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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the internal situation throughout Indcchina and to estimate French and Chinese Communist capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to Indochina through
CONCLUSIONS
outlook in Indochina throughs for continued stalemate, with both sidesaiting game. We believe that the French Union forces may make some slight territorial gains, but will notecisive victory during this period.
We believe that France will continue its war effort in Indochina, but willto transfer to the US alarger part of the economic andburden of Uie war, and to reduce its manpower commitments by developing the national forces of the Associated States.
We believe that France will seek toholdinghe French have apparently come to believe that they can no longerilitary decision in Indochina and that the Indochina problem can only be solved within the context of some form of over-allin the Far East, perhaps following the Korean war.
We believe that the Chinesewill not invade Indochina during the period of this estimate, whether or not hostilities in Korea are concluded. Present Communist strategy inis achieving considerablewith relatively small risk. We are unable to estimate what effect theof the Korean conflict beyond Korea would have on Chinesecapabilities and intentions withto Indochina.
We believe that the Chinesewill continue their present type of support to the Viet Minh, but it appears almost certain that this type of support would not in itself enable the Viet Minh toecisive victory in Indochina.
However, we estimate that if present trends continue, the difficulties which France will face in supporting major military efforts in both Europe andand in maintaining its position In North Africa, will in the longer runthe French Union's ability andto continue resistance in
DISCUSSION
Current Situation
Since the publication ofevelopments in Indochina throughhere has been no major change in the disposition or the relative numerical strength of the French Union and Viet Minh forces. French Union forcesclearing operations in the Tonkin Delta area during the spring monthsince that time seasonal rains havereatly reduced level of combat activity in Tonkin,rench Union regular troops currently confront an0 Viet Minh regular troops. Throughoutthe Viet Minh continue to conduct guerrilla and naval mine warfare and have maintained sufficient pressure against French Union forces to prevent the transfer of forces to Tonkin. The Viet Minh for the most part still control those areas of Indochina held at the time of publication ofSec maps.)
The French Union forces havelight gain over the Viet Minh in over-alleffectiveness. French Union forces are now superior to the Viet Minh In unit Are power andain attributableto the increased delivery of US MDAP equipment. Such equipment is superior in quality to that being given to the Viet Minh by the Chinese Communists and far greater in quantity.1
Chinese Communist logistic support to the Viet Minh appears to fluctuate considerably. During the last quarter1 the Viet Minh are believed to have receivedons of supplies. Deliveries probably fellbelow this level in the first quarternd despite an apparent increase sincehe level of aid is not believed to have reached that ofhinesesupport, exceptew recent border forays by minor Chinese Communist forces against anti-Communist Irregulars, appears still to be limited tonical, and advisory assistance,
A continuing problem facing the Viet Minh appears tohortage of food, but minimum requirements are apparently being mot by rice raids into the Tonkin Delta and imports from Communist China. The Vict Minh is having difficulty in exploiting its manpower potential, but appears to beits combat losses. Viet Minh moralethe present period of relative inactivity is difficult to assess. Morale among rank and file Viet Minh military forces is believed to be only fair, but morale among higher military and political echelons Is believed to be good. Whatever the state of morale, effectivecontrol over Viet Minh-held territory Is being maintained. Although little evidence on the point is available, such evidence as we have reveals no serious friction between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists.
Political instability characterizesto Vietnam and Cambodia, In Vietnam, the most important of the Associated States, the government of Premier Nguyen Van Tam, installed in June, has thus far failed towidespread popular support, although its initial actions suggest the possibility of greater administrative efficiency than that shown by the preceding government. Several outstanding nationalist leaders have refused to be identified with the government. In Cambodia, political unrest has increased to recent months. In the wake of mounting student agitation and the defection of the prominent nationalist, Son Ngoc Thanh, the King dismissed Premier Huy Kanthoul and currently rules by royal prerogative.activities by the Viet Minh and bynationalist groups have continued.
Union Capabilities And Probable Courses of Action
If France maintains Its present war effort in Indochina and the Chinese Communists do not intervene in force, the capability of the French Union forces to resist Communistpressure will probably improve slightly during the period of this estimate, largelyesult of the assimilation of US MDAP aid and the development of some experiencedmilitary units and leadership. The French Union forces will probably during this period strengthen their control of the Tonkin Delta area. These forces may also be capablethis period of making forays outside the Tonkin perimeter to attack Viet Minh military concentrations. French Union forces will not, however, have the capability to gain and maintain effective control over major areas of Viet Minh-hcld territory during the period of this estimate.
We believe lhat there will be little or no improvement in political strength within the Associated States In the foreseeable future. In Vietnam, Uie people generally do nota personal stake in the war effort and apparently still mistrust the French more than they fear the Communists. Accordingly, even if Premier Tarn should be able to carry out his proposed economic and politicalthe people will probably continue to be apathetic toward the regime, and over-all political strength and stability will not be greatly increased. Political unrest willcontinue in Cambodia. No significant changes are foreseen in Laos, the mostand stable of the Associated Stales.
In the absence of Chinese Communistdevelopments In Indochina will be primarily determined by the capabilities and intentions of metropolitan France. There are strong forces impelling France towardits commitments In Indochina. After an exhausting six-year war in Indochina, France is still confrontedteady increase in the costs of the Indochina war which currently takes almost one-third of the total French militaryn terms of professional military manpower, particularly officers and non-commissioned officers, Uie cost is even greater. This financial and manpower drain is seriously reducing France's ability to meet its NATO obligations and to maintain the power position on Uie continent which itnecessary toearmed
The French effort in Indochina is also influenced by fear of Chinese CommunistThe French arc apprehensive that substantial French victories would bring about such Intervention, with which the French, because of Uieir limited capabilities, would be unable to cope.esult, the French have apparently come to believe that they can no longerilitary decision in Indochina and that the Indochina problem can only be solved within Uie context of some form of over-all settlement in the Far Fast, perhaps following Uie Korean War.
We believe that despite Uie forcesthe French to reduce their commitments in Indochina, considerations of prestige and France's positionorld power will induce France to maintain Uie current scale of Its effort in Indochina, at least during the period of this estimate. France will, however:
a. Seek toholding action" in Indochina.
to. Continue, at Uie same time, lo seek US-UK guarantees of direct military support should Chinese Communist IntervenUon
efforts to Inject Uieinto any general negoUaUons onquesUons.
ita attempts to transfer toa progressively larger part of themilitary burden of the war.
Over-all2 military appropriations to dato have beenillion2 military appropriations for Uie Associated States amount toillionillion) Includingillion francs (SIM million) as subsidy for the National Armies of the Associated Stales.
Its efforts to reduce itscommitments by developing Uieforces of the Associated States.
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Minh And Chinese Communist Capabilities And Probable Courses Of Action
if the chinese communists continue to provide only logistic, advisory, and technical assistance, the viet minh will probably not be able to increase their strength or effectiveness significantly during the coming year. viet minh forces will continue their tactics of harassment, infiltration, terrorism, andwarfare. they will also continue to wage mine warfare in the inland waterways and along the coasts of indochina, an activity which the french as yet have been unable to counteract. they will also probably launch new frontal attacks on the french defense perimeter in tonkin in september-october when the present rainy season ends.unless chinese communist troops move into indochina in force, we believe that the viet minh will not be able to achieve avictory in tonkin or elsewhere in
the chinese communists will probably have the capability during the period of this estimate to improve airfields in south china, to continue improvement of transportation facilities, to continue stockpiling along the indochina border, and to increase their present level of logistic support for uie viet minh. if the present level of support issignificantly, the viet minhfor tactics described will be somewhatbut it appears almost certain that outside logistic support would not in itself enable the viet minh toecisive victory in indochina. the chinese communists will probably retain their present capability to commit and supportcommunist troops for an invasion of indochina. this capability will probably not be materially affected by the continuation of chinese communist operations within korea at current or expanded levels.
a chinese communist force. added to those of the viet minh, wouldbe able to force french union units to evacuate tonkin before effective assistance could be brought to bear. the chinesenow have, and will probably continue to have during the period of this estimate, sufficient jet and piston aircraft, independent of operations in korea, for damaging attacks against french union installations in tonkin, and, with surprise, for neutralizing the french air forces in tonkin. at this time, however, there is no indication that the chinesehave begun the necessary preparation of airfields and other facilities in south china to permit the commitment of the ccaf to operations in indochina. development of the air facilities in south china, particularly those along the nannlng rail line, would require three to six months for preparation forcombat operations; those on hainan island would require two to six weeks tofor such operations. the capability of the chinese communists for deploying air units at any time into the south china area for surprise attacks against the french in tonkin should not be overlooked, although such attacks could not be carried out over an extended period without the preparation described above.
e believe that whether or not hostilities arc concluded in korea the chinesewill not invade indochina during the period of this estimate. the chineseprobably have the capabilityto invade indochina, but presentdoes not indicate that such an invasion is imminent. moreover, the followingmilitateirectby chinese communist military forces:
communist strategy, whileimmediate victory in indochina,nevertheless lo be achievingadvantage. it divertsand us power from europe withlittle cost to the communists. itthe determination and ability offrench and the indo-chinese toand thus provide thean opportunity to aggravatethe western powers.
leadership is awarewest, and in particular the us,against communist china ifchina should invade indochina.other hand. communist leadership is also
aware that non-Communist opinion is divided as to the merits and timing of suchWe believe, however, that fear of such retaliation and of the major war which might result are probably important deterrents to open Chinese Communist Intervention in
We believe, however, that during the period of this estimate the Chinesewill continue their present type ofto the Viet Minh. The Chinesemay introduce combat troops in the guise ofe estimate, however, that the probable Communist fear ofmajor Western retaliation will restrain the Chinese Communists from committing "volunteers" in numbers sufficient toecisive military victory for the Viet Minh.
We are unable to estimate what effect the expansion of the Korean conflict beyond
Korea would have on Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to Indochina.
Outlook
Throughhe outlook inisontinued stalemate, with both sidesaiting game. We believe that the French Union forces may make some slight territorial gains, but will notecisive victory during this period.
However, we estimate that if present trends continue, the difficulties which France will face in supporting major military efforts in both Europe and Indochina and Inits position in North Africa, will in the longer run weaken the French Union's ability and determination to continuein Indochina.
SECJWTT
Original document.
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