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OF THC UXlItD STATU
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA
Number 1
The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available
INTERNATIONA I, IMPLICATIONS OFEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA
PROBLEM
daU
To estimate and enumerate the advantages andofN beachhead in South Korea.*
ESTIMATE
he maintenancenited Nations beachhead in South Korea would have the following major strategic and military implications for the United Nations and the United States: .
a. Maintenanceeachhead would have the following military advantages:
ull attainment of the slated Communist objective in Korea would be denied.
he loss of US military prestige which would resultithdrawal would be avoided.
he continued commitment of major Chinese Communist forces In Korea and Manchuria would restrict the Chinese Communistfor rapid consolidation of China, for large scale expansion in mainland Southeast Asia, and for resisting Invasion elsewhere on the mainland of China.
he Soviet Union would be obliged to continue the supply of material in support of Communist forces in Korea.
,*In the event of full-scale Soviet intervention In Korea, it Is estimated that It would be Impossible for UN forces tothe beachhead.
The Communist forces would be denied an additional operational base against Japan.
In the event that large scale operations against China become necessary, Korea would befor joint UN-US ground operations because:
The superior air and sea power of the UN forces could be brought to bear effectively against the numerically superior ground forces;
Chinese Communist attrition would be relatively high in the confined battle area -In Korea;
The beachhead would provide an operational base that would tie down large numbers of Communist forces, could be used to mount subsequent operations in Korea, and could be used to support operations elsewhere in the Far East in the eventeneral war with China.
b. The maintenanceeachhead would have themilitary disadvantages:
A critical proportion of the US Army and substantial proportion of US naval and air resources would be committed in the area, thereby reducing Immediate US capabilities for building up forces elsewhere.
A considerable drain cn US military resources would be imposed not only In the support of US forces In Korea, but also in the complete logistic support for Republic of Korea forces and the major part of the logistic supportther United Nations forces In Korea.
Waiiifr aim i
UN forces within the beachhead would be subjected to constant attrition (and in the event of overt Soviet intervention, danger of annihilation).
The continued deployment of the Army forces of the Far East command in Korea would leave Japan more vulnerable to hostile Invasion.
The US would be required to continue its support of several million Korean refugees.
N beachhead would have the following short-termpolitical and psychological effects:
would be an avoidance of the great loss ofthe UN and the diminution of confidence in the US thata withdrawal.
maintenanceeachhead would place stressesUN coalition stemming from increased fear of generalcontinued Communist propaganda opportunitiesa conflict between the West and Asiatics, andconcern over the diversion of major USto the Far East.
Chinese Communists would be prevented fromcomplete success in Korea and the beachhead would provide
a continued symbol of UN determination to resist aggression.
Far Eastern countries would react favorablyN beachhead. In Japan, maintenance of awould be particularly advantageous with respectapanese peace treaty. Those countries inAsia vulnerable to an early Chinese Communist attach,be apprehensive about the possibilityeneral warwhile UN forces were involved in Korea, and Indonesiaparticularly wouldithdrawal.
e. In South Asia, India would react unfavorably to the maintenanceN beachhead because of Indian hopes of reducing the possibilityajor war and becauseeneral Inclination to sympathize with Asiatics as against Westerners; Pakistan would react favorably to any evidence of US military strength. In the Near and Middle East, the maintenanceeachhead might salvage to some degree US military prestige among Iran and the Arab states; Greece and Turkey would oppose UN withdrawal unless It were partroader plan to attack Communism at its source, or unless they were convinced that Western Europe or the Near East were Immediately threatened,
t. The reaction in Western Europe would be influenced on the one hand, by an intensification of the fear that prolonged and inconclusive fighting In Korea would result in theof hostilities elsewhere and on the other, by concern lest the UN failajor effort to contain Communist aggression.
American reaction would be favorable.
is unlikely that Soviet policy willN decision toeachhead in Korea.
Original document.
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