PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER-DOC ALS

Created: 11/3/1950

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

KUMAN UhKASi

OH Till: PRBB1DBNT Ciy THE UHITKD STATES

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

BRARJ President's Secretary's Pile

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER

The intelligence organbtaHons of the Departments cf State, the Atmy. the Navy, ami Ihe Air Force participated in ihe preparation of this estimate and concur In it.

RUMANrosideu-.'s Secretary's Files

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PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER

of the Problem.

To estlmile the likelihoodajoraction in the Philippines during KoTember and the probable consequences of any suchas might be attempted.

The links {Hukbong Mapagpataya Ng Bayan) are today the army of Philippineled by avowed Communists whothe policies and seek to further theof World Communism. Their armed strength Is estimated at no more Thanhe Huks areuerrilla organisation, utilising "hit and run" tactics; making maximum use of thefchoice of terrain, and mobility; and avoiding frontal engagement with government forces. 'Ihe Huks, who are limited almost exclusively to Infantry weapons, have theof mounting several comparatively0 men) coordinated attacks simultaneously against widely separatedThey are also capable of extensive sabotage,

lor Imminent Huk Operations.

In part months, there have been manygenerally of low evaluation,Impending Huk actions varying inmajor disturbances in Manila tooutlying vUlagcs or isolatedspecific dates involved have oftenwith national or Communistol these reports probably wevethe HuVi lhpm.vlves as part of aprogram to confuse the militaryand terrortie the populace. Thus far,dates specified, Huk activity eitherfailed to materialise or was on aless than

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Thus, regardless of whether the Huks actually had plans for offensiveduring November, the element offor the most successfulof such plans has beenNevertheless, the intended operation will not necessarily have been called off nor will it be possible fcr security forces to prevent widespread attacks resulting ln extensiveand destruction. Because of the Government's state ofajor concerted effort against so strongly defended an area as Manila Isuk attempt toother more limited objectives in thearea, including the assassination cfofficials, the sabotage of publicies and attacks on military and policeis more likely. There is no direct evidence that attacks will be specificallyat US installations and personnel and such attacks are Judged to be improbable. Nevertheless, raids and incidental damage may occur.

elative Military" Capabilities of

0 men of the Philippineand Ground Force arc presently engaged in internal security missions, the bulk em-

! President's Secretary's Files

against the Huks (seehis force Is believed capable of preventing the violent overthrow of the Philippine Oov-ernment by the Huks during November. Moreover, it is estimated that military units in the vicinity of Manila ate able tothe city against attack but not to prevent acts of terrorism within tho Manila area.

The Huks, whose armtd strength comprises0 men, are unable to prevent the movement of Philippine units wherever such troops might be committed. The Huks ate. however, capable uf avoiding destruction at the hands of the Philippine Armed Forces and of conducting raids al will throughout the Luron countryside.

During the past few weeks. Philippine security forces have undertaken widespread operations against the Huksron. Thus far, no decisive Philippinehave been reported and Philippine In-telligence agencies have simultaneously noted somen Huk activities and"nls increase in link activity, despite security operations, strongly indicates that Government measures against the Huks, as In the past, continue to be ineffective taa continuing increase in Huk

hort-Term Effects of Poiilblo Huk Armed Action.

Successful large-scale Huk raids throughout the Luzon countryside, coordinated vithta Manila, would further alarm the Philippine people, increase popular distrust of the Qulrino regime, and enhance over-all Communist capabilities, Such success could be expected lo encourage further and bolder Huk operations.

Original document.

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