ATIONAl|jNTELLiGENCE: ESTIMATE ^fl"
v. W'
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES ANDOF ACTION IN KOREA
;. PuWirfiod2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OTICE
copy ot Uilaor tbe biformatlon and use of thean the tront cow andladlvMialS cadet the ]uxta01cUon o( thewho reouha the taforouUon tor the pe-formaace of thetr oQtasi omasa.dUsenv.natLir> elsewhere tn the department tc other omovs which require th.tor the performance cf official duites may be auttiorUcd by the folUtrlnjr.
a.istant to the Secretary of Wat* foroe theof Sble
Ulant Chief olar tbe Department of tbe Army
c. Direct or of Ma vol intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d Direetoe ofAF, forr*parttnrnt ot tha Air force
Aa&iitant to tha Director. Fill, lor the Federal Bureau of inrMtLgatkai
irector of Ictelllnonee, AEC. for tbe Atomic Energy Conuniauon
g. Deputy Cirector for InteUtarr.ee. Joini Statl. tor the Joint Staff
a. AssbUnt Director fur CottocUcnunnatlon, CIA. tor any other De-pr.rir.nj.'. oe Agency
may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurityr returned to the CeetrtJ InwUsroee Agencyhe Of*iee of CcUectlon andIA.
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n il If irrtjrcpgilmmt of Slate Office uf BrcrWair otf the Army
DrpMteMCtJt UW All Port*
Atonlr Wietfl- cwir.luUxi Julnt ChMU of Stair Federal niiicao ot lutpitxacon Umink iaa Dnw-ipeaett Herd
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CAPABD'JTfES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
The tatelH8ftnw mawlalUinsDepartments of Slateal with the Central Intelligence AgeWfct. itteeM thison 33
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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Corr.-nanlit capabilitiesrobable courses of action in Korea
through BnsVUMj
ASSUMPTION
The hostilities In Korea in not expanded on UN huiattiTr.
CONCLUSIONS
Communist military potential tn Korea li seen substantiallysince the beginning ol thtnegotiations. Troop strength has approximately doubled. Jet fighter strength has more than doubted.fiTectlvrnesi has Etiprored and ls now believed to be good to excellent.
The enemy Ls capable ofajor ground and/or air attaek with little or no warning. However, there are no current Indications of Communistto launch large-sale ground or sir operations in the near fatum
There arc Indications that BurletIn enemy air operations is so extensivee facto air war exists over North Korea between the UN tad the USSR The USSR almost certainly believes that additional commitments of Soviet air power could, under methods presently employed, be made In North
Korea and Manchuria without sericnis risk ol expanded hostilities. However, lt is unlikely that the Kremlin believes that Soviet-manned aircraft could be com-mitted over UN-held territoryrave risk cf global war.
he ComnrunisU now possess the capability of seriously cbah-riging the UN ulr effort in Northwest Korea as far south as the Chongchon River and of expanding their air operations scuthward into forward UN-held territory andwaters.
e believe that, during the period of this estimate, the Communists could not drive UN forces from Koreaajor Soviet effort wereo not believe the USSR will be willing to accept theisk of global war whichocrimitmenlentail
he Kremlin appears desirous of avoiding global war over the Korean
issue and for this reason would probably prefer rtlhe-continuation ot the present situation or an armistice.
espite the capability ta continue the wai in Korea, we believe that Internal economic und political considerationspnihsiblv rtterting pressure on theComrauntoU to conclude horlllltlei.
/he Communists in Korea appear to be prepared Toresumption of full-scale hostilities, an indennliestaliunatc, or an urrnlstloe.the pcssi unityenewal of full-scale hostUlcies by the Communistsbe Ignored, we believe that the CommunUU will continue to negoilate and will not take the initiative to brea* the present military stalemate.e believe rt probable that the Coc-munisW wish to conclude an ornusticr
However, we believe that the CommunUU will protract the negotiations so long at they consider that they can winfrom the 1'OW or any other Issue, and so long as they estimate that aof the Korean war dots not entail grave risk of global war.1
II an armistice Is concluded, wethat the negotiationolitical settlement will be com pi mi ted byInjection of Far Eastern Issues unrelated to
Whether orolitical settlement Is achieved, we believe Ihe Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain jnehar.nvd. Tbe Communists will procerd torth Koreailitant and armedt to subject South Korea to subversion,espionage, and guernlla warfare.
DISCUSSION
MIUTAUY SIUATION INAREA
Cammuniif Military Forces in Ihe Korean Area
Forces. Knemy ground forcesKorean aw* have alnwt doubledincencf-otUtKins began:
tttrtnath of Ewtat UiouodIn >Cor*i
Hanh
Chtitew
ttiaos
la andLOon to the Chin* OonuncnWt Fore" (CCP) now In Korea.eierves Inwn alt atroo of China could be com-mitledthat IVtpru; Cob not bMilies eU*whexe in0 troop* could be cconmitlrd provided tho Communists warn willing to reduce theirtuna proper.
ue powt; ci the Ceeaai-aniataa been substantially increasedaajorot reofgiinizaUon and re-equipment and relnforoanent North Korean (NK) armoied
equipment and new units have been organ-lad. The CCF has letroduced new artillery units into Korea andpiWJed aoo*arSUery tor tactical umta Enemy antiaircraft artillery units have Increased and
ownu.i,ale ccaimir* in Inn cor.cluUiii IBal Urn com-
nvunlilslorcil*ttr* Mow-
iw,i liit ion [cnansti
u* not Wsnir.teeUSi-
tartsaeaanai
a Thai tin CMewaawaataa id c.ow nothe UN *ana> On.
iiUN tnu-fire tonni ll Uie UN wne In Uiranlan an ox-pameon ol tun Korean oar.
mnuto deu
r.r. ll cewul. Sot* not
the employment of tin* made, their untlalrcraft lire mow cffocUve.'
ntensive training conxr tne serious losses of incurred byCocomurasU In Um aprtrighese programs have placed particular emphasis on smaO-unlt fcr
a total ofU0 combat aUCratt ot various types andmallype trainers. Included In the toUlel flchins.et fighters) arc believed to be inm and the remainder based In China proper, pr-manly amend Peiplng, Shaogh-ai,
mtereeptlon under goodNurlhawt Kurea;
b.UU ot attritionn eflart to -Uaitoata
other forward uuuiuoUm;
,fjrMg ot target,
adjacent waters. (The range o!
-oald tohe
Rnmenl at jet bombardment alr-nance these capsUll"*
2B. au- defenseighhina. With Sovietuclpauon. th- Comes-established aait warning net which givesfrom Hainan IslandM thercrdier aa well as tome coverage
trained, andjfi aircraft defense unit, along II- coasts fort tadaatnstarboruew. airfields, and coKununlcaUcns and wp-pVnelwort. BOOM important inland Wftat-LrUd and nuBtary InrtaOattBM arejlkaw***
j rf'grssOT H* rsyocenuand anvghtofiljlV Etawneie inCCA1 may be able to deploy enoughtodefend aattack but the present available forcesdeployed forefense
area*.
19beiwve that the CCAF Will probably be built upotal of at least sfcuafl by Julyof (ft* outcome rJ theuons (See TABor nreajottd strength or theur-tnemen. the over-allenso capabiltues of the Chlneee CensmumaU with regard to early warning.InU-reapbon and antiaircraft capabilities will probablyto Incic
CejwWilfiri. ChlnaaeKorth Korean naval capability* willcontinue to be negligible tmrnrnf th-of this estimate, (Seebove.)
n. FACTORS AFfECTlNG CC**MWIS1 COURSES Of ACTION IN KOREA Soviet Global bvhsrosH
the Kieenlm estimates thatinterests In the Far East can bea prolongation oriw ination ofto Korea depends In large degree onworld-wiae strategy. If. aa wethe Kremlin would preler tothe attainment of It- objectivesof global war. the Kret-Uncourw ot acUon in Korea whi-hIncreased risks of global war.Communist aggression in Korea has"iSmu^
role'in the Korean war and ha* notuse the war as an excusa fornosUUdee. The Kremlin thustasue and for this reason wcnldpreferontinuation ot thesituation or an armistice.
n tha otherresent Soviet strt-tegy envWages an early global war. which we beheve isikely, the Kremlin wouldseek to keep US militaryied down in Korea regareJees ol the risk ot global war.
Sinc-Soviol Rolollonshe Foeean war must already have
the problem Of the dlatrtbuUcn ol Us b.
between Peiplng and Moscow.hereno evidence that this problem has yetthe Slno-Sovletrotongwi Korean aar might produce frktion betwfwn the two governments. It is highly unlikely, hoaever. that such frictions wlU. wiUiin the pericd ot Una estimate, create raalorin the pcaV-ies ot the two power, with regard lo Korea.
The In Wool Sitvation inChina
t live Urn* of in* outbreak of the KMcao war the political and economicof ine moing amfmgreatly espended to euminate petentudendreast the
authority and the popular support of Ihe war snort. Organised programs ol tcirot have sought to purge theadmirJstra-ueeTand cLrohuuower of th. business
and the government had aimeamecd Its imen-
pwE.arncJecenoio^^
MBfyji wketb, while not reducingrapabiittr of the Chlneae Coeomurta-ZoiZmm* war. an.fthe long-term ppHUeal andabiti-ues of the regime.
tw burden of Ihe Korean heave Available l_ tremely fragmentary, indicate* thai Chlnr* Communist Oov-rnmenl aaWJJpgJJ.
W^regune
l restne-
1km have undoubtedly added to Iho eco-
peoblerna, notably In tho vital railway* and ixiwer planU. The reaulrorneiitj of the armed servicesuVtf bureaucracy nave confronted the regime "ith aerere shortages otnd technical porsonneL
he Chineaa CommunUia havednsUic nweaures to meet the requlre-tncnt. ot the war aa well .to eeod.ly their polltical power. Taxes have been in-Tensed, and Irrcg'dnr levies haveda acUvitles have
he Chinese Communists probably ham the capability, with continuing Sovieto support (a* avai effort at coarent oe HBDCed Sevence* the neat yea. OrM production of consumer goods Is UrA* to be maintaUied and crop prospect* both in China proper and In Manchuria are
ta'nlyesunjates that InMnrute prOlw-eatmn ot the war will seriously letam IU donxatk; development program and willopn-lar dtsilhistonrmnt with the regime. DespiteapablUty to eonnnua the warea. we believe Iha! internal economic and anlit'-csl considerations are pronably exerting pres-rsre on the Chinese Communists to conclude
Tha Internal Situation in Norlh Koreo
BS. Increasirigly severe fond shortages,destruction of industrial faaultra and power plants, and vanishing ra-rwpeeU of crd-flcation have caused deterioration of ditlian morale In Noith Korea Serious unrest has been prevented by shipments of consumer nods, wmeipally food, frcra lb* TMSE andhina, and by Crmmunistmeasures.
he highly effective apparatus ol control devetsoed by the North Korean irg-jne pner to the outbreak ot hoatlUties remain* basically Intact.o evidence ofde* lorioraUon In Ibo eOocUveneso of the police, or ot the presence ot subvetslvea In the armca lerces and aebnlnatcaUcn. In addition, the Nwth Korean propagandaime badly disrupted, has been strengthened during the current military lull.rcnre-mgatinn ot the war will elmeal certainty have an inereeainery ad verse effect on internaloelh Korea, thla will probably have little bearing on Cotnmunlsl courses of action in Korea.
Since the North Korean regime la controlled byR, IU Interests will I* subordinated Co tin- global or regional Interest* ot the USSR. However, ttovlrt policies In Korea will wtjum-ably be Influenced to seme extent by thedesire to nature North Koreamodel" SatcUCe of the USSR and by UM fear of in-creasing Chlnua* Communist influence in tie Internal sflalra of North Korea
Political Development! In South Korea
he rerrm political crisis between Syruj-man Una*ssembly ended In avketory for Rnee. There continues.to be conflict amcng Rhee. scene ot Sis supporters in tea recent actfcsrss /janiK the Assembly, and the Auembty. The con-stttalHnal change* efleetedolution to the political crisis will prcbably loiter Irxreas-Ing Inrtlon among President. I'rini" Minister, and Assembly. In view of US rressure as well as li.lri-.alionttl disapproval, however, It is probable that tuiee will be dupnawi tc refraii from further openly unccuutut -nasi act) in* and Ragraat acU of nUnuowUori. The soco-itty cl the UN forces has been maintainedcsul* of the KOKUrrornl, buteriod u! limef the South Korean military forces may be encd by the appointmen! of politicalot ttliee to high command.
political conflict in South Korea has treated the conflict tr> evidence of uie unpopularity and detrnorattan of the Rhee reghna. How-eiw. politicalents in South Korea, unlaw they seriously weaken the UN military pnvlUon, will probably have only minoron Communist actions in the area.
m. wcArsOrtS of communist
tNTtNTtONS Milrlcuy Indications
Communist military activities In Koreaelvwhan provide no conclusive indlcatlotis of Communist mien!ions Deaptte the great strengthening ofailllary grcund SBree raponuiiirs nace Ihe beginning ofegotiations, ISArenerally detensret poature. The evee Useicasing Caawnuniat afcr poUmuaJ kt not In iiaet; an ndscatloa of an Imminent expansion ol the ensray air eflort over Koiee, However, the mllllary sirength andof the Communis! forces are such that an offensive could be launched with Utile or no warning.
Prcpo^orton Indications
agaialBluCI tinned Intransigence on the POW issue In tne armistice negotiations, and has stresseddetermination not to be Intimidated by rrUitary pressure. Al the same time the propaganda tun stressed the CommunistIn eontrcoe tbe truer negoissukk**.
However, Were have bom some Indlca-ik.ii! In Communist propaganda which ran bs Interpreted aa preparationsessation of the Korean war. Thera bos heen atrndency in the last sue months to discuss Use war In the pas! tense and to emphoaire the benefits Which the Conmtmliu have
achieved Horn the war. The domestic propa-goiula of tha Chinese Communists has era-plusUad the regime's Internal program. North Korean prc^ganda has alio given less Bttenuon to the war and more to "normal" propaganda themes such as North Korean econ cm ill! problems, attacks on the Dyngmsn Rhee government, and guerrilla aeUvltles Ir* South Korea.
IncfirofioPi from the True* Neoorierhom
nning the covrac of the negoUBtions the Communists have cleany revealedults-tudea: first, that they are In no hurry to reach an agreement, and second, that they wish to piaca ihe anus on the UN for any breakdown in lu-fouauons. and for any resumption of cSensivr nprratlona The negotiations nave been narmwed in tbe last lew months to ihe single Issue ol repatriation of POW'l.
Indications tram Communis Diplomatic Moves
n ihe diplomatic front, their haveumber or indications, from both the Soviet Communis! sources,esire
t,olution for the POW Issue. For example, Indian efforts to break tho ttnmiiB-jont deadlock met with temporary encourage-cient in Helping The oaoH fur It* part has put out leaser* at the UN.
IV. FIrOnAeaE COSAMUNIST COUBES Of ACTION
munist* cannot be ignored, we beisve that the Communists will continue lo negotiate and will not take the initiative to break themilitary stalemate. CO. Weoobabla that the Conunu-wish to conclude an armistice. How
they
Ikuln* the paat year the haw .uiwtanllally Increased their cuutary strength in the horean area- At the aame time Uiey havo continued negotiations for an uimWtica at Panmunjom. permltlingover truce issues to be ruurowed to the ungle aw of POW .
Communisteanda. while making capital of the armistice issues, has not closed the dooregotiated settlement and may, in its broader perspectlvee. antlclpaleettlement.
he Communists in Korea appear to bo prepared ntheresumption ofndednite military stalemate, or Alinough the passiKlityf full-scale bosUUtka by theothernd so long as they
of the Koiean war doea not entail gravef global war.*
f an armistice Is concluded, we bellev. that the negotiator, of asettlement .ill be complicated by Communist injection of rati
asm UiaVInc CoarcurJal ob-Jectlve to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged The Cornrnuiiiite wiE proceed to redevelop North Koreailitant and armed Satellite, and lo subject South Korea to subversion, sabotage. ekp>wiage. and guar-rUia warfare.
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ESTIMATED CHINESEll 'OBCE AObTHE PfMOn JUIY0 THROUGH3
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Original document.
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