eon io,i
FOB tm MEJIDCTT OF THE QHITEO tTATCS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND DETENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN2
PfiO&lEM
To estlmau Chinese Commtinist capabii.iipi and inlentxms with wan2
ASSUMPTION
Th* USSR will conUnur to supporthe rax Dot InUrrme diracUj and overtly
Ft
CC+SUUSONS
ubstantial Increaser-allommunist* to Munchlarge-seal* invasion or limitedagainst Taiwan remainunchanged alnce1 when
publishedational-iat capabiUtMi to defend Taiwan have not improved aubtUnUally since that date.
that present US policyto Taiwan continuesprovided that US naval and airavailable to defend Taiwan,operations againstalmost certainty tall.
a. We do not brttev, that, under present circumstances, the Communists could achieve surpriserge-scalearge-scale Communist invasion attempt would almost certainly fall
coeapti before US tur an could be brought to bear
ommunist attackmi ted number of Ibetr beat troops probably could achieve surprise, but thealone could almost certainty contain such an attack, unlaaa tha Communists received timely large scale ralnforce-raenta US naval and air forces couldcertainly prevent such
J. If US policy with reepeet to Taiwan should change and th* US did notin the defense of Taiwan, th* Ouneae Nationalist forces could notdefend Taiwanarge-scale Comm un ist oneraUon
he Nationalisttia-tjvely stable and seriousmpvobable so long a* PrtsOdml Chiang Kai-shek bawds the |overnment In the event of the overthrow or death of Chiang, factional strife would be rntensi-Ssderiod of meiafathty would
probablyor* anothereader could establish hat authority.
The weight of military, propaganda, and other indications suggests that the Chinese Communists do not plan anattack against Taiwan.
Irrespective of dcnloprnents In Korea, we bebev* that th*ommunist*not makeimited surprise attackargeaeale attach againstduring the period of this estimate provided that present US policy withto Taiwan continues.
During the period of this estimate, the Communists will probably conductnuisance, or destruction raids (either by air) againstoMkon Islands and may assault and capture some of these islands However, tn do not believe such actions will neces sarily indicate an imminent Invasion of Taiwan.
B. Over the longer term, we believe that th*ommunist* will attempt to secure control over Taiwan by diploma tic means if possible, otherwise by military actionvorabl* opportunity pre ami* itself So Jong as lb* relativestrength of the United States and thahe Far East remains substantially unchanged, andg as US policy with respect to Taiwan remains unchanged, we bclMve the Chlneae.Com-muruaU will notilitary attack on Taiwan.
DISCUSSION
CMIKIM COMMUNIS! STIUATION The Chinese Cornanueiiti Amy
S. Since April IBM. whan NIE-zI wasthere has bean no signlf warn change ln the astlmsted itrenglh and effectiveness of Chinese Communist troops in position for an attack against Taiwan jep.OOO troop* are estimated to be
ungroops wham are deployed In in*and Shanghai areas could be utilised foe operations agaiiisl Taiwan. (See Map) This total forcencludes an artillery division and several thousand other special-Had troops Baecpt lor some inferiority In weapons and eeulpenent and In the scale of supporting arms andts combato eaUraated to bemsal to thai of Chinese Cornrnenrri troops m
eports of uaknowr. reliability mdvaie that at leasi SS.OCO Chinese Ceamvruiust iroop* have received sotne alrbom* training In North
Cruaa and Manchuria.* also been reports that Chinese Communist troops have own receiving amphibious Ualnlng. out we do not believe that that type of training has been conductedarge I
n th*assmpllon of fall-scale hostilities in Korea, the forts* diacusaedon be available for operations
II In ease off the jops presently eoaamittedeperaUons could a* redeployed toi coast fee aparaUon*
against Tarwan
Th* Chines* Communist Air Fores
IS The over-allf the Communist Air Force for Operations against Taiwan nave increasedanee the pubvallrss ofnd th* CCAF atormidable raCTtary force Th* total arreraft itetngUi of the CCAF tn easeeauonal units has tr* rewardO0 betn April lflftt and February Jet fighter strength m-
creaseduring UlU period CCA/ lorUCf increased w (See
I* TM major part ol thtased m
Vj1 i end .ftoelb Chme There it, how-
of iht CCAT based south ofstimated I? ]tt rightcnet (tf hlcre atIthlrn andUlor. lighten tl fihanghai. tadatenombers tl Hinting (Setven tn the cast ol inter aircraft, raoeptoy-bjM would be ntrettery before the Commu-nUts couldarge-scale air offensive against Taiwan. Substantial Wejtuc build-up would precede or accompany such redeploy mtol and would Be difficult lo conceal.
ddiLoo to moatlready based
of trie Yanr.ua HiurusU eoukl without appreciable effect on their present scale of air operations In Korea, maki avall-abtt lor an attack ooroundbombers. ISO light bombers,ubatantlal portson ofvailable bansports.
unne Ihe past several moo tha tht Coss-rr unuts have continued their intensiveconstruction and improvement pros-ram along the mainlandoast There art nowint-class airfields within SOO nautical mutt of Taiwan fits of these are withint fighter operational radius of Taiwan
IT If figpUng In ICeeva Is evpa ruled lo Inck-os U" air attacks against targets tn China proper and cc Manchuria. II is prtewbte that the Communist capability for air operalituTaiwan would vary Inversely with Iht mtsmlly and duiauon of the expanded UN optretiosts.
It la the event of an traassttce so sstsrea.part nf tht aircraftllllillCommunists In China could befioutn China with tittle delay,i f fuel and other
ii 'eoutremenU for lull-kale optra-Hons would be dlfflcull and would Uk* Umr
Tht Chinas* Corasnoaal Novy
It Tht capabillUet of tht ChineseNavy to support amphrbsom cessations
lifting iimuliajieously about im armies,orn)he ChineserU*ls have available *jnp."JEi-ou craft and tfupptnggreater* great registered Ion* to lift only two ertnlea.ully equipped men Th* remainder would have to be Utlad Hi Junk* and othercrafl ofRT Batedpe ad of mMMMtksra-muaiat force* transported to yank* frees em-barksUon points an the Bw* tow-Amoy area would requuc moreoura to reach the neaiMl landingn the watt coast of rormoaa The Korean altuaUon ha* noeffect on Chance* Cocas unlit water-borne tagabBHIe* tor opera tine against Taiwan
aerfifi Airfield* on th* mainland, within transport range of Taiwan, art lufftcient to support large-seal* airborne operatlotMChliaate Communist airapacityestimated to beto carry onlyroalmaUly ITOOistance of SCO nautical milesingle operation
34. The Chinese Oommu-
nlstt would face serious logistical difficulties
Inarge-acale assault agsimt Taiwan
a Although there art no rail Una* atrrlng PukMn. eastern Kwangtung. or southeastern Chakiang. the Peiping Canton and the Kiangss- Hunan Railroad* are eoesneeted witho*rw*iion poet*FBa-Cbow. Amoy. andystem ofhighways Prim toarge-tcale invasion, the Communis is would have to stockpile materiel and concentrate moat of We required troops ln the Immediate MelrUty of the ouHeading poets
urning stilt raasttance on Taiwan.and rttupply erfubstantial dallymaintenance of ear and raa
th* Taiwan SUalU Theeawsswtwsswl probably do not posaaaa the ab and ratal ca-pebiliUes to fulfillequirements in the face ol US parUcipaUon
elther an armistice in Korea no*large-scaleoreachange Chioia* Cornmegard.
M.of Xurprur. Under piraanl condition* It would te elrluaUy Impossible for the CnlDaa* Cotnrnunlau to achls-r* surpriseug* scale taeaukt
a The only three poets from wtuehmight be ad weed would he Amoy.and Swalow. and transportation,and port faculties inort areas are inadequate for the stagingargv-*raM in-'u't. In anylarge oraieeotraUons of treop* and anattrttl would be rbrrtrsui toalthough there might be an appreciable tlrnr laps* between the beginning of prtpara-tions for an Invasion and the detection of prrparaUOQS
b If th* COrnrausuataajor pot. Ikon of the aaealon fore* from soon distant ports such as Canton and Shanghai thedistance imoi-ed would require snayoeIto be at aea forours In advance of thteaving from porta oppcalt*thus reducing th* chancat of
c gwan sf the CraArnururts were to achsteeandanding troops ooUS Sanaa could be brought to bearCranmunttl ofttoadini hadeachh**d* ttrtnly tatobuahed. Thus the Cornnunlst* would face vtrtueJ tso-laUon of thetr karallag force.
owunvewrl Copobort iwirhtd SveprbwArlDck
am unlit aasault In Taiwan could be successful only if rt could be eosapietod before sobtianUaJ CS ftreea coak) be keoughl to bear Th* Crawmunast* probablj could achieve eurprlae fa an aUaek on Taiwan raory tt they II ml led thenn force to airborne trcupa and such other troops asy conventional landing craft In terms of paraonnel thts would amount toirworwa ueops andea borne troops
Effect of Moloorologtcol FactorsorgB-Scoie o' limned Ann Si on Toiveon
Inherentb* heterogrnr-
nature of Ihe lnvealeci fleet, and the oecca-Hty for staging fromnumber of embarka-lion polr.U. we believe lhal the Chinese Com-inunj'j will consider favorable weather over an extended period of time as essential to their operations. Unfavorable weatherIn Ihe form of mom ncetheasterlr to northerly winds which blow more than TOof (he time, arr experienced from October through March.esult, hear) seas would seriously hinder th* movement andof troops during this period. Th*Communists would therefore procablyihe more favorable period from April through September before conducting anofarge-scale or limited nature. (See Anne* C)
IMt CHINE St NATIONALIST SITUATION Tha Chinesermy
has barn no significant changestrength, dbpoalUon. and com positionNationalist Oround Force* since theOf NTS-2T. Th*trength of 4SS0OOflspcaed on Taiwaneffrctiventst of the Nationalista whole remains low. although it maysomewhat over tbe nest year asbear fruit. Materiel and trainingtcsenct ol isrje unit andand locompetent leadership onlevels continue lo hamper Iheof the Nationalist Army. InOenerUlastmoa poller of divide andpromotion of officers based enand the system of poUUcalto affect the morale of theadversely and to undermine useof unit commanders
The Chinese NallDnolril Air Forte
SO The strength and combat eilectlveneas of the CNAF has remained at the low levels noted In NTE-3T. In relator, to Ihe CCAF. however.
tht OJAF Is Inmuch wors* position than it was al the timeas written. Tht principal deficiencies of the CNAF are theof )ct aircraft, lack of combat experience and It lining, pooe malnltnanot and shortage of equipment, and spare parts. The CNAForldyp* aircraft In tactical units, ol which lift are piston fighters andight bombers The CNAF Is not capable of providing an effective air defense for Taiwan (Seeomparison of CNAF and CCAF sortls tapabUlttts)
The Chineie Noiio-iolii< Novo! Force!
SI. The capabilities of tbe Chants* Kalionei-bl Navy have Unproved somever the low levels IndicatedT, but the Nationalist Navy tt not an tfftctivt deterrent to aassault on Taiwan.
Stability of th* Nalionalitlhe Nationalistelatively stable and serious factional strut Uso long as President Chiang Kai-shek heads the government Chiang has had long experience th maintaining authority In spile of factional rivalries and much of his power dinm from the fact that al) taction*Mm as the supreme arMlcr la:trtliTir.sl disputes and rivalries The death of Chiang Kai-shek or his suddentn Iht unlikely eventoup would, however,onsequences. In suchactional strife woulderiod of instability wouldfollow before another Nationalist leader could establish his authority. Because of the mlensety personal nature of loyalty at the armed forces, rivalry between military leaders would considerably weaken morale, although Nationalist military capabilities to defendwould b* only slightly bastnad unless these rivalries developed Into armed clashes beta ten rival element*
PfcOSfCCTS FOt SUCCESSHINESE COMMUNIST ASSAIKT
nseal given outside assistance, theNationalists are not capable of defending Taiwanarge-scale Communistattempt Oiren timely and substantial
USa. end lagbtlc wpporV lb* Chs neuould probably OrlMt CIU-
naaeDi'mVb terra* Aa tag a*
lied a* tacki againet Taiwan could be launchedU^waSung,lgnuW Ihetnee-cssar, preliminary action, have armaienu,
not htm taken.
ao ertdence
aucop units am adequately tr^ed iotgtPffSln coordinated air operationsceSSrd outsid. of kianchorl. or North
b. -Then, have been nonmcant deploiment of Ccsrmunirtring them withinange of
atahtrt wesnflitary dtvesOpsntnts that could indicate
longtr range plan,ommunist attack on
Taiwan
al of yrt flgTittrt and light robesrota Manchuria and North China to tueh area, as Shanghai. Nanklnc. Hankow, and Canton might bt an Indication of rieeparaUonwtart attack on Taiwan Wt belbve. however, that this deployment is primarily fee atr aaecaae
ommunist assaults already made against small MaUnnalfet-held island* can be Interpreted ta preparations for an tnrasim of Taiwan (Bee Map) Communistof these bland, increases their capabtlity (or concert truing shipping,nd sup-pbes unobserved on bait net however, wt believe that awchrobably the firsttewa el ctsenuom presently dtaigned lo deprive the Nationalists of bases for fntelti-gvnee "pert Hons, guerrilla wart art- or for any contemplated asaault at the mtmbrri
c. The alrtkwd ai Swatow. which has not barn usedaagow being rt-hablltuied and'tnlarged.
US poixyrespect lo Timn Hnotthe con*lualon of an armbtlce In Koreanet ftfnacantti affect Chinese Ceaa munni teJalwe capabilities with respect lo Taiwan uric* the Increase to CWrauBklfat operations In in* Taiwan area weuM be eoun tared by th* increase to U8 capabl.i'.ies for defending. Taiwan I* wa adhnaie Inal thtationalistsiTci: ou lisle aaaiitanct and UrespecBvt of the courts of fen la in Korea are capable of containing andanlled Chines* Communist force engagedurprltt atlacfc tf tbe tease end nature ckafrttid In pare-traph II.
The Chinese NalsonalssU near batesubvtrirvc activity oo Taiwan wet! under control and bav* tbt cape bully to maintain such control under peaseni art urn-tlances However.ecurity forces continue to ferret out Communistnd It la certain that an Indt terminate number of agents tUll remain under cover in Nationalist rstabiabmrnu. petssbty even in naportanli-Biinms. In the tventarge-scale Communisthsec agents would bt likely lo insllgate sabotage and provoke dtfec-uoni thus reducing tht defensive capabilities of tht Kauonaltst forte*
OF CHfNfSI CCsHMUNBT auTErtTOro WITH BISPtCT TO TAIWAN 1 MVitory tndicotioevt
MX-arpe Jcale Intaite* AvaUabtedots not tndicste that thtommunists are preparingnvasion of Tehran within tht atari fww months.
a There have bawa na IndataHcaw of troop or maunel build-ups In or near the ouUoading
here have been no indication, that the Cnrnmunbti are assembling c* training tht watertlftarge-scale aasaestblc si Un th* spring of 1H0 when an attack
New Yf*ri meat age oT th* Central CorAmitie* staled! o- the uu for the comlnr
- -uo liberate. Hainan Island
andba various maswtn msub-'
actonaiwarttSjffictaJo m| atedat* of US agg.eeaion *nd made no reference to tn* feUand'thairman Mao. New Year'* message for 1M2 made no mention ol Taiwan
*uch tUlcmenu a* Chou En-Uls poUUcal report of1 in which he av clarad th*eople* art determliwd to Hberate Taiwan from th* grip of ihc Amen-can Bgircawni and wui never mat until they have acruc.cC thai end mdicau thai Peipmg ha* not ahandoned tn* "bberauOn' of Taiwan a* an ultimatehe nrcerauon of Tarwc" ruu altotcJaiwd to be one of the reauha to bey gram of roJrury;
nhoua^ClUtkeaei no Icnge: induce* Ih. Tiberallon of Talwan" a* an early Communisthisby Itaelf cannot be regardedlgnifi-cant indittuon of Intent
Indication* from Comntuniif Acfrvt In the UN
nd ttUIUto ceprttenutlns In the UK demonstrated rceuUderably lit*n
LlU'ln*1M0 Although
R repeatedly charged the US with
to lay in* of Taiwan.
CroWIM COMMUNIS! INTf NTIONS
WITH ttSFKT IO TAIWAN
o tang as the US dots not withdraw its
commitment lo defend Taiwan, we beliere
that the Chinese Cornmunl.lt will not attempt large-acel* or limited military aataulla (gainst Taiwan. UreapecUet of the Korean BtuatWn.
_and airInduilrlal emu
a Th* ComrnunU.li almcai eeruirih.
cemienorllr-tor Uefcs on major urban Ihroughoul China
6 A* long a* Ih. CommunitU deatre to eon tlnue negotiation* with reto Korea, il ta unlikely thai, MUck Taiwan.
C If Korean negotiation. should fall and fighting .ere intensified In atom*ended to China, the threat of US rcunUr-mee*urea would obvtou.lv nc longer be aflowe.er. w*hat under these arcumstance* Chinese Communis! rafhtanr cpabumta fee an attack en Taiwans lahe rios*3ahty M
at reeal of Intensified lacuonai Strife among thee do not be-bewe the Chinas* Coenmurjst* would attack Taiwan unlet* the Unliad SUlea badit* ceanmitrnent to defend the Island.
uring the period of this estimate, the Communists will probablyr dtatrucUon raids (either by erronalUl held offshore isl*ndi and may assault andf these ttkandt llowem. we do not believe such acuont willindKaie an im-rnlnentaiwan
Over in. koger term, wehai the
r Taiwan bytharwwe wy rcaatary actionsmrstUe oppoclunn, prtaenU Haelf so long as the reiairv* auuiary streagih of the Cniled SUlea and In* Conununlsu in the Far East remainsunchanged, and so lone a* US policy with rtapect to Taiwan remain, unchanged, weht Chlnaewill notiliUry attack on Taiwan
ANNEX A
VJ CCAF !
1 The CnAF. withilan fighter, pre. tally in tacticaliUmalad lo btolaximum air delenteof jio totUet during anour pcnodartle. per daydty ore-ration At Oppoted to th* Ujt CCAF.
APAIfUT.ES
tht aircraft eatimaUd loor* agtintl Taiwan* estimated to bt capable of mounting tht lol towing air effort fromukltn FroWnce wtuun optraUng radlut of Taiwan:
lira
Fin
Fin
Atlaci
Bombtii
ifins JJ*DI I
oo
Sortlr capabilities for both air fcects ire baaed on an average of three misiions during theour period with masimum of ao percent ttriietabUlty (after preparatorydown) and attrition rainercent for puion fighlen.ercent for Ughlercentuck aircraft,er-eenl for transport (assault) Tht maximumcombat rateima Leo lo be IS sortie* per month per plane for all type* In both air forco lutedo attrition rate it applied for sustained opertuoni since It is aiiumrd that combat lours wDl be aeitd feetuilion factor bai been applied lo ckcreaar estimated CCAF Jet fighter torut* one* they wtc not bt oppoted by jet fighters In the CNAF Ta* cieafaai attrtUcn of tht CMAFton fsghUrs hat been computed on the baiu of ptiton trpe opposition;jeheved thai If the CNAF pliion fighter, encounter CCAFhe combat ifftrtjTcneu of Ihe former would bt reduced lo an insignificant levelhorl parlod. la tltw of tht fwtgo log. th* CNAF It-net conrldcred captble of providing an effective tor cMerue for Taiwan it CCAF could mount
ANNEX B
KJtm
Forti ofThe followine.taging art amphibtou*oji TUiu
arenotable for
IAO YAO TS1NOTAO
rgcciiow
HI1ANOUA1 AMOY 8WATOW CANTOS
raeacrrr aa/mm Mil
SM
SAW
estimated pout capacity
i v
IS addtiireiai minor ports mifht tahr daj
oo-*oo mi
Perticf Dtba-Uliv* Th* folirwmg poru on Taiwan could run* be used lo debar* nnoin troop* and maieraal
occsptsd by the Cornmu-
KAO HSILTfO SWrout
ampin taiwan swcoast
Milcoot
I1JM
North and Weil Coast*
LDEK BUO XAIRO SHINKO
Totalmess.
S AmsAibtoet Lanitfj SVecbar There areeeches on Tola an considered soluble for amphibious landinfi with too-rnllon*:crafl and junks. The gradient of these beache* range* from moderaic lo flat. The most favorsble of these ar* totaled on Ihe west coast In the vicinityO HSIUNO
WBTCArscml. 0
VNOKANO end TAINAHOl. on lit* northawu coast ketwwm WWCrfU and TAN-SU! and on ihe east coast tn th* vicinity of SUO. KUA1JENKANO and TATTUNO.beache* tin Ihe easl coast lacksfls to the heanl, populated western section
ANNEX C
WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS
mKBUJTYABQI-aCALI
northeast monsoons,
setting south-
through the
Straits and reachingroam0 to (i
rr.ll" per <Uy In Dec Hid
Jan.
unsuitable (or large-teak operolkjnv
thru June
Jul;
thru August
anil ikon prrwd between northaait and aoulhwut monsoon; variable wlnda. light and variable currtnta setting generallyhath team and swellsO percent at Urn* tn AprU and Mar Typhoon mar oocttr ha
tmm
eVuthweat mon*oon. average veloaUaa brer and caUroa frequent. ata1 snodtrat* Tjphconi move from Pacific due watt across Taiwan Into China
April and May an bat* months for luge-scale sea oeamttlons;isk of tn countering typhoons tn
Average conditions better than In April and May. but danger of typhoons make* this pertod ksts suitable.
period
touthweat and northtait monsoons; typhoons ma; occur, winds arc variable.
Period from tale Beptember throogh tart; Octobertyphoon danger la over and before strongmonsoon begins may not be too unfavorable for sea operations.
Original document.
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