PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN THROUGH MID-1953 (SE 3

Created: 6/5/1952

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Tcr jrcnm; ASS1STANT diRECtor,ohe

SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PHOMBLE SOVTET COUHSES OP ACTION WITH RESPECT TO BERLTII THKOUCII

SE-30

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

This CorS-"KJSKKICK-

the Central intelligence Aoar.cy.

3

The Intelligence organizations of the3 of State, the Array, theAir Force, and tlie Joint SteXf participated with the Centralin the preparation of this estimate. All members of theCccnraittee concurred in thic estimatexcept the Intelligence, Department of State, whose dissenting opinion is

PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTIOS WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN THROUGH

THE PROBLEM

To cotimate probable Soviat courses of action with respect to Berlin, with particular referenco to the likelihood of ground blockade, during the periods; (a) prior to ratification by all signatory countri of tho contractual agreement with Woot Germany and thc agreementuropean Uefenae Community; (b) nubnequent to euch ratification.

BSTD4AT1

Tbe expulsion of the Western Powers from Berlinasic Soviet objective. The Kremlin regards tho Western position in BerlinroublcBcoe Western intelligence and political warfare base andubstantial lsrpedl&tent to the Soviet progrea for East Gereany. Moreover, toe Krcolic would regard thc expulsion of the West from Berlinajor blow to western prestige.

However, Soviet objective* toward Berlin itself are at the preaent tloo subordinate to the oore inportant Soviet objective of preventing or retarding Western, and particularly Woot German, rcanuonont and West German integration with the West.

Moreover, Soviet couraes of uctlou wllti regard to Berlin will be taken in the light of Soviet global policy and the Kremlin estimate of tho world power situation. The vlrulcuco with which Soviet propaganda io Booking to intensify Soviet Bloc opinion against the US is open to the interpret at ion that the Kremlin ls prepared to accept general war. While it would be unsafe to dloregord thio posoibility, we believe that ln thc pxirsuit of its objectives toward Berlin tohe Kremlin Is unlikely to adopt courses of action which it estimates wouldgrave risk of general wax.

Dlooenting viewo of the Special Aonltftant, Intelligence, Departnwnt of State, are appended hereto.

U. Wc believe the Kremlin probably now estimates that Soviet use of armed force toward Berlin would be met by force on the part of the US and the other Weatern occupying powers, abd that measures Bhort of force would be countered to the maximum of Weatern capabilities. Furthermore, the Kremlin probably estimates that at leaat the US would now be reoolved to resort to force if the western position in Berlin becaate or waB ebout to become untenable. However, we cannot estimate whether tbia probable present Kremlin view of Westernwill continue throughout the period of thia estimate.

believe the Kremlin estimates that interdiction ofbetween West Berlin and West Germany, even ifby maximum technical interferenceesternnot within tho period of this estimate make tbe WecternBerlin untenable. However, since Western capabilities forhove decreased, and Soviet copaMlitico for technicalan airlift have increooed, the Kremlin probably estimates that,

iflockade is prolonged, the Western position in Berlin would become untenable.

or not surfaceith West Berlin areand whether or not 3uch interdiction makes the positionWest in West Berlin untenable, will depend" in large part ondetermination of the US and ita allies to remainBerlin.

7 - Partly because of the uncertain effectc ofurface blockade und portlyf the Kremlin desire to ovoid un adverse reaction in Weet German opinion, the odds that the Kremlin will, beforeurface blockade are estimated to be less than even. However, the odds may shift, and very Guddealy,esult of events in Germany or elseuhere.

6. The USSH and/or Eaot German governmentill almost certainly apply increasing pressures on West Berlin. These pressures moy include attomptc to aeol off West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin, and harassing of traffic between West Germany aad West Berlin, possibly iaclxtding shutting off the access of the western occupying powers toerlin. To the ertent that the Krealin elects to increase the statureilitary forcce of the GDH, the severity of harassing acasurea and the use of GDB forces for such measures are likely to increase.

fter ratification of theuropean Defense Community (EIXT) agreements, the likelihood of oxtrcse harassing measures wouldsubstantially and progressively. Uc believe, however, that, both

boforo and after ratificatian, tbe Kremlin will carefully asaeee Western reaction to the various forma of pressure employed.

10. Soviet ground forces could overwhelm the Weotern forceo in Berlin, but such uao of Soviet ground forces would almost certainly lead to goneral war and io therefore unlikely- East Gorman forces may soon have tho capability to evict the Western gerrlBono from Berlin, but such uae of Beat German forces ia considered unlikely unless the Kremlin is prepared to assume grave risks of general war.

DISSENT OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Any analysis of current Soviet intentions toward Berlin must take Into account the Btrong indications that the USSR has now embarkedrogram of speeding up the complete satcllizution ofermany.rogran will inevitably involve isolation of East Germany from West Germanyampaign against the Western position in Berlin, probably including gradual Institution of measurce designed to eerioualy impede, if not cut off, surface and air traffic betweon West Germany and West Berlin. Special Estimateo the other hand, assumes that Soviet objectives toward Berlin continue "subordinate to the objective of preventing snd retarding Western, and particularly West German, rearmament and Wont German integration vith thcnd that in consequence the odda arc that the OSSR will noturface blockade partially because of concern over possible adverse reaction in Wevt German opinion

S. The apparent Soviet program of oatelliretioo of East Germany, of which new measures against West Berlin are an integral part, seems designed to insure that (a) Soviet control of Eoat Germany will bo more secure and (b) East Cermany willore effectivefor the achievement of Soviet objectives ic Germanyhole. Adoption of this pro^rn- would thereforeoviet estimate that frustration of Western plane ln Western Gcruony ia no longer possibleretended soft approach and that it now ic necessary to take measures ln East Cermany that will at least offset the western program in West Germany, and at the same timo develop seme other me ana than propaganda appeals and Indirect prooiiuros to effect ultimately thehicpnt of a, Soviet-controlled united Cermany.

3> It oppeera that this Soviet program for tbe eatellizatioc, of East Germany will encoorpass (a) establishmentalanced East German armed force under complete Soviet control; (b) the sealing off of the

Eastern'zone of Germany from'the Western zone; (c) alinrfnatian of Buch individual llhcrtioo an have been permitted to remain in East Connanj; (d) incrcuaing uoc of var-acoro activitiea with rcopect to Wost Germany, including border provocations, arrests of West Gorman nationals,-spy trials,e) changed In tha overt relationship between tho USSR end tbe GDR, possiblycparnte Soviet -East German poace treaty once West Germany hao ratified tha contractual agreementa; and (f)ecessary oupploment to all of thea campaign against the Wsotnrn position ln Wost Berlin.

Ii. On the basis of present indications tho campaign against tba vestorn por lt ion In Wost Berlin Is to ba prosecuted by the government of the 'German Democratic Republic with the USSR remaining ln thobut prepared to give the GDR Buch aupport as might ba required. The mouiMU'cn will probably be accompanied by GDB offora of arrangementa to West Berlin vheroby there would bo "Joint control" of tho affairs of the cityooperative solution of economic and trade problems,West Berlin voluntarily sovcrad ita connection with West Germany. Rejection of this offer, may be assumed, whereupon Wost Berlin will be definitively isolated from East Berlin and tbe Enstorn zone generally. Alsorobing but progreeclvo boole, restrictions will probably bo applied againat air and aurface traffic between Wont Berlin and Beat Germany. egree of flexibility will be retained in tho application- of these- restrictions, but after Went German ratification of tbe contractual agreements they will probably bo pushed more energetically. It appoaxa distinctly poaelblo that ultimately they will be extendedoint where surface traffic ls interdicted ond air traffic impeded through, among other things, technical Interference with planea using the corridors and armed attacks on planes straying froa tbc corridors.

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