SPECIAL ESTIMATE
TOP SECRET
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH
3
Publishedeptember^ .
late.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TSETSES-
fflSpo* w SECRET
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TO ALL HOLDERS OF SE-13
Revised Paragraphfpproved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on1
b. Atomichile Soviet atomic capabilities will re-main inferior to those of the US, it is estimated that the Sovietof atomic weapons (some of which might have an energy yield as highilotons) will increase as follows:
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present the Soviet air force has antrength ofedium bombers capable of one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to practically all important targets in the US. Although there is no evidence that the USSR has developed aerialtechniques, with such techniques these aircraft may be capable
he following factors must be considered in connection with the above estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities:
The number and/or size oi the productionasis for this estimate may be incorrect. The minimum program, which is not Inconsistent with the information available, wouldtockpile of about one-half the number of weapons Indicated. On the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expanded production facilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded.
The type of weapon postulated for calculating the stockpile figures may be incorrect. It is possible by changing the weaponto substantially increase or decrease the number of weapons in the stockpile,ertain quantity of fissionable material. Such changes, however, alter the kilotonnage of the Individual weapons accordingly.
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of two-way missions to most important US targets. Byhe USSR may haveU-4's and by. Byhe USSR also may haveong-range bombers capable of round trip missions against nearly all vital targets in. It probably will have by this time substantial numbers of twin-Jet high performance bombers capable of atomic attack on Western Europe and US overseas bases, andet bomber capable of attacking the US. Byhe USSR should also have sufficient stockpiles of nerve gas for sustained, extensive employment.
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH
SE-13
Published1
This estimate was prepared at the request of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council asof United States Programs for National Security.
The estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Intelligence Advisory Committee cohcured in this estimate on
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH
I. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS 1/
A. Probable Growth In Soviet and Satellite Capabilities.
The Soviet sphere will probably continue to increase its military, economic, and political strength over the next two years. Its absolute strength will be considerably greater In over-all terms byhan at present.
General Military Capabilities. The military strength-in-being of the Soviet orbit should further increase over the next few years. Of greatest significancerobableln Soviet capabilities for atomic attack and for defense against such attack, the further development of Chinese Communist military strength, and continued growth of European Satellite military power.
a. Substantial modernization programs are continuing in all three Soviet services and Soviet forces should remainigh state of war readiness. No sizable increase is expected in the Soviet army, which now totalsen,ine divisions, and can probably mobilize anivisionsays. While the over-all numerical strength of the Soviet air force is expected to remain substantially the Same, Soviet air power will become increasingly effective through continued conversion to jet fighters and bombers, improved
xcept in general terms, the position of Communist China is discussed in Section m.
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training standards, operational use of heavy bombers, and acquisition of additional electronic equipment.the USSR is increasing its strength in Eastern Europe and the Far East to maintain its relativeover Western strength.
b. Atomic Capabilities.hile Soviet atomicwill remain inferior to those of the US, the USSR may have as manyombs bynd as manyyome of these bombs might have an energy yield as highilotons. At present the Soviet air force has antrength ofedium bombers capable of one-way missions, carrying atomic bombs, to practically all important targets in the US. Although there Is no
pecial attention ls called to the fact that estimates of the Soviet atomic stockpile are tentative and uncertain because:
number and/or size of theasis for this estimate may beminimum program, which is not inconsistent with
the information available, wouldtockpile of about one-half the number of weapons indicated. Cm the other hand, from the information available at the present time, the possibility that additional or expandedfacilities will be constructed during the period under consideration cannot be precluded.
type of weapon postulated for calculatingfigures may be incorrect. It is possiblethe weapon design to substantially increasethe number of weapons In the stockpile, given
a certain quantity of fissionable material. Such changes, however, alter the kilotonnage of the individual weapons accordingly.
evidence that the USSR has developed aerial refueling techniques, with such techniques these aircraft may be capable of two-way missions to most important US targets. Byhe USSR may haveU-4's and by. Byhe USSR also may haveong-range bombers capable of round trip missions against nearly all vital targets in the US. It probably will have by this time substantial numbers of twin-Jet high performance bombers capable of atomic attack on Western Europe and US overseas bases, andet bomber capable ot attacking the US. Byhe USSR should also have sufficient stockpiles of nerve gas for sustained, extensive employment.
air defenses probably will bebyood all-weatherwith adequate airborne intercept radaravailable in limited to moderate quantities byand difficulties with ground controlshould be largely overcome.antiaircraft defenses with modernmust be expected.
USSR will probably considerablysubmarine warfare capabilities byf the known Soviet modernization andprogram. At present the USSR has ansubmarines. More than half are oceanmedium-range submarines ofand ot theseave thepatrolling in US coastal waters. Theirinclude torpedo attacks against shippingof ports.
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e. The Eastern European Satellite armies (including the East German) are expected to increaseresentivisionsy the fallhen Soviet re-equipment programs are expected to be completed. By that time these forces, despite some qualitative deficiencies, should be capable ofoperations with Soviet logistical backing or joint offensive operations with the Red Army. The East German Alert Police0 is capable of rapid expansion, with Soviet help, tooviet type rifle divisions.orce of only eight divisions is apparently contemplated at present due to the limitations imposed by the manpower demands of the East German economy. Unless the Korean war is prolonged, intensified, or broadened the Chinese Communist forces should also be materially strengthened with Soviet aid and technical support.
apabilities for particular operations. The Soviet hlor will probably bytill be able to carry out almost all of the offensive operations of which they are presentlycapable, except in the unlikely event that theof new weapons developed, produced and actually deployed by the West should offset the present preponderance of Soviet military strength on the Eurasian continent.
USSR should still be able to overrunand the Near East bylthoughstrength will increase Western defenselengthen correspondingly the time requiredoperations.
USSR is already capable of an atomic attackcontinental US. Although US air defenses willimproved byovietattack on the US may be even moreand the US will still be seriouslysuch an attack.
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Political and Psychological Warfare Capabilities. The Communists will continue to have extensive propaganda,and obstructive capabilities, both overt and covert, in Western Europe over the next two years. Moreover, Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities In the Far East will probably considerably increase.
Economic Strength of the Soviet Bloc. The over-all economic strength of the Soviet orbit will remain far inferior to that of
the Western Powers over the next few years, and little change is likely3 in relative productive capacities. For example, US, Canadian, and Western European raw steel output should continue to be four times as great as that of the Soviet bloc, rising toons3 as compared to an0 tons for the Soviet bloc. However, the Western Powers will continue to be less able than the USSR to bring their over-all resources to bear on maximizing economic readiness for war. The Soviet economy is alreadyigh state of war-readiness and its productive capacity is atevel and ofharacter as to enable the USSR toajor war effort. Although the expansion of the NATO mobilization base will substantially narrow the gap between Western and Soviet economic war-readiness byhe USSR will stillubstantial lead. Continued large-scale arms production and stockpiling during the next two years will further increase Soviet economic war-readiness and extend the period over which the USSR could expect to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Increasedin the European Satellites and their further integration Into the Soviet economy will also contribute to Soviet war potential.
owever, certain sectors of the Soviet economy are highly vulnerable to air attack and will probably remain so for the period of this estimate despite Soviet efforts to improve their air defenses, continued dispersion of facilitiesore complete system of reserve stocks. Moreover, certain economic
weaknesses will still persist within the Soviet bloc,hortage of merchant shipping and deficiencies in such items as oil, crude rubber, certain machine tools and precision instruments, some non-ferrous metals and alloys, and some electricalWestern trade controls already have some impact, and to the extent that these controls are tightened such deficiencies will become more important. However, apart from the effects of US bombing, it is unlikely, in view of the Soviet stockpiling program and the probable development of substitutes, that these deficiencies will seriously affect Soviet capabilitiesong war. Although inferior by US standards, the Soviet land transport net is probably also adequateajor war.
Stability of the Soviet Sphere. Despitewithin the Soviet bloc. Communist controlfor the period of this estimate. The onlyof serious internal strains would be inif it remained embroiled in hostilities in the FarSectionhile chronic difficulties will persist Inof the European Satellites, they should beeven firmer Soviet control. Domestic dissatisfactiondeprivations created by the forced pace ofcollectivization, and rearmament willonstantSoviet orbit, but no serious threat to the USSR.
B. Probable Soviet Policies through
Objectives. It can be assumed that over-allwill remain the same as outlined inhort-term aim of Soviet policy will continue to beof further growth in Western strength and unity.
The USSR must be increasingly concerned with the pace of Western countermeasures, which it doubtless views as an ever more serious threat not only to the early accomplishment of itsobjectives but eventually to the security of the Soviet orbit itself. In particular, the USSR must fear growing US military power and its projectioneries of overseas bases
encircling the Soviet bloc. It must also be seriously disturbed over the approaching rearmament of Western Germany and Japan, both with potential revisionist aimsis the Soviet bloc. The USSR's acute sensitivity to these developments is amply evident from recent Soviet cold war moves. While the USSR may still see sufficient opportunities to justify aof its present aggressive cold war policies, mounting Soviet concern as Western countermeasures develop further may leadhange in tactics by the USSR, With the rising curve of Western strength, the possibility ofhange will become progressively more acute.
Continued Aggressive Political Warfare. For the time being, however, it appears likely that the USSR will continue its present aggressive policy of political and psychological warfare. Despite the increased strength of anti-Communist forces, the USSR and Communist China probably see various revolutionary and subversive opportunities still open to them, particularly in Asia. They may be expected to continue their penetration of adjacent areas, promoting Communist coups wherever the situation seems favorable. The Communist forces will also attempt through local strikes, propaganda, and other means to obstruct Western rearmament andthe stability of free nations.
The USSR doubtless also sees possibilities of creating rifts between the non-Soviet countries, given the present acute stage of world tensions, and will make every effort to divide the Western Powers. Further Soviet initiatives to forestall the rearmament and pro-Western orientation of Germany and Japan are almost certain.ackground of continued threats, the USSR will almost certainly intensify its propaganda and diplomatic "peace offensive" to convince the world that
the "aggressive" course of the US and its allies is leadingew war, thus playing on Western fears and attempting to weaken popular support of Western countermeasures.
continuing its efforts to undermine WesternUSSR will continue to devote much attention to Asia.and Communist China undoubtedly consider thatand subversive opportunities exist in theFar East, where the decline of Western influencehas created serious instability. The Kremlinthat through stimulating local strife and civil war init could either expand its own sphere of controlthe West of important resources or dissipatein costly and inconclusive military and
Soviet or Chinese Communist localin Asia, is also possible during the next twoCommunist invasion of Indochina or Burma andof Yugoslavia are serious possibilities (see Sectionthe extent that the Kremlin considers it necessarythe Tito heresy before Tito or the West becomethe USSR may feel compelled to act soon. Tiarise in other areas, such as Iran, whichopportunities, possible Communist interventiondiscounted.robable major factor in anyor against any such overt expansion will be the SovietCommunist estimate of the resultant risks ofand their willingness to accept those risks. In view ofand UN reaction in Korea, the growing pace ofand the ever sharper delineation of thestruggle, the USSR probably now considers thataggression would entail serious risks of generaldeciding on such local aggression the USSRconsider not only Western capabilities in anybut also over-all US capabilities against the USSR.
the USSR might under certainprecipitate general war (seeore likely thatar, if it comes,from Soviet misjudgment of US actioniven situation
or from the inability of either the USSR or the US to yield in cases where they regarded their vital interests as involved. The most immediate danger ofevelopment would be in eventrolongation, intensification, or broadening of the Korean conflict. If under such conditions the Communist forces In Korea were threatened with decisive defeat the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extente facto local war between the US/UN and USSR would exist. In the event of critical developments in other areas as well as in Korea, the increasing tenseness of the international situation and the growing strength of both sides, which might lead to an increased determination to defend what each considered to be its vital interests, will make the danger of general war through accident or miscalculation considerably more acute.
ossibilityajor Shift In Soviet Tactics. While it appears likely that the USSR willime continue Us aggressive cold war pressures, the further growth of Western strength and counterpressures during the coming period mayhift in Soviet tactics. Viewing the last three years' developments, the USSR may consider that its postwarand expansionist opportunities, except perhaps in Asia, are steadily narrowing and that continued cold war pressures are unlikely to pay off. The Kremlin may consider that such cold war pressures are only generating relatively greater Western countermeasures, which might eventually, particularly if they Include German and Japanese rearmament,ituation dangerous to the vital Interests of the USSR itself. Therefore, if the USSR is to achieve its immediate primary objective ofecisive increase In Western strength, it may be increasingly faced with the necessityhift from aggressive political warfare to some other approach.
eliberate Initiation of General War. It is impossible to predict whether or at what point the rising curve of Western strength might lead the USSR to consider this trend sohreat as toesort to force before the Westtrength dangerous to the vital interests of the USSR. The risk ofevelopment will become more acute as Western defense programs progress, particularly In regard to German and Japanese rearmament and the development of US overseas bases. The USSR is increasing its already high state of war-readiness and continuing Its systematic domestic propaganda campaign to prepare the Soviet and Satellite peoplesfor possible war. Moreover, the USSR, with its intense suspicion of Western motives, may consider present Western defensive preparationsrelude to eventual action by the Western Powers tohoice between war and unacceptable concessions upon the USSR.
he USSR presumably recognizes that its still inferior over-all war potential, together with Western atomic superiority, would make the outcomeeneral war doubtful, despite initial Soviet successes. Nevertheless, this consideration cannot be accepted as necessarily controlling the USSR's decision and the period throughill be one of acute danger of global war. If convinced that the circumstances described aboveilitary showdown with the West during this period, it is possible that the Soviet rulers would themselves precipitatehowdownime and under circumstances that they considered most favorable. It is alternatively possible, however, that they would for ateriod concentrate their attention on moves designed to maximize their immediate readiness for the impendingThese moves would include further steps in the military and economic mobilization of the Soviet Union and the Satellites. At the same time, the Kremlin and its Satellites might undertake local aggressions aimed at improving the immediate position of the USSR. The USSR would have to weigh the prospective
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gains in such local aggressions against the danger that such aggression might touch off general warime and under circumstances unfavorable to Soviet interests. But the Kremlin would make Its assessment In this regard against the backgroundelief that general hostilities were imminent in any event.
elaxation of Tensions. As an alternative to deliberate Soviet resort to early general war, if the Kremlin considered that there were compelling reasons against this course of action, the USSR might decide toemporary shift, at least in Europe, to new and less obviously aggressive tactics, designed to lull the Westalse sense of security and undermine growing Western strength. Considering that its present aggressive postwar policies had reached the point of diminishing returns and were engendering ever moreWestern countermeasures, the USSR might see in this alternative method of political warfare even better opportunities of undermining the growing strength and cohesion of the West.actical shift would not necessarily imply that the USSR would suspend all its aggressive and subversive tactics; it mightofter policy in Europe, for example, while continuing to expand in Asia.hift toourse would be only temporary, and It Is impossible to say at what point, if ever, the USSR might consider it necessary to adopt it, or how far it might be willing to go. There are strong grounds for believing that the USSR would in any case be unwilling to make the major concessions which would appear to be necessary to assureolicy's success.
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TOPI. PROBABLE GROWTH OF NATO STRENGTH AND WILL TO
Except in the eventarked reduction in US aid, some improvement in Western European strength and morale seems likely bylthough less than that anticipated from US and NATO programs. Further progress toward achieving MTDP goals, continued expansion of Europe'sore unified and efficient NATO and intra-European effort, and the probable integration of West Germany into the Atlantic Community will all contribute to this improved position. Nevertheless, certain countries will still be deficient in political initiative and popular will to sacrifice and Western Europe will remain subject to dangerous economic and social stresses. It will still benot only to Soviet occupation but to Soviet cold warthrough
NAT Military Strength. Byhe European NATO forces should be considerably stronger than at present if thereontinued high level of US aid. European defense budgets and military production will probably increase over the next two years and although forces in being will fall short of phased MTDP requirements, their morale, leadership and combat readiness should be markedly higher than at present. However, available European NATO forces will still be insufficient to do more thanull-scale Soviet attack, except In theevent that the effectiveness of new weapons developed, produced, and actually deployed by the West should offset the present preponderance of Soviet military strength on the Eurasian continent.
Broadening of the NAT Coalition. The formal or informal association of Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Western Germany with the NAT defensive coalition, which, despitedegrees of European reluctance, should be consummated in the coming period, willajor increment to NATO strength. The developing integration of these countries either directly or
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indirectly into the NATO structure and the strengthening ol their forces should help to offset the increases In Soviet and Satellite strength. The southern flank of SHAPE should be materially strengthened, partlyreater availability of Mediterranean bases. However, numerous political and psychological obstacles will continue to delay the optimum utilization of Yugoslav, West German, and Spanish potential and to postpone the date at which these nations canull contribution to European defense. It seems unlikely, for example, given the continuing obstaclesest German contribution,izable contingent of combat-ready German forces will become available before some time Moreover, to the extent that the Western Powers do not meet German demands for full equality, German cooperation may be delayed.
conomic Burdens. Despite the marked degree of economic recovery during the ERP period, Western Europe's economy is being subjected to new strains by NAT rearmament needs.pressures and raw materials shortages generated by rearmament, persistent economic nationalism, and thereluctance or inability of many governments to take the necessary measures to cope with economic maladjustments will all hamper both optimum defense output and continued economic expansion. Nevertheless, the next two years shouldmall rise in European productionmall and uneven increase in living standards, despite rearmament drains. Much will depend upon how far national economic policies can minimize therepercussions of rearmament while maximizing European defense efforts. reat deal will depend upon theto which not only US economic aid but US materialsand economic trends in the US itselfontinued expansion of European production. Becauseorsening balance of payments situation in the UK, for example, increased US aid may be requiredatisfactory rate of British defense build-up is to be achieved.
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and Psychological Factors. The poor statemorale, still deficient popular will to sacrifice, andof vigorous governmental initiative, particularly in keycountries, will continue to hamper the achievementobjectives. Despite the marked degree of postwarrecovery there still persists in many continental countries
a serious lack of governmental and popular confidence in Europe's ability to solve its economic and social problems, and to defend itself against external attack. Popular morale and confidence will be bolstered as NATO and other programs develop, but will long remain an uncertain factor, particularly in event of war.
no seriously adverse internal politicallikely in any Western EuropeanarkedIn political stability seems at bestchief areas of uncertainty are France and Italy, in boththe position of existing governments will continue toThis in turn prevents them from dealingwith military, political, and economic problems.some form of coalition should be able to maintaincontrolling position in France and Italy, unless aworsening economic or international situation leads to
an acceleration of the trend toward polarization of the political scene. The powerful French and Italian Communist parties will probably maintain substantial strength, but their obstructive role should be somewhat reduced unless rearmament creates major economic stresses on which they can capitalize.
of the Alliance. Supranational institutionsunityspecifically the European Defense ForceSchuman plan administrationhould develop duringtwo years, but there is no indication that anyis yet prepared torue federation with ItsNATO the problems of rearmament will probably dictate
a further unification of effort byhough among the treaty powers and those associated with them the problem ofnational objectives will continue to hamper theof maximum strength. The continuing debate over the sharing
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of rearmament burdens, the constant threat of rearmament to social reform and welfare programs, the problem of trade with the East, the struggle for markets within and outside Europe, the part Germany is to play in the alliancell these will be exasperating and sometimes frustrating problems with which the West must deal. Added to all these will be the difficulties always posed by an ambivalent Europe looking to the United States for strength and power yet envious of Americanand often doubtful of the aims and methods of American policy. Nonetheless,hould find the alliance stronger than at present and better organized than It is now.
On the other hand, if the USSR could remove some of the fear of World War HI and Soviet invasion, European popular willingness to shoulder the burdens of rearmament wouldcertainly lessen, and there would be strong pressure on the governments to divert resources from the NATO effort to meet pressing economic and social needs.
In any case the US will continue to lace serious problems arising from the failure of Us European NATO partners to meet present rearmament goals. Even If the Western Europeans were willing and able toarger share of NAT defenseadequate NATO rearmament would still be impossiblelarge-scale US military and economic assistance. In view of the continuing uncertainties of the European situation, much will depend therefore, during the period ol this estimate, on US leadership andubstantial reduction in US assistance over the coming period would seriously jeopardize European economic and political stability, as well as the creation of an adequate NATO delense.
in. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR AND FAR EAST
decisive outcome of the East-West struggle inprobable during the next two years. At present it appears
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nlikely that the US and its allies will be able to do more than aintain or perhaps slightly improve their present unsatisfactory osition in the Near and Far East, while on the other hand there Is acute danger of major deterioration. The East-Westecome increasingly acute in the Far East, and will remain acute so long as Communist China plays an expansionist role. The threat of Communist expansion in the Near East and South Asia is by no means as immediate, but In these areas as well as in the Far East, the Western position is seriously threatened by the anti-Western cast of the Asian nationalist revolution. This antl-Westernism, combined with social tensions, poverty, governmental and military weakness, and naivete or lack ofabout Communist objectives, makes most Asian states vulnerable to Communist exploitation and complicates US efforts to bolster them internally. In the Far East in particular, the Communists have succeededarge extent in identifyingwith the Asian revolution, and ln encouraging its anti-Western aspects. In those areas where Communism has gained no firm foothold, Asian nationalism has expressed itself in acute suspicion of US motivesersisting trend towardHowever, the continued economic and military dependence of the free Asiatic countries upon the Western Powers provides ihvm an inducement to align themselves with the West.
he USSR and Communist China willerious threat to US Interests in the Far East throughubjected to continuing economic and military stressesrolonged, intensified, or broadened Korean war, the Chinese Communist regime may be able to strengthen itself over the coming period by modernizing and strengthening its armed forces, by further consolidating its domestic control, and by making some progress In solving Its economic problems. The Peiping regime will play an increasingly influential role in Asian affairs by virtue of its growing prestige and through the influence it exerts over Asian revolutionary movements. The I'SSR will probably continue to provide substantial military'chnical help, although its economic aid will almost certainly
[all far short of Chinese requirements. rolortged, intensified, or broadened struggle with the US and its allies might critically weaken the Peiptng regime unless the USSR provided much greater military and economic aid
hile frictions may develop between the USSR and Commu-Inist China and there remain long term possibilitiesajor clash of Interests, it appears unlikely that any serious rifts will develop in the next two years. Ideological affinity and mutual antagonism toward the West, as well as common fear of Japanese resurgence, probablyontinued close relationship, at least over the short term.
seems almost certain that Peiping intends to playexpansionist role in the Far East. Whileinternal consolidation and developmentontinuednaval strength should prevent China througherious threat to the US-dominated offshore(except perhapshere will remain an everdanger of Chinese Communist aggression against suchmainland areas as Indochina, Burma, and Souththe Korean war has somewhat restricted Chinesecapabilities for operations elsewhere, suchincrease In the event this conflict is ended. In anyChina will almost certainly increase its covertof Indigenous revolutionary movements. It maythe prospects for eventual success by these methods,in Southeast Asia, are sufficient to makeintervention with its risk of war with the West.
probable emergenceolitically stable andwill help to establish an East-West balance of powerFar East. However, the revival of Japan's powerinevitablyong term development and Japan aloneno means be able to counterbalance Slno-Soviet strengthAsia in the next two years. Moreover,may develop in post-treaty Japan, and if Japan fails
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to find markets and raw materials In non-Communist areas, there may develop an insistent demand lor economic collaboration with the Asian mainland. Under these circumstances, there willontinuing substantial requirement for US assistance,in the development of foreign trade. However,onservative anti-Communist government should tend to support US interests, and over the next two years at least Japan shouldrowing asset to the Western position in East
Asia.
he chief immediate dangerritical development in the Far East liesrolongation, intensification, or broadening of the Korean war (see. Even if some compromise solution were reached in Korea, the US would still be faced not only with the constant threat of renewed aggression in Korea or elsewhere in Asia and the consequent necessity of maintaining large forces in the Far East, but also with major reconstruction problems in South Korea. The reconstituted North Korean forces, together with the Chinese Communists, willontinued capability for re-occupying South Korea in the event US and UN forces are progressively withdrawn. The rebuilding of South Korean security forces and the rehabilitation of the prostrate South Korean economy will in any case constitute formidable
tasks.
outheast Asia will continue to be extremely vulnerable to Communist penetration. There is no prospect for earlyof strong anti-Communist governments in the areaeal danger exists that, with increased Chinese Communistor even overt intervention, indigenous Communist movements may extend their control over more of Indochina and Burma within the next two years. If these countries were to fall, Thailand would doubtless prove unable for long to withstand Communist pressure, and the situation would also deteriorate further in Malaya,and the Philippines. In any event, all Southeast Asianwill remain weak and unstable during the coming period, and may require increasing amounts of outside assistance, including
military assistance, even to maintain themselves. In the absence li( major Communist successes in Indochina or Burma, theIn Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines should improve bylthough long term problems of local insurgence,instability, and economic development will still remain.
Nationalist military position on Taiwan shouldwith US aid. Enhanced Nationalist capabilities lorthe mainland will require an increased allotment ofstrength for coastal defense. However, the security
aiwan will continue to be hampered by the regime's economic difficulties, general inefficiency and corruption, and will require close US control ii US military and economic aid is to be
B. probable Developments ir. the Near East fand North Africa)
the Near East the serious possibility of athe situation overshadows the limited possibilities ofover the next two years. At present, except inTurkey, the West is facedrowing crisis In whichmotivating force is not Communist pressure but thenationalism of Iran and the Arab world. Theof Greece and especially Turkey and the wideningol US Mediterranean bases should be positive favorableIn this area. However, these factors will probablyby continued Arab-Israeli animosity,of the British system of alliances, andtoward the West. Active Soviet intervention in theseems unlikely, except possibly in Iran. More likely isgrowth of neutralism, which might limit US-UKof the area's strategic position and petroleumof the existing unsatisfactory US-UK positionNear East (except in Greece and Turkey) will dependthe successful solution of the area's economicupon the satisfaction of at least some nationalist aspirations.
Developments in Iran will depend largely upon the outcome of the current oil controversy, but in any event Iran willremain internally unstable during the next two years. While successful negotiations with the British might substantiallyIranian revenues, it Is doubtful whether effective use would be made of these revenues. Failure of the negotiations may well lead to economic chaos and increase the dangerudeh) coup. Overt Soviet intervention remains unlikely unless the UK intervenes with armed force, in which case the USSR might occupy Azerbaijan.
In the Arab states social and political instability, anti-Zionism, and extreme nationalism will hamper the achievement of US objectives throughhere is little likelihood of sufficient improvement in Israeli-Arab relations to permit their joint association in Near East defense. Arab resentment over US support of Israel also creates problems for the US.will continue to undermine UK influence and seriously jeopardize British retention of their Important Egyptian bases. However, despite the trend toward neutralism in the Arabthere is some increased awareness of the Soviet threat and, particularly if an increased Soviet threat developed, the Arab states might more willingly cooperate with the West. Their price would probablyharp increase in the amount
of US aid.
srael's ultimate orientation is uncertain, despite Itsdependence on the US and its stated awareness of the Soviet threat. Continued immigrationaucity of resources pro-lung economic instability and there is some danger that Israel might seek an outlet through renewed expansion at the Arabs' expense.
hile violent explosions tn French North Africa may not occur over the next two years, rising Arab nationalism, fanned by extremists in the Arab states, will create increasingin this area and also in Libya, and may affect the security of US bases.
C. Probable Developments in South Asia.
in South Asia over the next two years willlargely on the outcome of the Kashmir dispute.of the effect that war would have on the disputantsIn greater readiness to compromise, and some de facto
if not negotiated settlement may emerge. The resultingstability in the area would be favorable to US interests. Pakistan may be able to give more positive expression to its pro-Western leanings and, if given US support, may provide bases and troops for the defense of the Middle East. Although India is far less likely to abandon its neutralist policy, at least so long as Nehru remains prime minister, continued Chinese Communist penetration of Southeast Asia, especially Burma, might lead India toore forceful anti-Communist policy. On the other hand, if continued friction over Kashmir leads to war, the resulting economic stresses and communal disorders would leave both India and Pakistan prostrate and vulnerable to Communist penetration. In any event, the deep seated social and economic aliments of the area, and particularly of India, preclude the development in the short run of strong states capable of adding significantly to the power of the Western coalition.
IV. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
situation In Latin America througho be favorable to US interests, despiteersistent isolationist attitude amongLatin American opinioa The area's tradeimproved since the Korean war and Is likely toAllew governments are pro-US, and onlyand Guatemala are there pronounced anti-UShigh official circles. The chief present problem inis the maintenance of political and economicof which have been increasingly threatened In the last
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mportant obstacles to lull Latin American support of US policies are the persistence of isolationist sentiment andto make sacrifices in the East-West conflict, which to many Latin Americans appears primarilytrugglethe US and USSR. The force of isolationist and nationalist opinion, particularly in countries where important elections are approaching, has obstructed direct military aid to the UN in Korea, and has caused pro-US governments to act cautiously in US negotiations to secure strategic materials. Communisthas been to play upon this isolationism by attacking Latin American bonds with the US. Soviet adoptionorepolicy would increase the susceptibility of isolationist groups and complicate the task of governments desiring towith the US. Nevertheless, in the eventajor crisis, most Latin American governments would act tn the spirit of the Rio Treaty.
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Original document.
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