SECORm IrtFORKATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEfiCS
offtc. or Rc.oarfiJrUJ16IGfflCAL REVIEWELEASE AS SANITU
SHIPPING IN THE USSR2
Thia documentorking paper. Tho data and conclusions contained horoln do not nccoacarlly roprooent the final pooitlon of CRR and should bo regarded en proviclonal only and aubject to roviBion. Additional data or cosEcnt which aay ba available to tho user ia solicited. Thin report contains information available to CRR as
ho CHANGE IN II DEC
CLASS. CHANGESEXT RE VIEW Dtfti
A
nlPILIB [Mi
COffrjNTS
Suoaarj
I. Introduction
Historical
II. Vbluno of
World
III.
1- Basic
Facilities and
Condition, and Distribution of tho Merchant
0. Quantity and Quality of
of
o. Availability of Foreign Tonnago ,
Areas
Type of
Acquisitions ,
o. Increased Chartering
d. Seisure of Foreign Tonnage ln Soviet
a. Capture of Shipping through Occupation of Western
froa the.
of Traffic to Other
Maintenance and Repair
Efficiency of Operations
IV, Materlain and Kanpovor
Principal
Kanpovor
Efeplov&eat
V. Limitations, Intentions, and
Appendix A. Gaps in
Appendix B.
CIA/RR PR-n
p hi
iT"
SECLRITi INFORKATIOn
rfflCHAFT SHIPPDIO IE TCT nsqi
In contrast to tho position of the USSRorld power, the Soviet Merchant fleet ranks veil down tho list when oosrparad with tho merchant fleets of other nations and is of little significance in world-vide merchant chipping operation*. On tho other hand, despite the limitations which its modest size Imposes on its potential wartime capabilities, the Sovietfleet is of vital importance to the uSSR. Certain areas of the USSR depend upon merchant shipping for virtually all of their tranoport require-aontc. Tlie importance and vulnerability of Soviot morchant marine activities are further indicated by the fact that, should tho merchant float be damaged or iamobiliaed in time of war, little of the traffic normally carried by saa could be diverted to land routes. The over-all strategic limitations of Soviot merchant shipping will not be surmountedadical change in tba nonafigroasive morchant marino policy of tho USSR occurs.
Although tho Soviet morchant marino is under tho control of tho Minister of the Merchant Marine, the various shipping companies appear to ba allowed conoid arable independence in operation and to be subject only to political supervision and the over-ell rwqulremonto of the Five Tear Plans. The Soviot morchant fleet, employing0 persons,roan reg-ietered tonsfRT comprise OS Lend Leaso vessels. The float la widelyRT being ln tho Baltic and theRT in tha Black Sea,RT ln tho Far East. Tonnage consists mootly of cargo and combination ships, tankers representingRT of the total. The capabUiUea of the USSR for expanding the also of its merchant fleet either by domestic construction or by the purchase of vessels abroad ara considered to bo relatively minor. Present domesticof ocean-going merchant tonnage is estimated to be less0 CRT annually. Acquisition of foreign shipping through either direct purchase orcontracts has0 CRT annuallv from all sources.
The USSRumber of excellent porta on all its eeacoasts, with the exception of the Siberian coast lino. The Northern Sea Route, though limited by seasonal factore, is an important new area of operations for Soviet shipping,radual expansion of porta along the route cen be expected. Thefactor limiting tho capacity of Soviet porta ls that many of them arefor long periods of the year. In opite of the great strides whieh the USSR hae made in overcoming the physical limitations of weathor upon merchant shipping operations, ice and weather will Inevitablyajor problem.
jn routine operations be-
tween ite own porta and those off the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe. traffic between the DSSR and foreign ports is carried chiefly by foreignehlpa^oBestlc operations are conducted alaost exclusively" Eooerallj of raw raterlala and bulkg^"- Little or no reliable data srT
available on the volume of Soviet naritimo traffic, Eotimatoa of theporforoance vary botweonillion andillion annually,of the Fourth Five Year Plan
aVSSk total cargo lift of the fleet ia about
i 1jion long tons ,
Foreifn><pwned tonnage at present is, as in theajor factor In nesting the shipping nooda of the DSSR. While the USSR can charter lares aaouataofdry corgo tonnage, any great Increase in the present rate ofppoaition from the In thclS-nT of war however tho USSR probably wouldonsiderable aaount of ton-nago through seizure of shipping in occupied areas. Such ooizure might aore than doublo the preaont also of the Soviot float.
The standards of operation of the Soviet merchant mrlne.tonance, operating efficiency, and other aspects of merchantelow those of tbeituation aggrevat^rcoo-fUctlng Soviet direction and poor administration- Son* degree of lavement in the performance of the merchant fleet could be brought -bout by better main-
w^eeoma tTZ
little likelihood that the necessary aeaeurao will be initiated in peacetime.
ransport to tt. Soviot war effort might mako ouch measures Imperative.
aaterlal and asnpover roquiraaente of the Soviet ocean-going aercbant fleet appear to be substantial. Steel requlreaoate are estimated0
S Uvere estimated9 toetric tons annually.
chant ahipplng ln global strategiclies in tho support whioh it could give in time of war. In thoae terauT tho Soviot aerchant flootritical weaknosfl. Strong military forcoa cannot be tranaport ad across long stretches of open water and supported froa
G flj Jfj iX
bases without adequate shipping. The merchant fleet which the USSR now controls is only of moderate else and, therefore, is insufficient to permit Soriet participation in largo-ocale Intercontinentalajor weakneao which can be remedied only by the following i
construction, presently almost nonexistent!
of foreign tonnage, being carried out only
inor dogreej
In foreign yards, now proceeding at a
Tory slow ratej or d- Capture and defections, in the event of rapid Soviet advances ln Western Europe.
Merchant^ shipping is of basic importance to tha Soriet economy- Many areas of the USSR depend upon coastal snippingajor portion of their transport requirements, the areas along the northern See Route snd the Pacific const north of Vladivostok being particularly dependent upon coastal shipping. In addition, there ere other areas whero tho loss of shipping facilities would seriously affect the Soriet economy. For example, ln areas along tho Baltic coast and the Black Sea It la probable that present rail lines could not hand To even minimum requirements if water transport wore lost.
Despite its Importance to the economy of the USSR, the Soviet merchant fleet ia small In comparison with tho merchant fleeta of other world powero. The ocean-going merchant floot of the USSR,ross roglatored tons (CRT) of US-owned Lend LeasoRT, orercent of the world merchant fleet. 2/ The Soviot fleet, however, la eocupled primarily with domostlo and Soviet Bloc traffic and ls of virtually no importance In world-vide maritime transport operations, of which it handles much leesercent. Roliablo traffic data are not available, andnotes of0 too-kiloraoter performance of the Soviet ocean fleet range all the way froaillion ton-kilometers to aa much aaillion ton-kHoaetara. The flgaro ofcUanwtere ia believed to bp close to actual performance.
perations date from the earliest history of^fS^L inL,nofperations began ln scription, was foundedupon foreign bottoms, lalknmver, did not exist until after thethe follow^ de<^e, progress was rapid.
Mftfl
R^ai^aS^J BiUlon fflT of oceangoing ahlpe, and there vere Russian shipping agents la overoreign cities. $ Despite this
EFE^ t ncapabla of Booting tha demands made
"HJ*;- gr example,ercent of Buaelan export!he float waa largely lSlSl.il
when Rueeia entered World. but it conaiatod of ehcut aa much
IzS^ZfAiChlear title (aee
evelo"*Jcnterchant fleetottor cf
Siof f^change, the large re-quixemente for importe, and tho need to export. The Qoot, which had slmoct dieappearod during and after tho Revolution, van rapidly built up by the pur-chaao of foreign ohipaittle domestic conntruction. ThiTenabled the
pon foreign
maritimeshippingajor part of ita
msxitimo tranaport requirements. Expansion of tho morchant fleet oontinuod
the USSRRT of ocean ohlpplng.
J1and In5 the Soviet-ovned
ountlnE Lend Lease ahipsOC CRT. had doclinod1 CRT. Including US-ovned Tossala,e USSR had much Zrt dipping5 than Since tho end of World Var II, reparation aalTage operatlona, and acquisitlone from tho Satellite countries tare steadily built up tbe merchant fleet to Its present level.
. table illustrates the aire of the Soviet merchant fleet
by aelected yvero an reported by the US Maritime Administrationt
Siie of the Soviet Morchant
1/
j
000
a/
gj
fj
a/
n. LeoooRT.
tceaoi^fttjfla-
- ;- Althou^n scope, tho available information cm gorernmental organiaotion with respect to tha Soriet morchant fleet io quite reliable.
'v, fleet ia under the authority of the Ministry of the Merchant Marine, whoso Miniater le aaeiated by five deputies, ftl^ various Division, of the Ministry control and direct suchnd training. The txu-chan? merino itself is divided into three main fleets: the Nortta*sWn, the Southern!
rioperating
ccenpanies^ which appear to bo responsible for activities in specific geographic Tanker operations are cnder tho control of the Chief of tho Tanker
S6Se1SS eC'SlS "honker companies borate
!Tf: TackorB 10 Baltic and Northern areas
are under^ojbnjediateof the Chief of the Tanker Fleet, while tho Far East tanker fleet handles such shipping in that aroa.
wlthlnt Mrchant fleets apparently operate as do non-Soviet steamship companies includinr tho
tonance of traffic and tho collection of feres -nxfrrSghTclar^ Tnoin7ef
^ J" cii wtthlhe ubiquitous transport plan and the supervision of political cca-lssars who scrutlnlre all aspects of operations.
of control which the Soviet Navy ecrts over merchant ohippine
ut there ie evidence that the armed forced do hare considerable authority over operations ln certain areas auch as the Far East and the Far North. The Minister of Morchant Marino is currently an admiral and many naval officers hold high positions In the Minishere are indications, moreover, that merchant ships always ar/avaSe tonnagI0arlsr auxill*riG8 vhanever requiremente for additional naval
ii. Vftiwa* pf Tnfftn
Information on the volume of Soriet merchant shipping is reasonably adequate, except for the years ismodlately proceeding World War II.
- 7 Soviet morchant fleet carriedillion metric tonsand, contrary to the general impression,ubstantial partforeign trado. In that year, for examplo, half of all exports by contrast, wasercent.
at prvsesrs. i
aoureo, are believed to be accurate. 2/
S^f*ri**Jproportion of purely domestic trade before World War II than at present. The foregoing figures,oriet trade
porta an wee* areas, to the extent that9 each reeion of tJ USSR had increased oonelderably the number of ita Importanteduced many of the botUenecks ln freight morementa. In thbBlnck Sea for eammple, tbe derelopaent of petroleum and ore exports vaa rooponeible for the building and expanding of numerous parte sech as Potl, Batum, and Tuapse.
jr.
During World War II tbe operations of the Soviet merchant fleet vera confined largely to Lend Leaso traffic In the Atlantic and in the Far East and to local activity In the Baltic and White seas. Uoeuaber of tho major ports In the Black Sea vas lost for varying lengths of tlao, and traffic was routed through other amellar porta ln the area. The merchant marine vas used vary little In regular comaeroe, being pressed Into servloe to support-ailitary operations with such uses as supply snipe and armed raiders. Probably tbo moot laportent function of tho aeronaut fleet vas to carry Lend Lease traffic.
Little specific Information is available on tbe postwar volume of Soviet ocean-going traffic, and the scanty data which have been compiled are subject to wide error, possibly as much asercent or more. It baa been estimated that ocean freight perforaance amounted toillion toillion ton-kilometera/ The Soviet press has announced that the Plan? ^filledercent. Estimate, on tbe0 performance of tbe Soviet merchant fleet vary widelyover limit ofillion ton-kilometere and an upper limit ofillion ton-kilometers, It Is believed hoveyor, from an analysis of data on Soviot shipping, that the lover limit,illion ton-kilometers, is olooo to the actual performance.
HI. CapuMT^aj
1.
of Dmorouaaa not been reported for
soma time and detailed information ia not available oa aany port facilities, in-foraation in generally^accurate and adequate for broad evaluation.. eetba gape in intelligence materialerchant ahipping ia contained in Appendix A.
a. fart rafllUMM Art Tnmnmm*.
^
The USSRumber of good porta on all of Its aaa frontiers, vitb the major exception of the Siberian count. In tho vast on tbo Culf of Finland there is Leningrad, the leading port of the USSR, Thia port, serenely damaged during world War II by tbe long German siege from1 to earlyaa largely been repaired. Leningrad is the main terminus of Soviet Baltic Sea traffic andor half of all Soriet Imports. Tbe city and its surrounding area, moreover, produce almost one quartor of tbe Industrial output of the DSSR,hich makes traffic through this port of major Importance, Leningrad alao la the terminus of several of the small number of cargo and passenger liner services of the DSSR. Ships from Leningrad cell at London, Western European porta, and Scandinavian ports on fairly regular schedulee.
The port of Leningrad has boon supplemented, and to some degree supplanted, by tho acquisition and expansion of thc ports along the Baltic. Among these porta are sroostadt, Tallin,ays, and Kaliningrad. In addition to their importance aa porta for the Baltic traffic with Satellite areas, some of these, especially Kronetadt, aro of major Importance as naval bases.
In the Slack Sea and the Sea of Aaov thereumber of ports of major Importance to the Soviet union, the principal ones being Odessa, Novoronslsk, and Batuo. Odessaarge volume of general cargo for the southwestern area of the USSR, Novorossiokeading port for grain exports, and Betas Is the major oil port in the Black Sea. In addition to these ports, Poti is important for ore exports, among them manganese, while Tuapse exports oil. Mariupol, Kherson, and Kikolayov are grain porta. The Black Sea porta are In relatively good condition, all major war damage having boen repaired.
The Far Eastern ports were undamaged and have been considerably expandod ln recent years. Tbe major port in the Soviet Far Eaat at present ls Vladivostok, but lt la likely that the building of other porta such aa Sovetekaya Gavan, Petropavlook, Nakhodka, and hagaovo will gradually reducereeminence. Control of tho porta of Port Arthur and Da Iron, nominally In Chlneeo territory, will further augment the Soviet potential for handling its Far East maritime traffic. In the Far North the development of the Northern Saa Route hasajor goal of the USSRumber of years. Ports, notably Tlksl and Providoniya, have grown up, and the continued expansion of traffic along this route will make the porta of Murmansk, archangel, end Molotovsk even more Important than at present. umber of other porta that In tbe past havo been little more than anchorages along this route will become Important porta. If present plans are carried out.
Tbe principal factor limiting the capacity of Soviot porta la that many of thorn are icobound for long periods of the year. For example, Leningrad la Icebound for periods ranging fromoeeks each year. Other important ports In the northvest also are inactive during winter. Moat porta in the Far East are closed for long periods becauso of io*. Vladivostok la kept open only by tba constant nee of Icebreakers, while other porta such ea Potropavlosk,
Sovetokoyn Govan, and fffagaovo remain closed. The limitations caused by winter weather In the Far East hare been offset to some degree by theof Soviet control over the Chinese territorial porta of Dairen and Port Arthur, which are open all year. Black Sea ports are not greatly Impeded by lee conditions, and they too ore open tho year round, although Kherson and Hlkolayev must be kopt open by tbe use of icebreakers. Along tbe Northers Sea Route, ice obviously constitutes the overriding limitation on traffic. Despite all efforts, the navigation period still, is confinedf tbe year, end It is not likely that tho navigation soacon will bo greatly extended.
b.Sortition, flfri Pirtrlpption of the ]frrchsjw neat.
The statistical information available on tbo Soviet merchant fleet is believed to bo accurate to withinrercent. The nonstat lot leal Information le considered to havoary narrow margin of error, as the also, condition, and distribution of the ocean-going fleet is known with considerable accuracy.
The Soviet merchant fleetRT, ofRT eoaprlee US Lend Lease vessels to whioh the USSR does notlear title. Cargo ships and combination ships comprise the major portion of tho fleet, tankers accounting for onlyRT. Combination ships, which now form an important eegsent of the fleet, are especially Important because of their adaptability for use as troop transports. However, the fleet argely consists of old and slow vessels of small and medium also which are far below maritime standards generally accepted throughout tbo world for economic' operation and vhlch are too alow to oompete with foreign bottoms. percent of Soviet morchant vessels areRT, whileorcont areRT. Ex elusion of US-owned Lend Lease tonnago, moreover, would raise theons" percentage even higher. Ofhips in-on group,re Lend Lease ships. Lessercent of the Soviet tonnage la mode up of ships0 GRT. Aboutercent of tbo total tonnage. Including Land Lease ships. Is overears old, endorcont is overears old. If tbe US-ovnad tonnage is excluded, aboutercent of the tonnage is overeers old andercent overoars old. IC/ Sixty percent of tbe ships are Inknot category. ercent of the ships, amounting toercent of the tonnage, are capable of moro thannots. Of tho Lend Loose ships,re inknot group, and there In the group undernots.
The Soviet merchant fleet la distributed as follows: RT In tbe Baltic and Northern Sea RouteRT ln tho Black Sea,RT In tbe Far East. 2mV Concentration of Soviet shipping In the Far East bas been going on steadily for several years. In previous years the fleet was divided rather evenly between the three above-scationed areas, and tbe build-up of the For Eastern fleet appears to bave been brought about by fairly equal withdrawals from both tho Baltic and tbe Black seas, analysis of tbe fleet disposition reveals that most of tbe large ships are In tbe Far Bast and In the Blaok Sea. The majority.of large peoHengor snipe whioh might be used for troop movements are concentrated in tbo Far East.
Tha Soviet merchant fleet uses coal aa fuelreater degree than that of any other major power. Aboutercent of theercent of the total tonnage, depend upon coal for fuel. Thereignificant variation in tbe typos of fuel used by the various Soviet fleets. Coal is used byercent of the Northwestern fleets, while only AO percent of the Black Sea ships depend upon coal. In tbe Tor East,ercent of the fleet uses ooel. It appears that Instead of convertlag to oil or disposing of coal-burning ships, the DSSR, insofar aa possible, haa merely shifted ships to those areas where suitable types of fuel are available. x'-/
The Soviet merchant fleet operates primarily In Soviet end Satellite ports.engaged principally In routine trade operations. -Baltic Sea trade probably accounts for the major portion of all trade, with tbe Black Sea trade next ln importance. arge part of the Far East fleet ordinarily is engaged in supplying the requirements of the industrial coaplexoa north of Vladivostok.
Exports in Soviet ships generally consist of such raw materials as lusher, grain, and ores, while Imports largely are finished goods. The Soviet fleet, however, participates toinor degree ln DSSR trade with non-Bloc areas, for which tbe DSSR predominantly uses Satellite and foreign tonnage.
Although tbe preeent traffic level of tbe Soviet merchant fleet is not known, then probably is atheoretical capability of considerably Increasing perfermenaa without additions to tbe present fleet. Kany vessels do not operate at maximum efficiency, because ef such problems as poor cargo-handling and Inordinately long lay-ups for repairs. The capacity of tha fleet may be Increasing very slowly by small acquisitions of teenage abroad. These lncraaeotB, bcwever, do not much more than retard tbe Increasing obsolescence of tbe present fleet.
According to fairly reliable Information, maintenance of the Soviet merchant fleet Is poor, being lover than tbe standards of Western nations. Jj/ Consequently, the actual potential of tbo fleet is limited to well below its theoretical capacities. Proas reports and articles in technical publications constantly harp on the deficiencies of tbe various fleets and individual ships. Ships operating without major repairs or performing excellent feats of cargo handling are praised extravagantly. Indicating that tbe Soviet authorities are keenly aware of deficiencies and are Interested in improvement.
Actual observation of Soviet ships while ln foreign ports shows that conditions vary widely from one ship to another. While somo ships are obviously dirty and neglected, others are clean and well cared for. One reason for this variation, aside from tbe temperament snd attitude of .the Individual shipmaster. Is tho absence of repair and maintenance facilities in various parts of tbe DSSR. It appears that seme porta lack facilities for even routine repairs, so that ships in those areas are in poor condition, while
d. Efficiency af qc^ritlflaj
. sjjefficiency of the Soviet merchant fleetconflicting directions fro. varioustart, to psrforn by aoBini.tr.tor. who are fax.5uchgreatly it at the low level which permit. Under efficientof the Soviet merchant fleet could be greatly
ATallabUltV Of Fovlm Tftfrnaya
Data on tbe preaant availability of foreign tonnage to tbe DSSRgeneral in nature, but fairly accurate atatlatica probably could be
xn,re?ott yearb- foreign-flag tonnage haaajor factor in meeting the .hipping requirement, of the DSSR, Deapite tho efforts under the
2fl?a *2 wso USSR
foreign trade with non^cennjnlat areaa. JA/ The USSR uee. ite own and Satellite ehipe primarily for domeatic traffic, while foreign-flag ahlpe are used principally for trade between son *loc countries and the Soviet Bloc. Theysest of
tlmmted only very^oughlytwi^jrgin of mimfljni high a.aroant. Eatlmatea of foreign tonnage now under charter to tbe DSSR, for example, rangeTT^
i.ional policiea and the attitudes of private ahlpping lntereetatrteo toward the chartering of .hipping sthe USSR are the determining factors in the exeunt of auch tonnage made available.
estimatehe Soviet merchant fleet bavev This over-all figure la based
b. By Areas-
Soviet water tranaport capabilities for personnel and dry cargo
t#Slack Saa fleet next. Tanker
ast and in the Black Sea. The Baltic end
Arctic areas bave virtually no tanker capacity.
10
estates of Soviet capacity for oonatructlon of new msrcl
range00 CRT annually of ocean goingSST .therlef^udy made9 ofovietengaged ln construction andrr^p^ in the conclusion that even the0 CRT wee well above Soviet capabilities at that time. Actual capabilities at present are believed to be Insignificant for either replacements or additions to the fleet. Soviet capabilities for constructloo of new^serchant ships In wartime is not believed toactor of Importance, since, as at present, ship construction capabilities will be almost entirely devoted to naval oonatructlon.
b. Foreign AcaulaJUnp,,
mft^ . . Is not acquiring any significant amount of aerchant ship tonnage from foreign sources, probably not more0 CRT annually. The Satellites areumber of small craft for Soviet account, and plans have been made for tbe construction of ships ofRT each In Satelliteut such vessels are likely to stay
tV' will not alter thepotential significantly, with tho possible exception of somein tanker transport capabilities. For example. In January; Roster reported thathip,4 CRT vers underin Western ohipyordo for Soviet account. Some of those woreships of value to the fleet, but it is evident that on the averagetoo small to bo of any great importance. Poland la acquiringabr0ad' ^vever. includingtanker tonnesTlnd ithi. that some of these vessels eventually may be transferred to the In any case, they are likely to be operated under Soviet control. In obtaining ships from Veatem owners, outcry
the oast the reluctance of Western gorern-^
nafLStJ^.^ wlthsuch transactions,
fLtffSf^ At present tha high price
tomafiB
the eventar in which the USSR overran Western Europe end
H
'Tk' totact, the Sovietlnereased at least twentyfold, even excluding tbethe CKlllloo CRTcapacity
^oditioas the USSR can charter dry-cargomuch difficulty. If ltB efforts la thle regard esultlag rise la world prices night well act aa aSoviet charters. World tanker tonnage at present la rather tight, andST tonnage thraugf chlrterLg.
. cbarter oftankers, or their equivalent,
would double the preeent ocean-going tanker fleet.
,,Inof var, cost would be no object, and the USSR
theoretically night be able to acquire enough tonnage to double its present Mg*Mfc flee* jf tt javod quickly and bought or chartered tonnage from neutral countriea before the West could countereve.
d- fofaUro Of FomlCT Tonnage in Soriat Peyt,
In the eventudden outbreak ofonsiderable aaount of foreign tonnage probably would be found in Soviet porta. On the basis of evanable data estimates of Western shipping in Soviet porta at any given time could bo made to Indicate tbe tcmnage which might be seised.
CflrtBTt of Sblmlnr throve rVcm^tion of wet,
amount of shipping which tbs USSR would acquire by occupation
or western Europe cannot now be accurately estimated. Barring aof foreign shipping from Continental ports before SovietWestern Europe, however, the USSR vould almost certainly acquire aof tonnage. he basis of rough estimates, lt appears that thereocean-going shipping in Western European ports, ex-
cluding the UK,ny given time, arge part of this tonnage would escape ?z ut tho remainder probably would be sufficient to more than doublo the present Soviet merchant fleet,
f- IfrfPCtlODB from the Wast,
u fdefections from the merchant fleets of tbe west is difficult to estimate. Tbe risk of defection probably would be greatest
rzRT, or nearly three times the else of tbe Soviet fleet. Ccmmunlst members and
tr0ne,inttheindustry of thosesteps probably would be taken in tbe event of var, however, to! 1. efections to the USSR, and theae measures, if Evecof the combined French-
Kalian fleet, bowever, wouldubstantial addition to the Soviet
Plversion offrar-
ot possible at present to oat laat o, exceptost general way, tbe potential capabilities of tbe USSR to divert ocean freight traffic to
,uiiwt ocean iroivrn. Lrniiic t
other moans. The possibility that the DSSR could divert auch traffic froa
bp WOMta certain areas. Tbe rail ro ado night be utlllaedf the traffic that now novae by water along the coasts. Thle expe be necessary In tbo event of an affective blockade of Soviet port;
n im * Present, auch traffic goes north out of Satellite areas to Baltic Porta for trsnssMpaant to tbe DSSR. It la unlikely that existing rail Jifp^ of this trifle, which would havolJ be reroutecaseight blockade or -ir attack. In the BiacTsee,
trafflcl UM> are aquaily poor.
h T nT"UT^ore^venents
acroae the Black Sea to Odessa and other porta for ahipaent inland. Tbe rail linen in this area probably could not handle the bulk cargoes that would be thrown upon then by effective hostile action against ahlpping.
... 1 tho absenceail network capable of handling
bulk coaaoditios in large quantities over and above nonaal cosnitaentfl> would preclude any large-scale diversion of ocean-borne freight to overland rail lines.
h. iBProved ttU"tenan.ce and. Repair.
^Soaa degroa of laproveaent in ship maintenance and repair could be
brought about, but unless Soviet plannersigher priority to ocean transport than it apparently has at present, it is unlikely that there will besubstantial change ln the near future. In wartine, on tbe other band, and particularly if no general blockade were ln effect, water transport night be oo Important that tbe DSSR would be forced to Improve aaintenanoe and repair
thatmerchant ships probably would ooae under direct ailitaryin World War XI, and efficiency alght Increase
i- JflcroMcd Efficiency of Op^ratio'lr- .
Soviet concern with tho poor performance of tbo merchant fleet lo evident in press critloiem and also In official Soviot data, obtained from various aouroos. riority high enough to remedy thia situation apparently haa aot boon decreed, end, therefore, there is little prospect for improveaent. Indoubtful that efficiency In merchant marine operations^ would increase In time of war unless merchant shipping activities wore placed unaor naval CGBBaad.
Materials and KannOwor. Principal ^tprftaU
roquircoonU of tha Soriot morchant fleet ara
estimated to0 iwtric tons of finished steal, broken down aa follows ship0 tonaj ahip0 tons. W
The fuel oil requirements of the Soriet ocean-going merchantestimated9 atetric tone annually. detailed study of the composition of the fleet in
there haa been no significant change since thato which was applied by adjustment7 figure for oil consumption in the merchant fleet as reported in tho Soriet official publication Plnnoyornn I'i tYg gJwUMME). This estimate of tho fuelips, which constitutesercent of ell Soriet ocean-goingwas cheeked agslnot actual known consumption figures of certain Soriet merchant shine snd is bailored to be accurateigh degree.
2.
iodire^Oojitosoni.
Few data are arallehle upon whieh to base estimates of the manpower employed In other industries supplying the requirements of the Soriet merchant aarlno. Insofar as ship construction is concerned, lt la known from US axjOTicnce during World War II tbat fororkers ln the shipyardsore employed In producing the materials required in the shipyards.
On the basis of data given In tho Third Five Tear, total Gmployment in the Soviet merchant marine is estimated to be aboutigure believed to bo accurate withinrercent.
c Skill
v of reports by prisoners of war and other obnervera, it may be concluded that Soviet shipyard workers generally aro not highly okillod In ship construction or repair work. Fragmentary data contained In POW roporta and Soviet press and official statements indicate, aoroovor. that technical skills and Job aptitudes In tbe merchant marine areower eeUbar than In the Western merchant fleeta. The tables of organisation of Soriet ships are known to be comparable to those of Western ships with one lsnportont exception: tbey generally are overmanned in the lower ratings.
1. at long.
Ita modest slee, ita lneffiolency, aad the adverse weather eocdltlooa under which It operates are Important limitations of ths Soviet merchant floot. Possibly the principal single weakness in the coaposltion of the fleet is the shortage of tankers, which sharply limits the capability of tbe USSR to draw upon available sources of supply in world petroleum markets or to transport Its own oil production by sea to distant areas of consumption. The tanker shortage, however, is of importance mainly in peacetime because tbe Soviot ability to move oil in tankers during hostilities would be limited basically by lack of naval power to protect tankers on the shipping lanos. Throughout tho Soviet merchant fleet, operating efficiency Is substandard, largely because of the abnormal average age of the vessels, the low level of training, and Inadequate repair facilities. Weather limits Soviet maritime operations, mainly because of the severe ice problems encountered in Soviet northern waters but also because of bad fog conditions In various areas. In fact, the Soviot morchant fleet operatos under the worst weather conditions confronting tbe fleet of any world power. Divided Into segments separated in some cases by thousands of miles, tbe fleet alao suffers In peacetime from Inflexibility. This disadvantage would be more critical during hostilities, when the fleet probably would bo unable to transfer vessels between its isolated areas of operation, except in occasional instances.
It is difficult to explain why the Soviets haveerchant shipping policy which allows such limitations restricting Soviot freedom of action, particularly in terms of sny lerge-ecele global strategic oonaltwnts for merchant shipping requiring the transportation of largo armies across the It la true that tba failure of the USSR toajor rule Inide trade ls consonant with Its determination to conceal tha gaps ln Ita economic self'sufficiency program and to limit International contacts to those activities which are Indispensable to its eoonomlc existence or which directly further ita world political objectives. Furthermore, the USSR nay not desire at present to promote maritime trading, because international tensions subject Its cams ere lal relations to constant rebuffsarge part of the world. Another factor delaying expansion of tbe Soviet morchant fleet bee been the preoccupation of Soviet plasm are with other cess It* onto that take priority In requiremante for steel and shipyard capacity ever morchant shipping. The wide disparities ln priorities clearly indicate that large tonnages of merchant shipping will not oome off tbe ways ln the USSR until Soriet naval expansion has reached some undisclosed level of development.
These considorations do not explain, however, tho Soviet leek of aggrosslvanoas In purchasing vessels abroad or ln contracting for shipin foreign yards. It may be that tho USSR had not foreseen, at least until recently, intercontinental warfare and, accordingly, bad geared its economic and military development to the possibility of hostilities on the
EyriiBiaa land km onlj^If so, thia ie of great significance to the US, for it would mean that th. USSR hae admitted, to itself It least, that it cannot Invade and conquer tho US andtalemate is its maximum capability at thia time. In this case the Soviet, might view the merchant marineelatively Impotent weapon which would be quickly driven by enemy blockade
otothe shaky security of Soviet harbors and the Such an attltudo on the part of the Soviets would no doubt bo soawrwhat tempered by their hopeapid advance to tha Channel and the Bay of Biscay at tho outset of hoetilitios would result in extensive captures and defections of merchant vessels, thus securing sufficient ready tonnage to carry out whatever shipping activity tbe Soviet Navy end air roree could protect as well as acquiring shipbuilding capacity.
The over-all strategic limitations of Soviet merchant shipping will
t** Tbolresent rate of acquisition of new tonnage does little more than offset the advancing
cb^lesconceand in no case represents substantial progress toward buildingowerful merchant marine coaxeasurate with tbe stature of the USSRajor power.
Potentially, however, the USSR could mako rapid progress In merchant marino development. Shipyards now occupied with naval orders ere capable of turning out morchant vessels, and shipbuilding capacity oould be expended considerably from domestic resources. In addition. If the USSR were willing
onnage could be acquired. The USSR evidently is more interested in obtaining tanker tonnage abroad than dry cargo ships, and enough tonnage may be acquired through construction or purchaser abroad in theears to Iaprove petroleum lift capabilities considerably.
Il*^In overcoming present operational limitations within ths next few years la unlikely, principally because the soviot morchant fleet does not have the requisite economic priorities. Prospects -or improving the present inadequate repair facilities do not appear bright. The repair of merchant shipsigh degree of skill and much specialized oquipoent, frequently requiring more skill than Is necessary toew ship. The USSR appears to be greatly deficient in both the skills and the^ fo*TerT oubstantial repair and maintenance program essential to placing the present merchant fleet ln prime condition or for miantalnlng llflhsl level of operational efficiency In the event of war. Training facilities may be Improved and greatly expanded to furnish technically competent crews, but suoh progress will take time.
the USSR has made ln overcoming
the physical limitatlonaof weather upon merchant shipping operations, lee and weather will Inevitablyajor problem.
2. Intentions.
Aaong tbo various Soviot shipping dsanalopmants which might be indicators either of changes In shipping policy or of broader political and military policies and intontionc are tbe following:
unexplained departures of Soviet merchant
vessels from foreign porta;
absence of Soviet shipping traffic from
certain foreign areas; c- Steady build-up of the Soviet merchant fleet In the Far Eaet;
covert meetings at aea of Soviot merchant
vossola with Soviet naval craft, perhaps for fuel transfers;
of potential troop-carrying vessels;
of Soriet floating dry docks to tho
Far East;
8. Expansion and isnprovoment of port facilitloo.
Itoet of those activities have In tbe peat reflected purely economic factors. Some havo merely revealed Soviet administrative confusion. Theybe continually surveyed, however, because their recurrence in combination, orla more extreme form, might provido positive indicators of military develop-snnts.
The intentions of tho USSR with rospoct to its eerchant marine also would be frequently revealed by careful observation of Soviot chipping opera-tlone. For oxample, accurate knowledge of large-scale acquisitions of new tonnage, changes In the criteria for tho retirement of obsolete vessels,in given areas, modifications in the volume or pattern of Soviet shipping activities on routes to nonCoenunist porto, and alterations ln tbe chartering policies of the USSR oa both "out" and "In" charters usually would permit definite conclusions to bo drawn.
To translate suoh conclusions into useful estimates concerning broador courses of Soviet action will not always be possible, particularly with rospoct to the intentions of tho USSR in terns of localised or large-scale hostilltins. The Soviot merchant fleet at present le essentially an economic Instrument and, aa such, will probably expand scmewbat in keeping with the goneral economic doTolopment of tho USSR. It also will be subject to occasional sudden and
aro,thD BOrchant fleetB of any country, to satisfy unanticipated localised racnilrements or other purely economic demands. lopments of an innocuous nature and those carrying dangerous strategic implications mast, therefore, be carefully differentiated if they are to servo as indicators of Soviot intentions. Probably tho most Important Indicator of major Soviet novas wouldoviet shiftassive to enogevelopment which would have Isuportant, and possibly ominous,
of the USSR could be dielocated seriouslyeneral
Western refusal to construct, charter, or eell tonnage to thoUSSR or to^arT
Tne^ dlroct op direct Sorlet accounts
The US, In particular, could bring strong pressure on numerous other marltioo
a0tl0n- V tho WoEfc vo^ld mako theof Soviot foreign trode lapoasiblo on the present basis, because tbe Soviot Bloc now depends upon Western ships (in terns of numbers of vessels) forercent of all of ito maritime traffic with tbe rest of tbe world adoption ofolicy by the Vest might affect tbo USSR as follows:
the flow of strategic materials from
ovorsoas areas;
a realigimient of stockpiling operations
In tho Far East and possibly other areas;
O) Weaken economic ties with the Satellites by reducing the ability of the USSR to supply Intra-Bloc maritime transport aa requiredi
U) Complicate Soviet economicbytbe receipt of foreign exchango through exports;
equire withdrawals of snipping from that
portion of the fleet now engaged in domestic traffic. If any foreign trade of consequence were to be maintained. Thin would havo roper* cunoions on other domestic forms of
M .. ould cripple tbe maritime operation* of the USSR if offectlyo action to repossess tbe US-owned lend Lease chips now operated by the Soviot Union were possible. These ships account for slightly more thantonnage and actually represent an even larger ELfJ*! BflrUljBO ^aport potential, since they ore, on the wholo; bettor than the averago Soviet vessel. Ropoaoession, howovor, is dependent upon so many factors that it is unlikely.
- harasa and hamper Soviet shipping operations
sPeclany oU. at Woetorn-controlled bunker stations, by such teclmiques as slowdowns against Soviet ships ln Western ports,
Sship, thoroughly. While these latter tactics might be trivial in isolatedetermined campaign of
damaging offset upon
Woe torn surface and air attack against Soviot shipping vould roduos its opsratloaB on tho high seas to no no re than occasional novenents. With Western air supremacy, attacks could be node in strength against even tho relatively protected closed areas, such as the Baltic, Block, and Caspian seas. Economic warfare Bsasures, ouch as preclusive buying and chartering of vessels, would deny to tbe USSR materials useful ln shipbuilding, maintenance, and repair and would reduce the tonnago available to tho USSR for use in whatever areas it night at any tine still be able to protect. Various transport control Measures, moreover, such as the wartime navicert system, or an extension of it, -wold greatly reduce the volume of blockade-running by tbe Soviets,
esult of such Western military action and economic warfare, substantial Soviet trading with overs ens areas could be Interdicted, the USSR would be Incapable of mounting and supporting overseas operations requiring the use of large military contingents, andshipping operations In support of nearby military campaigns would be in constant danger of insupportablo losses. Thus Soviot transport capabilities eventually vould be United to the interior Eurasian linos of communication in the USSR.
e*aUod 0Dd accurate data oa Soviet morehant shipping
icioncyestimating actual S. capabilities fw both uar and peace. Data oa efficiency of racbant chipping
JSv^'Tirc^loc operations, arc poor ond conatititto a? important deficiency Tho laclc of intelliscaco on Soviet capabilities formerchant ships makes it difficult to ootSuto Soviot abilitv to n>
urcas. Lock of accurate knowledge*oa the extent to which non-Soviet shipping interests have chartered shipping to the USSRap In knowledge of Soviet peacetime transport capabilities groover, tho xack of detailed inforsmtion cn trials, and particular^ on
i0UBppraising demandn of tteupon the over-all economy. However, adequate information^nrai0of ths Soviet aerchant fleet, although
serious gaps exist in traffic
or tetzllot studies, although this subject is not of sufficient interest to warrant en exhaustive research project.
i. JtaniasiAca.
Although the broad organisational features of thobGfttloreliablo information on tho ^ agcacioc or tho extent of oontrol exerted ia tho Soviet of nPPWoatay ttarelnted data rescrdlog operations
ordination end analysis bof oro evaluation.
Considerable otatieticai data existtuiy of the voluno of irarchaefc shipping traffic before World War I, although before Worldhe ScvtS policy of secrecy on traffic statistics became stricter and data filed with the League of Nations are scanty.
Data.
a. Port rflcilitios and InstaUatlnpa.
Although there aro many detailed atudiea by theof the Army and tho Navy, the sourcea generally are somewhat out of date and therefore not necessarily accurate. Although deficiencies are remedied to some degree by reports from ship personnel calling at Soviot porta, the strict security regulations et those ports severely restrict the coverage of such reports. Detailed analysis of existing information on Soviot ports end facilities probably would.be of considerable value in raising to eceso degree tho over-all reliability of basic data,ajor collection effort would be required to improve present Information,
The capacities of Soviet porta have been studied In detail, and reliable estimates have been made. In addition to tho abilityort to load or discharge cargo, those studies also take into consideration tho clearance faculties, such as rail and road routes, and capacities. Available data aro believed to be rensoribly accurate, although some information ie old.
Total.
huch more information than is presently available would be required toetailed statement. Such data are available in ONI and aro believed to bo accurate to withinrercent,,
Bv
Estimates of capabilities by areas can bo mademall range of error, adequate Information being availablo in OKI- To arrive at an accurate figura at any time would require merely statistical treatment of the character 1st It of tho ships known with reasonable certainty to beiven area.
Pftoabattta.
Although there ls Uttle valuable information, this deficiency is not serious. Partial surveys havo been made by ONI and other agencies,
b. Egrofsp, Acgyripltloas,
Information Is fairly good on this important subject, although consineroble Information Is available to CIA and ONI, no definitive otudles are possible. etailed list of requirements has been issued for collection, and lt Is hoped that additional data will become available.
Information ls only fair. gfaWt of fttPign ToaDRge la Sarli tfflf
h*w Ma>- Ifdatallod dataMvrt'aT^QE on acresonts of rnrchant ships can bo appro-printsarious gap in information will ba substantial Sifted,
K- PlYaralon Of Traffin to Other Kenan.
otudlas aro known to hare boon modo. Tho potential capabilitioc
o"w'ttaatedtrafflC oapabUlUoo byvaUr both inland and coastal. WhUo scan data of reasonable"allable the over-ell date required for this ourvoy ore not believedIn sufficient detail. Any information whicho considerableSoTiet-publish^ reports. Even date
covertly secured would not bo
HJSi reliable, since It has been shown that such statistics often are
madn^^S * the best studies which could^might be as much asercent in error.
J auffielemt msaber of reports from scattered areas are available
1- IncroMed Efficionovs available,
2. fan coyer
e. Sinn pint.ritnrtifnn
No comrarehensive data or detailed studies are known to exist.
APPENDIX B
Melrin, Maritime Hlaturv of
Balaak, Vaayutln, Folgin, Bconoaric Gooranhv of tho US
Hoyd'p Roflrtor Pf gbiTOinflt Mgvfl'P StllPPtHP Erfer,.
Wleboll, Heirin,BmWJBB Qf
obove.
JbJd.
MltcheLl, Malrln, Maritime Hlotorv
Same as 1,
lb id.
CIA, National Intelligence Survey,p.IA Library
lfi- fili.
National Intelligence Survey,IA Library
lB. pii.
Of farchant Shipyards In tha Soviet Onion. Appendix to ORE Report,tate, OIR Report, Tulnar.hm^ of tho Saarit
H. CIA,R Weoalv IntoHlTirT FYiTMrttt,
Original document.
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