YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT LEADE

Created: 10/20/1952

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

President's Secretary's Kilos

1 FOH THE PRESIDES? OF Tilt: tniTED STATES

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE yugoslav intentions toward albania

Published2

The foamcing ncuber organtiitUmt of thtiiory Committee participate* trlth tht CentralAgency In the preparation ol this tstbnate; The intelligence oraanUatUms of tht DepartmtnUtate, the Army, the Now, the Air Force, endJoint Stiff. Att meiHberi of the Inletttgnnea Aditivry Committee concurred in thU eittrnvta on It

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

President's Secretary's Files

yugoslav intentions toward albania

THE PROBLEM

To review Ihe conclusions* with respect to Yugoslav InlenUons.

ESTIMATE

The conclusions ofertinent lo the present problem are as follows:

activity within Albania,troublesome problem for the lloxhanot an Immediate threat.

long as the ieslst*nc* effort inremained divided and did not receiveexternal aid, the Albaniancould probably control it.

w. Yugostavta,reece had con-flktliuj interests in Albania, and eachpreferred the status quohange favoi able to the others.

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. jAlbanlan Government leaders have" shown concern over the lnrrea.se of Yugoslav and other propaganda against the regime. At the middle and lower levels of the party and government. Including the securitya loss of confidence in tlie longrospects of the regime and an Increased sense of personal Insecurity appear to have developed.

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ven if the Yugoslavs should succeed In unitlnR the various Albanian emigre factions,

prc*nt those forces, though notare under the control ofmajiy_of_whom were Indued inthese forccs

revolt only if they became convinced that an Insurrection (a) would receive sufficient aid from the outside to Insure success, (b> would not result in Yugoslav, Greek, or Italianand (c) would lead to an independent Albania actively supported by the WesJeriL, RowrsJ

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Current Situationbonlnhi,.

'ihe Yugoslavs could overthrow the Hoxha regime if they utiliied their own forces or large numbers of Koaovars (an Albanian minority In Yueosluvla) for operations In Albania. Even if only Kosovais were used, the Yugoslavs almost

President'si 1

es

estimate that their Importance to the West Is such that identifiable YugoslavIn Albania would not result In the loss of Western support. However, the Yugoslav leaders probably estimate that Identifiable intervention would adversely affect theirfavorable relations with the Western Powers, wouW complicate Yugoslavia'swith her non-Communist neighbors, and might provoke Soviet or Satellite retaliation.

n the other liand, there are advantages for the Yugoslavs in continuing their political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly Intervening or deliberatelya coup attempt. By continuing theircourse they can promote the predomi-nance-of the Yugoslav-supported group_thc Albanian emigre movement.

rz

he Yugoslavs would- almost .certainly seize upon any opportunity toro-Yugoslav regime in Albania If it could be done without incurring serious risk of provoking. Western disfavor or Soviet retaliation.^ ]

for Uie present they will

continue to exert political pressure against the Albanian regime without directlyor deliberatelyoup attempt.

Original document.

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