NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE FUTURE ORIENTATION OF JAPAN
NIE-52
The Ujtelligenee organisations or the Departments of Slate the Array, the Nary, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff partlclpated with the Oantral Intelligence Agency in the preparation ol this estimate. All members of theAdvisory Committee concurred In this estimate on
THE PROBABLE FUTURE ORIENTATION OF JAPAN
THE PROBLEM
mal-which areh to aaaeas in the light ol these factors
robable future orientation in the East-West conflict.
CONCLUSIONS
We believe that Japan will seek to achieve its national objectivesro-Western orlc-AUon, at least during the next two or three years.
believe that the essentialof Japanese society, theposition of ccdiservativeparties and groups, and theof major leftist forces, makeof conservative controlalmost certain, at leastIf, however, the Liberallose its present majoritywithin the conservativesthe Japanese Government.
believe that the basicof Japan will be to rebuildstrength and to enhance itsin the Far East. Because ofand military deficiencies, andJapanese conservatives share aidentity of interest with the USCommunist expansion,toward the realisation of thesewill almostrequirewith the US, at leastnext two or three years. Evenperiod, however, Japan is likelyto develop at least economicwith Communist China and the USSR
The degree of Japanese cooperation with the US, in both the short and lone term, will depend largely on the extent to which the Western alignment not only meets Japan's needs for security and foreign trade opportunities but alsolu expectations for economic and military assistance and for treatmentovereign equal. Adverse developments in any of these respects wouldexisting pressures for independent courses of action in Asia and make Japan mor* vulnerable to Communist tactics of conciliation and threat.
As the most probable long-termwe believe that as Japan grows in strength and bargaining power, it will seek to increase its freedom of action in Asia within the frameworkenerally pro-Western orientation Japan will probably attempt to readjust its relationf with the US, seeking to eUminate the basing of US troops in Japan and seeking to attain Increased influence andIn Asian affairs of Joint US-Japanese concern. Japan will inevitably attempt to expand economic andela-
lions with Communist China, andwith the USSR, to the extent possible without jeopardizing its domesticand will seek at the same time toasic alteration ln its pro-Western foreign policy,
f, however. Japan is unable to solve its economic problems, it will bevulnerable to economic andpressures from the Soviet Bloc and will be tempted to seize opportunities for closer economic and political relations with the Bloc. Even In thisonservative government would seek to avoid courses of action that would be likely to lead to Japan's absorption into the Bloc. Serious Internal pressure in Japan would be more likely to result, at least initially,rend towardauthoritarian measures rather than ln the risero-Communist regime.
DISCUSSION
AFFECTING JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICIES 1
Geographic Positionapan's positionmall island country close to the Asian mainland has made Japan susceptible to political and cultural Influences from the mainland. In modern times theol strong maritime powers In the western Pacific and the activiues of strong powers on the northeast Asian mainlandthe concern of the Japanese over their national security. The postwar Increase in the power of Communist China and the USSR has exposed Japan to Communist Influence and pressures, and concern for Japan'shas received new emphasis. On the other hand, the Japanese have been and areof the strategic importance of theirposition astride the approaches to Korea, North China, and Siberia.
Economic Factors
apan's foreign policies In the post-treaty period will be strongly Influenced by economic pressures. As in the past, there willritical need for imported food and rawto support Its expanding population and Industrial production and to provide for the development and support of armed forces.
' The historical backsround for this section Is presented ln Appendix A
0 population ofilliontoillion1 and. according to present tiUmstes. will reachillion5illion5 Domestic food production, which cannot be increasedprovides onlyercent of current consumption:esult of thegrowth, Japan will produce less thanercent of Its food at present per capitalevels. If present strong social and political pressures for increased levels a. per capita food consumption are to be satisfied, even larger food imports will be required. (See Appendix B)
1 Japanese industry in most Iieldsevels of production by an average ofercent Japan's present production level Is estimated to be aboutercent of capacity. (Seehe achievement of the levels ofxpanding production toercent ot existing plant capacitywould make possible the attainmenttandard of living at least comparable to the prewar period (present living standards arc estimated to beof prewar levels) while supporting moderateand capital Investment programs The Japanese also have the technological andcapacity to improve and add to their existing Industrial plant. Manpower would b. adequate to meet the requirements ol anIndustrial activity, and further ratlon-
n the use of Industrial labor would Increase both the pool of available manpower and the efficiency of Industry. However,industrial production depends onimporu of most basic rawarticularly coking coal, iron ore, raw cotton, and crude petroleum (See
he restoration of Japanese levels ofto prewar levels3 and the support of moderate rearmarrvent and capita! Investment programs wouldevel of imports in the order or thoae presented below:
Jarsarseac troporta Net import* Projectedpert
'i.i. of uttnc
Mie sot
l.Tfi
1AO0
u.oco
Rice (brown race
O
in
SS10
it m
equlvakni) Wheat Sugar
Haw Cotton Coal
Partially eattmatcd.
apan's ability lo obtain imports of this order will depend in part on production levels la source areas and In part on the extent to which political considerations permit Japan access to these sources. The roost Important factor, howvver, will be the extent to which Japan bt able to earn sufficient foreignfrom exports and other sources to pay for required imports.
ver the next two years at least, with large US procurement and military expendl-turea in Japan, Japan's prospect* arefor obtaining the necessary foreignJapan's commercial exports havedoubled In value each yearurrent trends Indicate that thesewill continue to expand, though at arate (See Appendix E> The rapidof the Japanese overseas merchant marine wll!ubstanUal favorableon the foreign payment* balance. It is eatlrnated that3 Japanese commercial exports and net earnings from shipping will
Iron Or*troieun; COCO barrels) bring Inillion US dollars worth of foreign exchange outrialillion needed to pay for imports- expenditures in Japan by Allied Forces and US and UNagencies, plus relatively smallfrom tourists and foreign businesswill contribute-UUon. largely in US dollars. This will cover thedeficit on trade and shipping account and leave Japanet favorable balance ofmall pari of which wouldet increase In Japanese holdings of US dollars. (See
Japan's rapid postwar ecoriomic recovery and satisfactory short-run ecoriomic outlook, however, ar* based on abnormally high dollar earnings incident to th* occupation, thewar, and present US aecurltyWhen the level of such earnings falls. Japan's continued economic viability willonarket for still largerand on getting more Imports from non-dollar sources. Considerable progress in this direction ha* been made. Onlyercent of Japan's import* came from tha US1 as compared withon-Communist Asia providedercent of Japanese Import*
The Japanese postwar economic recovery has taken place without significant trade with the Communist Bloc Largelyesult of Japanese investment and emigration.trade with mainland China (Including Manchuria) wasigh level during the prewar and war yean.ainland China (including Manchuria) supplied aboutercent of Japan's total imports, and took aboutercent of Japan's total exports. Mainland China supplied more than half of Japan's total coal Imports,uarter of Iron ore imports, and three-quarters of Itsimports by quantity. Japanese trade wiih the Soviet Union and lis East European Satellites has never been ImportantSouth Sakh.art of the USSRas an important supplier of coal and wood pulp to Japan
IB. Thereendency among thu Japanese to overestimate the benefit that Japan under ent circumstances would derive from
trade with the Communist Bloc Mainland China can provide little or none ol such vital Japanese imports as sugar, rice, raw cotton, crude petroleum, bauxite, rnanganeso. and copper. Moreover, since the Japanese have lost their investment position in the area and political considerations now exert aninfluence on this trade, Communist China is not likely, at least for some years, to provide Japan with either markets or raw materialscale comparable to that of the prewar period.
ccess to Communist China's markets and cheaper raw materials (particularly coal and Iran ore) and access to coal and fishing grounds in the Soviet Far East wouldimprove the competitive position of Japanese exports, ease Japan's balance of pay-meets problems, and might improve prospects for expanded industrial activity. But such trade is not essential to Japan's continued economic growth so long as'Japan canto develop large-scale trade with dollar and stciling areas, and particularly with Southeast Asia.
hereumber of serious obstaclesurther significant expansion of Japan's trade with non-Communist Asia such as the political Instability of the area, theof sterling, and the'ruilM capacity of the area to produce the tuou.-rs -Japan requires eriod of trot, 'hew -liifh.ilties can be overcome, particularly IT economic development programs In tieconcerned are undertakenarge scale. But over the next few years,igrilficant expansion of Japan's trade with rson-Corrimunlst Asia are not bright.
herefore, the Japanese Government will be subjected to strong internal pressures toeconomic relations with the Communist Bloc, particularly trade with communist China. Cerious popular resentment is likely to develop in Japan if. following an armistice in Korea and In the absence of otherattacks, Japan's Western orientation should preclude efforts to develop economic relations with the Communist Bloc.would be particularly strong if Japan, in response to US pressures, severely limited trade with Communist China and then found that individual Western Powers adopted less restrictive policies with regard to their own trade with thu area, ln addition, any of the following possible developments would greatly Increase the pressure upon the Japanese to trade with the Communist Bloc:
acquisition ofwhich Is assuming Increasingto Japaneplacement for Chinaexternal trade
general economic depressionthe expansion of Japanese experts toworld.
return to the restrictiven the part ofnotably the US andoffset these pressures, the Japanesewill almost certainly seekaid so that economic expansion can bewithout becoming dependent onChinaignificant portion offoreUrn trade.
Current Trends in the Distribution of Political Power
ac*,rround. Prioray, political -onlrol in Japan was concentrated In three major groupsthe mlMary. the clvlban bureaucracy, and the financial and industrial interests The role of parliament, political parties, and organised labor was generally slight, and the real struggle for power took place within and among the three major power groups The military occupied aof particular strength because of Itsprestige and its direct access to the Emperor, the titular source of ell authority, and focus of national loyalty.
cctipcffdn Policies. The occupationIn compliance with the initial US post-surrender directive, attempted tothe foundation for responsible,government and to broaden the base of political power and diffuse its exercise.changes initiated to thishe granting of universal, adult
suffrage and the provision ol conatitaUonal guarantees of bene rights of political activity andhe estaNUuimentarliamentary system insuring cabinetto thehe reduction of the Emperor's legal position to that ofof the State and of unity of thehe encouragement of localparticularly with regard to localthe police power, education, andOther measures, such as the barring of wartime leaden from public office, theof popularly supported political parties, the fostering of trade unionism, tht land reform program, and the program to break up the great, family-controlled financial monopoliesimed to develop new leadership and Interest groups and to broaden riopiiiar participation in Japan's political lift.
resent and Probable Future Politicalof Major Japanese Institutions and Groups
c TA*eep and abidingfor the Emperor institution as the symbol of stability in national life and of an ordered social structure continues to exist. In the past, the makers of modern Jap-in relied upon the prestige of the Emperor instituUon Intheir programs. Proposals to eliminate Ihc Imperial institution, advanced byCommunists and some Japanesehave met with little or oo popular support. In the short run. it is unlikely that any change in the ep.vtirutionally powerless position of the Emperor will be effected. If the presUge of the Imperial InstituUon grows, however, the Importance of the throneymbol of national unity and moral authority nay again enable special internt groups to use the institution In their efforts to attain power.
b. Tht Military One of the mostpostwar changes in domestic politicalhas been the destruction of the political power of the military. The military group was forced into the background, both by the stigma of defeat and by the terms of the occupation. Under the new Japanese consU-tutlon the military was deprived of Its former power toabinet or blockabinet The present political leadership, moreover, appears determined to maintain Bob control over the military.the rearmament of Japan, together with actual or threatened hostilities in the Far East, would grrdually enhance the powerof the military class, this group will probably not attain iu former supremacyposiibly under conditions of prolonged domestic or international stress.
Bureaucracy. The power ofhas gcen greatlythe pnrdominantgiven the Dietnew constitution and by theor elimination of some ol thefunctions. On the other hand, thepower position of the bureaucracy wasby the eliminauon of theand jy the antl-Zaibatsuthe occupation policy ofJapanese governmentalpossible served to maintain theand influence of this group, manyhave attained prominence withinand political parties themselves.traditional tendency of the Japaneseboth in and cm of government, tothe tralVied bu.-eaucracy as theof experience and skill in publicwin tend to sustain or Increaseinfluence of the bureaucracy.
and Industrial Groups. Atthe occupation authorities inUS post-surrender policy,to break up the familyand business monopolies. Thethese monopoliesr-Juded fromand public life of the country on.hat they. In alliance with thehad been responsible for JapaneseShot tly after IU initiation, theof Lestroylng monopolies was modifiedgrounds that its complete executionpostpone the economicJapan Subsequently, the severity ofof business execuUves was alsoIt is almost certain thatin Japanese business will soonmodifying or abolishing most of thelegislation and that the trend will
be to monopoly organiiaUon and cloaa Uer. between government andmanclal and business interests will also Influence gov-erament policy through their ties with the conservative political patrtiea.
c Labor Although ttnioiuution proceeded rapidlyay. labors pollUcalhas been limitedack of coheslveness and byhe labor movement, and in the left-wing political partiesorganized labor vtB probably continue strikes and demonstrations, its politicalwill probably decline at least through
f. Rural Society. The socle' stability and reliance on traditional patterns which char-hcUrtse Japanese conservatism havedrawn strength from Japan's ruralMoreover, the land reform program has strengthened rural conservatism and stability byajor source of unrest and brcodenlng the base of private land
p. Fotttton ol Political Parties. The placing of supreme executive and legislative power In the popularly elected Diet in postwar Japan has provided much greater opportuniUes for popular influence on national policy. How-ever, while party leaders have dominatedpostwar politics, public opinion has had only limited influence or. the political parties, in part because public opinion has beenThe parties continue to exhibit such prewar characteristics as factionalism,on personal relationships, and neglect of grassroots organization. There are already mdlcatlons of decreasing popular Interest in party politics as the province of the relatively few. If these trends continue, the Diet will tend to revert to Its prewar status as atrading grcund for dominant special group*.
h. Ththe press has become anand articulate institution in the post surrender period and will resist attempts of the government to Institute pre-surrender control. So long as the press remainsIt will remainheck on theexercise of governmental power.
rutnt Political Situation. The current strength of the various Japanese politicaland factions in the Diet elected9 is indicated below:
1 Ii Marth IK2)
Lower Hou-e
House
fan/
Club
San Chib
Party
Ichl Club
Democrat <
Conjerpotipe Parties. Party names and party affiliations are constantly changing In Japan, but the dominant conservauve party, the Liberals, hasonsiderable degree ol unity and party discipline Thenowafe majority In the Lower Hcust Although the Liberals havelural'tv In the Upper House, they aresupported by the Ry&ufukai. theClub, the Progressive Party, and the Dal Ichl Club, all of which are conservative fac> Hons differing little tn their basic principles from the Liberals Conservative strength In th* Diet, in the light of existing social and political trends, will probably be maintained and even increased In the national election' required bylthough shifts In the relative strengths of conservative parties may necessitate the formation of coalitiononservative party support is found among all classes In Japan but isstrong In business and Indtatrial groups, in the small towns and countryside. In the bureaucracy, ana among former military personnel Many present-day conservauve leaders ar* the "liberals" of prewar Japan and are strong supporters of psjliamenUryIn times of crisis, however, Japan's conservauve* would not hesitate to adoptpollUcal and economic measures
Kon-Communlit Portia. TheSocialists, the strongest groupconservatives and the Communists, cmare split and disorganised over theof the peace settlement, rearmament,orientation in the East-Westsupport is drawn from organisedworkers,esser extent, small andlinlawmen. Because of their oppositionmodifications of occupationeconomic and political reforms, thehave been supported by theseurban, whose stake In theof such reforms Is largest Inof their supporters among studentswhile not tn sympathy withCommunism, are impressed by theaspects of Marxism as anJapan's history andey to itsin general, however,the socialist movement has beenrather than strengthened by thedoctrinaire approach to currentparticularly as advanced byleaders. Internal factionalismto continue among the Socialists.the development of strong andand moderate leftistis hampered by the strength of thepolitical and social organization ofon which conservative power Is based.
Oroupt. On theright, numerous small and thus farultranationaUst societies havein Japan in recent years. Theirinclude ex-military personnel,and former administrators ofpossessions. They have ralliedand they will probably benfluence so long as theleaders can make progress ineconomy and in attaining aIn the Far East
CommurtUf Party. TheParty has steadily lostsince Its peak in early 1MB. andfrom nearly two years of internaland confusion0 registered The Soviet-sponsored party policyseeks to undermine the Yoshldiand the US position in Japan. Overtly the party seeks broad popular support byupon Japanese nationalism, exploiting the problems arising from Western orientationparticularly those relating to the presence of US troops in Japan, US control over the Ryukyus, and limitations on trade withChina. However. Its Increasingon underground organization andto violence will probably lead torepressive counter measures by theOovemment and will probably further reduce popular support for the party. ACommunist objective within Japan Is toara-mllltary foice meanwhileIts Influence in left-wing labor by forcing It to choose between acquiescing tn governmental suppressive measures or siding Willi thehe Party hascapabilities for sabotage, espionage, and subversion It does not have the capacity for seizure of power by violence, and future aeer*-Ito lis strength will be overbalanced by strengthening of police and security forces.
Notional Ism
efeat in World War II discreditednationalism in Japan andimenational feeling. Many Japanesethe concept that Japan was to be the Switzerland ot the Orient, and thelimitation on armaments stilt has strong popular support The idea ofremains attractive to many Japanese who fear the consequence of Japan's involvement In the East-West struggle It may be expected that u'.trsnatbnalMs, Socialists, snd Com-murists will exploit neutralist sentiment
onservative groups in Japan are now en-eoui aging thr revival of nationalism, and most of the Japanese people are coming to accept the necessity for alignment with the West and for defensive armamentrotection against possible Soviet aggression. Probably the memory of defeat and the changed power situation in thr Far East will prevent aof the aggressive nationalism of theperiod and alow the pace of rearmament at least for the next few years. However, most
Japanese believe that the future ot theiris mextricably tied to the fate of Asia and that Japan's political and economicentitle It to leadership In Asia. Given an opportunity, it is probable that aggressiveand pan-Astanism would revive In Japan.
Japan's Positionower in the Far East
Japan was able to pursue an Independent and aggressive policy in the Far East prior to World War XI because her industrial capacity, modern military forces, geographicaland strong nationalism gaveower position far stronger than that of the other states of the Far East, and because the attention of the other great powers wason Europe.
Following the defeat and occupation of Japanapanese military forces were disarmed and demobilized. At present,security forces, comprising the National Policehe Autonomous and National Rural. and theSafetyre capable of maintaining internal order, but would beby themselves to defend Japan against external aggression.
Several basic changes in the powerin the Far East will affect Japan's ability to regain its prewar power position
a, Japan cannot build military forcesfor defense without extensive foreign aid. Japan now has the economic capability to maintain at0 divisions withtroops ii this force Is initially equipped by the US. On the other hand, theof strong sea and air power wouldong-range project and would requireforeign economic assistance and, Initially, foreign technical assistance as well.of materials to naval construction In Ihe short run would seriously retard rebuilding the merchant marine and further complicate the foreign trade outlook. Thus Japan willforeign military support even for defense and will be unable, for the predictable future, to develop with Its own resources military forces capable of supporting an aggressive foreign policy.
ainland China Is controlled by agovernment backed by formidablepower; Soviet power In trie Far Eastand Communist China andare closely allied. The US hasmajor pollUcal and militaryin the western
c. The wartime experience of most Farcountries with Japanese occupationJapan's prestige with the result that Japan has little appeal as an example or leader in Asia, and Communist China and India now contend for leadership in Asia. While these considerations do not preclude the re-emergence of Japantrong Asiatic power, they do makee-emergence very unlikely In the foreseeable future except with the support of some other power.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS4
Economic Developments
rrespective of the level of trade with the Communist Bloc, economic output in Japan is likely to continue to expand. The major forces making for the expansionthe probable high level of US expend!-tures in Japan for special procurement and for Korean rehabilitation and the Increasing rate of armament procurement for the use of Japanese forces. In addition there will becapital investments directed toward the dovelopment of Japan's electric powerthe merchant marine, nonresidential construction, and modernization andof existing plant and equipment Inand toward the development of sources of foodstuffs and Industrial raw materials in South and Southeast Asia, Although Japan's dollar income and acquisition of other foreign exchange4 will be enough toessential imports, continued pressure for increased consumption during this period of rising employment and Incomes mav make It politically difficult for Japan to get from domestic sources alone the funds required to finance investment and rearmament Japan will therefore almost certainly seek USassistance. The Japanese Government may also resorteduction of consumption levels through inflationary deficit financing.
r>
the traditional Japanese method of financing rearmament and investment programs. It Li also likely that as the rearmament andprograms claim an Increasing share of Japan's resources, increased economicon the use of raw materials andwill be required-Internal Politico! Developments
4 pollUcal condlUons Inwill probably remain generally stable largelyonsequence ol the essentialof Jrpanese society reinforced by the effects of land reform akness of Japan in face of the growth of Communist power in Asia and the danger of Communism within Japan will encourage eidsUng trends toward tho revival of traditional ideals and tradlUonal cultural and political patterns. II la also Ukely that the conservativeof Japan will repeal or make substantialof occupation-sponsorednotably those affecting public safety, labor, business organization and practices, andin ion These modifications areto provoke opposition of varying degrees from labor and from other elements generally supporting the Socialist parties, but theirwill generally be to reinforce the position of the dominant conservauve groups. While -the structure of government Is likely to beie changed, it la probable that in its operation tacreaslng recourse will be made to theof the Emperor to win popular support for government policies. The bureaucracy and the financial-industrial In Ureal* are likely to be the major dynamic groups in Japaneseand within the conservative pcdlUcalThe Socialist parties and organized labor will probably remain relatively weak. At least in the ehorl run the left-wing Socialist* are likely to become increasingly Isolated in the Diet, supporlediarTowlng sector of the electorate The right-wing SoclaJlata are lutely toiberal ccpcsiltion party seeking support from disaffected elements to their right and left. The Communist Party, whether or not suppressed, will probably fail to regain significant popular supportIt may expand its capacities foraction and extend Its influence In the ranks of left-wing labor.
conservauve and generallyis likely to be conUnuedIf, however, In tbe nationalmust be held byheParty should lose its present majoritydivision* within theweaken the Japanese Governmentgovernment will be the targetresentment that may developissues as the presence of US troopsUS control of the Ryukyus. andon trade with Communist Chinaof this resentment by opposiUondevelop considerable popularweaken the effecUveness of thein its implementation of foreign policy.
Nortional Objec'lvet of the Japanese Government
Japanese Government undercontrol will have as Its basic objectiveof JapanosiUon ofand power. Specifically, theundertake to; (a) stimulate aspirit; (b) expand the domesticand foreign trade, (c) develop(d> regain control of the Ryukyus,least the southern Kuriles, andower In Asia.
f-oroign Policial
rientation toward the West. At least for the next few yean th* fillers of Japan willcertainly recognize that progressIt* foreign policy objectives and thesecurity of Japan require close relations with the USestern orientation. The degree of effecUve Japanese cooperaUon within this alignment, however, will be con-tlngent upon satisfaction of Its expectations for significant economic and militaryconfidence in effective US aid in ease of attack, compromise of the inevitable ronluets of US and Japanese policy, and treatmentovereign equal Undourjbsdly Japan will attempt to exploit it* strategic position In the Far East to exact such termr from the US-
RET
The Communist Bloc, tided and abetted by the Japanese Communist Party, may be expected to exploit every opportunity toJapanese rearmament efforts, toanti-US and anti-Western sentiments, and to hold out the prospect for profitableand political relations between Japan and the Soviet Bloc. The military capabilities of the Communist Blocormidable and immediate threat to Japanese security; at the same time, the development ofrelations with Communist countriesto many Japanese an attractiveto economic dependence on the non-Communist world. Japanese susceptibilities to Communist overtures or threats, however, are overshadowed by the prevailing Japanese belief that Its national interests are best served by close relations with the West.during at least the next two or three years. Communist efforts to Influence the future orientation of Japan are not likely to attain significant success.
reas ol Independent Policy. As Japanese strength grows, however, Japan's nationalvirtually dictate an increasingof independent policy with respect to non-Communist Asia and to the Soviet Union and Communist China. Japan is likely to seek:
economic and political tiesrco-Communut Asia with the objective oftalntng ultimate leadership In the area; and,
least limited contacts with theand Communist China. Even arelationship with the US Is not likelyJapan from undertaking suchcourses of action. These courseswill almost certainly be regarded byOovernment as means ofIts bargaining power with theboth short- and long-runbolstering its internal andprestige, and increasing Japan'sof action in the long run. Throughconciliatory and/orare not likely to alter Japan'sWestern orientation.
n the unlikely eventoalitionwith strong Socialist representation came to power,overnment would probably tendthird force" position in Asia. In addition, it would probably seek to reduce Japan's commitments under, the Security Pact with the US
LONG-RANGE TRENDS IN JAPAN'S ORIENTATION
Major Influences
ny Japanese government, whatever lis political complexion, will beby serious limitations upon itsand militaryuingand the probable sharp reduction In special US spending in Japan will makea stead) expansion ln foreign trade, and probably foreign economic assistance if living standards consistent with political stability are to be maintained. Japan will not be able for many years, without foreign assistance, to defend Itself against attackmuch less to support an exparulonist policy.
Future Trands
f they can maintain progress towardJapan's economic and military strength and inte. national prestige,elements such as those now in control of the Japanese Government will probably be able to remain In power. Since those elements recognize an identity of interest with the US in containing Communism, they may betooreign policy generally consistent with US objectives. The degree of Japan's cooperation with the West willhowever, on the military security,opportunity, national self-respect, and international positionesternoffers.
Since Japan will aspire to an independent position of power ln Asia, completeof Japanese and US foreign policies is unlikely. The USpectapanese government that was successfully meeting its problems as aof US economic, military, andsupport.
If, however, Japan is unable to solve Its economic problems, ite particularly vul-
S
nerable lo economic and diplomatic pressures from the Soviet Bloc and will be tempted to seise opportunities lor closer economic andrelations with the Bloc. Even to thisonservative government would seek to avoid courses of action that would be likely to lead to Japan's absorption Into the Bloc. Serious internal pressure in Japan would be more likely to result, atrend toward traditionalmeasures rather than in the risero-Communist regime.
he most probable long-term prospect lies between these two extreme cases of very close cooperation with the US and an attempt toeutralist foreign policy. As the
Japanese bargaining power increases, Japan will attempt to Increase its freedom of actionreat Asian power, within the frameworkenerally pro-Western orientation. Japan will probpbly attempt tots relations' with the US, seeking to ellmlnav. the basing of US troops to Japan and seeking to attainInfluence and leadership in Asian ar fairs of joint US-Japanese concern. Japan will Inevitably attempt to expand economic and political relations with Communist China, and probably with the USSR, to the extent possible without jeopardizing its domesticand wilt seek at the same time toasic alteration in Its pro-Western foreign policy.
;,cret
on Jopon's
Basic Prewar Orientation
tarty National Object ivu. The emergence of Japanodern power began8roup ot soldier-statesmen seizedrestored the authority and prestige of the throne, and set out to make Japan secure against Western ericroerhmeoU and to makereat power. From their contact* with the West, these early Japanese leaders realised that to attain their objectives It was necessary to adopt Western political forms and to modernize Japan through theof such programs as universal military training, universal education, andThe> also were aware that Japan, an insular country with inadequate naturalwould have to expand Its foreign trade If these objectives were to be achieved.
Tht Growth otNattonalttm. WhilemodemizaUon, Japan's leaders were careful to preserve the lightly integrated feudal loyalties and poll Ileal hierarchy,popular loyalty from feudal families to the imperial institution. Thus redirected, the totality of national loyalties and energies could be focused on support of foreign policies regardless o! the material sacrifices imposed upon the mass of Japanese people. Through the educational system and universal military training. Japanese youth was indoctrinated to glory In Japan's military traditions andheritage.ew decades the average Japanese had developed an Intense loyalty to the Emperorrofound belief in the mission of Japan to bring order to
evelopment of gxpanilontima-tional roitcy initially, Japan's leadenon the development of normalcommercial relations, and theof national strength. However.leaders, with their military background, atrong nationalism, and appreciation of the weakness of China, were impatient to followh century example of Westernln the Far East. The war with China, started by Japanignified the triumph of the policy of forceful expansion.4 until the Washington conference. which marked the end of the first period of Japanese expansion. Japan had acquired control over Formosa. Korea, the Pescadores. South Sakhalin, and thaIslands and had achieved recognitionpecial position ln Southuller measure of Japan's expansionistwas also revealed inemands" served on China
he Interval of Peace/id Cooperationhe control of Japan had rawed from the hands of the above small group ofelder statesmeneirs of the past, who had created and guidedof the Japanese State, to members of the new classes developed In the process of that modernization. The new leadership washebureaucracy, product of the new education: in the officer corps of the newly created National Army; and In the new business leaders, who as heads of the fai.iily controlled financial houses were still closely allied with the two powerful feudal clau that had engineered the Melji restoration. The postwar surge of popular and nationalIn the building of an industrial structure with world wide trading connections, and the fading out of the old feudal controls before the advancing competence of the new nationalprovided political parties and the Dietrief opportunity toairly significant degree of influence Inpolicy, at home and abroad. During the decade that endedusiness leaders whoominant Influence favored Japanese participation In worldThey were convinced that Japan possessed economic advantages that would make peaceful economic expansion more prethan an expauslon built upon armed
force. Under their Influence and leadership Japanourse of peacefulcooperation
eturn lo erponnonam ToUowingowever, internationalhad been discredited Inesult of the world-widewhich hit Japan especially hard. To many Japanese, the only answer to Japan's problems of supporting lis swollen populationesumption of expansion by force. The discrediting of liberal policy and business leadership within Japan and the growingfor policies of aggressive expansionthe return to power of the military class, this time unrestrained by the wisdom and world knowledge of the "Elder statesmenhirlngs there had deve'ew class of young officers, much Influenced as to their outlook by the plight of the rural class from which most of them had sprung. They were chauvinistic, anU-capitahsUe,and fanatically convinced that Japan's Emperor wax being badly advised byand corrupt politicians, and wereconverted to tbe belief that aggressive expansion offered the only solution to Japan's domestic and foreign problems. This group, relying upon Its traditional prestige as the loyal supporters of the Emperor, and Itsdirect access to the Throne, terror-
lied all opposition, renewed ihe Indoctrination
ot the people In the ancient warlike andvirtues of the Japanese people,rogram of expansion. The weak reaction of the major powers to. the initial Japanese act of aggression In Manchuriathese youthful leaders and thepopulace that the new policy was sate and profitable-Prewar Orientation
apan's power position In the Far East was generally sufficiently strong to allow Japan to remain free from precise or restrictiveor commitments Japan's orientation with respect to any particular major power was determined primarily by coincidence of interests, or by the other power's will andtoos.Uon in the Far East, rather than by any traditional relationship. Only Japan's relations with China and with Russia (both Tsarist and Communist)significant exceptions to thisBecause of China's geographical proximity, raw materials, and marketJapan traditionally regarded both China proper and Manchuria as its sphere ofand Ihe most suitable fields for expansion. The Japanese program, however, led towith Russian Inn Northeast Asia, and RussiaTsarist and Sovietwas there-lore regarded as the greatest potential or actual threat to Japan's national interests. However, both powers for various reasons,for some time to accommodate their interests on tha Asiatic mainland, Japansuch an accommodationrereqi'l-atte to its expansion and consolidation in China and areas to the south.
APPENDIX "B"
0 3
Domestic 0 3
Net 0 3
POOD REQUIREMENTS OF JAPAN BY PRINCIPAL3 Oomnicdit;
Rice (brown rice
heat
Minor srains Pill***
White potatoes Sweet potatoes Sugar
Estimated daily per capita caloric intake
Dunns the yearice tu obtained almost entirely mm Korea and Pormoaa. Patiowere supplied bj Manchuria and China. Principal aourcei lor super were Indon.sis. Pormoaa, ana iht Philippine*. Minor prams were importedumber of tbe countmi In ttk
maam chiefly la Thailand and Burma with smaller auantrUe* (rom
hina, Meaico, and the United .tales. Vheal procurement wasly In th. US. Oaa^ liattiaga, ssadjajllilliii Principal .uppiier. ol minor pram, were tbe US. Canada. AreenUna.
.wOf procurement umUar to that or IBM, with tha euipUon
that communis China Is not assumed toajor trading partner of Japan In central, th. Bouth-' ountries. Korea and Pormoaa are expected to becomemore Importantur, a. ruppaeri of rte* Tbe LS and Canada will supply th* bo* of wheat and minor train* Tb* US will also supply Use bulk of Japan* soybean tequtremaau and possiblyCO tons of nee
wn Wittsddy rloe;illed rice equals
rown rice Import* were asaumed lo be milled rice.
e. Tbe production of rice andrine UU* period was above the see ran0 The averse, to nee durtaf, the pearsasetric tons: and foe wheat, IJIiMQ metric tons.
d Th. prcdueUon of rice. because of favorable wtathtr conditions, was abov. tht averaet for the postwarle* producUon In 1H1 totalsd MeWM metric lorn, brown ricelent Ave"annual nc* rsrodoctl* for
tff*1', 'tl'PPears to be low as compand to th*0 andtftt.t, qpjy tyum of^ fpjmM,ondition, durln, thesewMc resulleiThe esumaiei for ltSl are based on the assumption mat arena, westher cor.diuoriin that year, that productivity per unit of band wiu improve col, eUfbtl,the rsewtwof cuttlvaWd *cr*iS. will
f Data ar* for US fiscal pear lUi.
an*
r* appaar som.what high In rtieUon toflSPX WWtabU "nd taPOpul.tlon lr.cr.as, Hoa-ve, thistb. fact that, in th. postwar vaars. betUr and more* of availablec)
stuffs has been made. For example, tht trailing rtUi tor wheat ere now eomewhai tolihtr than In the prewar years. non-IooC usessuch ai nee lor aaae (rice wlnei, nab for fertiliser ana outer industrial useshart been eul down Moras* fsriUUes sod cc sit runs procedures an now more effltlcnistimated that Uses* emnotu essences aa*apercent of fooder capita beats.
Bouroea; The lUC-leea0 production and net Import daU are baaed on the JapaneseNI Annuel Report to the rood and Agrlcaltare OtfanltaUon of the United HsUone, June IHl.Natural Resources Section Report; Japanese Crop end Lfpesfock Statistics.nd SCAP. Jopan.ii economic StatuHci bvlltUnceUon n,he IMS date, are estimates of om/DRF. Departroenl of 1UU.
APPENDIX "D"
PRINCIPAL RAW MATERIAL Rlk*UIREWENT8 OP JAPAN, IBM, ttSl. AND IBM0 METRIC TONS UNLESS SPECIFIED OTHERWISE)
Principal aourcn for raw material Import* are summartaed below:
Wool
Aoout three-fourths ofmports will probably be fromhe rt-malnder will be targety from Pakistan.exico, and Africa
The bulk will be from Australia with smaller quantities from South America. Africa, and possibly the US.
Coal
The UB I* likely lo be by far the tartest supplier, with smaller quantitiesfrom India and Ooa Communist China and Sakhalin are other potential awpptsera.
Bait
The Near Eastern coemtrlas. followed by SouUseast Asiatic countriesrnelud-laf Formosaand Bpaln art likely to be tha ma]or supplieni MainlandenUallysrfe auppUtr.
Ore
Malayan Union, the FhlUppinei. Ooa. and India will be the principal Asiatic suppliers; substantial quantities of UB and Canadian Iron ore Will probably also be Imported
The UB and ChU* are primary sources.
Near East and the UB are principal sources portani In the future.
may become un-
Domastlcargely bHumlnous trade; small quantities of semi-anthracite coal are also ID* eluded import* consist lantty of melallui-gtcal grade coking coal; only severs: hundred thousand tons of anthracite coal an toeJadrd.
c. Estimated.
siur. an green lo term* of ore of which to percent Is lion content e. Includt* only iron on, a* complete daU for other aources of Iron anncludes all types of Iron for pig iron productloo, such aa pyrites. Iron sands,stlmaled.
Source Da la for ISM an baaed on official Japaneseais for 1M1 an based on SCAFal'malas1 an those of ODk/DRF. Department of State.
APPENDIX "E"
JAPAN'S EXPORTS BY MAJOR6ND ESTIMATES3
million DS
and Beverages'
and Fibers*
2
and Metal Products'
*
2
9
Include* export* of minor cereals, vegetable and Oah ctu, vegetables andanned and Oder
packed foods. tobacco, alcoholic beveragend lea-fa Includes, exports of cotton. rsyoM. wool. Industrial fibers, and their manufacture* Cotton textiles are b>
far the most important in value; tn ISM, Uiej were valued at Sill nUllion; In IK1 atillion, and e.
tiniale* for 1BU provideillion. In IMS, raw silk and Ulk manufactures, valued at SIM million.
were also of major Unportaoc*.
e. Includes exports ofnd ores, steel mill prod nets, tranaporteuon equipment (water and landi. machinery and motors, and otherroducta.
exports of chemical fertilisers.caustic soda, and dm and palnu
toe Japanese exports, aspeeiany of textiles txeept for raw auk and lebnea lie chiefly in AsiaesUmated that about one-half of the value Of Japan's total3 win be sold ln Asia,Communist China; about one-sixth to the United sun. Canada, and UexKo: and the remainderto the other areas of the world, Machinery and metal products. It Is estimated, will findma.teu tn Asia as well as tn other areas of the world. Chemicals, particularly nltrofenouswillead* market in Asia Foodstuffs, such as marioe products, canned foods, andill be sold lo the AoJar areas. ehseDy the US.
Source: Prewar daU are based on Official Japanese Trade Statistic* and Include exports to Korea and For-axoaa;ata are baaed on BCAP. Japaneie Kconomt StafisfMi.II.; estimates for ItSS are by ODt/DRF. Departeoeot of SUM
tor aovu. ana aMtbeaaiol Koreand ni atDAP pwurWm
rivate capital moeenuraU and official amortisation iM-lode* reparations and reeUU.Uoo payaer.U.
Original document.
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