SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
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In order lo expedite delivery, this estimate is beingpecial preliminary distribution. The final printed copy will include this text unchanged and four TARS and will be disseminated as soon as possible.
The intelligence organizations of Uie Departments of State. Uie Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated with the Central IntelllRence Agency in thc preparation of this estimate. All members of the Inielligence Advisoryconcurred In this estimate on
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THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain possible US courses ofand (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.
ESTIMATE
Expansion of the Korean WarN Embargo on Shipping and Exports to Communist.China
N embargo on shipping and exports to Communist China, if effective, could reduce Communist Chinese seaborne importsHowever, if exports were permits ted to Port Arthur and Dairen. and it exports from Hong Kong and Macao were notthc effect of the embargo would be largely nullilied. In addition, to avoid large loopholes, the embargo would have toestrictions on exports to non-cooperating nations of goods which might be transshlped to Communisthe cancellation of charters and the prohibition of the sale of merchant ships to Soviet Bloc and other non-cooperating countries;ovementsuch as refusal oi clearance,and other pressures appliedorld-wide basis.
* b. Although these controls,ffectivelywould be sufficient la intensify the existing serious economic strains inChina, their impact would be long ,tenn and would not. in themselves, force tlie ^Chinese Communists to end the Koreanr threaten the stability of the Chineseregime.
must be expected that thc Sovietwould not respect this embargosome other states would give onlycooperation. Thc payment ofCommunist China would stimulatethe embargo. While it is impossiblewith precision the importance ofthey would serve to diminisheffects of the embargo.
Communists could furtherthe effect of these measuresmore ot their ships in theeven though such dislocation ofshipping might impose seriousthe Soviet Bloc. The USSR wouldlo expand overland shipmentsChina.
a UN embargo on exportsto Communist China is unlikely,to reduce Communist Chinese
xpansion of lhe Korean War by Naval
Blockade of Communist China
a. Effective interdiction of Communistseaborne Imports wouldaval blockade (including an embargo) of allCommunisl seaports, including Portand Dairen. It would be essential to
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Uie use of Hong Kong and Macao fas transshipment points for trade with Com-ffconlst China.
b. Such Inteldiction would Intensify the [exiting serious economic strains ln Commu-Jnist China, but would not in itself force the ^Chinese Communists to end the Korean war Tor threaten thi' stability of thc Chineseinist regime.
S;"c. The Chinese Communists would be un-Sablo lo counter such interdiction effectively, Sbul would probably employ mine warfare -against the blockading ships and mightaircraft and
he USSR would endeavor to offset the ^economic effects of the embargo and blockadeexpanding overland shipments toist China The USSR would refuse toize the legality of the blockade. It wouldundertake to escort Soviet shipping Into Port Arthur and Dairen and mightto escort Soviet shipping Into other blockaded ports. It might resort to theert use of submarines and mines against bkekadUig ships. Enforcement of themight well create incidents which would heighten International tensions, but wethc Soviet reaction to such Incidents alone would not result tn the USSR Initiating general wnr.
imited Expansion of UN Airin Order to Protect UN Forces in Korea fiom the Consequences of the Growing Communist Air Threat
UN air attacks againstaircraft and air bases in ManchuriaImmediate vicinity of the Ynlu River could
seriously Impair thc Communist capability to extend Ihcir air superiority over larger areas In Korea and thus to threaten the position of UN forces in Korea by air attacks.
Chinese Communists would reactUicir aircraft and bringing tomaximum air defense capability.also attempt to increase their airagainst UN forces, installations, andthe Korean area.
USSR probably would not openlythr Sino-Soviet Treaty, but would prob-
ably react by committing additional Soviet forces lo thc air defense of Manchuria and North Korea despite the continuing risk of general war.
urther Expansion and Intensification of UN Military Operations in the Korean War a. Sustained and unrestricted UN airon Communist military targets inand North Korea, combined with large-scale UN ground operations in North Korea could seriously impair the Communistcapability to maintain their position in Korea.
c believe that thc Chinese Communists would react Initially by attempting toair action against UN forces,and ships in the Korean area.
USSR would probably reactby giving support short ofof its own ground forces and shortcommitment of Soviet air forces toover UN held territory, but includingof additional elements of itsforces to action in and overNorth Korea.
the Communists should find thatwere proving insufficient toto maintain themselves militarilythe USSR would probably intensifyThis aid might well include theof "volunteer" forces. It mightthc employment of Soviet forcesan extente facto local warthe US/UN and the USSR wouldthe Far East. At every stage, however,would probably endeavor tothe possibility ol ending the conflictnegotiation if the global InterestsUSSR would he served by disengagement.
xpansion of lhc Korean War byof Nationalist Military Forces The Cliiimv Nationalist Forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping andthese forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only
logistic support for an invasion butair aod naval support ax well. Even so. Chinese Nationalist ground forces could hardly be ready lor an invasionnd Chinese NaUonallst Forceshole are not likely to be ready instrengUiarge-scaleertain small units of lhc Chinese NaUonallst Army are already capable of effective employment In small-scale hit-and-run landing operations.esser amount of preparation the Chinese National' Ut Army could be employed effecUvely in Korea. Certain selected divisions could be made eflecUveelatively short Umc for rotational service on the Korean peninsula.
ol the Korean War of Non-Communist Guerrilla
Forces Already in China
Thc Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing lhe strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not nowignificantEven if guerrilla capabiliUes were developed, the guerrillas could be employedonly in conjunction wiUi oUier courses of action directed against Communist China
ol the Korean War byof Several Courses ofConsidered Above
a. An Intensification of UN operations in Korea and ;ui expansion of lhc war lo include bombardment of Manchuria and anof Communist China's seaborne imports, if successful, would probably have theeffects on Communlitie Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations inines ofanchuria would
beommunist China would be forced Into an increased dependence on the USSR for military supplies and other criUcalhinese-Communist capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia would be reduced substantially; and finally
n increase of Soviet commitments in thc Far East would reduce Soviet capabiliUes
elsewhere.
he USSR would almost certainlyits aid to Communist China in response to ihese US courses of acUon. This aid would probably include increasing commitment of Soviel air defense elements in Communist China and North Korea. If the Communists found that such measures were provingin countering the US effort, the USSR would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well Include Uie introduction of "volunteer" forces. II might even include thc employment of Soviet forces to such an extente facto war between the US/UN und lhe USSR would exist in the Far East. At every stage, however, Uie Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open Uie possibility of ending the conflict by political negoUation if tlie global interests of thc USSR would be served by disengagement.
c. It is recognized that precise lniormaUon on enemy intentions is rarely available and
that enemy counteraction under Uie various circumstances here considered cannot beiih complete accuracy. However, all aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we believe it unlikely that Uie USSR willchoose to precipitate global war be-eatMC of lhc implementation of the courses or action examined in this estimate.the possibility of war bycannot be discountederiod ot high international tension such as would
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