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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL'g^J
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director (Plans) l0Assistant Director for Special Operations
Situation in Central America
nday, Havana, Panama, San Jose,Salvador and Mexico City were visited, and
from Guatemala was met outside his country. Although most oiinformation has been reported piecemeal and inreview of the highlights of the Central
2. The leading leftist candidate to replace President Ulate of osta Rica3 is Figueres. head of the Social Democratic Party, was reported that he intends to win the presidency cither by legal ectionsesort to arms, He is in0 to groups upportlng his candidacy, and this is given as one of the reasons hy he must win, by lair means or foul.
3. His next door neighbor, president Somoza of Nicaragua, is informed of Figueres' plans. Somoza says he will not permitto be caughtqueeze -play between leftist governments in Guatemala and Costa Rica but will take steps to prevent any such occurrences. If Somoza does not recover his health, there ia no one of his caliber in Nicaragua to replace him. eftist opposition group could easily take over.
American situation hole maylearer picture of the problems ahead.
4. The government of Guatemala recently furnished covert military aid in thc form ofifles androup in Honduras which is planning to overthrow thc rightist. regime of President Galvez and ex-Dictator Carias. Galvez and Cartas ore aware of the arms shipment and have said that they have the situation in hand.
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Opposition to the Communist-infiltrated government of Guate mala has increased within the country since the passageecree expropriating the property of many of thc landowners and oflcrs an
EvKlTl
SECURITY WFORIUTIOR
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excellent opportunitysychological warfare campaign during the next six months. Anti-Communist Guatemalans in exile will probably attempt to overthrow the Arbenz government soon after the end of the rainy season, which normally terminateseaceable change has been effected by forces within Guatemala. One danger in delay by the revolutionaries until next year is the attainmentompromise agreement between the landholders and the Arbenz government, which will lessen theresistance movement.
The one country in this group where indications arefavorable from the United States' point of view, is Mexico. There hasoticeable swing to the right in the past year, and it is expected thc next President will be more active against the Communist Party and its members than any preceding ones. This is not because of any change in thc basic ideology, likes and dislikes of the Mexican people but may be attributed to theof Mexico's corrupt leaders.
Panama, as usual, is overrun with rumors of forthcoming trouble. Many of these seem to be spread by the opposition to Remon in order to create an atmosphere of uncertainty which they believe will favor their objectives. There are reports of gun-running by opposition groups and unsubstantiated predictions that Remon will not remain in power moreays. There are conflicting reports about his health, some to thc effect he cannot live out the year. He has no strong lieutenant to step into his shoes.
Adding to the general instability of Central America are three other factors: vicious. propaganda being spreadajor scale by Argentina's labor attaches, gun-running from Mexico, and the. activities of the Communists.
Of the three, the all-out Argentine propaganda attack against the United States seems much the most dangerous in all countries except Guatemala. mall country such as Nicaragua there is reliable evidence0 has been spent by Argentinahree-month period for thc sole purpose of attacking the United States. In Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Mexico the American
Ambassadors
Ambassadors express themselves as more concerned ovrrpropaganda than that emanating from Moscow. Thisevelopment of the last year, which has been intensified since January. Argentine activities unquestionably give support to the plans of all. groups, Communist and other. The line followed is Marxist and is difficult to distinguish from Moscow.
The Communist Parties of Central America, with theof Guatemala, each consistew hundred members. To these must generally be added several thousand followers. There is little or no proof of outside direction except through members who make periodic visits to Moscow. As is usual with the Communist Parties of Latin America, they are chronicaUy short of funds, but in spite of this they have been able to captureey country as Guatemala. We have one high-levelin Costaow-level one inoubtful one in Nicaragua; the one we had in El Salvador was lost when he moved to Honduras, and in Guatemala wepanishwho, althougharty member, furnishes information on Communists.
The sale of arms by Mexico to revolutionary groups throughout thc Caribbean adds to the instability of the area. We recently have assigned one man exclusively to an investigation of these sales. Although we know that they are being made, we are not yet informed how they are shipped, to whom and for what Reports so far indicate shipments have gone to thcGovernment, the leftist group of Costa Rica, the Accion Democratica of Venezuela, some to unknown groups in Panama and some to Somoza.
In Mexico we are engaged in the most important operations of this Agency in Latin America. There are only four cities with top priority targets: Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Caracas. The first two have USSR Embassies, the second two have USSR Legations. In Mexico there are Czech and Polish Embassies, and in Buenos Aires all the satellites are represented except Albania. While Buenos Aires has the largest number of installations of interest, it is the city where operating conditions are much more difficult than anywhere else in the territory of thc Division. The only city where such progress has been made as to justify thc hope
of success within thc next year is Mexico. In Mexico wc are informed
of most
S8ftf*t
of most Czech operations and withinays we expect to knowPolish plans.conducted
against the Soviet Embassy, and it is believed that this, coupled with extensive information from the Poles and Czechs, will place us in an ideal position to take advantage of any crack, any weakness, in thc Soviet armor. Possibilityhysical penetration of the Soviet Embassy is so remote as to make it unworthy of To all intents and purposes the Embassyortress where physical surreptitious access would be possible only by tunneling from without. Even if one should gain access, there are still so many barriers between that point and the major target, it is highly unlikely one could enter undetected.
Ineeting was held with Chief of Staff andof Intelligence of USARCAIUB for thc purpose of reviewingtaff study on this is in the course ofwill limit or amputate four of the secondary objectiveswill also permit CIC to continue in its true
counterintelligence aspect, with proper co-ordination with CIA. The relationship between CIA and CIC and their relativewas so confused that there was the danger of this Agency finding itself saddled with responsibilities beyond its
of DTROBALO. Its prior-
ity targets are two, thc penetration of thc Communist Parly -
currently
currently unsatisfactory, and travel control. Tocumenthe crossroads of Latin America. Most travel by air toAmerica, the north and west coasts of South America,travel to the east coast goes through Panama. with the unique facilities available for
icccss
^makes Panama the indicated place for anof interest.
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