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INHUMATION
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SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOB [IOtUICISCOF STATE
ESTIMATE
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS, AND PROBABLE REACTIONS TO AN IDENTIFIABLE US PROGRAM OF PREPARING THE NATIONALISTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST Si THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS 3
2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approver Release TOP SECRET
CAP. AND US P!
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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS, AND PROBABLE REACTIONS TO AN IDENTIFIABLE ,'US PROGRAM OF PREPARING THE NATIONALISTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
SE-29
The InteUigence organizations o[ the Departments o! State, the Army, lhe Nuy. the All Force, ind lhe Joint StafT participated with the Central InteUigence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All memberi of theAdvUory Committee concurred In this estimate onee. however, footnote of the Director ofUniled States Air Force, on page 1.
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PRESENT AND POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS, AND PROBABLE REACTIONS TO AN IDENTIFIABLE US PROGRAM OF PREPARING THE NA-
TIONALISTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the present and potential capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists for various offensive operations against the Chinese Communists; and to estimatereactions to an identifiable US program of preparing the Nationalists foroperations against the Chinese Communists.
CONCLUSIONS'
Chinese Nationalists do not now have the capability to undertake anof mainland China or Hainan or to participate in combat operations in Korea or Southeast Asia. At present, theare only capable of conducting minor raids and limited air attacks against nearby mainland of China. The scope and nature of these operations would be limited primarily by lack of equipment and training.
inimum of three to four months of intensive large unitombat-effective force0 ground troops could be made available foroperations in Korea or Southeast Asia If three to four months ofamphibious training werefor the above, and if sufficient train-
ing craft were available, this force could conduct effective amphibious raids.
lthough Nationalist naval and airwould continue to limit the scale of Nationalist raiding operations against mainland China, raids by the force0 ground troops would prob-
SAP desires to record the following comment: Although In agreement with Uie facta presented, Il Is believed that the esUmate does not Indicate sufficiently Uu positive asset which the Chinese Nationalist military potenUalthe Western powers. If developed Into an cftecUve military force and adequately supported, the NaUonallsts wouldrowing threat to the Chinese Communists. To counter this threat, the Communists would be required to maintain very large military torces in China proper, particularly In the coastal area from Canton lo Shanghai. Moreover, theof this potenUal wouldorce In being which would be useful In countering Soviet employment of satellite forces In Uie Far East.
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deter the Chinese Communists irom diverting for operations elsewhere any important part of thehinese Communist troops now deployed in the coastal area from Canton to Shanghai.
After the required advisory and logistic support had been received from the US,eorganized Nationalist divisions could be made effective for offensive operations. These troops, except for0 men mentioned above, would require aboutonths training for each division. This time estimate does not include the period required for amphibious training. These divisions would be of an average size0 men. The time required forthe totalivisions would depend on the availability of training facilities and on the necessity of maintaining some divisions in-defensive positions on
With US air, naval, and logisticand US over-all direction, this force would be capable of undertaking major operations on theSto guarantee the security ofwouldontinuing requirement.
In view of the limited manpowerto the Nationalists on Taiwan (seend the vastly superior manpower resources of the Chinesethe Nationalists could notsustained large-scale operations on the mainland without substantialand defections from the
A US program of preparing theNationalists for offensive operations would boost the morale of theIt would also encourage theleadership to interpret such a
US decisionommitment thai US lorces would participateutureinvasion of the mainland.confident that the US could not back down once so committed, the Nationalist leadership might embark on independent operations regardless of US directives or the prospects of success.
Although the Nationalist leadership would almost certainly prefer to useforces for an invasion ofChina, it would probably renew its offer to make forces available in Korea if given any encouragement to do so. The Nationalist leadership might also beto participateN forcefor the defense of Southeast Asia. However, prior to the release of forces for use in Southeast Asia, or forces for use in Korea beyond those previously offered, the Nationalist Government would almost certainly seek additional US
Communist reactionrogram of preparing the Nationalists for offensive
operations, in addition to anof anti-US propaganda, wouldinclude: (a) an increase in the capabilities of the Chinese Communists to counter the growing Nationalist threat; (b) seizure of the offshoreislands; and possibly (c) air attacks on Taiwan. If the Chinese Communists assessed that Taiwan was toase of US-supported Nationalist strength
from which the mainland would one day be invaded, they might feel compelled to make extensive increases in existing coastal defense forces, at the expense of their military establishment elsewhere. Once committed toefensiveposture, their calculations withto present and future military
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would be affected by this threat to the security of their coastal border.
he reaction of the Near East to an identifiable US program of preparing the Nationalist forces for offensive operations would in general be apathetic. In the Indian subcontinent and the non-Corn-munlst countries of the Far East, reaction would for the most part be adverse.would be less adverse, particularly in thc Philippines, Thailand, and theStates of Indochina, to theof any employment of Nationalist troops in Korea or mainland China that might successfully take pressure off
Southeast Asia. The Western European countries would react adversely toS program. This unfavorablewould probably not seriouslyhowever, with the cooperation of the Western European governments with the US in European affairs.
f an identifiable US program ofthe Nationalist forces for offensive operations were undertaken subsequent to increased Communist operations in Korea, the Western European countries would probably support the US program, and reactions in other non-Communist countries would generally be lessthan as indicated above.
BEARING ON CHINESEOFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
The Chinese Nationalist Militaryround Forces. The present combat strength of the Chinese Nationalist Armyowever, no divisions are ready for offensive operations at the present time. Morale is considered satisfactory or better. However, ordnance, signal, andequipment is obsolescent and Ln short supply; present units are considerablyserious shortcomings still exist in unit and combined training; and leadership above the division level ls incompetent orIn large-scale combined planning and operations. No Nationalist Army units have had amphibious training.
ir Forces. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) has in tacticaloul71 fighters; 38
The combat personnel of Uie Chinese Nationalist Army are presently organised intormies ofivisions, one armored brigade, one parachute group, and six independent artillery regiments. It ls anticipated that, by the end othis force will have been reorganlicd Intormies ofivisions, one armored brigade, and one parachute group.
5 light;6 andIn the event of hostile attack,all of these aircraft would be required to participate, at least Initially, in the defense of Taiwan. CNAF morale and leadership are good, but its combat effecUveness Is lowof inadequate spare parts, equipment, and supplies. Including POL. and limited operational training and experience,in bombardment-type aircraft. Most important, however, is the fact that thehave no jet aircraft.
avel Forces. The Nationalist Navy is composedmall vessels, the largest of whichestroyer-escort-type ships.in this number aremphibious ships, of whichre LST's. Morale in the Nationalist Navy appears good. Although the combat effectiveness of the Individual ships has improved, the over-all combatof the present fleet is low because of: (a) an Inadequate logistic capability; (b)
'The present personnel strength of Uie CNAFlying personnel oftt are trained active pilots. This Is the planned maximum moblUzaUon potential of the CNAF.
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failure to understand and apply theof command responsibility in coordinated operations; andystem of officerwhich seriously limits the possibility of improvement. There0 Nationalist Marines, but they cannot be expected toin larger than battalion size, and at present only one battalion Is equipped for limited amphibious operations.
uerrilla Forces. Thererganized guerrillas on the Na-tionallst^held offshore islands who have had commando training and experience. These forces are organized in approximately bat-talion-slzed units and are equipped at least as well as Chinese Nationalist regular forces. Although there are anin scattered units on the mainland, none of these units is believed to be effectivelyor directed by the Chinese Nationalists.
Chinese Nationalist Manpowerost of the present Nationalist units were organised prior to the end of World War II. Since coming to Taiwanhese units have had few discharges or new recruits, and consequently normal aUrition is becoming an increasingly important problem. Before the Nationalists would be able to commitnumbers of troops lo operations outside
of Taiwan, additional manpower would have to be found for reserves and replacements.
he chief source of available manpower for the Nationalists is the indigenousof Taiwan. ew Taiwanese have beer, inducted Into the Nationalist military forces. If assured of fair treatment, andIf all-Taiwanese units were formed, the Taiwanese probably would not resist The great majority of Taiwanese are anti-Communist, and such troops could serve as an effective national guard for the defense of Taiwan provided adequate training and equipment were provided them. It Isthat there are now on Taiwanhysically fit Taiwanese plushysically fit Chinese malnlanders (excluding the military) in theoale age group. In view ot existingIt is probable that upen could be conscripted immediatelyore over the courseear without seriously affecting production. of the probable Taiwanese aversion to participation in operations againstationalist aversion to the creation of Indigenous combat units,raction of the lotal Taiwanese troops could beInto those Nationalist units committed to offensive operations against the Chinese Communists.
In sum, the manpower situation on Taiwan is estimated as follows:
NaUORftllll Military Ejtabtlihment
ClflUini in Aftalwaneie Croup hinese
Civilian! tnaiwanese hinese
Guerrillas on Oftihore
Wands TOTAL
CO.CO0
K
OO
s.^o
CC0
0
soo.eco
oa
B.OOO
oo
ull.SU lor MUI-
t*iy
Oul aAr-
Ixilni ih* Econa.
mt af Taiwan
DCS
Sl.COO
,nfs
a-hum* lot orto>
JOO.
Aiaiaat iht Ca.su*O0
0
memmm omm*.
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nc ten a
side (rom Taiwan, the Nationalists have (ew sources oi manpower at this time.considerations probably preclude the early transfer to Taiwan or the anti-Communist Chinese POW's in Korea or of any significant number of the Nationalist troops in Burma. Nationalist efforts to effect the release0 troops interned by the French inhave been unsuccessful. (There is some doubt concerning the usefulness orof these internees, but once released,half of them might be salvaged for some militaryhe overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia cannot bea significant source of manpower because their loyalties are divided and their attitude toward Peiping and Taipei is one of "wait andn addition, these overseas Chinese are largely engaged in business and have little desire to forsake their preseni relative security. Finally, the various Southeast Asian governments, through fear of antago-niiing Communist China or lack of sympathy for the present Nationalist Government, would probably not permit overt recruiting of resident Chinese.
view of the limited manpowerthe Nationalists and the vastlyresources of the Chinesethe Nationalists could not supportlarge-scale operations on thesubstantial recruitments andfrom among the mainland Chinese.
Political Factors Affecting Notionalist Offensive Capabilities
Chinese Nationalist political sceneby the centralization ofin the handsew and of powerin the hands of one man. Thedlvide-and-rule and the practice ofunswerving loyalty to thethe prime requisite for individualare the means relied upon toof centralized control. Insphere, these same factors havein the overextension of the powerof the political police. In theof military incompetents, andin the general failure to delegate to
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commanders at all levels authorityto their assigned responsibilities.
The Nationalist Government has sought to sustain morale and give purpose to itsprograms by promising an early return to the mainland. Continued failure of these promises to materialize will almost certainly result in widespread disappointment andMoreover, many responsible Nationalist leaders recognize that successful large-scale offensive operations In thefuture are actually impossible without substantial outside assistance, direction, and participation.
Communist activity on Taiwan has been effectively suppressed and is not likelyto affect Nationalist military capabilities unless subversive actions were coordinatedommunist invasion ol Taiwan.
The Taiwanese generally resent theof the Nationalists. However, although frictions exist, antipathy has diminished and is not strong at present.
Economic Factors Affecting Nationalist Military Capabilities
does not haveilitary force of the size ofNationalist militaryannual production hasevels, but theTaiwan has Increasedercent since
NATIONALIST CAPABILITIES TO ENGAGE IN VARIOUS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Raids, Feints, ond Diversions against Hoi-nan and the Mainland
Nationalist Marine battalionoffshore guerrillas are now capablelimited raiding operationsmainland. The.Nationalist Navy doeshave the capability for supportingagainst Hainan. More extensiveoperations could be conductedforces If present deficiencies Infighter aircraft, shipboard antiaircraft
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and officer efficiency were
In addition to trie marine battalion and offshore guerrillas presentlyorce0 ground troops, consisting of one army headquarters and two divisions, istate of combat readiness.inimumonths of intensive large unit training, this force could be made available for offensive operations In Korea or Southeast Asia.onths of coordinated amphibious training were substituted for the above, and if sufficient training craft were available, this force could conduct effective amphibious raids. Nationalist naval and air deficiencies, however, would continue to limit the scale and effectiveness of these operations.
The Chinese Communists would probably be incapable of sealing off the entire China coast from effectively conducted Nationalist raids. Such raids would probably deter the Chinese Communists from diverting forelsewhere -any important part of theroops now deployed In the coastal area from Canton to Shanghai.
Naval Operations ogoinst the Mainland
Nationalist Navy Is consideredfor tht defense of Taiwan. If theto assume the responsibility (orTaiwan, the Nationalist Navy willof conducting small raids andthe leu fortified coastal pointsand Chekiang Provinces, If anaval blockade were Imposed onChina, the Nationalist Navy couldthe blockade by interceptingthe Taiwan Straits. In its presentreadiness, the Nationalist Navy canmatch any present Chineseforces.
Air Operations against the Mainland
total Nationalist air strength, ifin air attacks against the Chinesemight Initially inflictupon Communist installationsot communications. However,CNAF logistic and maintenancea relatively strong Chinese Communist
capability for counter-air operations.air attacks against the mainland would be seriously limited in effectiveness andThe CNAF has the capacity at present to transport,ingle airlift, more than twice the present Nationalist strengthartially trained paratroopers, although It does not have the capability of providing an effective fighter escort for such an airlift. Thc CNAF airlift capacity could also be used to transport personnel and supplies in support of guerrilla units on the mainland.
given sufficient materiel andthe CNAF. with its presentorganizational structure, couldone jet fighter-bomber group; aair capability,7et photo reconnaissancesurveillance of Communistairfields, and other strategicalong the China coast; and aair defense system withinterceptuch aprobably be accomplished within
Anti-Communist Guerrilla Operation*
the foreseeable future,lo conduct guerrillaprobably be limited to conductingraids from the offshore Islands,communication links withunits, and Infiltratingonto the mainland.
Employment of Troops in Korea orAsia
Nationalists could,eriodto four months, prepare thediscussed In paragraphbovein Korea or Southeast Asia.
'To Implement this program the Air Section. MAAO, Taiwan, recommends equipping the CNAFF Jetistonightet reconnaissance aircraft,MJet Interceptors, and electronicrequired for an effective air defense system, and providing training and Incidental materiel support to accompany such aircraft and
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Invasion of Mainlandhe Nationalists do not have theto undertake an invasion o( mainland China at the present time. Preparation oteorganized divisions on Taiwan and thefor offensive operations would depend on the timely receipt ol equipment and the arrival ot US advisory personnel. After the required logistic and advisory support had been received Irom the US, theseivisions could be made effective for offensive-These troops, except for0 men mentioned In paragraphbove, would require about twelve months training for each division. (These divisions would be of an average size0he timefor readying the totalivisions would depend on the availability of training facilities and on the necessity of maintaining some divisions In defensive positions onThis time estimate does not include the period required for amphibious training. Even after all of the above requirements had been met. Nationalist naval and airto support these forcesajoroperation would be inadequate.with US air, naval, and logistical support and US over-all direction, this force would be capable of undertaking major operations on theS commitment tothe security of Taiwan would be arequirement.
PROBABLE NATIONALIST REACTIONS PROGRAM OF PREPARING THEM FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THECOMMUNISTS
S program of preparing the Chinese Nationalists for offensive operations would boost the morale of the Nationalists and give meaning to their programs ot military and psychological conditioningeturn to the mainland. It would also encourage theleadership to InterpretS decisionommitment that US forces would participateuture Nationalistof the mainland. Feeling confident that the US could not back down once sothe Nationalist leadership might em-
bark cn independent operations regardless of US directives or the prospects of success.
the Nationalistalmost certainly prefer to useforces for an invasion of mainlandwould probably renew its offerorea if given anyto do so. The Nationalistsbe willing to participateNfor the defense of Southeastprior to the release of forces forSoutheast Asia, or forces for use Inthose previously offered, theGovernment would almost certainlyUS commitments.
PROBABLE INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO AN IDENTIFIABLE US PREPARATION OF THE CHINESE NATIONAUSTS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINESE
Reaction of Communist China and the USSR
The Communists probably believe that the US is already preparing the Nationalists for future offensive operations, and they maythat the US is preparing to support such operations with its own forces.
If It appeared that US assistance to the Nationalists were limited to training andPeiping and Moscow would probablythat the Chinese Communists could counter any foreseeable Nationalist If the Communists estimated that US air and naval forces would support ainvasion, they would probably Increase their defensive capabilities to the extent necessary to counter the increased Nationalist threat. If the Chinese Communists assessed that Taiwan was toase ofNationalist strength from which the mainland would one day be invaded, they might feel compelled to make extensiveIn existing coastal defense forces, at the expense of their military establishment elsewhere. Once committed to such amilitary posture, their calculations with respect to present and future military opera-
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would be affected by this threat to the security ol their coastal border.
any event. Peiping and Moscowcertainly react to Nationalistby intensifying the tempo andtheir present anti-US propaganda, bytoedge between the US andand byhard-soft"to intimidate potential supportersUS-Nationalist program and toworld of the Communists' peacefuladdition. Communist reactions wouldinclude accelerating preparations forof coastal China and seizing theNationalist islands. Finally, theundertake attacks on Taiwan.
Reactions of Non-Co mm unist Countries
Japan. Japan undoubtedly desires tothe combined Far Eastern power ofChina and the USSR. However, Japan is lor the time being almost wholly dependent on the US for its security, and moreover is fearful that any extension ofin the Far East would involve Japan directly. ReactionS-Nationalistwhich to the Japanese might seem to risk serious diversion of US strength from Japan's defense and an expansion ofIn the Far Eastthereforebe apprehensiveot unfavorable. In the event that Nationalist offensivewere undertaken when Koreanhad been substantially Increased, either on Communist or US initiative, this Japanese reaction might be appreciably modified,if the Communists suffered major losses. Japanese apprehensions wouldbe Increased, on the other hand, ifoffensive preparations were undertaken after an armistice had been reached in Korea.
Southeast Asia. The countries ofAsia would in general react unfavorably to an Identifiable US program of preparing the Nationalists for offensive operations. Reactions would be less adverse, particularly in the Philippines. Thailand, and theStates ot Indochina, to the prospect of any employment of Nationalist troops in
Korea or mainland China that mighttake pressure off Southeast Asia. In general, the countries of Southeast Asia would fear that the Chinese Communists would be provoked to attack them, or that there might be an expansion of hostilities in the Far East which might develop Intowar. In addition, widespread distaste for the Nationalist regimeenerally lew appraisal of Nationalist offensivewould contribute to the generally ad-verse reaction. These attitudes wouldbe intensified should Nationalist offensive preparations be undertaken under conditions eitherorean armisticeS-initiated expansion of the Korean war. If Nationalist offensive preparations followed substantially Increased Communist operations In Korea, reactions in Southeast Asia would be lessbut would remain generallyexcept perhaps in Thailand, theand the Associated States of Indochina.
Australia end New Zealand. Generalfor both the Nationalists and theircapabilities, the desire to avoid the risk of general war, and domestic politicalfrom vocal Labor oppositions wouldagainst support for an Identifiable US program o( preparing the Nationalists (or offensive operations.
South Asia. US-sponsored preparations of Nationalist China for offensive operations against the Chinese Communists would elicit adverse reactions throughout South Asia,In India. Such operations would be regarded by South Asians as bringing general war nearer and as definite evidence of US aggressiveness. These attitudes would beaffected by the course of events in Korea.
iVear East. There is general apathy throughout the Near East with respect to events In the Far East. These countries, largely neutralist, would probably Interpret an cbservable US program of preparingforces for offensive operations as an effort to expand the war in the Far East. This reaction would not be significantly modified by events In Korea. However. Turkey would probably ultimately supportrogram.
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estern Europe. The Western European countries would react adversely toS ptogram. This attitude would be prompted by the conviction that the decision would not only divert US resources to Asia but would be indicativeS intention to expand the conflict in the Far East. This unfavorable reaction would probably not seriouslyhowever, with the cooperation of the
Western European governments with thc US in European affairs. In the event ofmilitary operations in Korea initiated by the Communists, the Western European countries would probablySof building up the Nationalist lorces. However, the Western European governments would wish to be consulted concerning the eventual use of the Nationalist troops.
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