or. 3
- Ebskus H. Hokji, Jr.
OMWiJ OU-jftc dl_
Cifny^filu.iA. {Jtxjcshluak. On,&
Approved !otDais
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.
0
CiUt.DCh' ?Ot THE PREilDrM
Id accardanco with yearatcit herewith esti-ostes regarding five critical situations lo tha fax Bast. Tha Intelligence orga-aiations of tie Departawnta of State, the Amy, the KaTy, and the Air Force participated In the preparation of these estimates and concur In
The estlaates followhe following crderi
hreat of Full Chinese Ccsamnint Intervention ln Korea
hreat of Soviet Intervention inhreat of Chinese Ccmamlat Invasion of Farehreat of Chinese Cotiunmlst Invasion of Indochina
r -
ccrsunlst Capabilities and Threat ln the Philippines
General Soviet end Chinese CoBsaanist Intentions and Capabilities ln the Tar Best
as tha conclusions reached with respect to thesesituations depend in pert on the possibilityoviet decision to resort to global var, the latest agreed estlaete on that subject is also attached as aaoloenxe G.
B. SMITH Director
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l^cL^A. THREAT OF FULL CHINESE COMMUNISTKOREA
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
o estimate the threat of full-scale Chinese intervention in Korea.
- Kii>*ML" CAPABILITIES
he Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking
air and naval support, are capable of intervening effec- lAA
O Ibut not necessarily decisively. In the Korean conflict. Y
ACT0RS BEARlNGNTENT
Indications of Intentions. Despite statements by Chou En-lai,
ovements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities t
border violations, there are no convincing Indications of an actual 1
'* *Communist intention to resort to full-scale Intervention In Korea.
iFactors Favoring Chinese Communist Intervention.
a. Intervention, If resulting in defeat of UN forces,ajor gain In prestige for Communist China,It as the premier Asiaticajor gain for WoddCommunlsra with concomitant Increase In Communist China's stature In the Slno-Sovietesult In the elimination
of the possibilityommon frontierestern-type democracy;ermit the retention of sources of Mao-churlan electric power along the Yalu River.
bj. Intervention, even if not resultingecisive defeat of UN forces, would: (i) enable the Chinese Communists to utilize foreign war as an explanation for failure to carry out previously announced economice consistent with and furnish strong impetus to anti-Western trends in Asia;laim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to China.
ntervention, with or without assurance of final victory, might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the cause of the Soviet Union, in that it would involve the Western blocostly and possibly Inconclusive war In the Far East
SL. The Communist cause generally and the Sino-Soviet bloc particularly face the prospectajor set-back ln the struggle with the non-CommunistN forces areto achieve complete victory In Korea.
actors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.
a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear theof war with the US. Their domestic problems are of such magnitude that the regime's entire domestic program and economy would be Jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained In war with the US. Antl-Communlst forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be endangered.
bj. Intervention would minimize the possibility of Chinese membership in the UN andeat on the Security Council.
pen intervention would be extremely costly unless protected by powerful Soviet air cover and naval support. Such Soviet aid might not be forthcoming because it would constitute Soviet intervention.
d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help and increase Soviet control in Manchuriaoint probably unwelcome to the Chinese
fi. If unsuccessful, Chlnose intervention would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment on the grounds that China would be actingoviet catspaw.
J.ilitary standpoint the most favorable time for intervention in Korea has passed.
ontinued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt Intervention, while avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert aid would enable the Chinese Communists to:
further antagonizing of the UN andof war with the US;
Promote the China-led Asiatichile ostensibly supporting peace;
Maintain freedom of action for later choice between abandonment of aid or continuing such covert aid as might be appropriate to Chinese Communist needs in Korea;
atisfy the "aid Korea" demand in Communist circles in China and Asia generally, without risking war with the US.
TV. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION
hile full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regardedontinuing possibility, aof all known factors leads to the conclusion thatoviet decision for global war, such action is not probableuring this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.
0 B. THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KOREA
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
estimate the threat of direct Soviet militaryin Korea
n. CAPABILITIES
armed forces now ln the Far East axe capableoverwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning.
m. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT
of Intentions. The Soviet Union to dateno indication that it intends to intervene directly inthe beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought
in its official statements and In its propaganda to give thethat It is not involved in the Korean situation.the USSR has taken no political or military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea. However, the Soviet Government for some months has been Increasingly improving its military capabilities In the Far East as well as ln other strategic areas.
a, Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention. The defeat of North Korea wouldajor set-back for the USSR. It would Involve:
he lossatellite, and the establishmentestern-oriented state on the frontiers of Communist China and the USSR.
iving the Westernotential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regardhreat to the industrial, communication, and military centers of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East.
% c, Weakening tho Soviet military and political positionis Japan.
loss to Soviet political prestige in that itthat the Kremlin is not willing to support itseffectivelyoviet-instigated action.
loss to Soviet military prestige in that it would endency, whether or not Justified, to re-evaluate theof Soviet military equipment and tactics.
eduction In the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its political control by means short of war in that it would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-inspired aggression.
actors Opposing Boyle. interYenUga*
a. In weighing potential gains and risks of intervention, the Soviet leaders must calculate, as an overwhelmingthat their open intervention would lead to directwith US and other UN forces over an issue on which the Western world hasew degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would be limited by the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater.ecision to intervene openly in Korea, in the ultimate analysis,ecision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.
The Soviet leaders may estimate that it will be possible, without assuming this all-critical risk, to salvage some of the losses suffered from the Korean situation. US military activities could be obstructed by extensive guerrilla action, which might Involve the US in an extended and costly occupation and which could contribute to Soviet efforts to develop inacial enmity toward the US and the Western Powers.
IV. PROBA3LUTTES OF SOVIET ACTION
t is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military interventiononsequent grave risk of war. They will intervene ln the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis ol over-all considerations, that It is lo their Interest toa global war at this time. ..
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C. THREAT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION OF FORMOSA
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
estimate tbe threat of Chinese CommunistFormosa-
H. CAPABILITIES
Despite certain definite Chinese Communist deficiencies in naval and air forces and probably in amphibious training and doctrine, the Communists are now capable of launching anagainst Formosa withroops and moderate air cover. The USSR couldinimum furnish tactical advice and technical and logistic support.
Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient in number and materiel to defend Formosa, lack of staying power, poor command structure, lack of inter-service coordination, questionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition make their defense capabilities questionable.
Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the Chinesedefense forces are capable of holding Formosaetermined Chinese Communist invasion.
JH. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT
of Intentions. Frequent official statementsChinese Communists have clearly Indicated their intention
to seize control of Formosa. However, available Intelligence does
not Indicate their intention to do so in the Immediate future. An unknown factor bearing upon the intent to invade is the degree of control the USSR Is capable of exercising over the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet intent with respect to Formosa.
actors Favoring Invasion of Formosa.
_a. The occupation of Formosa would remove the symbol of Nationalist resistance;otential source of coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist regime; and would seriously diminish continuedresistance in China and throughout Southeast Asia.
or continued postponement ofon Formosa would resultoss of "face" toCommunists.
would provide the Chinesea small but significant source of foreign exchange,potential source of rice, thereby contributing somewhatCommunist capabilities for economic reconstruction.
actors Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.
_a. Success would be improbable.
b. An attack Involves the risk of war with the US as long as US forces are interposed between Formosa and the mainland. The Chinese Communist leadership would beto Jeopardize its popular support, domestic achievements, and Internal program by an attack on Formosa that could lead to retaliatory air attacks on Chinese cities,trictof the Chinese coast, to strong economic sanctions, and to protracted warfare that could sap Chinese economic strength.
he Chinese Communists face serious domestic problems, including banditry, widespread unrest, guerrilla opposition, economic stagnation, agrarian maladjustments, and the problems involved in consolidating the Communist Party's political control. For these reasons the danger exists that, if attacks should fail or prove unduly costly, the present apparent solidarity of the Communist regime would be subjectedevere strain.
& In view of current UN interest in Formosa, the Chinese Communists have some reason to hopeavorable political solution.
IT. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMITNIST INVASION
t ls believed thatoviet decision toglobal war, an invasion of Formosa by the Chinesewill not be attempted during the remainder
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D. THREATHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION OF INDOCniNA
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
estimate the threathinese CommunistIndochina
IT. CAPABILITIES
From forces presently deployed near the Indochina border, the Chinese Communists couldroops for an Invasion of Indochina without appreciable forewarning.dditional Chinese Communist troops could arrive at the border In support of an invasion within ten days. Reinforcements and supplies might be moved by sea to rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast It is also within Chinese Communist capabilities to furnish air support for an invasion.
These capabilities could be exercised without Jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations In the Far East, except to the already inadequate air supportimultaneous North Korean or Formosan intervention.
If the Chinese Communists should invade Indochina, It is almost certain that the defending forces under the French would soon lose all of V'.etnam, except Cochin China.
ITT. FACTORS BEARING ON INTENT
of Intentions.
construction and improvement of roads,air facilities; the provision of technical and trainingadvisory personnel; present logistic support from theof Kwangtung, Kwangsi, andthese mightas positive indicators of an impending invasion.however, might also be indicators of an increase in
the flow of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh Communists, rather than of Chinese invasion.
Chinese Communists have givento the Viet Mlnh, there has been no public Chinesestatement which could reasonably be construed as ato invade or as Justification for Invasion.
Favoring Intervention.
Chinese Communist Invasion of Indochina wouldmosl rapid means ofommunist Indochina.
fall of Vietnam to the Communists wouldof Communist control over Burma and Thailand.
early Communist victory in Indochina wouldoffset the loss of International Communist prestigeby Communist reverses in Korea.
Chinese Communists, operating on behalfCommunism, might invade Indochina with theeven If UN Intervention should deprive them ofWestern bloc forces would be involved inin the Far East.
W
actors Opposing Intervention.
Chinese Communist Invasion of Indochinaincrease the risk of Chinese Communistwar against the Western Powers or the UN, as well asof global war.
Viet Minh military successes haveprobability that Communist control of Indochina can besecured without resort to Chinese Communistthere is no major increase of presently plannedassistance to the French and their supporters.
Minh capabilities can be substantiallyresort to open intervention.
of Indochina by Chinese Communistarouse local anti-Chinese sentiment and could besource of command conflict between Pelping andleadership.
Chinese Communist invasion would tend tothe presently neutral states of Asia, partinilarly India..
China's prospects for membership Inand UN-sponsored organizations would be Jeopardized andfor the establishment of diplomatic relationsoutside the Soviet orbit would be curtailed.
Chinese Communist Invasion of Indochina might provide the US with an impelling reason for retaining lh the vicinity ofajor objective of the Chinese Communist government the US Seventh Fleet.
rV. PROBABILITIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVASION
It Is estimated that an open Chinese Communistwhile possible and capable of being launched with little or no preliminaryImprobablet is highlyhowever, that the Chinese Communists will increase the substantial military assistance already being given to the Viet Minh forces.
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E. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND THREAT TN THE PHILIPPINES
OF THE PROBLEM
estimate the Communist capabilities and threatPhilippines.
Huks. The Huks (Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ngtoday the army of Philippine Communism, led bywho foUow the policies and seek to furtherof World Communism. Their armed strengthat no more thanhe Huks area guerrlUa organization, utilizing" hit and run"maximum use of the elements of surprise, choice ofand mobility; and avoiding frontal engagementforces. The Huks, who are limited almostto Infantry weapons, have the capability ofcomparatively0 men)simultaneously against widely separated targets.they have expanded their areas of operationand to other islands of the Philippines. In recenthave carried out better coordinated and more widespread The Huks have terrorized local communities andwith travel. They can extend and Intensify theirIn weitkly defended provincial areas, and mayanother series of coordinated attacks before the end
a. Support of the Huk movement, apart from that derived from unorganized lawless elements, is found among large numbers of peasants, who willingly or by force and Intimidation contribute to the Huk movement. Another source of support Is found ln the Philippine labor movement, whore low real wages and poor conditions of work permit exploitation of the union movements by Communist
organizers.
("Jrommunists have achieved power In China, it is Believed thaflapproximatelyillion Philippine Chinese have already aligned themselves with the Peiping regime. Such Chinese are probably facilitating Communist communications, providing financial support, and otherwise rendering aid to the Huks.
c. Available intelligence does not indicate that the Huks have received, or are likely to receive, sufficient assistance from external Communist sources to alter their military capabilities significantly
overnment Countermeasurcs. Government efforts to deal with the Huk problem have been ineffective thus far.forces have been and are able to maintain over-all internal security but are unable to control local areas where dissident groups are strongest. Recently reorganized armed forces may be able to deal more effectively with Huk activities, but little Improvement Is anticipatedisillusionment with theneffectiveness has caused many persons who are not active Huk supporters to become .Indifferent andtoward government efforts to stamp out the dissident forces. The government, moreover, has shown little disposition to adopt and implement basic agrarian and social reforms which
i
might reduce considerably the number of peasants whothe Huks.eduction would lessen measurably Huk capabilities and the intensity of their operations, but would not eliminate the hard core of the Huk movement which would continue tourdensome security problem.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
hile the Huks are capable of conducting widespread, coordinated raids particularly in central Luzon, and creating some disturbances In the Manila area, it Is estimated that they cannot overthrow the Philippine Government
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F. GENERAL SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST
OF THE PROBLEM
estimate general Soviet and Chinese Communistand capabilities In the Far East
Soviet Union and Communist China share theof establishing Communist control throughout theLogically, both would prefer to secure this objectiveresort to general war. The Soviet Union includes in ItsKremlin controlommunlzed Asia, Including China.Communists may well object to such Kremlin control,given no overt Indication that they do not accept theMoscow ln International Communism.
HI. CAPABILITIES
of Direct Employment of Armed Forces. Theand Communist China have the capacity, through aof measures short of war, further to develop the strengthIn all areas in the Far East except those occupiedor UN forces. It Is estimated, however, that ln no area ofEast, except Tibet and possibly Indochina unlessexternal assistance ls Increased, do they bave theof establishing complete Communist control duringsuch measures.
ith Fuji-Scale Employment of Armed Forces. In the event of war beginning
a* The Soviet Union acting alone has the capability of rapidly occupying Korea, Hokaldo and Okinawa; ofubstantial amphibious-airborne invasion of Honshu; and of conducting harassing attacks .on the Aleutians,he Philippines, and other islands in the adjacent waters, and lines of communication.
ommunist China acting alone possesses the capability to overrun Tibet and substantial portions of the mainland of Southeast Asia, and totrong attack on Korea.
c. In combination, the Soviet Union and Communistthe capability of overrunning practically all the Asiaticand possibly of occupying all Japan and
IV. INTENTIONS
the Soviet Union and Communist China havethat they intend to pursue without pause their goalCommunist control over every vulnerable area InEast by every means open to them short of direct usearmed forces. Neither has given concrete indication of
an intention to employ0 its own armed forces outside its own boundaries.
It is estimated in particular that,oviettolobal war, the Soviet Union will notu"intei veue directly with its armed forces in Koreanand the Chinese Communists probably will not0 attempt to invade Korea, Formosa, or Indochina.
With respectossible Soviet decision to precipitate global war, the latest agreed conclusions are set forth In Enclosure G.
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G. CONCLUSIONSOSSIBLE SOVIET DECISION TO PRECIPITATE GLOBAL WAR
he Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated byenin 1st-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations affecting theof the Soviet Unionorld power. They have made clear that their long-term object ls to establish World Communism under the domination of the Kremlin. Their immediate concerns, however are:
maintain the control of the Kremlin over thethe Soviet Union.
strengthen the economic and military positionthe territory of the Soviet Union.
To consolidate control over the European and Asian Satellites (including Communist China).
d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the establishment, ln Europeand Asia, of forces capable of threatening the Soviet position.
_e. To eliminate Anglo-American Influenco in Europe and Asia.
o establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia,
To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that order.
On the basis that the long-term object of the Soviet rulers is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers are not prepared to succumb to Soviet dominationight, there is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on the other.
The Soviet Union will continue relentlessly itspressures on the power position of the Western nations.
The Soviet rulers could achieve, and areair way towards achieving, tho first three parts of their object (seeL above) without risk of involvement In direct armed conflict with the Western Powers.
ndg^ of their object are Improbable ofwithout the employment of armed force, though there are still factors in the existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, In certain circumstances, and In the absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overt Involvement of Soviet armed forces.
In pressing to achievend jj of their object, the Soviet rulers will, at certain stages, Inevitably impinge upon the vital Interests of the Western Powers and so Incur the risk
of involvementeneral war precipitated through theof the Western
lo. the belief tbat their object cannot be fully attained without involvementeneral war against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberatelyaroment when, in ftelr opinion, the strength of the Soviet Unionis the Western Powers ia at Its maximum. It is estimatederiod exists now and will extend from the presest4 (Noteith its peak at about2
From the point of new of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Ui Em isosition toeneral war of limited duration now if Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.
B. While intelligence is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise lis Initiative and capability toeneral war', mTlew of the foregoing It must be recognized that the riskeneral war exists now and hereafter at anytime when the Soviet rulers may elect to lake action which threatens, wholly or in part, the vital Interests of the Western Powers.
NOTE4 being the date by which it is assumed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces In Europe will be bulli up totrength that they can withstand the Initial shock of surprise attack; and when the gap between the relative strength nf the Western Union forces and those of the Soviet Union will have begun to contract.
NOTEhen the Soviet Union has made good some essential deficiencies In atomic bomb stock pile, and in certain types of aircraft; and before tbe North Atlantic Treaty Organization economy ls fully geared to the war effort
ERRATA for Central Intelligence Agency Top Secret Memorandum of5
A phrase has been omitted fromnd Threat in the Philippines. Thenumber ofelongs ine, thusfirst sentence ofread: "Since the Communistspower in China, it is believedumber of the
approximatelyillion Philippine Chinese have already aligned themselves with the Peiping regime."
Original document.
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