PROSPECTS FOR AN INCLUSIVE MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DATE SEP 2CCt
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
prospects for an inclusive middle east defense organization
SE-23
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staffwith the Central Intelligence Agency in theof this estimate. AU members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on
SEORET
PROSPECTS FOR AN INCLUSIVE MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
THE PROBLEM
To examine the possibility of forming an inclusive Middle East defenseto estimate the kind of organization which may be possible; and to indicate the major problems which would be encountered in efforts to improve theof such an
ESTIMATE
Status of The Middle East Command Proposal
The establishmentiddle East defense organisation was first proposed Inhen the US, the UK. Prance, andinvited Egypt to Join with themounding member In settingiddle East Commandustralia. New Zealand, and South Africa had aready agreed into the concept of MEC. Inhe sponsoring powers issued astatement informing Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel of the principles which they would follow in the establishment of MEC. By implication these states would be invited to Join In the enterprise as associate membersuture time.
The slated objective of MEC was to strengthen the defenses of the Middle East through the cooperative effort of all statesIn its defense, whether or notpart of the area. OrgsuilxaUonally. MEC would consist of two bodies: (a) thestructure itself. Including the Supreme
Allied Commander Middle East and his staff; andiddle East defense liaisonin which all sponsoring and associate members would be represented and which would serveink between the command and all the member states. It was envisioned that the MEC organisation would:lans for operations In the area In time of war or International emergency; (h) provide advice, training and materiel to the Middle Eastern countries: and (c) arrange for use of facilities by MEC through specific agreements between MEC and the Individual states pro-vicing such facilities. It was statedontinuing aim of MEC would be to increase the defense capabilities of tho Middle Eastern countries in order toroportionate reduction in the peacetime role of states not territorially part of the area. It was also stated that MEC would not interfere inand disputes arising within the area.
he sponsoring powers hoped that the MEC proposal would contributeompromise solution or the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. The Wafd government in Egypt, however,the four-power proposal as an attempt to continue foreign occupation of Egyptian territoryew guise. Practically all politically articulate elements In Egypt have approved of th? government's position. King and the present Hklali government arc
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favorably disposed toward association with the West ln regional defense, but even they demand prior acceptance of at least the principle of early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soli andof Farouk's title as King of the Sudan as well as of Egypt.
ajority of the governmental leaders in the other Arab states have privatelyarked Interest ln MEC, they do not feel that Ihey have the political strength to run counter to local popular support for Egypt's position.
Although Israel has expressed Itsto cooperate with the Western Powers in building up the defenses of the Middle East against Soviet aggression, it stated that lt could not openly associate itself with the MEC proposal at this time.
Prospects for Establishment of an Inclusive
Middle East Defense Organization
olution of the Anglo-Egyptianis essential to the establishment of any inclusive Middle East defense organization. Egypt will not join until its controversy with the UK is settled, and under presentno other Arab nation Is likely to If Egypt does not,
ettlement of the Anglo-Egyptianthat would permitiddle East defense organization would require British acceptance of at least the principle of early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and on British recognition of Farouk's title as King of the Sudan as well as of Egypt. Egyptwill not reduce these demands.
If these demands were met, it is almostain that Egypt would notiddleefense organization which Includedominal command structure or which provided for stationing of foreign groundln Egypt in peacetime. However, Egypt would probablyefense organizationts function were limited to: (a) coordinating operational plans; <b) planning Western assistance to the Middle East states fortrengthening of their forces; andor the development in peacetime, and the use in wartime of Middle East defense facilities, in this case, Egypt would probably agree to allow British or other Westernto remain in the Suez Canal Zone for maintenance of the bases. Egypt might also cooperate in the formation of an international air force in the Zone. However, Egypt would insist that all ground and air bases In the country be under Egyptian command.
f Egypt agreed to participateiddle East defense organization, the other Arab states would almost certainly be willing to participate. The chief motivation of all of these countries would be the hope of obtaining substantial amounts of arms, militaryand economic aid from the Western Powers. They would also hope that theof such assistance would increaseerious Western effort to defend the area in the event of invasion from the USSR, Jordan, because of its economicon the UK, would probably noton the withdrawal of British forces from its territory. Iraq, where nationalistichave so far been kept in check, would probably agree toiddle East defense organization. Syria and Lebanon wouldjoin, but would refuse to permit ihe stationing of foreign troops on their soil. King Ibn Saud would be willing toiddle East defense organization but would insist on preserving the special advantages in hiswith the US which he now enjoys. The leaders In all these countries andIraq are more aware of the threat of Soviet aggression than the Egyptians.
he multilateral character andIhe four-power sponsorship of such aEast defense organization would beto Arab nationalists only because of the inclusion of the US. Arab nationalists would hope that US influence would counterbalance the influence of the UK and would insuretreatment. Despite Arab suspicion that Israeli and Zionist pressures will influence US courses of action and that the US isto support the UK in its controversies with the Arab governments, there is anthat the US would supply arms and other
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aid to the Arab states without binding them by "unequal treaties" or Interfering in their Internal affairs. This docs not mean that Egypt would accept the substitution of US for British forces on Its territory or that any of the Arab states would be willing to accord to the US the type of administrative influence which the UK now exerts in Jordan and Iraq. It does, however, mean that the Arab states would prefer to obtain military and economic assistance from the US rather than from the UK or France and would prefer to deal with US advisors. Arab cooperation In any Middle East defense organization, therefore, would be likely to Increase to the extent thateans of increasing US aid to the region and reducing British and French influence therein.
is doubtful that Israel couldiddle East defensealthough Israel could probably bewith the purposes of theties with the US and UK. InIsrael would probably be unwillinginto any arrangement whichmilitary Information to itsand would certainly oppose anyln Arab military strength relativeown. Moreover, Israel is reluctant toovert step calculated to alienate thethus eliminate all possibility ofemigration from the Soviet bloc
Problemsiddle East Defense Organization
settlement of thewould thus probably makeestablishmentegional defensecapable of channelling Westernaid and advice to the Middle Eastof carrying out some preliminaryand coordination, Itsa more broadly effective organization would remain an extremely difficult task.
Although the evacuation of British forces from Egypt wouldajor irritant in Arab-Western relations, Arab fears andand intraregional rivalries wouldto plague negotiations for development of an effective organization. Public opinion, as well as many leaders, would continue to underestimate, Ignore, or be fatalistic about the threat of Soviet aggression, which they would regard as far less tangible than the question of Western 'interference" or the Arab-Israeli dispute. Arab leaders wouldsuspicious of Western motives, and would be concerned lest the defensebe usedeans of applying collective pressure on them or re-establishing spheres of influence. Moreover, nationalist resentment against foreign interference in the Arab states might be turned against the regional defense organization, and leademand for the withdrawal of foreign technicians from the Suez Canal base and other Middle East bases. In general, most states would remainprimarilyesire to exploit Western fear of Soviet aggression in order to improve their military strengthls their
For the foreseeable future, effectiveof the Middle East against Sovietis dependent upon the commitment of Western forces for that purpose, regardless ofiddle East defense organization is established or not. Over the longer term, an effective Middle East defense organization would require an improvement in Arab-Israeliessening of the hostility of Arab nationalists to cooperation with the West, and the inducing of Arab states to give primary emphasis to the defense of the area against Soviet aggression.
Original document.
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