SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: ORIGINS OF A DIRECTORATE

Created: 3/15/1953

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; ORIGINSIRECTORATE

Donald E. Welzenbach

Although the Directorate of Science and Technology wai not formally establishedecommendations for its creation were made almost nine years earlier, and the Duectorale of Research had been cieated in2 The suggestioncience and technology entity was needed aroseittle-known, yd highly influential effort called the Technological Capabilities Panelt horned bv Presidentisenhower in. Theventual formation cameesult of pressure brought to bear by another entity, the President! Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boardhich traces its origins to this4 period And it was the same two men In the TCP and the PFlAB who wantedirectorate:Institute of Technology (MIT) President James R. Killian.nd Polaroid Corporation President Edwin H. {Dinj Land.

The TCP endeavor grew out53 report by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilizationhis panel, which included in its membership MIT's Killian and Polaroid's Land, warned newly elected Presidenl Eisenhower about US vulnerability to surprise attack. Both Land and Killian had been associated with Air Force advisory groups since World War II. During the war, Killian, as assistant to MIT President Karl T. Compton, oversaw the administration of the nation's largest scientific endeavor. Radiation Laboratory (RadLab) At its peak, RadLab was substantially larger than the Manhattan Project- It brought together more thanercent of the nation's physicists and employed moreersons. RadLab scientistsritish invention known as radio detection and ranging, oi radar,cm radar small enough to put aboard aircraft,recision gun-laving radar, andong-range navigational system known as Loran.

During President Eisenhower's first year in ofiSce he worried about this nation's vulnerability, especially in the light of the paucity of hard intelligence about Soviet capabilities and intentions Reinforcing his concern were theof0 NSC and CIA estimates that recommended the United States should be prepared tolobal warhe so-called "year of maximumoremost among the President's concerns was the sire and disposition of the Soviet Union's fleet of intercontinental Bison bombers

To many US political and military leaders, the Soviet Union in theppeared to bc moving inexorablyosition of parity with the United Slates. First, the USSR detonated an atomic device in the late summer

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early three years sooner than US experts predicted it could. Then, only four years later, in Augustscant nine months after the United StatesSoviet Union also succeeded inydrogen devicefrom lithiumore advanced technology than the heavy-water method used bv US scientists. Only two months before tins Soviet nuclear success, an uprising in Berlin to protest the Soviel occupation was promptly crushed by Soviet troops. Even in the United Nations the Soviet bloc seemed bent on causing dissension and unrest between Western Europe ami the United States and between the developed anc undeveloped nations.

President Eisenhower became greatly concerned with the possibility lhat the Soviet Union mighturprise attack against the United StatesS military attacheew Soviet intercontinental bomber at Rame-nskoye, south of Moscow, inhis was theison, ihe Soviet counterpart of the2 which was only then going into production Pictures of the Bison taken at Ihe Moscow air show4 had an enormous impact on the US intelligence community. Unlike the Bull and several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the Bison wasderivative" of US or British designs, butnative" Soviet designing capability which surprised US Intelligence experis-

Inrevor Gardner. Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott's special assistant for research and development, learned of Piesicent Eisenhower"sover the possibility of surprise attack. Gardner thought thecholars could be of some help in this matlerand went to see Dr. Lee DuBridge. chairman of the ODM'$ Science Advisory Committeeo urge him toroup of experts meet with the President on the matter of surpriseuBridgelenary meeting of his group with the President on4 at which Eisenhower told the assembled scholars about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and of his concern lest they be usedurprise attack on the United States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of military surprise, the President challenged Ihe scientists lo advise him on this problem.

The President's challenge led SAC Chairmano ask MIT's Killian toubcommittee of SAC members, many of whom lived and taught in the Boston area, to examine the feasibility ofcientific assessment of the nation's defenses. Killian held this meeting at MIT onhe subcommittee recommendedask lorce be recruited, but stressed that it needed the expressed endorsement of ihe President. If approved, the task force would undertake studies in three areas of national security; Proiect One. offensive capabilities; Project Two. continental defense: and Project Three, intelligence, with supporting studies in communications and technical

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On. President Elsenhower authoriicg Killian lo enlistane! of experts and totudy of the country's technological capabilities "lo meet Wnie of its currentisenhowerreat deal of confidence in Killian. Prior to his election as President, il should be recalled. Eisenhower was president of Columbia University. During his tenure there. Eisenhower came to know and respectellow college president who was elected to head the prestigious MIT when he was onlyears old.

During July andillian organizedf the nation's leading scientists into the three special proiect areas and an additional communications working group The various TCP groups, working under the aegis of the National Security Council, begao-meeting on4 For the nexteeks,he members of the various panels meteparate occasion; for briebngs. beld trips, conferences, and discussions with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establishments. They were made privy to all of the nation's defense and intelligence secrets as well as to the statusn-going programs before they began drafting their final report.

The Pioiect One group, charged with investigating US oBensivewas headed by Marshal) C. Holloway of ihe Los Alamosman panel included Ruben F. Mettler from the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense) who later cotounded Space Technology Laboratories (STL) which subsequentlyart of the TRW Corporation.

Proiect Two. which investigated the nation's defensive capabilities, was beaded by Leland J. Haworthof Brookhaven National Laboratory.man pane! included Herbert (Pele) Scovillc,hen of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Proiect who later became CIA's Assistant Director for Scientificand its first Deputy Director for Research; and Brockway McMillan, then of Bell Telephone Laboratories and later the second Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Project Three, whose task was to investigate the nation's intelligencewas headed bv Polaroid's Din Land. It was the smallest of the three groups with only six members. In addition to Land, they were: Harvard'saker, the nation's leading designer of aerial lenses; Nobel physicist Edward M. Purcell; Joseph W. Kennedy of Washington University. St.enowned chemist responsible !or isolating plulonium; John W. Tukey of Princetonand Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Allen Ufham.fittlen engineer and former treasurer of Polaroid Corporation.1

The formal TCP report was published on5age document, titled Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,omentous

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impact on the US Government during the ncit two decades The TCPwere responsible lor great changes tn the US defense andcommunities At the outset, the TCP Revorl noted "We obtain little significant information from classical covert operations inside. We cannot hope to circumvent these elaborate iSovtet secunf y) measures in an easy way But we can use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our

importance that President Eisenhower attached to this report was apparent in the issuance, on the very day of its publication, of National Security Council (NSC) act ionequiring all eiecuf ive departmentsand agencies of the government to comment on the TCP recommendationsCI Dulles assigned overall coordination for this effort within CIA to his new assistant. Richard M. BisseJI. /r. who. along with the DDCI. Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell.ssigned action to suitable Agency officers for each paragraph on which the Agency had to comment'

The TCP intelligence panel saw the need loresearch programa stream of new intelligence tools and; felt that existing groups within the intelligence community were loo small and too heavilywith specificupport of field operations. The Project Three panel found such efforts "not appropriate for broad, fundamental, and imaginative research in intelligencend went on tonew laboratory facility where broad fundamental research in intelligence can be conducted"

CIA. in responding to specific TCPhich urged "adoptionigorous program for the extensive use. in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science andtated that it hadermanent Advisory Board, composed largely of forme: members of the Technological Capabilities Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existingn subsequent years, this advisory unit, known officially as CIA's Scientific Advisory Board, came lo be referred to as the "Landecause Land chaired it forecade Its membership included the six men on the Project Three panel plus Jim Killian and Jerome B. Wicsncr. professor ol electrical engineering al MIT and Killian's successor as MITAdministratively, the Land Panel was attached to the DCI's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Dick

The Land Panel was destined to exert great in2ucnce on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agencv. especially in the field o( overhead collection, but in other fields as well

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Roots o( PFIAB

While the TCP effort was beingour-man Special Study Croup, authorized bv President Eisenhower and chaired bvr.es K. DcolittWUSA,ompleted its investigation cf CIA's clandesiinc operations being carrier! our bv the Directorate of Plans, forerunner of rhe Directorate of Operations Dooliltle was concurrently deputy direclor of Killian's TCP endeavor. Dooiitlle'j Special Study Croup report, issued onecommendedommittee of civilians be appointed to oversee the CIA. No action was taken on this malter until moreear later, onhen DCI Dulles resurrected the suggestionetter to President Eisenhower.

For several years, Montana Senator Mike Mansfield had introducedcallingoint congessional "watchdog" committee for the CIA. Because the Dooliltle reportimilar suggestion, the Mansfield resolution picked up senatorial support and. by the end of5 legislative session, it looked as thoughesolution might win Senate approval. It was DCI Dulles' idea to forestallossibility by having the Presidentivilian committee before the Congress reconvened earlyC President Eisenhower, who was also "concerned about the stale of management within thegreed with Dulles' suggestion and. by Executive, effectivestablished the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA).

That Eisenhower looked upon the PBCFIA entity as something more ihanro forma panel can be seen from an entry in his diary concerning his first conference with the board onEach (member) will be required to take an oath to reveal nothing to any nonauthorized person of any information he may gain while on this task. The charter of thentend to be very broad."

Themembcr PBCFIA included three of the four members of the Doolittle panel and its first chairman was Killian. By this time. Killian had gained an enOrmouJ amount of respect from President Eisenhower for his abilitypresiding officer" who could draw people together and get constructive solutions to problems. The President was "quite confident lhat Killian could get the PBCFIA going and get it aligned to.what he (Eisenhower) really wanted it lo1 The PBCFIA. and its successor, PFIAB. was to act as an oversight board for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other intelligence units for the nextears.'

The Land Panel

When Killian set out to appoint the TCP panels he brjt approached Bruce S.ice president ofittle.o head Projectl!an placed such importance on the TCP effort thai he expected panel chairmen to

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spend full lime at the taskittle wji reluctant io rebate Old for the several monlh) it would take to do Ih* study Because Kilhan was anxious lo get oothe eflort. he told Old to forget about his offer, and instead contacted hn close fr-end. Lanri

Land had toajor decision abou: hit career. When Killian asked him to head the Proiect Three panel. Land, ihe millionaire inventor of the polarizing alter and the instant camera, had just turnede waseave of absence from Polaroid and was living in Hollywood. California, advising Alfred Hitchcock on the lechnology of making three-dimensional movies Land's choice was to give up his current interest In cinema's third dimension and return east to Polaroid and the TCP appointment 11

Unlike Killian, Land did not believe in Urge committees Following his rule lhat any committee of which hean must fataxicab. Land limited his group to 6ve plus himself The five he chose included four erriinent scholars and an engineer

Inand and Harvard's Jim Baker traveled toto prepare foe the Protect Three study and arrange for briefings by the various intelligence organizations. As these briefings progressed, the panelaccording to Land, became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation's intelligencee would go in and interview generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away worried. Here we were, five or six young men, asking Questions that these high-ranking officers couldn'tand added that Project Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central Intelligence Agency "

Al the end of4 Land got around to conferring with DCI Dulles' special assistant. Dick Bissell. who came away from ihe meeting without any definite ideas as to why Land had contacted himroiect Three panelit should be recalled, were not very happy with the status of US intelligence agencies at the time But, Killian had corJadenee inpecial relationship existed between Killian and Bissell going backn that year. Killian. the executive assistant to MIT President Karl Compton.anel that recruited this brilliant young economist from Yale in order to strengthen MIT's Economics Department. Since that lime.'Ktlhan held Bissell in high esteem

Meanwhile. Killian was in Washington arranging for the many trips and briefings lo be given the members of the three major TCP panels. Onndeptember. Killian and General Dooliltle, the TCP's deputy director, rtvlewcd these plans Oneptember. Killian lunched with Air Force Secretary Talbott to discuss the study."

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aiypical committee. Itower haw that lentweight to anv suggestions it might male The panel had been directly commissioned bv President Eisenhower to ew mine ihcacti-itiesol thentelligence community and lo*recomrr.end changes Having participaiedumber of Air Force-sponsored studieseveral panel members had definite ideas on how to improve intelligence collection, and, more importantly, they had Inirect line to Ihe White House

It was Land's Project Three panel lhat pushed the idea ofigh-flying aircraft to obtain photographs of the Soviet Union The conclusive action came in late1 when Land and Killian "met with Eisenhower to discuss various TCP recommendations thai the President, concerned about leaks, had considered loo highly classified to include in our TCP presentation to the National Securityndeed, the TCP Rtvorl included the following footnote

In order to keep this report outore restricted riassibcation. the Panel hat prepared for highly restricted circulation two other reports on intelligence embodying recommendations and conclusions for transmittal directly lo appropriate offices of the government19

One of these "two other reports" was the proposal to buildircraft. Tbe otherroposal toissile unrig submarine (hat resulted in the construction of the Polaris-class ofillian describes his and Land's meeting wiih President Eisenhower thusly

Land describedystem using anlane and recommended that its development be undertaken. Alter listening lo our proposal and asking many hard Questions. Eisenhower approved the development cfystem, but he stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not becomeIn the bureaucracy of the Defense Departmenl or troubled by rivalries among the services.pecial management arrangement was devised that made it possible for the advisory group of scientists and engineers constantly to appraise and guide theprogram and to permit quick decisions to be made. The protect was made the responsiblity of the CIA. Richard Bissefl wis to be in charge of the project, and Trevor Gardner provided full Air Force support."

Land's version of the meeting with Eisenhower is more succinct: "We told the President we were confident this aircraft could and wouldndthe Soviet Union's Bison bomber*

Concerning the uniqueness of this proposal. Killian remarked that Eisenhower's "readiness toroposal ol this kind and tn act upon it on

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th* recommendationroup of scientists eternal lo lb* government: was Jn omen of .treat importance for the future relationship of the scientifico him It was also an illustration ol hu responsiveness lo innovativeoth Land and particularly Killian remained closeassociated with the Eisenhower While House for the remainder of his presidency

Channel for Scientific Guidance

Killian. first as chairman and laterember, served on the PBCFIA throughout Ihe second Eisenhower administration. Inresidentennedy asked Killian to again chair this panel, by then renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boardnd he also madeember LandFlAB member until the end of tbe Ford administration.

After the Soviet success in launching two earth satellites in the fall7 there was even greater demand for scientific guidance to President Eisenhower as well as to many Cabinet-level eiecutivcs The mam channel for this advice was Killian After consulting with White House Chief of Stan Sherman Adams. Director of the Office of Defense Mobiliution Gordon Cray, and Specialfor National Security Affairs Robert Cutler. President Eisenhower decided to reorganire and upgrade ODM's Science Advisory Committee. He wanted it to be directly responsible to the President. located in the Executive Office of the President, and chairedpecial Assistant to the President for Science and Technology who would be his scientific adviser, would regularly attend National Security Council meetings, and have an office and staff near the NSC quarters in the Executive OSce Building. According to Cutler, "our first, and only, choice for this new position was Dr.illian, -hose effective conduct of the earlier Technological Capabilities Panel study had won everyone's

Thus,resident Eisenhower named Killian the firs! Special Assistant to the President foe Science andosition he held until9 when he turned it overand-picked successor. Dr.rofessor of chemistry at Harvard, the designer of the implosion device for the second atomic bomb, and an original member of CIA's Boston Scientibc Advisory Panel.

During Killian's tenure, he met almost daily with Eisenhower and became one of the President's five most tiusted advisers of this period. Owing to his

increased workload as presidential science adviser and his positionaid government employee. Killian relinquished the PBCFIA chairmanship in early

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resident Eisenhower completed his leo-ganixation plan by co-opting ODM's Science Advisory Committee and making it the President's Science Advisory Committee iPSAC) with Killian its chairman. This "interlocking" aspect of Killian's serv.ee to the President as both scientificnd chairman of PSAC as wellember of the PBCFIA gave the

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scholar unusual Influence within the Eisenhower While House Kilhan sand effective"ess as special assistant "were greatly facilitated by aletter written by President Eisenhower to Cabinet officers. White House staff, and all members of the National Security Council, wh-eh stated his wish that" Killian and all members of PSaC "have access to all documents and other material, however sensitive, that we might need for our work and whichfurther that the science adviser and PSAC would bc available to be of help to these other officers at tbe top level ofn addition. Eisenhower invited Killian "to be present al NSC and Cabinet meetings and sessions of lesser policymaking bodieshese actions by President Eisenhower brought the scholars inside the White House and gave their recommendations the cloak of highest authority. The suggestions of Killian. as science adviser, and the reports of the various PSAC committees, over which he pres.ded. came to bc considered bv many defense and"intelligence units as White House edicts. Changes in programs were often effected without resort to presidentialuarter century bter. Killian. in his book The Educationollegeemoir, referred to this era as one of "creative integrations and interdisciplinary congenialityariety of research fields"osaenpt. Ktilun discusses this influence.

hose individuals who served on the Technological Capabilities Panel, on the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and on PSAC provided this creative integration ofpeak. For example, the fact that William Baker, Edwin Land,ere engaged concurrently in several of these groups made it possible to achieve an extraordinary synthesis of minds and ideas to aid the President in achieving his goals in shaping our defense and intelligence programs and policies The factumber of us. including Baker, Land. Zachanas. Wiesner. Beckler. Kjstiakowsky. and many others, worked together with interdisciplinary congeniality made possible the success of such schievenients as the Polaris, the acceleration of our intercontinental ballistic missile program,. new lechniQues of undersea warfare, and spectacular advancemeni in our reconnaissance capabilities Coupled with this concert of minds was the fact that the results generated could be brought directly to the President Ior his consideration. My ready access to President Eisenhower made ilfor me promptly to bring to him. and to open opportunities for others to bring to him. new and important technologies, concepts, and analyses that added to the strength of our nation "

Examples of the influence the PSAC scientists -ielded can bc seen in the creation in8 of the position of Director of Defense Research and Engineeringhe establishment of the Advanced Research Protects Agencynd stso of ihe National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Killian and PSAC urged the Eisenhower administration to create NASA in order lhat thereeans forivilian space program Indeed, it was PSAC's idea that NASA should be comprised of the National

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Advisory Committee(or Aeronautics(NACA)and Werner von Braun's Redstone Arsenal learn of missile experts from ihe US Army's Ballistic Missile Agency."

A Note of Discord

During the5 tohings went swimmingly for Dick Bisscll's small and highly seetel Development Protects Staff. This select group of engineers and managers was doing the things which the Land Panel believed needed to be done to use technology for the collection of intelligence.ote of discord crept into Bissell's relations with Land and Killian after he assumed the duties of Deputy Director for Plans in late9 Both Land and Killian looked upon science and technology almosteligion, something sacred to be kept from contamination bv those who would misuse it forends Into this categoryhe covert operations and "dirty tricks" of Dick Bisscll's Directorate of Plans. It rankled Land that Bissell had taken theProjects unit with him into the Directorate of Plans in9 Land was greatly upset when he learned that Bissell had involved one of Land's favorite projects,, in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.18

Inllen Dulles announced his retirement and President John F. Kennedy named West Coast millionaire and former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone to be his successor. In one of McCone's first meetings with President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the new DCI learned of that body's concern lhat the Agency's scientific and technical efforts might be inhibited by continued association with the Directorate of Plans. Both PFIAB chairman Killian and board member Land explained to the new DCI their strongly held belief that the scientific and technical part of the Agency shouldeparate entity andart of the Plans Directorate.

Following this session, McCone sethree-man working group to review the organizational structure and activities of ClA. This group was chaired bv CIA Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick and Included PFIAB Secretary J. Patrick Coyne and General. Schuylern adviser on the staff of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. One of the working group's major concerns was the proposal forew directorate for research and development. All deputy directors were asked to comment on the idea. DDP Bissell adamantly opposed the proposal. His reply included his arguments for keeping such efforts under the aegis of his directorate.9

22 PFIAB meeting, DCI McCone told Chairman Killian he intended toew position of deputy director for technical collection under whom all of CIA's scientific activities would be consolidated. Meanwhile.pposition to PFIAB pressures for stripping the Development Projects Division from hts directorate, when added lo the fallout from the Bay of Pigs fiasco, resulted in his losing Ihe favor of his two strongest supporters. Killian and Land Dick Bissell resigned or.

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eparture confronted DO McCone with the problem ofanager for three, large, nearly-biilion doilarremains ofhotosatellitc effort,roiect louperfast reconnaissancehich Bissell had headed for more ihan seven years

Killian 3nd Land, who were almost singlehandedly responsible for CIAs involvement in the three major technical collection efforts, were anxious that action be taken swiftly, followingeparture, in order that none of these reconnaissance programs suffer for lack of management direction. Thus. they again uged McCone to consolidate these and all other technical and scientific endeavorsew directorate unconnected with covert activities.50

Onhortly beforeeparture, McCone approved the issuance of Headquartersnnouncing the appointment ofelms to succeed Bissell as Deputy Direclor for Plans and indicatingeputy Director for Research and Development would be created at some future date

Two days later. Headquartersstablished the position of Deputy Director for Researchffectivehe notice said that certain of the activities of DDP's Development Protects Division would also be transferred to the DDR, along with other activities in research and development. And two months later.ffectiveransferred the "Special Projects Branch" and supporting elements of the Development Projects Division to the DDR and stated that additional activities might be transferredater date. The first DDR was Dr. Herbcrl(Pete)Scoville,ho was moved up from his job as Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence (ADSI).

This piecemeal publicationajor organizational change was indicative of the foot-dragging attitude in many Agency quarters toward moving ahead with DCI McCone'j plan to consolidate all scientific and research efforts in one directorate. Byhen the terms of reference of the DDR were published incCone had been forced to compromise on the scope of the new directorate since neither tlie DDI's Office of Scientific Intelligence nor the DDP's Technical Services Division could be pried from those twoRay S. Clinc. who replaced Robert Amory as DDI onefused to give up OSI to ihe new directorate because he saw this as "weakening CIA's analytical1 Richard Helms, the new DDP, felt just as strongly about TSD and several of his directorale's aircraft operations. Ashe DDR consisted of three offices: the Office of Special Activities (OSA) which was primarily the Special Projects Branch of the Development Projects Division; the Office of ELINTomprisedmall part of theof Support's Office of Communications and an even smaller contingent from the Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Scientific Intelligence; and the Officeof Research and Development (ORD)made upof several former members of the Directorate of Plans' Technical Services Division.

Peterit ran long on the tasks his new directorate was supposed to accomplish and short on the manpower needed to achieve such goals. The

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Directorate of Research, as approved bv DC! McCone ineverighting chance All ol the scientific and engineering e* pert lie within the Agency aside from Ihe lew expeitsin the DPD/OSA group, resided in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and that unit belonged to the DDI

In2 was not the best year forew directorate in thearly in ihe year the intelligence community was caught up in trying lo learn moreew missile installation seen in overhead photography of Tallinn in the Soviet Baltic state ofimilar, prototype installation had been photographed in0 by the lastission during an overflight of the missile test center at Saryshigan. The satellite photography, however, was substantially poorer thanmagery and photo-interpreters could not determine whether the Tallinn missiles were intended to shoot down aircraft or missiles

Then, late In the summer came (he upsetting discovery of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba, which led eventually to the discovery of medium-rangemissiles in ihe early autumn. Scovillc was caught up in both of these problems In response to the Tallinn question, he agreed to cooperate with Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charykrash project toigh-resolution photovatellite that could possibly obtain better imagery of the missiles.

The mailer which consumed more of his time, however, concerned the warheads which the Soviets intended for the missiles being moved lo Cuba. Prior to coming to work for the Agency. Scoville had been technical director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and hu assistant, then as now. was Air Force Colonel Edward Ciller. Because of this background, Scoville wasone of the nation's leading experts on warheads and both his and Ciller's expertise was needed to answer the questions being asked by high-ranking Kennedy administration officials about the real nature of the Cuban missile threat. Thus. Scoville and Cillerarge part of the late summer and much of the autumn2 organizing efiorts within the intelligence community to obtain nuclear-type data from these warheads11

Spelling It Out

By late wintercoville was frustrated and fed up with trying to preserve an Agency presence on the overhead reconnaissance arena as well as provide the type of technical and scientific support expected from hit under manned directorate. Scoville's dissatisfaction came to the attention of PFlAB chairman Killian in3 Neither Killian nor Land had been satisfied with the Directorate of Research concept, and in3 they decided they should providecCone with more specific guidance for strengthening the Agency's technical capabilities by creating, organizing, and exploiting neu; resources of science andheir eSort. tilled "Recommendations lo Intelligence Community bvas approved by ihe entire Advisory Board in3 and given so DCl McCone This lime they left nothing to

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chance, bul spelled oui in areai detailat they had in mind.an be seen in the :'olio" -ua Wrt->

(a) The creation o( an organization for research and development which will couple research (basic science] done outside the intelligence community, both overt and covert, with development and engineering conducted within intelligence agencies, particularly the ClA.research, academic and industrial, must be wined to mission-oriented research.

(bj The installation of an administrative arrangement in the CIA whereby the whole spectrum of modern science and technology can be brought into contact with major programs and projects of the Agency. The present fragmentation and com part mentation of research and development in ClA severely inhibits this function.

(cj The clear vesting of these broadened responsibilities in the top technical official of the ClA. operating at the level of Deputy Director. Recasting and extending the CIA'se of Research may accomplish this. If it does not. alternative administrative arrangements must be devised. This technical official, as we conceive hisshould have reporting to him the following groups,ompetent technical leader:

Technical Requirements.

Systems Engineering.

Development.

Field Engineering Services.

Behavioral Sciences.

(d) Formationew special research and development groups that may be partatural science division, probably coordinated with the behavioral sciences group, that cross-connects various classic disciplines in ways of primary importance to intelligence missions. Thus, studies of camouflage in plant, bird, and animal systems (where it seems toighly developed element in survival) coupled with physical optics, radiation and spectroscopy, might reveal new methods of both disclosure and

The importance of intelligenceaior eflort to draw fully upon the most advanced science and the best scientific brains in the nation. Our scientific intelligence should be so sophisticated and advanced that it will be beyond the capabilities, if not the imagination, of our adversaries."

The very detail of these recommendations reflects the importance tha: Killian and Land attached to them. In effect, they were telling DCI McCone just how they wanted him to revamp the Agency's scientific and technical efforts. Indeed, before the year was out, these recommendations would be exploited to the full McConc's initial response lo these PFIAB recommendations was made through President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Origin*

McCeoige Bundv. on3 Ik-cause he had taken no action in the direction suggested. McCone generalized about the progress made His response acknowledged that he had considered including OSI and TSD in Ihe Directorate for Research, but had suspended action in this regard His answerromise to "move ahead with additional chances" that would give the DDR "expanded responsibilities

Before McConehance to dohis direction, Pete Scoville submitted his resignation, ono fake effectune (this date was later extended toetter of resignation said he had been frustrated in his attempts to merge all scientific and technological functions under the new Directorate ofcCone asked ihe Director of the Office ol Scientific. Albert D. (Bud) Wheelon, to take over Scoviltes responsibilities..The brilliant but brash missile expert demurred Wheelon told McCone he thought the Directorate of Researcho-win situation because it did not control all of the Agency's scientificlthough he was McCone's first and only choice for the position. Wheelon dragged his feet until he managed to win from McCone the concessions he sought, the inclusion of the DI's Office of Scientific Intelligence and the DS's Automated Data Processing Staff within ihe new directorate. Before the endheelon's directorate also included the Foreign Missile and SpaceCenter (FMSAC) headed by former US Army missile expert Carl E. Duckett.

When Wheelon finally agreed lo accept the position, he insisted that the directorate be renamed and lhat PFlABs3 recommendations be considered the new directorate's charter document Abo. Wheelon persuaded McCone toeparate, higher pay scale for scientists and engineers so that he could hire experts from the private sector to work within the Agency on advanced reconnaissance proiects. Thus, when Wheelon assumed control of the Directorate of Science and Technology3 he became the leader of what would become one of the nation's most productive units for employing science and technology to collecturing the next three years, using the expanded charter and special pay scale. Wheelon fashioned what several Air Force observers have called ihe nation's most powerful development and engineeringefore the end of the decade, the Agency's youngest directorate dreamed up, engineered, built, and deployed collection systems which gave ourubstantial intelligence advantage

After nearly nine yean of urging the,use of science as the handmaiden of intelligence. Killian and Land succeeded in3 in having aunit created which embodied their ideas. The existence of theof Science and Technology must ultimately beonument to the wisdom of Edwin H. Land and fames R. Killian. Jr.

Seville taiei became Depui* Director ol the Amu Cwrrol ind Diunnioem

heelon lecure. September IW.

" AnupdiK:ve oicudeoill.che; Aircil! Corporationi member ol

he letved on the oommunon lhalnrech.ml llie nuciWrate ofVirginia.

onhmin tad.S

Original document.

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