Soviet rulers may elect to take action which threatens, whoily or in part, the vital interests of the
Western Powers-NoteSM being the date By which II Is assumed that North Atlantic Treaty OrfsnizaUoan Europe wEl be built up totrength that they can withstand tha initial shock of surprtta attack: and when the tap between the relauve strenrth ol thc Western Union force* and those ol the Soviet Onion win have becur. lo contract.
Notehen the Soviet Union has made good some esaenUal deficiencies in atomic bomb stockpile, and la certain types ol aircraft; and before Ihe North AUanUe Treaty Or-ganlxauon economy la fully reared to the war effort.
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Original document.
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