copi no.i 7
r THE PRESIDENT
rUemcD .'Mlav. of the unites
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
Tier
sjiuja- +k
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RE
yrow* teaGPiM ot Chi Contnl
1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TeP^SEegET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
21
Final Cop/
Thc text of the basic estimte is identical with the advance copy distributed onecember. The accompanying TABS have been added since that distribution.
The intelligence organizations ol the Departments of Stale, thc Army, thc Navy, and the Air Force participated with thc Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisoryconcurred in this estimate on
THE. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain possible US courses ofand (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.
ESTIMATE
Expansion of the Korean WarN Embargo on Shipping and Exports to Communist China
UN embargo on shipping andCommunist China, if effective, couldChinese seaborne ImportsHowever, if exports wereto Port Arthur and Dairen, and ifHong Kong and Macao were notthe eflect of the embargo wouldnullified. In addition, to avoidthe embargo would have torestrictions on exports toof goods which might beCommunisthe cancellationand the prohibition of the saleships to Soviet Bloc and othercountries;ovementsuch as refusal of clearance,and other pressures applied onbasis.
these controls, if effectivelywould be sufficient toexisting serious economic strains inChina, their impact would beand would not, in themselves, forceCommunists to end the Koreanthreaten the stability of the Chineseregime.
must be expected that the Sovietwould not respect mis embargosome other statesive onlycooperation. The payment ofCommunist China could stimulatethe embargo. While it is impossiblewith precision the Importance ofthey would serve to diminisheffects of the embargo.
Communists coulc furtherthe effect of these measuresmore of their ships in theeven though such dislocation ofshipping might impose seriousthe Soviet Bloc. The USSR wouldto expand overland shipmentsChina.
a UN embargo on exportsto Communist China is unlikely,to reduce Communis: Chinese
xpansion of the Koreon War by Naval Blockade of Communist China
a. Effective interdiction of Communistseaborne imports wouldaval blockade (Including an embargo) of allCommunist seaports, including Portand Dairen. It would be essential to
prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao as transshipment points (or trade withChina.
Interdiction would intensifyserious economic strains InChina, but would not in itself foresCommunists to end the Koreanthreaten the stability of the Chineseregime
Chinese Communists would beto counter such Interdictionwould probably employ minethe blockading ships and mightaircraft and submarines.
- d. The USSR would endeavor to offset the economic effects of the embargo and blockade by expanding overland shipments toChina. The USSR would refuse tothc legality of the blockade. It would probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur and Dairen and mightto escort Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports. It might resort to theuse of submarines and mines against blockading ships. Enforcement of themight well create incidents which would heighten International tensions, but wethe Soviet reaction to such incidents alone would not result in the USSR Initiating general war.
imited Expansion of UN Airin Order to Protect UN Forces in Korea from the Consequences of tho Growing Communist Air Throat
UN air attacks againstaircraft and air'bases in ManchuriaImmediate vicinity of the Yalu RiverImpair the Communist capabilitytheir air superiority over largerKorea and thus to threaten theUN forces in Korea by air attacks.
Chinese Communists would reacttheir aircraft and bringing tomaximum air defense capability.also attempt to increase their airagainst UN forces, installations, andthe Korean area.
e. The USSR probably would not openlythe Sino-Soviet Treaty, but would prob-
ably react by committing additional Soviet forces to the air defense of Manchuria and North Korea despite the continuing risk of general war.
Expansion andUN Military Operations inWar
and unrestricted UN airon Communist military targets inand North Korea, combined withUN ground operations ln Northseriously impair the Communistcapability to maintain their position
believe that the Chinesereact initially by attempting toair action against UN forces,and ships in the Korean area.
USSR would probably reactby giving support short ofof its own ground forces and shortcommitment of Soviet air forces toover UN held territory, but includingof additional elements of itsforces to action in and overNorth Korea.
the Communists should find thatwere proving Insufficient toto maintain themselves militarilythe USSR would probably intensifyThis aid might well include thcof "volunteer" forces. It mightthe employment of Soviet forcesan extente facto local warthe US/UN and the USSR wouldthe Far Kast. At every stage, however,would probably endeavor tothe possibility of ending the conflictnegotiation if the global interestsUSSR would be served by disengagement.
of the Korean War byof Nationalisf Military Forces
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greaUy expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only
logistic support for an invasion butair and naval support at well. Even so, Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly-be ready lor an invasionnd Chinese NaUonallst Forceshole arc not likely to be ready lnstrengtharge-scaleertain small units of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment ln small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.esser amount o! preparation thc Chinese National' 1st Army could be employed effectively in Korea. Certain selected divisions could be made effectiveelatively short time for rotational service on thc Korean peninsula.
of (ho Korean War by
Utilization of Non-Communist Guerrilla
Forces Already in China The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing thc strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not nowignificant operationalEven If guerrilla capabilities were developed, the guerrillas could be employedonly in conjunction with other courses of action directed against Communist China
of the Korean War byof Several Courses ofConsidered Above
a. An intensification of UN operations in Korea and an expansion of thc war to Include bombardment of Manchuria and anof Communist China's seaborne imports, if successful, would probably have theeffects on Communisthc Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations lnines of communication In Manchuria would
beommunist China would be forced into an increased dependence on the USSR for military supplies and other criticalhinese Communist capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia would be reduced substantially; andn increase of Soviet commitments in the Far East would reduce Soviet capabilities elsewhere.
USSR would almost certainlyIts aid to Communist China inthese US courses of action, This aidinclude increasing commitmentair defense elements Inand North Korea. If thethat such measures were provingin countering the US effort,would probably intensify its aid.might well include the introductionforces. It might even includeof Soviet forces to such ana de facto war between the US/UNUSSR would exist in the Far East.stage, however, the Kremlinendeavor to keep open theending the conflict by poUticalthe global interests of the USSR wouldby disengagement.
is recognized that preciseenemy intentions ls rarely availableenemy counteraction under thehere considered cannot bewith complete accuracy. However,of the Soviet problem considered,It unlikely that the USSR wiilchoose lo precipitate global warof the implementation of theaction examined in this estimate.thc possibility of war bycannot be discountederiodinternational tension such as would
T WT-iiWRE T
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TAB A
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SEABORNE TRADE
During lhc lasl half0 Communist China's seaborne imports reached record levels. These imports consisted primarily of raw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber,products, steel and steel products,anufactures, and pharmaceuticals. At least three-fourths of these imports passed through Hong Kong and practically all were carried ln non-Communist registered shipping. Seaborne Imports into Communist China reached even higher levels during the first half1 and the composition of these imports did not change significantly.
During the latler half1 there hasecline both in seaborne import* into Communist China and In the tonnage ofommunist registered shipping engaged intrade with Communist China There are sev-
eral passible reasons for the decline in thetrade of Communist China. Among these are: Western export controls, increased imports from thc Soviet Bloc, institutionystem oJ selective buying by the Chinese Communistshortage of foreignresulting from heavy imports0 and the first halfnformation now available does not permit even an approximate estimate of thc relative importance of these lac tors.
art of the decline In the tonnage of non-Communist registered shipping involvedrade with Communist China has been offset by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping to carrying Communist China's foreign trade. States of the Soviet Bloc are buying oradditional ships for use In this trade.
TAB B
COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA
Present Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are due directly to SovietIn terms of equipment, operationaltraining, and. in many cases, theparticipation of Soviet personnel. Insuch capabilities, the following factors are pertinent:
. a.. let Aircraft.irst-line jet fighters of theype are located in the Mukdcn-Antung area ofdditional first-line Jet fighters, which are now located in thc Peiping-Tientsin, Tsingtao. Shanghai, and Canton areas, could be deployed forin the Mukden-An'.ung area
adar defensebeen installed and set in operation,assistance of Soviet radar engineers,and advisers, which Is believed tocontinuous early-warningthc Manchurian border south tovisual system supplements thrsystem.
Artillery.ubstantial number ofartillery pieces as well as largeof automatic weapons. The majorityarc Soviet manufactured7 mm. pieces. Reportsindicate that the total AAA strength is
being increased by shipments of SovietHeaviest concentrations are located in thc Mukden area, Shanghai, and ln theof Canton. AAA defenses appear to be employed for the protection of the industrial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in thc communications and supply systems. Reports indicate that the AAAinclude gun-laying radar.
d Aircraft Control. The Communist air defense system in Manchuria has thefor limited ground-controlled interception.
ommunist air defense capabilities Inarc estimated to be as follows:
a, In the Dairen-Mukden-Antung-Harbin area of southern and eastern Manchuria, the Chinese Communistsajor aircapability against daylight bombing missions. At night their air defensewould be considerably less.
Ii. Communist air defense capabilities In southern and eastern Manchuria are such that considerable losses of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during aof systematic air attacks. Underof prolonged air attack, the ability of the Chinese Communists to maintainwould be in direct proportion to the amount of support which the USSR would render.
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TAB C
CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES
Chinese Nationalist Armytrengthersonnel organizednfantryrmoredara-trooportndepend-ent regiments,ndependent battalions. The bulk of these forces is disposed onsome combat elements arc located on Matsu. Quemoy. and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist Army has no significantof trained reserves, and under presentits mobilization capacity IsThe mass induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded Its proposed MDAP. Even' ln this event, the dependability andof Formosan Iroops would beAl the present lime, the Nationalist Army Is short of some types of ammunition, arms, and other equipment, and the materiel that Is available is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materielthc lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (Including the lack of interservicehe combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army Is poor.
The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consistsombat groupsactical aircraft. Of this total, however,are serviceable for combat. Theseofight bombers andiston fighters predominantly of World War II design.of the lack of spare parts and Improper maintenance facilities, the combatof this force IS very poor. Underof sustained combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft. Its capabilities would be reducedegligable factoray or two. In spite cf these difficulties, thc Chinese Nationalist Air Force Is believed to have the organizational structure and necessaryto absorb and utilize the additional
equipment, including Jel aircraft, necessary to make it an effective force.
The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists ofiscellaneous craft, the largest of whichestroyer-type vessels. Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, thewould be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means oflanding craft and following up with five or six divisions lifted by other shipping. While the Nationalist Nary could not, by Itself,blockade the Chinese mainland, It could give limited supportlockade.
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greatly expanded, and unless thc US were willing to provide not only logistic support for an Invasion butair and naval support as well. Even so. Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be ready for an Invasionnd Chinese Nationalist Forceshole are not likely to be ready Instrengtharge-scaleowever, certain small units of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already capable of effective employment in small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.
elaUvely short time certain selected divisions of thc Chinese Nationalist Army could be made effective for rotational service on the Korean peninsula. The ChineseArmyhole could be employed effectively in Koreaesser amount of preparation than would be requiredarge-scale invasion operation of thc Chinese mainland.
T*UF SKCsitTl
TAB D
ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN CHINA
Strength ond Location
Thc maximum total number of effective guerrillas throughout all China which can with any certainty be said to exist at thetime ls. Dormant or potential guerrillas exist In unknownbut the utility of this category ls and probably will remain small pending all-out war or revolution in China.
Active guerrilla forces arc located for the most part in inaccessibleregions and on Nationalist-held offshorePrincipal regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Puklen border, the Kwangsi-Kweichow border. Szcchwan. the Cheklang coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest
Thoir Physical Composition and Condition
The term "guerrillas" Is an elastic one since these resistance forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly In composition from one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fall Into the following categories: (a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whomallegiance, but most of whom owe noto Taiwan; (b) discontentedand peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority racial and religious groups, lhe most active and effective units are those in categories (a) and
Guerrilla forces sufferack ofdirection and coordination,elative lack of organization, quite often from lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious deficiencies In arms andand. perhaps most Importantly, from an almost total lack of communication facilities.
In addition, guerrilla forces sufferack of adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies.
Thoir Motivation and Allogionce
o single political program unites orthe guerrillas. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the basicforce behind guerrilla activity at the present time is the struggle for existence and self-preservation.
G. Despite Nationalist and Independent claims, the Chinese guerrillas are likely for the most part to follow whatever leader and whatever political group can support and maintain them.
Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is primarily that now beingby Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist guerrilla effort, however, remains largelybecause of the hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
Independent elements continue toubstantial guerrilla potentlalln Kwangsi andt is believed that the claims of one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid, but this group does not have the resources to maintain itselfoutside support,
Their Continuing Decline in Strength and Effectiveness
Communistdissident elements have beenand, with the furthercontrol by Peiping and the forming byof an effective anti-guerrillaChina, guerrilla strength andunder present circumstances willcontinue to decline.
perhaps surprisingly lowuerrillas should not belo the successes of lhe Chineseantl-gucrrllls program. Thisalso reflects more accurate USconcerning anil-CommunistChina than was available when earlierwere prepared.
Their Present Capabilities
guerrillas have attime the capability for:
Sporadic raids;
Occasional sabotage operations;
feints, and diversions againstfrom the Nationalist-held
<d) Providing Intelligence concerningChina; and,
(e)otential nucleus for amovement in mainland China.
guerrillas at the present time dothe capability to;
Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another of thc Chinesearmies;
Seriously interdict Chinese Communist lines of communications or logistic support;
Attract to their ranks substantial numbers of defectors from thc Communists;
Significantly aid military operationsationalist invasion be launched in the near future.
capabilities are unlikely towithout sizeable outside support andof the Chinese Nationalists.
Original document.
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