4*
I. Introduction
Importance
Historical
General Daecriptloo of Notuork and Facilities
Organisation
JJ. Volume of TraffIo
Motor
Passenger Motor Transport
m.
A*. Basic
1. Extent and Condition of the Road 5
2. Motor Vehicle Inventory
3* Quantity and Quality of Maintenance
Efficiency of
Seasonal Factore
Anlael-drevQ Transport
Capo
of Traffic to Other
Raw
Expansion of Motor Vehicle
A. Effect of Damage by Western
Pflgfl
IV. Mater lain and Manpower
V. Capabilities, Intactlone, and Fbaoible Coontarcetlooa
feasible Counteract
A22flndij&Q
Appendix A. Gaps ln Intelligence
Appendix B.
SECURITY INFORMATION
HJQBtfAY TRANSPORTsfP,
Highway transport ln tbo USSRupplementary economic oervice, the main function of which is tha abort-haul novas ant of freight. Inog thia function, Soriet highway transport haa ln recent yearsarger wnmwl tonnage than the railroads and <ni*nA waterways combined, although, because of the abort average length of haul, the annualperformance of highway transport has not yetercent of total Inland freight traffic In0 Plan, highway transport was scheduled to account4 billion ton-kilometers,ercent of the total, but5 billion ton-kiloe-eteru actually were carried.
Since the planned mloalon of highway transport haa never encompassedsot omenta, the Soviet road network has remained largely undeveloped outside urban areas. The network now includesillion kilometers of roads, of which onlyercent have foundations and onlyercent are hard-curf acod. Tho constructionmall number of paved crosa-country bighwaya waa undertakenarticularly in the European USSR, but military rather than economic considerations havo been paramount In theof these projects. The terrain, climate, and shortages of heavystone, road-binding material, and trained highway engineers all have retarded tho development of tba road network.
Estimates of tbe siae of the Soviet motor vehicle park vary widely* but it ia likely that there areillionillion motor vehicles in tbe USSR, aboutercent of which are trucks. Although tho availability of fuel bas notactor limiting motor transport operations, there bas been in crooning emphasis recently oa the production of vehicles equipped to bum nonllquid fuels. Tho extent to which animal-drawn vehicles are used intransport is unknown, but tbe quantity of traffic carried In this way, particularly In rural areas, must be substantial.
Motor vehicle- production facilities in tha USSR have expandod rapidly ln recent years. Tbs types of vahiclea produced since World War II are well adapted to tbe operating conditions prevalent in the USSR. Generallymaintenance and repair facilities, nbortagea of spare parts, andvehicle operating procedures, however, havo prevented utilisation of the motor vehicle parkevel equal to its potential capacity. military allocationsarge proportion of current production, thus affecting unfavorably both tho quantity and condition of vohlcloo available for civilian purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviet motor vehicle park ls believed to be adequate in terms of the traffic requirements placed upon lt. The extent and condition of the highway net and ths traditional dependonco of Soviet
chipporo on roll tranaport oro tho major faotoro hindering fuller development and mora widespread employment of motor tranoport.
I. Introdnctlon.
Tho ten "highway transport" aa used In thla report Includee motor end arJaml, urban and lnterurbnn, end freight end passenger tranaport. The roport deals primarily, boverer, with motor trancport.
The primary funotlon of highway tranoport In the USSR ie the abort-haul movement of freight between railroad stations, ports, airports, and induatrial Installations In eitlee end the haulage of farm supplies endproduce to and from outlying suburban areas. Except In the suburban areas of the major cities, there are few modem highways suitable for truckingactor which hae restricted tho development of long-dietanco motor tranaport. Oo the basis of total tonnage carried, Soviot highwayIn most years7 has handled acre freight than tbe railroads and inland watervayo combined. On the aore significant basis of tcm-kiloaxrtere, however, highway transport probably bas not accounted forercent of
total Inland freight, although under the Fourth Five Tear0 goal for highway transport4 billion ton-kilomctero annually,ercent of the total Inland freight traffic. 5 billion ton-kilo-motors, however, actually wore carried. Generally speaking, therefore,transport In tho USSRupplementary econonic service. J/
Footnote reference* In arable numerals refer to sourceo listed in Appendix B.
The expansion and iEprovement of highway transport never has had hign priority In Soviet planning nnd practice, although it is being given increasing emphasis. The facilities Inherited from Csariet Russia Includedewsections of good road, whioh had been built primarily for military operations. Ho large-scale construction of improved roads was undertaken. and subsequent construction, while inprovlng radial transport In the vicinitj of lnrgs towns, has contributed Little toward the development of an integrated nation-vide road system.otor vehicle product ion, nonexistent during theaara of the Soviet regime, received strong Impotus9 with theoontroot with the Ford Motor Ccnpany. 2 the Gor'kly Motor Vehicle Plant, built under the terms of thia contract, began productionar^ecale' mnd Soviet output Increased In that yearo more0 motor vehicles annually. Since then, production facilities have otoadlly expended, and output has increased tootorear.
Excopt In tho Ticlnity of tho major cities of tho European USSR,fev all-woathor highways suitable for motor tranoport, Moat Sovietof primltlre construction, and severe weather conditions cauoo deepfrost heaves which render many of the roado impassable for motormuch of the year. Tho accelerated motorization of tho Soviet Armyimproved, all-woather highway cormoc-
t J, tJ2tbou^rehabilitation and cowrtroctiom havo boendirectod toward the devalopmemt ofetwork, certain physical handicaps havo pre-
- cam oaro pre
vontod expansion of the reed system at tha planned rate. For example,of stone and binding material and tho Instability of tbo soil in many areas of the USSR make Initial road construction costly and constantand repair necessary, y The inventory of motor transport vehicles has boonexpending, but production of replacement parts and construction of motor vehicle repair and servicing facilities havo failed to keep pace.
4. OrpflnlEqtioB.
J. Conatruction, heavy repair, and maintenance of national hlghwayo aro directed by the Main Administration for Hlghwayo in tho Kinlstryof Interior Responsibility for highway construction probably was given to tho WD because that Ministryarge labor pool at Its disposal, and the USSR has been boavlly dependent on manual labor for road construction and aaintenance. The acute shortage of road-building equipment hao boon somewhat alleviated only recently. With tbe exception of those transport vehicle pools at tbe disposal of various Industrial and government organisations throughout tho USSR the operation of motor vehiclen engaged in transport is controlled mainly by the Ministries of Motor Transport of tho individual Republics, whichalso supervise construction and maintenance of highwoyo of Republic importance. Each Kin iotry directs motor tranoport operatloss, ouch ae urban passenger transport end niscellsneoua local trucking, within the boundaries of its own Republic. Highway tranoport statistics ere compiled by tho individual Republics, except for traffic carried in vehicles of the above-mentioned government organisations. The Central Statistical Office in Moscow maintains otatisties on all highway transport traffic.
n. Tfllarq or Trnfflr.
Tho limited material availoblo on Soviot motor freight traffic is bus-merised in tho following table covering tbe period of the first four Five Year Flansi
Soviet Motor Freight Traffic jj Sclectod Years90
10 (Plan;
Of Total Average length Inland Freight of Haul
(Billion Ton-
fcU TafTtrri*)
5
Percentage of Total Inland
frvipht Tmw
0.1
0.7
2.0
1.9
left.
1.2
N.A.
4.2
1 date ereranslation of1 Flan. The original coerce of the ton-tile meter figureso puhliehed Soviot amterlal, and in all likelihood the other figures ere oinilarly derived. The reliability of tho information le, therefore, coneidart to do relatively high.
The following estimator, on rotor freight turnover bave been computed on the baais of Soviet press and radio items giving truck traffic percentage In-ereanee, on tho easenptlan that the percentage Increases for transport as given ln the Soviet press are accurately reported. Theso ectiara too are considered to bo reasonably reliable.
Estimated Soviet Motor Freight
05
Although the trend In motor freight turnover indleatee atoned increase ln the employment of motor transport, tbe Increase haa aot been seffieient to produce any substantial change in the general pattern of Soviet
^nianfi frolght movements. Bo reliablo eetlaatce of tonnage originated and aTorage length of haul can be node for tben the baala of information currently available. However, several Soviot sourcon agree that betweenndercent of all freight transported (tonnage originated) la handled at one tine or another by motor transport. 5y Official Soviet policy regarding motor freight transport has been aimed at the continued development of short-haul truckingupplement to railroad transport and at increasing tho length of truck hauls. Inome freight rates were readjusted in order to encourage short-haul boy omenta by truck. Railroad freight rates for distances of fromilometers were "considerably" rained, while motor freight rates woxo correspondingly reduced. Inrucking rates in the RSFSR (Rueelan Soviot Federated Sociallathe major constituent Republic of the TJSSR, again were revised, with an additional reduction ofercent os movements for dint oncer, of less thanilometers and fromoercont on distances of more thanilometers. This measure indicates that some difficulty has been encountered in divertingilometer shipments from tho railroads to highwayvailable evidence reveals that betweenndercent of total truck freight is hauled distances of fromoilometers,ery small percentage going farther thanilometers.
2. Passenger Motor Transport.
Passenger motor transport in the 0SSR Is almost exclusively urban in character. Statistics for passenger traffic are evailable In terms ofincreases ovor come baao year or in terms of percentage relationships to planned lovels but have not yet been analysed la detail by CIA.
m. canflbuiUCT-
1- Extent, and Condition of frfo p
Considerable divergence of opinion exists regarding the extent of the Soviet road system. ussian-born German highway engineer, whohorough study of the Soviet road net during World War II, states that accurate statistics exist1 only. At tbat time, according to thia source, tbe over-all length of Soviot highwaysillion kilometers,ITHm kilometers of secondary roads and tracks, many of which were undefined country lanes without foundations of any kind. Of theillion kilonetero,0 kilometers were surfaced. 7/S news paper correspondent states that before World War II the highway networkDO kilometers, including city streets and unimproved dirt roads.be original source of this information ls not known. Tho British have reported that, according to Soviet statistics, there wereillion kilcaeters of road ln tbe USSRfilcmetero were surfaced.
The wide variation among thoao prewar figureu, whioh ere claimed to bo boned on Soviet statintice, ia difficult to underatand. Since there are numorouo deflnitiona of tho varioun types end cleoooo of roods In the USSR, however, it ie likely that the various estimates hove been made on substantially different bases. Therefore, any exaot breakdown of tbe total network by type should be accepted only with reservations. Tho figureillion kUometere reported by the German engineer as tbe prewar network appears te be the nest all-inclusive. S estimate prepared7 follows Jfl/i
Estimated Extent of tho Soviet Read System Solocted Tears70
Totalgj
iln
stone, asphalt, or concrete.
uly. 9ilometora were added toroad not through acquisitlon of tbo Baltic States and other territory.
The various Five Tear Plana have provided for road construction and repairarge scale, but the major emphasis has boon placed on dirt roads. Dimply constructed, of poor quality, snd generally of only local importance-Planned goalo arc shown in tho following table:
Planned Sorlot Road Construction and Isjproveaont
rUloffrttni
H^Jtodg
of
fora -Total,, sa&ass&s/ Reeds
im Jig;ggg
a. Stone, gravel, or water-bound surface, or ony aurfacoolid foundation.
ftifaflJ TiT
The Fourth Five Yoarpacified oimply that "the network of Improved roads ^presumably cur faced/ under Union and Republic Jurisdiction ohall bo Increased0 kilometers inear period: and the existing network of arterial roads shall be restored and comoletely The degree of accomplishment achieved with respect* to theso plans is not known. The total nilcego ef the Soviet road system probably haa not Increased since World War II or, for that natter, The over-ell condition of the roods probably bas improved slightly, and it is likely tbat most of the war damage has been repaired. It ia not believed, however, that surfaced roads yot represent core thanoaroent of the total network. Moat surfaced roads, ln any case, are within cities and toons.
m roMcls arcnVgrT-
As in tho case of the rood network, ootimates on the total else of Soviet motor vehicle park vary considerably. Ho reliable estimate can be made without on accurate kiiowlcdgo of Soviot vehicle production, ond thia information Is not available at present. Tho following table preoenta estimated inventorieo for selected years of the prewar
Estimated Prewar Soviet Motor Vehicle Inventory Selected Tears31
Year. Trucks fljxj guflyj Pacflanser Cars _Total
TOO
400
600
Other oourcos report total Soviet motor vehicle strength7ndariously0 trucksare)ehicles.
Estimates of tho also of the postwar Soviot motor vehicleto be particularly uncertain. There io no agreement among sourcesthe extent of aorvicoability within the inventory, sotlmatcs rangingtoercent, and little is known about rates of retirement or tbovehicles allocated exclusively to the military, Ono estimate haothat is, from1 toeptember
.
ho USSRend Lease vehicles from the US. ig/ Tho
following tablo in procanted ao Illustrative of the prevailing conTuoion on the also of tho poatwar motor vehicle inventoryl
Various Estimates of Postwar Soviet Motor Vehicle Inventory
13/
J
22/
OO g>
16/
y
J
a. Tbe Fourth Five loartated that tbo total lnvontory waa to be Increased to twice that of the prewar level.
The nost recent CIA estimate of the eize and composition of the Soviot motor vehicle perk for tboae made ln tbo fallTho estimate includos only serviceable civilian vehicles, and the Inventory is given for midyoart that is, the oversee number of vohicles operating throughout tho year. Although necessarily based upon ann estimated retirement rate, an estimated rorviceability factor, and an estimated annuel vehicle production, all of which are subject to varying degrees of error, this estlnate of tbe also and composition of tho Soviet motor vehicle perk novertholoas to bolioved to be the nost practical yet made. It Is euanarised an follows |
Estimated Kidyear Inventory of Serviceable Civil las Motor Vehicles ia the
2
end Bunco Paenoncer Cars
Total
Tho total nuaber of oarviocablo vehicles, both civilian and Military, is estimated as followsi
Estimated Midyear Inventory of Serviceable Civilian and Military Vehicles in tho
o A 2
and Buses Pascenger Cars
Total
Despite tbe variations among tbo several estimates, lt can be concluded that the total Soviet motor vehicle perk lo nowillionillion vehicles and that the large majority of these vehicles, probably at leastercent, are trucks. The park is believed to be adequate in terms of tho traffic reo^iiremonto placed upon It.
Two other developments should bo mentioned with regard to Soviet motor vohicles. In the firot pleco, although Soviet dependence on foreign dooSgn and technical advice has boon very great, new postwar models which started coming into produotlon89 show purely Sovietbased on wartimo experience and are charecterisedeneral additional rugcednosB not found in the US-built prototypes. Second, tho conversion of gasoline-powered vehicles to the use ofend compressed natural gas fuels haa been steadily increasing. Prisoner-of-war reports on Individual plants Indicate that current production of vehicles burning no nil quid fuels amy In same instances amount to as much asercent of total output.
a. Bonds.,
Examination of published material on Soriet roads Indicates that maintenance ard repair are constant problems. The rural population io required topacified number ofear to roadractice abandoned ac unsatisfactory in the OS In the peat prisoners of war also were extensively used for road work. Road-building machine stations (Haohino-doroabnayn atantslyaMBS),evidently similar in concept to thoBona machineatro being established ln increasing nun bora, although tbo number of rood-building machine stations now operating ie not known. Each Installation le allottod mechanised equipment and ia responsible for the maintenance and repair of roads in ita area, asof read-building equipment expande, road-building machine stations probably will increasingly replaeo requisitioned manual labor.
b- HrtW Vehicles.
Although tbo number of basic typea of vehicles produced in the USSR ia relatively limited In order to facilitate interchangeabllity of eompo nente and parte, etandardisatlon haa not been fully realised, largely because local modifications of tho basic types havo bo en numerous, and noprogram of oparo-perts production has been initiated. Kost oparo parte still aro produced by local repair shops as the need arlees. Ropeiraro inadequate, and the demands on thorn are increased by tho fact that vehicle life before capital repairs ere required has averaged consistently only00 kilometers. Major factors shortening tho life of vehicles are inferior quality of gasoline and lubricants, poor condition of tbe roads, and haphazard vehicle servicing Complaints ln the Soviet press concerning insufficient quantities of eparo parte ond ths Inadequate number of vehicle repair and servicing facilities ere numerous, Despito tho fact that these cocditions are known, their ovor-ell effect apparently haa not boon published in statistical fore, and estimates of the serviceability of the total vehicle park, therefore, continue to very es much aeercent. Most of these estimates are based on the assumption that serviceability has reaaised unchanged since before World Uar II.
a>. mXsf.toW.VLJZVuXXvne.
Itaaa dealing with tha inefficiency of Soviet motor transport aro published in the Soviet preasrequency which suggests that wasteful operating practices are so numerous as to prevent tha achievement of planned traffic goals, despite other press claims to tbe contrary. The following item, publishede of particular interest, since it concerns tho countryholei
->toro thanercent of all trencport expenses in /urban/ trade conoioto of oxpensoo for eutcrobile and noree-drawn transportation. Tho proportion of such expenses to trado turnover is ono and one-half tines that Increase in such transportation costo istho result of inefficient utilisation of vehicles: tho fact that too much time is spent waiting at the suppliers; and because hauling ia falsely registered as having been Trucks in tbo urban tradoro employed in tho transport of freight onlyoercent of their total working tine, host of the trucks sake only ono,axinuas of tvo tr*po per day instead of tho required throo or four. At the eeno tine onlyercent of the load capacity, scan tines even loss, is used. he total standing tine of truces exclusive of that spent In loading or unloading, is sovcml ticoc that cpent in
C^iaat0be ^eiency of Soviet trucking operations cannotVf"?statistics sSoZ to those filodln It 1thInterstate Coewreo emission. Indies of efficiency based tfar II1 booa ^hliohad byR since before World
sa^nf^-Eflstorji.
ntity of information, both Gorans and tSJ36C. JfGff0ct of tnoto on motorfactor governing
transport in tho USSR
ubstantial part of each Spring thavs and sunser rains
forTtt^or Nicies in entire regions
a Although ereu ianobilisos motor transport
duf^of toeairly effective techniqueteftho SoviateTa^ So
tho period when
vehicular mobility rcachos its maximum throughout ths OSSR.
e 3to be used exteaeivoly in
0fpresent Soviot ^ffT71 detail fro* Certain broad liaito only can bo
9.
Animal-drawn tranoport lo tho only radius to which Soviot motor vehicle tranoport night reasonably be diverted inundamental purpose of highway transport in tho USSR io to relieve tho raUroadaubstantial ahare of their short-haul traffic burden. Such dlvoroion is unlikely, however, because of tho relative elownoso of animal-drawn tranoport. The inland watorwaye, for the coat part, ore not eo located as to permit thoir uoo aa an alternative for* of transport.
According to published Soviotillion draft animals were available In the USSR at tho and There7 million horses, including those hold by the Soviet army, but not moreillion of this total are estimated to be used for draft purpooes. This estimate is baaed on projectionnown prewar ratio. The6 million draft animale reported are oxen. No figures are available on the number of ro indoor, camels, mules, aad donkeys, nor ia the USSR known to havo published statistics permitting an estimate to bo node of tho number of wagons and carts In the Soviet Union. On tbe basis of horcopower equivalents used in Soriet sources, lt may bo calculated thatillion draft eninals equalrucksorsexorse; average horsepower per truck. Tn addition, there are anractors with on averago power rating oforsepower each currently In use in agriculture. In an emergency, these tractors also oould bo used for transport purposes.
b. HECtiiifl.
In wartime, it io conceivable that Soviet military demandc for trucko might become so great that tho railroodo again would taknfor short-haul movomcnta. At the cane tine,utilisation of animal and water transport probably would be increased to tho naximua. It la strongly suspected that during World War II only tho receipt of US Lend Lease vehicles by the USSRomplete collapse of tho Soviet motor transport system,
2. Kcw Construction-
Road-construetion prolecto undertaken in the USSR during the period of tho Fourth Pivo Tear) were designed to provide tbo more ln-teaaivoly developed areas of tho country with high-capacity feeds equal to those of Western European standards and to extend and improve tbo local networks of secondary roads. Theao projecte wore concentrated in the European USSR, and several hundred thousand prioonoro of war were employed on the work during thoears of tbe period, Theao prioonoro of war worked almost oxclu-oivoly on roads of all-CSSR Importance. Increasing efforts to extend tbe use
of rh^^LS r* uoro nadB toward the end of tho period, whent^S! Strenuous efforts vera madTS
af^iiSbW=hbscov^eraetopel,n^uyoyahor, Kharkov-Rostov, and RoetcWh^hmi-Tbilisl. All ef' UwCO?otructlonnd moot of them* ^complete ork also una
be*t"cannot? ahoptaCeBechanical road-buildingIquirmont,esponsible forconatruction of auch element Claimed orerfulfilliBont of Plan goals in8 ond iq/.q t*viTr:
? f'ch-publictecd hydroelectric installations and canals, uhich^arantlv
construction resulted in large aeasurocarcity of rocd-bindin/-the European USSR the difficulties encountered in buildingfoundations on the unstable soil of the area,hortafe of^ tcchf5f^ qualified supervisoryby thorepatriatian of the Gernan prisoners of war Thesealao lowered the quality of the work completed, therebyfor auintonance sndincreasing
InfoTEatioa regarding current road oonotruction in tho Soviet
Far East ie sparse. Heports of Japanese prisoners of warkotchv* area. Somf of toesTrSortsanyilfT ffTconstruction program may bo to facilJtatTconstractinn materials. If thia is true, the reads may be abandoned as rail connections are extended.
3. Expansion of Motor Vahlele Pajft.
motnr wehian be mado with respect to expansion of thebecause figures on sotual postwar motor vehiclethe USSR are not available. Since the termination of tend Leasefexternal sources havo not beezT'
dSewU^rl:10 dependence upon foreign design ande7OT'attempts to import smallTdB vohiclM forend possible copying Probably will continue. The number of vehicles shipped clandestinely intotem Europe and the Far East is difficultuction in the Satellites is not yet sufficiently large to permit
oown that Soviet aMpmentl of voMcloe
to the Satellite countries, on the other hand, have been increasing
It la not possible to estlaate quantitatively the potential effect on Soviet motor transport capacity of war damage that would bein the event of Woo torn attack. Generally speaking, Soviot roads aro relatively invulnerable to attack, other than attack resulting in actual occupation.
zv. Hat-vTisjgrVrnwyor Bjffirirjaffl&a.
Tho following estimates, made inxe believed to bo the beat estimates available on Soviot requirements of materials and manpower for motor transport.
Princlpel Raw Katerials Required by Soviet Motor
Metric Tons
XHB
b/
cj
2
6
on the basisnit norm derivedSoviet requirements Repairincluded.
on en adjusted US experience factor;included.
consumption figures by typo of vehiclefrom Soviet oources exploited. Shiakln.wore applied to estimated inventory andfigures. Requirements for petroleuacalculated by using an adjusted US
Soviet requiromonto for new vehicles oan be estimated only if the retirement rate, current strength and serviceability of the park, and over-ell level of traffic are known, which ls not tbe cose. Roquirnmonta for repair parte aro believed to beut no specific estimate of parte ro<raircnonts can ba made without firmer knowledge of tho number, present mileage, and annual mileage increment of the vehicles eomprloing tho total Soviot inventory. Road oonotmctlon matoriele and equipmont
are in short supply Specific requirements for these items depend on thenstruction projects snd tho degree of importance attached by the USSR to mechanizing road construction, neither of which is
B0ns WGre employed in transportation0 ia the USSR of vhichillion were employed in forms of
transportation other than rail and water. Of the latterOO wore engineers and specialiste. Tho number engaged in Soviet highway tranoport aloneatter of conjecture, but one driver per vehicle would account forillion employees, with no allowance being made mL^^JT* r8ecbanice, ccrvicemcn, and dispatchers. These and^Si^thby the Soviet press n nforaatlon ousgestohortage of profeasionally trained highway construction englnaors and vehicle designers
Ztf8 *th0 DSSP" butal ertont of that
shortage and its precise affect aro unknown.
V-
1. Capabilities.
Information available to indicate ln specificTSfc^toArariporTiT
0ho ^SSR, It is difficult,
"r'^ "timato the capability of Soviet motor transport to supportaction. connection with Soviet military planning, tho fact that the highway network of much of Europe is relatively wstt-deve^ped may influonce the USSR to maka more extensive plans concerning the fuW
of Itn^wTfJ arkjustified on the basin
of ito own undeveloped road system,
?onePS,JorBOL" io known that the Soviet Onion hasillion toillion serviceable trucks, which could, under pros eure, carry
00lUIoncaT^ ledli^edroducingear, and the supply of fuel probably is sufficient to permit nosr-capacity opera-
? netu^k
cu-tninod year-round motor transport operations between most oltlesof tbo USSR stillhysical inpoasibility, postwartha. motor tranoport has improved remarkably OUtrf aPPa?ontly bavo bean surpassed, Tho^JJ^7capability, ho^er, willupon the priority which Soviot planners assign to furthermotor vehicle
2,
Indicationa that tho USSR intends to develop
high-ay transport ao an independent form of transportation. Postwar trends
suggest that motor tranoport ia to ronain an auxiliary service, supplementing water ana rail transport through the carriage of chort-houl traffic.
Broader Soviet policies outside the transportation field are not likoly to be revealed in the ecanty information on civilian highway tranoport developments which is now available. Changes in tho allocation of vehicles to the orflod forces and in military requirements for vehicles, if known exactly, might indicate broader Soviet intentions, ao would the stockpiling of vehicles, fuel, end portable bridging equipment or tho sudden removal of substantial quantities of those items from storage. Widespreadof civilian vehicles llkewiso would be an indicator. Conversely, the known absence of any of theao developments mightack of iamedlate Intent to coamence hostilities and wouldheck on other evidence.
3. Poaelble
The most obvious peacetime measure which can bo taken by the West to limit tho capability of Soviot motor transport is the rigid enforcement of comprehensive export controls and the sealing-offll non-Bloc sources of motor tranoport equipment. Although the effectiveness of this measure would not be as far-reaching today as it would have been several years ago, Soviot deponen foreign design and technical developments probably is still groat, and delivery of anyr parts to tho Bloc vould increase Soviet capabilities both directly and Indirectly, Possible effects of Western action in wartime are sharply limited. As previously indicated-the Soviot motor tranoport ayBtcm probably would prove toelatively unrewaralng ot rat ogle target. Tactical operations against Soviot xotor transport, however, might be considerably Here effective, particularly Inwith attacka on other Soviet transport media.
CAPS IK IHTELLIGEHCS
Conaldorablo netoriel on tho oubjoot of Soviet highway transport is available within CIA. Prowar data, relatively ccnploto and reliable, con-slat either of actual Soviet statistics or of estimates based directly oo such figures. Postwar data, however, consist almost exclusively of estimates, often baood on assuaptiono of quostlonsblo validity, to which lt usually has been necessary toakeshift uethodology, employing DS experience factors or anbiguous Soviet percentages. Both the volume and value of highway transport intelligence have declined steadily andand specific current Information ie now almost entirely lacking.
Tho available material lo sufficient to permit some general conclusions as to the relative importance of Soviot highway transport and somoregarding ouch items of major Importance as thb road net, the rotor vehicle inventory, and motor transport traffic. It is net, however, sufficiently detailed or precise to permit the development of any firm knowledge of Soviet capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities with res poet to highway transport.
Tho major cause of this leek of data on Soviot highway tranoport Is, of coerce, the fact that actual statistics have not been published by tbe OSSR since before World War II, and tbe Intelligence collecting agencies have not succeeded In obtaining them by other moans. Elimination of the gaps In Intelligence does not require on increasing flow of Information butimited quantity of material of markedly Improved quality. It is posslbloompleto snd careful statistical analysis of notorial now on hand mightefinement of somo of the present estimates. Such on exhaustive study, which would draw mainly on Information supplied by former prisoners of war, bas not been undertaken, becauso tbe volume of material is oo largo, and sufficient time to analyse lt conclusively is lacking.
APPEKDIX D
SOPRCKS
-
proBS translations: Strategic. IntelllponnaChap, III, Jan
gfrttttlflflffiPlgmtn Chap. VIII,
CIA, ' *
RE,
1 SOP ',-'.
v;arlu&iaD Science Monitor, article by Paul
"
Intofrlgenco Pjgent. Chap. Ill,
pncn_Digest, Chap. Ill,SS3
12. Information from Dept. of Steto, Offico of Foreign Liquidation, Foreign Economic Section.
Strategic Intalllcence^DlgRflt. Chap. Ill,,
.
Dept. of Commerce, Eurcau of Public. "'ear. ;j,
MIS Intelligence Research3
25.
26,
unidentified other thanE,
Dopt. of Stato, OIR
Midyear estimate, ID, Military Implications of the Soviet Auto-BOtlyq
E, Status of OSSR
Report).
E, midyear estimate.
1.
CIAriginal. Royal Notherlando Arny,
0
Russian Research Center at. ShJmkin, Thct'n behind thc Iron Curtain.
CIA,4
CIA, FDB,ha Germn Arwv agolnBt Weather. Terrain, and Partisanfi: FDB,. Marzhotokl, MeCDaniaod-Trapa-portotlon in tbeept. Far East
study,jbsria1 1
tori
Dept. of Defenae, For East Command, terrain otudy. South Central
Ruse inn Research Center at. Shimkin, That'a behind tho^Iron Curtain.
Ibid.
Original document.
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