1t* I
HO. ABSISMNT OIRECTUB.ONB
%
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER1
ugust 1M1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IMllllMUlW,.
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of tboon the front cover and of Individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho require the Information for the performance of their ofDetal duties.elsewhere In the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
o. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Stale for Intelligence, for theof State
Chief of, for the Department of the Army
of Naval Intelligence, fox the Department of the Navy
ii. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
s. Director ofC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
eputy Director for Intelligence Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency
copy may be either retained or destroyed byccordancesacurrty regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency bywlt& the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA,
R1BUTION (NIKrace of the President HaUonsl Security Council Nations! Security Resources Board Deportment of State Ofllco of Secretory ef Defense Deportment ef the Army Deportment ol the Hary Deportment ef tho Air Force Atomic Knerey Commission Joint Chiefs of staff rcdernl Bureau of mmUeaUon Research and envelopment Board Munitions BooJd
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER1
NIE-35
The Intelligence organizations or the Department* ol State, tho Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint StallIn the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this catlmatougust.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER1
NIE-35
The Intelligence organizations or the Department* of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint StanIn the preparation of this estimate. All members or the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred In this catlmatougust.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA DURING THE REMAINDER
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current situation and probable developments In Indochina dcring the remainder
CONCLUSIONS
current military stalemate Inappears likely to continue at least through the endnless theCommunists directly Intervene with forces over and above the0 "volunteers" which they can introduce as individuals or in small unite In probable continuation of present assistance to the Viet Minn.
If the Chinese Communists directlywith large forces over and above thorn introduced as Individuals or in small units, the French would probably be driven backeachhead around Haiphong. The French should be able to hold this beachheaJ for some time, unless the Chinese Communists achieve air
Chinese Communistis not likely as long as theare extensivelyKorea.
hostilities In Korea end, or thocommitment there can bereduced, thero will be anlikelihood of direct Chineseintervention in Indochina.nee. however, we consider suchunlikely during the period
DISCUSSION
Current Situation B. The present mlUinry situation in Indochina Is one of stalemate. In the period since Oen-era) do Lathe da Tassigny assumed command, the Franco-Vietnamese forces have repulsed tho Vlot Mini* drive to conquer Tonkin and firmly hold the key Had River delta around Hanoi and Haiphong (searenchapparently resulted from: (a) theleadership of Qeneral de Lattre, whoflagging French morale; (b) MDAP aid; (c) the arrival of French relnlorcemonU; <d)
Uw Inexperience at large-Kale war .'we of the Viet Minn (luorrlllas; and (t) the limitations of Chineie Communlbt lupport. The ir.sue-Diiate staff work and lack of supporting arms of the Vict Mlnh forcci placed themer-!ou* disadvantage in pitched betUai with the French, who wore strengthened by the timely arrival of us military nki. Including aircraft, napalm bombs, patrol and landing craft, and ground combat materiel. The Chineseupon whom tha Viet Mlnh forces art dependent for logistical support, have been supplying them with ammunition, lightand some artillery.0 Chinese personnel have been Infiltrated Into the /let Minh in cadre, technical, and advisoryThis number is believed to beHowever, the Chinese Communists, white apparently maintaining roughly the same level of material assistance as of last December, have not Intervened directly or with substantial "volunteer" forces orstepped up arms aid. Under theseGeneral da Lattre, drawing rain-forcemenfs from other areas of Indochina and skillfully uili'g mobile reserve forres. was able to hold the Franco-Vletnameaa militaryIntact and to Inflict heavy looses on tha Viet Mlnh.
Political developments, howaver, have been lass favorable. Despite tha gradual French transfer of certain responsibilities, thegovernment has been alrw to develop and has continued to sufferack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) French reluctance to relinquishcontrol of political and economic affairs', (b) lingering Vletnimeae suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with tha apathetic and "fence-sitting" attitude of the bulk of tho peoplo, which iiaa deprived theof broad-based popular support; (c) the difficulty common to all new andgovernments, of training thepersonnel and building an efficientand (d) tha failure of factional and accUonal groups to uniteoncerted national effort
In Janui'y iOSl the opportunity arose ofroad-based cabinet representing moat non-Communist group la Vietnam;Premier Kuuabinet composed primarily of members of his own pro-French faction. Although Kuu has displayed aome administrative eklll and his government ftaa gained slowly In cffKUveneas, the weakness of the Bdu cabinet and lie ailegod "French puppet" status have limited lbs appeal tonationalism and have alienated strong nationalist groups, including the powerful Dal Viet group In Tonkin. Communist control of much of the country and Vlat Mlnhof large areas under nominal Frenchhave also discouraged many people from openly allying themselves with the
oational Vietnameseessential prerequisite to growth In the political stature of the Vietnamand to an ultimata non-Communistinmade someand Vietnamese unlti have performed creditably in recent engagements. French intention to proceed with the building of the Vietnamese Army Is evidenced by theirof siseable French cadres andmissions to assist In organization and training. Plans call for the exparWon of the army from its present strength, However, It will take considerable time before tha planned forces are organized, trained, and equipped In battalion units, and even longer before effective divisional units can be put Into the Hold. Pro tress in the forniatlon of the army is retarded by lack of capable officers, at all levels of command, shortages of equipment, and the apatheticof the population, At the soma tune, differences of opinion between tho Vietnamese leaders and tho French, particularly over who will exercise control over the Vietnam Army, have proven lad full cooperation andprogress In the army's development Dairy inietnam Army under Vietnamese control hasontribulLng factor In limiting popular support of theregime,
On the opncalng aloe, the politicalof the Vict Mlnh has buen reorganised upon more openly and ngpreaMYciyUnas, following the usual pattern ofdevelopment In other Communist
trim The Comrminti| Party role has beenwith tiiiiel party-linori crrmlng punv tnlu the riH't'cruiind end Ho Chi Minh himselfost Important part. Tlib dcvtilui>.'ii*At may havo been limed to forerteil any "nationaliitdpvlatlonlijt" tendencies In 'he Vict Minn, andrelude to greatermunlst partlcipatlor. in ami direction of the movement. In theof fur'her military victories. Viet Minh popular support appears unlikely to Increase. While weihic to determine whether the Victctually losing any of Its popular appeal, the regime apparently Ismore and inori on tightenedcontrols. These tighter controls may prevent defections and facilitate theof people already under Viol Minh control.
Vtst Minh ond Franco'Vietnam Capabilities
improved morslu of theicnts, the gradualin the Ylciiiamess Army, and thearrival of Mi)A? aid will probablyFrencti. byhe capabilitya limited leTensfvc and possiblysome lost territory. However,andnot, in thereview, be ilia decisively to defeatMinh.
the other hand, we consider itthat Hip Viet Minh canIphong mcv, evon withthe present typo of ChineseAlthough the Viet Minh.Chlncr aid, will beby ihr end el the rainyOrtober. the Franco-Vietnamese forcessubstantial quanttUaa of MDAPIhr next (rw months, and at0 to zo.ooo reinforce mantade ijittrr (of which four battalionsto himrenchwhich I. complrtely unopposed,further Increased. The Frenchin to he reinforced by an aircraftcm Inriviisiiir.iy hamper the flow ofsupplies to the Viet Minh andnmplilblmtii opoi aliens. Moreover, by
Aoiwnoixobls ol eppcalni forces.
December the French ring of fixed defenses around the delta will be completed. Under these elreurnstancra, the French wuuM have the advantage of fightingzrd defenses, which would permit them to assemble larger mobile reserves and to luke advantage of their superiority Ins distinct from guerrilla warfare.
Chineseapabilities ond Intentions
IS. Itasic Chinese Communist andpolicy to promote Communist control over Southeast Asia, and Helping and MoscowIndochina aakey toregionof its strategic location and because of the advanced revolutionary situation already existing there. PrlpliiK has eirrady *unp.-rtrd tho Viet Minh regime by recognising Ho Chi Mlnh'a regime and by providing it will, teen-nlcal and material aid. There are numerous indicatleiv of Chinese preparallons lav greater military nvpijort of the Viet Minh, posaiblydirect Intervention with Chineseforces.
he Chinese Communists are cnjwblc of substantially increaiing their present type of aid to the Viet Mlah, psrUculaily by lheof sizeable numbers of jvi vnuci as individuals or cadres into the Viet Minh Army. We believe that the reinforced fnforces could hold the bulk of their Tonkin perimeteriet Mliih even II the Viet Minh were lupported by as many0 inmtrr.ted perscnneJ. although wilh such additional wppirt the Vtct Minh mlrht win some weal vlctorirs. Continued Chines* CcmmunUl Infiltrationuge scale,would gradually make the FrenchIncreasingly precarious.urning to Chinese CommunUifor large scale Intervention with ihrtr own forces, we estimate thato.ooc Chinese Communist neid force Uoc-psnow bo made available and loglstfcaltyfor an Invasion of Indochina. The poor transport net and forbidding terrain of the border region limit the forces which couM presently beo 'hst nuaiUr. They could ba loghUcady supported only for abort nflenslve opera lions ol about one week at a
time, passing to the defensive during thefor replenishment of supplies.the Chinese Communists are slowlytheir capabilities for stockpilingby Improving road and rail supply routes into Tonkin and arc improving airfields In the border region. Consequently Chineselogistical capabilities for offensive operations are gradually increasing.
n addition the Chinese Communists have the capability of mounting Intense airof short duration against the French, whose aircraft are concentrated on threeairfields In Tonkin. SuccessfulCommunist air attacks of this sort would materially enhance Communist capabilities for large-scale ground operations.air superiority In the Tonkin area would also materially hamper French surveillance and naval blockade of the Tonkin Gulf, and consequently permit increased over-water aid to the Viet Mlnh.
IB. If the Chinese Communists Intervenethe end1roops, they could probably eventually drive the Frencheachhead at Haiphong. The French, however, should be able to hold thisfor some tune, unless the Chineseachieve air superiority.
The Chinese Communists will undoubtedly be Influenced in deciding whether or not to intervene directly In Indochina by the future development of the situation in Korea. So long as the Chinese Communists remaincommitted In Korea, we consider it unlikely that they will intervene directly in Indochina. Although the Chinese Communists might drive the French from Tonkin,ajor victory is not assured. An indecisive andcampaign would place additionalstrains on total Chinese Communist
If the Korean fighting Is stopped under conditions which appear to remove the threat of renewed UN attacks, transportationIn the border region would continue to limit the ground forces which could bein Tonkin, but the possible diversion of resources from tho Korea-Manchuria area would permit early intervention with greater assurance of the continued arrival of supplies and replacements for the operation. Wathat by too monthsorean armistice, Chinese Communist capabilities for invading Indochina could be signiflcantlvwhilo air capabilities could bo greatly increased. The Chinese Communists and the USSR might then consider that Indochinamore favorable opportunitiesuick and decisive victory8 risk of US and UN intervention than did Korea, They might calculate that tho US and UN would beto undertake another operation of the Korean type and that some UN members would be unwilling to defend what they le-gard as French colonialism In Indochina. Thus In the eventessation of hostilities In Korea, the likelihood of early ChineseIntervention In Indochina,after the rainy season ends in October, would increase.
On the other hand, the Chinesewould probably hesitate to Intervene openly in Indochina while they werefor an over-all Korean settlement.the withdrawal of UN forces, and these negotiations would doubtless taketime. Moreover, If Communist acceptanceease-fire In Koreaesire toemporary "relaxation" of worldearly intervention in Indochina would be unlikely. We also believe that theInadequacies of its line ofthe strengthening of the French forces, and the risk of foreign intervention, would probably lead Peiping to conclude that It still could not count with certainty' onuick and decisive conquest of all Tonkin, but might become involved In anotherand costly campaign in which the risk of foreign intervention might increasethe Communists might expect that through Increased cadre, jnatcrlai and technical aid to the Viet Mlnh they could still wear down the French and achieve successes without the necessity of early large-scale intervention.
On balance, therefore, wo believe that the Increased Chinese preparations in tho Tonkin border region probably reflect an Intent to facilitate the flow of "volunteers" andaid to the Viet Mlnh forces, while
ing for posslblo large-scale mUrventlon, rather than an Intent to Intervene1
onsequently, the probable outlook through the end1 In Indochina Is one of continued military stalemate, if the Chinese Communists do not directly intervene. The tightening of Viet Mlnh political control, the further development of the Viet Mlnh forces, and increased Chinese Communist aid will probably be balanced by the arrival of French reinforcements, more MDAP assistance, and progress towardietnam Army, Some territory may change hands but we do not foresee any major victories on either aide, at least through the end
APPENDIX
Opposing Forces in Indochina as1
Franco-Vietnamese Forces:
French ground
- Armed Forces of Associated
Auxiliary
Semi-military forces (railway guards,
French Air
French Navy and Naval Air
Viet Mtnh Forces:
Viet Utah regular(est.)
Total *
Opposing Regular Ground Forces in Tonkin:
Franco-Vietnamese
Viet Mlnh
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: